Full Opinion

Case: 25-30060 Document: 122-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 25-30060 November 5, 2026 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Bobby Glenn Wall, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:24-CR-20-1 ______________________________ Before Duncan, Engelhardt, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* Bobby Wall pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography and aiding and abetting. He challenges one of his conditions of supervised release, which provides that he may not access any computer, other devices or media, or the internet itself “without prior written approval of the probation officer.” Wall questions the condition as overly restrictive to the extent that it requires him to seek prior approval “every single time [he] must use a computer or access _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 25-30060 Document: 122-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 25-30060 the Internet.”1 Because Wall did not object to this condition in the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Fields, 777 F.3d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 2015); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). Special conditions requiring a defendant to obtain prior approval for each use of an electronic device or to access the internet are unreasonably restrictive. United States v. Naidoo, 995 F.3d 367, 384 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Sealed Juvenile, 781 F.3d 747, 756–57 (5th Cir. 2015). Wall and the government agree that his supervised release condition, as it is worded, is overly restrictive; they also agree that we should affirm the condition with instruction that “prior approval” does not require individual approval for each specific instance of computer use or internet access. We have done so before. See, e.g., Naidoo, 995 F.3d at 384; Sealed Juvenile, 781 F.3d at 756–57; United States v. Melton, 753 F. App’x 283, 289 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished). Accordingly, the challenged condition of supervised release is AFFIRMED, but subject to our guiding caselaw that such condition does not require Wall to obtain individual approval every single time he must use a computer, access the Internet, or use any other covered device or media.2 _____________________ 1 Wall also questions the application of a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)(B). But Wall entered a plea agreement with the government that contains a broad appeal waiver. While the government is not enforcing the appeal waiver as to the supervised release-condition issue, it is enforcing the appeal waiver as to the guidelines issue. See United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2006) (determining that the defendant’s “waiver of appeal is enforceable to the extent that the government invokes the waiver provision in his plea agreement”). 2 This raises the question of what “prior approval” applies going forward. “This circuit has repeatedly stated conditions of supervised release . . . should be read in a commonsense way.” United States v. Delacruz, No. 21-20634, 2023 WL 2733428, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (quoting United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 2013)). We have indicated that one “commonsense” interpretation is requiring written approval from the probation officer for categories of computer usage (e.g., to pay bills, take online classes). 2 Case: 25-30060 Document: 122-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 No. 25-30060 The government’s motion for summary disposition is DENIED. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). _____________________ See United States v. Clark, 784 F. App’x 190, 192, 194 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Melton, 753 F. App’x at 289. 3