Brandon Bailey v. Dustin Henderson
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-6132
JudgeJeffrey S. Sutton; David W. McKeague; Richard Allen Griffin
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0456n.06
Case No. 25-6132
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Nov 16, 2026
)
BRANDON LAMONT BAILEY, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
DUSTIN HENDERSON, Lieutenant, ) KENTUCKY
Individual and Official Capacity,
)
Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION
)
Before: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Brandon Bailey, an inmate, lost his job and then his temper.
Corrections officers eventually subdued Bailey by pepper spraying and tasing him. Bailey sued
the officer who tased him, Dustin Henderson, for using excessive force. The district court granted
Henderson summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. We affirm.
I.
Brandon Bailey is an inmate in a Kentucky prison. Until November 1, 2022, he worked in
the prison’s kitchen. That day, an officer fired Bailey for swearing at a nurse. Bailey denied
having done so. After he and the officer began to argue, the officer called for backup. A colleague
tried to convince Bailey to calm down. That did not work. Becoming more agitated, Bailey “yelled
that [he had] done nothing wrong.” R.1 at 3. Two more officers arrived and repeated the
instruction to turn around. Bailey again responded by yelling that he had done nothing wrong and
No. 25-6132, Bailey v. Henderson
retained a verbally and visually combative stance. After more yelling and more refusals to calm
down, one officer pepper sprayed Bailey, while a second, lieutenant Dustin Henderson, told him
for a third time to turn around. This time, Bailey turned around and took three or four steps away
from the officers, at which point Henderson tased him in the back.
Bailey filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Henderson used
excessive force in violation of the Eighth (and Fourteenth) Amendments with respect to the use of
the taser. Officer Henderson moved for summary judgment. A magistrate judge recommended
granting Henderson’s motion. In doing so, the magistrate first rejected the officer’s argument that
Bailey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The magistrate then recommended that the
court grant qualified immunity to Henderson on the ground that he did not violate any clearly
established Eighth Amendment rights. The district court adopted the report and recommendation
and granted summary judgment to Henderson.
II.
Three sets of well-established principles guide our resolution of Bailey’s appeal.
One: We give fresh review to whether Bailey raises a genuine dispute as to any material
fact, giving him the benefit of the doubt with respect to any inferences from the record-supported
facts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Two: Qualified immunity prohibits a lawsuit from proceeding unless the officer (1)
violated Bailey’s constitutional rights and (2) the governing caselaw clearly established those
rights when the violation occurred. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
Three: Because Bailey is a convicted prisoner, his claim arises “under the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.” Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th
Cir. 2002). To survive summary judgment, Bailey must show that Henderson used force
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“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of” inflicting pain, Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quotation omitted), and that the use of force was objectively “cruel and unusual,”
U.S. Const. amend. VIII, not merely “de minimis,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10.
Gauged by these principles, the district court correctly granted Officer Henderson’s motion
for summary judgment. The first problem for Bailey is that no evidence shows that Henderson
had subjective ill intent when he deployed his taser. Henderson tased Bailey after the prisoner
grew increasingly agitated and, as Bailey concedes, after he repeatedly defied orders. Bailey’s
agitation caught the attention of at least five officers and of several inmates, who were prompted
to leave the area. Against these facts, and as confirmed by the video, a reasonable jury could not
find that this was a “malicious[] and sadistic[]” use of force rather than “a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline.” Id. at 6–7 (quotation omitted).
The second problem for Bailey is that this was not an objectively cruel or unusual use of
force. We have long permitted prison officers to use tasers as “a proportional level of force in
response to a prisoner’s refusal to follow orders.” Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608, 620 (6th
Cir. 2023); see Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1992). The prison officers gave
Bailey ample time to calm down and to obey their repeated orders. When he did not, they
reasonably used pepper spray (to which he does not object) and, six seconds later, the taser to
ensure control of the situation. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
The third problem for Bailey follows from the first two: His theory of an Eighth
Amendment violation is not clearly established. To the extent “existing precedent” puts the
“constitutional question beyond debate,” that precedent clearly undermines rather than supports
Bailey’s claim. City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015) (quotation
omitted). In this regard, Bailey bears the burden of “identify[ing] a case that put [Henderson] on
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notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021)
(per curiam). A specificity imperative is “especially important” in the fact-sensitive context of
excessive force cases. Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 367 (6th Cir. 2022) (quotation
omitted). No case of ours establishes that an officer’s decision to deploy a taser against a
recalcitrant inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. If anything, our cases clearly establish the
opposite proposition, namely the propriety of Henderson’s use of force.
All in all, the district court correctly rejected this claim as a matter of law.
Bailey’s first response on appeal is that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
acknowledge in its opinion that it viewed the video footage of the incident before granting
summary judgment. Bailey likely forfeited this argument by raising it only as an aside in the
conclusion of his objection to the report and recommendation. But even if this argument had hit
leadoff for Bailey at every stage, we would still come out the same way. Bailey’s only evidence
that the court failed to “review and consider” the video is that it did not mention the footage in
granting summary judgment. Appellant’s Br. 4. No procedural rule created by this court or any
other (to our knowledge) requires the district court to mechanically list every piece of evidence it
considered in reaching its conclusion. At all events, and most importantly, the court’s description
of what happened is entirely consistent with what the video shows happened.
Bailey locates his supposed right to request a court to reference video evidence in Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). His position rests on a misunderstanding of what Scott is (and what
it is not). Scott helps judges determine whether a proposed factual dispute is “genuine” at the
summary judgment stage. Id. at 380 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). After Scott, courts depart
from the normal rule of crediting the non-moving party’s view of the facts when video evidence
“blatantly contradict[s]” it. Id. In this instance, however, the video confirmed what the summary
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judgment papers showed—that there is no material factual dispute, genuine or otherwise, for a jury
to resolve.
Bailey next argues that the tasing was unjustified because it occurred after he turned
around, purportedly bringing him into compliance with the officer’s orders. But the record cannot
be fairly read (or the video fairly viewed) to reveal the excessive use of force against a compliant
inmate. Only six seconds separated the pepper spray (which Bailey does not challenge) and the
tasing, and Officer Henderson, unlike this court, did not have the opportunity to replay those six
seconds before deciding how to react. Henderson’s “split-second decision” understandably gets
“wide-ranging deference.” Burnett v. Griffith, 33 F.4th 907, 913 (6th Cir. 2022) (quotation
omitted). Keeping in mind the reality that “corrections officials must make their decisions in haste,
under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6
(quotation omitted), we view the tasing in the context of the prolonged and unsettling defiance by
Bailey that immediately preceded it.
The six seconds, at any rate, do not convey a story of compliance. Nobody contests that,
after turning around, Bailey took several steps away from the officers without having been asked
to do so. We have held that when an officer fired a taser at a suspect who took a few steps away
against an order to submit to his authority, the officer did not commit a clearly established Fourth
Amendment violation. Thomas v. City of Eastpointe, 715 F. App’x 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2017). The
same holds true in the context of the “less protective Eighth Amendment standard.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989).
Bailey claims that an unpublished case—Young v. Kent County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 21-
1222, 2022 WL 94990 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022)—alters these conclusions. In that case, the court
found a Fourteenth Amendment violation when a pretrial detainee disobeyed orders, an officer
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used pepper spray against him, and another officer tased him. Id. at *2–3. Bailey’s reliance on
Young runs into several obstacles. One is that an unpublished case generally “do[es] not clearly
establish anything” because it is not “existing precedent.” Bell, 37 F.4th at 368 (quotation
omitted).
Another is that the case does not “squarely govern[]” this one. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam). In finding a clearly established violation, Young relied on the
district court’s determination that the claimant had been restrained after he was pepper sprayed but
before he was tased. Young, 2022 WL 94990, at *5 (concluding that the court was “bound to
accept” this factual determination). The opposite is true here. The record simply does not support
Bailey’s claim that he was subdued in that six-second interval, as the uncontradicted evidence
showed. Bailey, notably, does not dispute the general rule that the use of a taser is an appropriate
response to noncompliance in a prison.
We affirm.
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