Milwaukee County v. Ali J. Yousef
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket2025AP001177
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 17, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2025AP1177 Cir. Ct. No. 2024TR25701
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I
MILWAUKEE COUNTY,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
ALI J. YOUSEF,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: LENA C. TAYLOR, Judge. Affirmed.
¶1 DONALD, C.J.1 Ali J. Yousef appeals from the judgment of the
circuit court which found him guilty of exceeding the posted speed limit by
sixteen to nineteen miles per hour, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(5). Yousef
1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP1177
argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for the circuit court to
find him guilty, and that he was denied due process and a fair trial when the court
“repeatedly interrupted him, discouraged self-representation, and disregarded
contradictory evidence.” For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Yousef was cited on December 15, 2024, when Milwaukee County
Sheriff’s Deputy Riley Ancil observed him going approximately sixty-seven miles
per hour in a posted fifty-mile-per-hour zone. At the initial return date, Yousef
pleaded not guilty and the matter was set over for a court trial.
¶3 At trial, Milwaukee County called Deputy Ancil to testify. Ancil
testified that he had been working as a Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Deputy since
July 2021 and was working in that capacity on the evening in question. Ancil
stated that he was patrolling the area of Interstate 794 in the City of Milwaukee,
and “was monitoring traffic from a stationary position in [his] fully marked ghost
squad” utilizing his radar laser on southbound traffic. Ancil observed a black
Honda travelling approximately sixty-seven miles per hour in a posted fifty-mile-
per-hour zone, which prompted him to initiate a traffic stop of the vehicle.
¶4 Deputy Ancil also testified that he calibrated his laser every day “to
make sure that the distance and everything is working” and that, as far as he
remembered, it was working correctly on the day in question. Ancil identified
Yousef in court as the driver of the vehicle. The squad camera video footage from
the incident was also entered into evidence and played in court.
¶5 Yousef, appearing pro se, was given the opportunity to cross-
examine Deputy Ancil, but had to be reminded multiple times by the circuit court
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that the purpose of cross-examination was to ask questions of the witness; not for
the purpose of Yousef himself testifying. Yousef repeatedly asked Ancil how the
speeding vehicle could be identified as his own, given that there were multiple
other vehicles in front of it. Ancil explained that he could identify the speeding
vehicle by its headlights and then by following the vehicle into traffic.
¶6 After cross-examination, Yousef testified in his own defense. He
questioned how Deputy Ancil could have identified his black Honda as the
speeding vehicle, noting that the weather that day was foggy and asserting that he
does not speed when the roads are wet because his tires are not good. Yousef also
again pointed out that there were multiple cars immediately in front of his own.
Additionally, Yousef, identifying himself as an engineer, opined that the radar
laser would not work well given the angle at which Ancil was observing traffic
and the foggy weather conditions.
¶7 After hearing closing arguments, the circuit court entered judgment
and found Yousef guilty of the speeding violation. The court noted that, despite
Yousef’s questioning of the functioning of the radar laser, there was no actual
testimony or evidence in the record that the laser was defective. The court pointed
out that Yousef, though holding himself out as an engineer, was not trained in the
use of the radar laser like Deputy Ancil. The court also noted that Yousef had
provided no evidence that his status as an engineer would provide him with any
specialized knowledge of how the radar laser worked.
¶8 Yousef continued to attempt to argue even after judgment was
rendered. Yousef asked if the circuit court was able to identify his black Honda in
the squad camera footage. The court explained to Yousef that it had relied on the
evidence put into the record, and that the only evidence put into the record
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No. 2025AP1177
indicated that Deputy Ancil utilized his radar laser and determined that Yousef
was driving above the posted speed limit. The court noted that it found Ancil’s
testimony to be credible, and stated to Yousef that it may have been helpful for
him to consult with an attorney about these issues. Yousef now appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Yousef first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at
trial. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict is a question
of law which we review de novo. State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d
710, 817 N.W.2d 410. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the
County and will only reverse where the evidence “is so lacking in probative value
and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]t is not our function to review
questions as to weight of testimony and credibility of witnesses. These are matters
to be determined by the trier of fact[.]” Id., ¶33 (citation omitted). The findings
of fact made by the circuit court “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”
See WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2).
¶10 Yousef’s challenges to the evidence consist largely of unsupported
assertions such as “[h]eadlights under such conditions are indistinguishable among
vehicles,” and “[s]cientific studies recognize that fog interferes with laser
accuracy[.]” Yousef provides no support for such claims, nor did he present any
support for them at trial. We need not consider “unexplained and undeveloped”
arguments. M.C.I., Inc. v. Elbin, 146 Wis. 2d 239, 244-45, 430 N.W.2d 366 (Ct.
App. 1988). Yousef’s arguments also provide no citations to the record. “As a
general rule, we do not consider arguments based on factual assertions that are
unsupported by references to the record.” Rock Lake Ests. Unit Owners Ass’n,
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No. 2025AP1177
Inc. v. Township of Lake Mills, 195 Wis. 2d 348, 360 n.5, 536 N.W.2d 415 (Ct.
App. 1995).
¶11 The circuit court heard testimony from Deputy Ancil which it found
to be “credible,” and observed the footage from the squad car dash camera. Based
on that evidence, the court found that the County had demonstrated that Yousef
was guilty of driving in excess of the posted speed limit in violation of WIS. STAT.
§ 346.57(5). Yousef has not shown that these findings were clearly erroneous, and
he thus fails to demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty
verdict against him.
¶12 Yousef next contends that his due process rights were violated by the
conduct of the circuit court. He argues that the circuit court repeatedly interrupted
him, raised its voice, and “discouraged his self-representation by suggesting he
should have retained counsel.” This, he insists, undermined his right to present a
defense. Whether one’s due process rights were violated by the circuit court is a
question of law which we review de novo. Gonzalez v. Teskey, 160 Wis. 2d 1, 7-
8, 465 N.W.2d 525 (Ct. App. 1990).
¶13 The record contradicts Yousef’s assertions. At no point during the
trial did the circuit court discourage Yousef from representing himself. During
trial, the court assisted Yousef by explaining that he could cross-examine Deputy
Ancil, but he could not at that point give his own testimony. There were other
points during the trial where the court gave Yousef further guidance. These
“interruptions” provided Yousef with guidance and explanation as to proper court
procedure. A judge has the authority to “exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence” during court
proceedings in order to “[m]ake the interrogation and presentation effective for the
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No. 2025AP1177
ascertainment of the truth” and “[a]void needless consumption of time.” WIS.
STAT. § 906.11(1). It was within the realm of the court’s discretion to give
guidance and instruction to Yousef when he attempted to testify on his own behalf
rather than cross-examine Ancil.
¶14 After rendering its verdict, the circuit court explained its reasoning
to Yousef, who continued protesting; it was only at that point that the court
indicated that it would have perhaps benefited Yousef to have retained counsel.
Yousef provides no support for his contention that this comment violated his due
process rights. “We may decline to review issues inadequately briefed.” State v.
Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
¶15 In support, Yousef cites to State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 403
N.W.2d 438 (1987), and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). However,
these cases do not serve to support Yousef’s arguments. Lehman is inapplicable,
as its focus was primarily on whether the circuit court has the inherent authority to
appoint counsel to assist a pro se defendant; that is not the question in the present
case, as no counsel was appointed to assist Yousef. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d at 67.
Similarly, Faretta dealt with “whether a state may constitutionally hale a person
into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him or her, even when he or
she insists that he or she wants to conduct his or her own defense.” Faretta, 422
U.S. at 807 (citation modified). Again, that is not the question in the present case,
as no counsel was appointed to represent Yousef.
¶16 Essentially, then, Yousef has provided us with no legal authority
upon which to examine his argument, and “[a]rguments unsupported by references
to legal authority will not be considered.” Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646. We
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No. 2025AP1177
therefore reject Yousef’s argument that he was denied his right to a fair hearing or
his right to self-representation.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
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