United States v. Todd Allen Stafford

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0262p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ > No. 24-1612 │ v. │ │ TODD ALLEN STAFFORD, │ Defendant-Appellant. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Marquette. No. 2:23-cr-00010-1—Jane M. Beckering, District Judge. Argued: October 21, 2025 Decided and Filed: September 11, 2026 Before: MOORE, CLAY, and WHITE, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Britt M. Cobb, WILLEY & CHAMBERLAIN LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. John J. Schoettle, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Britt M. Cobb, WILLEY & CHAMBERLAIN LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. John J. Schoettle, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court as to Count 1, in which MOORE and WHITE, JJ., concurred. MOORE, J. (pp. 14–24), delivered the opinion of the court as to Counts 2 and 3, in which WHITE, J., concurred. WHITE, J. (pp. 25–33), delivered a separate opinion concurring in Judge Clay’s and Judge Moore’s majority opinions. CLAY, J. (pp. 34–44), delivered a separate opinion dissenting from Judge Moore’s majority opinion and Judge White’s concurring opinion.  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ CLAY, Circuit Judge. Police arrested Todd Stafford on information that he had engaged in sexual activity with a 15-year-old boy (“M.V.”) whom he met through an online dating app. A jury found him guilty on one count of coercion and enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and two counts of interstate travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE and REMAND in part, for the reasons set forth below. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On April 28, 2023, Todd Stafford and minor male M.V. began corresponding on an online hookup and dating website. At the time, Mr. Stafford was 59. M.V.’s dating profile listed his age as 18, but in reality he was 15. According to M.V., he listed his age as 18 because that was “the lowest age [one] could select” on the website. At the time, Mr. Stafford worked for the Navy with his primary duties being to serve as a Navy representative at honors funerals for deceased service members. Mr. Stafford worked two such honors funerals in Green Bay, Wisconsin on April 28, 2023. He stayed in Iron Mountain, Michigan that night because he had family in the area. While in Iron Mountain that evening, Mr. Stafford reached out to M.V. via the hookup app and the two began exchanging messages. They discussed their sexual interests, and Mr. Stafford suggested that they meet up at his hotel so that he could give M.V. a massage. The two agreed to meet the next morning, and at 9:00 am on April 29, 2023, Mr. Stafford picked M.V. up at a pre-arranged meeting spot and drove him back to the hotel. M.V. had asked Mr. Stafford to pick him up, stating that his car was not working. In reality, M.V. could not drive to their meeting because he did not have a license. Once at the hotel, Mr. Stafford and M.V. undressed to their underwear, and Mr. Stafford gave M.V. a massage. Around 10:00 am, Mr. Stafford drove M.V. back to their prearranged meeting spot.  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 3 From April through July 1, 2023, Mr. Stafford and M.V. continued to converse online. During this time, M.V. told Mr. Stafford that his parents had taken away his phone. M.V. also told Mr. Stafford that he was doing summer school in order to graduate early. On July 1, 2023, Mr. Stafford asked M.V. if he would like to meet up again at the same Iron Mountain hotel. At trial, Mr. Stafford testified that he was in the area again because he had worked an honors service in nearby Coleman, Wisconsin earlier in the day and had another service in Iron Mountain on July 2. M.V. agreed to meet, but said that he could not stay the night because he had a 9:00 pm curfew. Mr. Stafford picked M.V. up at the same meeting point and took him back to the hotel. According to M.V., the two had oral and anal sex at the hotel. Mr. Stafford denied that the two ever had sex. Later in July, M.V.’s parents confiscated his phone and found sexually explicit messages with Mr. Stafford. M.V.’s father began messaging Mr. Stafford, pretending to be M.V. M.V.’s parents also alerted police, and law enforcement began messaging Mr. Stafford posing as M.V. On July 21, 2023, Mr. Stafford asked M.V. to meet up again, and M.V.’s father, pretending to be M.V., said yes. Mr. Stafford testified that he was in the Iron Mountain area again to work funerals in Winneconne, Wisconsin (on July 21) and Land O’Lakes, Wisconsin (on July 22). In messages, Mr. Stafford suggested that “M.V.” tell his parents he was with a friend so that he could spend the whole night. They agreed to meet at a park in Iron Mountain. The police organized a sting operation and arrested Mr. Stafford when he arrived at the park. Police later recovered Mr. Stafford’s luggage, in which they found massage oils, lubricants, sex toys, and condoms. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On September 26, 2023, a grand jury indicted Mr. Stafford on three counts. Count 1 charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) by “using the internet and a cellular communications network to persuade, induce, entice, and coerce Victim 1, and to attempt the same against Victim 1, an individual Defendant knew to be under 18 years of age, to engage in sexual penetration with Defendant, for which Defendant could be charged with Third Degree  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 4 Criminal Sexual Conduct, in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.520d(1)(a).” Indictment, R. 11, at Page ID #21–22. Counts 2 and 3 related to Mr. Stafford’s meeting and attempted meeting with M.V. on July 1 and July 21, 2023, respectively. These counts charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) by “travel[ing] in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct.” Id. at Page ID #23–4. Mr. Stafford was arraigned on these charges on October 5, 2023 in the Western District of Michigan. The procedural history relevant to this appeal is set forth below. A. Pre-Trial Proceedings Exclusion of Portions of M.V.’s Hookup App Profile: The government filed a motion in limine to exclude certain sexually explicit portions of M.V.’s hookup app profile—and cross examination relating to the same—on the ground that Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the “rape shield rule,” rendered it inadmissible. In that motion, the government did not seek to exclude non-sexually explicit portions of the profile that listed M.V.’s age as 18. Defendant filed a motion in opposition, arguing that the profile was “not the type of evidence that falls under Fed. R. Evid. 412.” Resp. Mot. In Limine, R. 60, Page ID #156. He averred that he was introducing the evidence to show that he reasonably believed that M.V. was 18, not to show M.V.’s sexual predisposition or history. Id. The district court granted the government’s motion in limine. The court reasoned that Defendant’s claimed purpose for using the dating profile evidence would necessarily involve Defendant making arguments about M.V.’s sexual history and disposition, which FRE 412 prohibited. Jury Instruction Challenges: Prior to trial, the parties submitted joint jury instructions, which were based on the Sixth Circuit pattern jury instructions. The instructions listed the elements of Count 1 as follows: (A) First: That the defendant knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced an individual under the age of 18 to engage in unlawful sexual activity. (B) Second: That the defendant used a means or facility of interstate commerce to do so.  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 5 (C) Third: That the defendant knew the individual was under the age of 18. Joint Jury Instr., R. 84, Page ID #227. The instructions described the elements of Counts 2 and 3 as: (A) First: That the defendant traveled in interstate commerce. (B) Second: That the defendant did so with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. Id. at Page ID #231. The jury instructions provided the following definition of “illicit sexual conduct”: a sexual act with a person under 18 years of age that would consist of: (i) knowingly engaging in a sexual act with another person who; (ii) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (iii) is at least four years younger than the defendant. Id. The instruction further clarified: To prove the defendant intended to engage in illicit sexual conduct as required for counts two and three the government need not prove that the defendant knew the specific age of the other person he intended to engage in a sexual act with or that the requisite 4-year age difference existed. The government need only prove that the defendant knew or had reason to know or thought that the person was under 18 years old. Id. at Page ID #232. The proposed instructions as submitted to the district court also included the following special instruction to Counts 2 and 3, to which the government objected: it is an affirmative defense to Counts 2 and 3 that the defendant reasonably believed that the other person had attained the age of 16 years. Id. at Page ID #234. The district court removed the special instruction containing the affirmative defense, reasoning that Mr. Stafford was not charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), the violation to which the affirmative defense applies. Defendant objected.  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 6 B. Trial Trial proceedings began on March 11, 2024. M.V.’s parents, Mr. Stafford, and law enforcement officials testified. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal: Mr. Stafford moved for judgment of acquittal as to all counts under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure after the government rested its case, and renewed the motion after the close of evidence. With respect to Count 1, Defendant argued that the crime required “some knowledge that Mr. Stafford knows that [the victim] is not 18.” Redacted Trial Tr. II, R. 136, Page ID #1854–55. With respect to Counts 2 and 3, he said those convictions required “having knowledge that the witness is under 16.” Id. at Page ID #1855. He also stated, more generally, that he was challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as it related to age. Id. C. Verdict The jury ultimately found Mr. Stafford guilty on all three counts. The district court sentenced him to 156 months (13 years) in prison and five years of supervised release. DISCUSSION A. Count 1 In Count 1, the jury found Defendant Stafford guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Defendant challenges the legal accuracy of jury instruction 16.09, which described the elements the government needed to prove in order to convict him under § 2422(b), and contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on this charge. We are unconvinced by Defendant’s arguments. 1. Jury Instructions The government argues that the invited error doctrine entirely precludes our review of Defendant’s challenge to the Count 1 instructions. Under the invited error doctrine, we may decline review if the defendant fails to object to a jury instruction and jointly submits the challenged instruction. See United States v. Sharpe, 996 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1993). But even  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 7 if these two conditions are met, we may nonetheless review the jury instruction challenge if “the interests of justice” so demand. United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 491 (6th Cir. 1997). The government is correct that, under our precedent, Defendant technically invited the error of which he now complains because he did not object to instruction 16.09, and he jointly submitted the instruction to the court. Ultimately, however, “[w]hether the circumstances of a particular case justify deviation from the normal rule of waiver under [the invited error] doctrine is left largely to the discretion of the appellate court.” Id. at 491. And here, because the government jointly submitted the now-challenged instruction, it is as much at fault as Defendant for inviting any error. See United States v. Myint, 455 F. App’x 596, 603–04 (6th Cir. 2012); Barrow, 118 F.3d at 491. Accordingly, we will review Defendant’s challenge. Because Defendant did not object to the instruction, we apply plain error review. United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 913 (6th Cir. 2007). Under this standard, we will reverse the district court only if the defendant shows (1) an “error,” (2) “that was obvious or clear,” (3) that affected the “defendant’s substantial rights,” and (4) “that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 2422(b) criminalizes using a means of interstate commerce to coerce or induce a minor to engage in sexual activity. The statute’s prohibition specifically applies to those who “knowingly persuade[], induce[], entice[], or coerce[] any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempt[] to do” the same. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). To determine if a defendant violated § 2422(b), the government must identify an underlying “criminal offense” with which the defendant could be charged. Id. In this case, that “criminal offense” was Michigan state law MCL 750.520d(1)(a). MCL 750.520d(1)(a) imposes strict liability on a person who “engages in sexual penetration with another person” who is “at least 13 years of age and under 16 years of age,” regardless of whether that person is aware that the minor is under 16. See People v. Cash, 351 N.W.2d 822, 827–28 (Mich. 1984).  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 8 The instructions that the district court provided to the jury reflected the requirements of both of these statutes and stated, in relevant part, that to convict Mr. Stafford, the government had to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that “the defendant knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced an individual under the age of 18 to engage in unlawful sexual activity” and that “the defendant knew the individual was under the age of 18.” Redacted Tr. IV, R. 138, Page ID #2096. The court also instructed the jury that “unlawful sexual activity” meant “sexual penetration with a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years.” Id. Defendant argues that these instructions were legally inaccurate because they should have stated that “the government had to prove that that Mr. Stafford knowingly used interstate commerce to . . . coerce an individual who he knew was, or believed to be, 13, 14 or 15 years old to engage in sexual penetration.” Appellant’s Br. at 36–37. He contends that this is the correct standard because, under the predicate Michigan law, it is not a crime to solicit sex from someone 16 or older. As support, Defendant relies primarily on an Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Langley, which stated, without any analysis, that § 2422(b), when charged with a state law criminalizing sex with someone under 16, required “the government to demonstrate [that the defendant] believed [the victim] to be under the age of sixteen.” 549 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2008). Langley is unpersuasive. That court did not actually consider the legal question of whether the age requirement from the state law predicate should be read into the elements of § 2422(b) because the only relevant question on appeal was factual: was there sufficient evidence to justify the jury’s finding that Langley knew that the victim was under 16? See id. at 730. Because there was extensive evidence on the record showing that the defendant knew the victim was 15, the court bypassed the interpretive legal question entirely. Accordingly, Langley does not help us resolve the legal question in this appeal. Sixth Circuit precedent, however, clearly compels us to reject Defendant’s argument. Defendant in effect asks us to modify the age element in § 2422(b) based on the age contained in the predicate offense. But our precedent states that doing so would be improper. This is because, under § 2422(b), “the underlying [state] criminal offenses are not elements of the federal offense.” United States v. Hart, 635 F.3d 850, 856 (6th Cir. 2011). Therefore, all that the  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 9 government must prove under § 2422(b) is that “the sexual activity proposed to a minor could be chargeable as a criminal offense.” Id. Defendant could have been criminally charged under MCL 750.520d(1)(a) simply based on the act of having sexual contact with 15-year-old M.V., regardless of whether he knew that M.V. was 15. We recently considered and rejected an identical statutory construction argument under a virtually identical federal sex crimes statute in United States v. Deakins, 152 F.4th 693 (6th Cir. 2025). See id. at 704 (describing the relevant language in 18 U.S.C. § 2421 and § 2422(b) as “identical”). There, the defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2421 for “knowingly transport[ing] an[] individual in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent that such individual engage . . . in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.” The predicate “criminal offense” for which the defendant could have been charged in that case was a Florida law that imposed strict liability on anyone over 24 “who engage[d] in sexual activity with a person 16 or 17 years of age.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.05; see also Deakins, 152 F.4th at 703 n.5. Like Mr. Stafford, the Deakins defendant argued that the combination of the two statutes required him to have “specific intent to commit Florida statutory rape” and that the government thus “needed to prove his awareness of [the victim’s] age.” Deakins, 152 F.4th at 706–707. We disagreed: “To convict, the government simply needed to show that Deakins transported [the minor] ‘with intent’ that [the minor] engage in ‘sexual activity,’ and that the intended sexual activity was in fact illegal.” Id. at 707. The same is clearly true here. The government did not need to prove that Defendant had any awareness of M.V.’s age. The elements of § 2422(b), as correctly charged under Hart, are: (1) that, using interstate commerce, the defendant “knowingly persuade[d] an individual under the age of 18 to engage in sexual activity” or attempted to do so; (2) that the defendant “believed that such an individual was less than 18”; and (3) that the defendant “could have been charged with a criminal offense” “if sexual activity had occurred.” Hart, 635 F.3d at 855–56; see also United States v. Buddi, 168 F.4th 439, 450 (6th Cir. 2026) (clarifying “that § 2422(b) requires knowledge of a victim’s minor status” such that the government must prove that the defendant knew the victim was under 18). According to Hart’s logic as further elucidated by Deakins and Buddi, the age-related elements of a § 2422(b) crime charged with MCL § 750.520d(1)(a) are  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 10 that: (1) the defendant knew that the victim was under 18 (satisfying § 2422(b)); and (2) the victim was 13, 14, or 15 (satisfying MCL 750.520d(1)(a)). This is exactly how the district court instructed the jury in this case. Instruction 16.09 told that jury that it could convict Defendant under § 2422(b) only if the government proved that M.V. was 13–15 years old and that Defendant knew that M.V. was under 18. These instructions were legally correct, meaning that no error, plain or otherwise, occurred. 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on Count 1 under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant preserved his sufficiency challenge by moving for judgment of acquittal as to Count 1 after the government rested its case and by renewing the motion at the close of evidence, so we apply de novo review. See United States v. Sease, 659 F.3d 519, 522 (6th Cir. 2011). In assessing Defendant’s challenge, we “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” and may overturn the conviction on sufficiency grounds only if we conclude that no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Davis, 473 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Although Defendant asks us to find that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was aware that M.V. was under 16, based on our analysis in the preceding section, the correct question is whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that M.V. was under 16 and that Defendant knew that M.V. was under 18. There was. We have held that “the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.” United States v. Washington, 702 F.3d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th Cir. 1985)). At trial, M.V. testified that, at the time of his meetings with Defendant, he was 15. He also testified that he told Defendant that he was under 18. That alone would be enough to sustain the conviction, but the government offered additional evidence indicating that Defendant knew that M.V was a minor. For instance, it showed that M.V. told Defendant that he was still in high school, that he was taking summer classes, and that he had a 9 p.m. curfew. The government also argues that Defendant should have known that  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 11 M.V. was a minor due to the facts that Defendant had to pick up and drive M.V. to their meetings (indicating M.V. did not have a license), that Defendant knew that M.V. was trying to hide his dating/hookup messages from someone, and that M.V. had a “youthful” appearance. Although Defendant tried to undermine that evidence at trial and again in this appeal, it is not our job to second guess the jury by reassessing the credibility of the evidence. See United States v. Crumb, 187 F. App’x 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we conclude that there was clearly sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendant violated § 2422(b). B. Exclusion of Evidence Defendant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence certain sexually explicit portions of M.V.’s online dating profile. He further contends that the court erred by failing to hold an in camera hearing to determine if the material was properly excludable. In excluding evidence, “[a] trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) misunderstood the law (here, the Federal Rules of Evidence), (2) relied on clearly erroneous factual findings, or (3) made a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Kettles, 970 F.3d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding portions of M.V.’s profile. Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a), also referred to as the “rape shield rule,” excludes: “(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.” The district court excluded portions of M.V.’s profile that explicitly described his sexual preferences and interests, reasoning that Defendant was trying to use this information to show M.V.’s sexual behavior and predisposition. The court did not exclude non-explicit portions of the profile that listed M.V.’s age as 18. Defendant argues that FRE 412(a) did not apply because he did not want to use the profile as evidence of M.V.’s sexual predisposition, but rather (1) as evidence supporting Defendant’s “state-of-mind” argument—i.e., that he reasonably believed M.V. was an adult because of the mature content in M.V.’s profile—and (2) to undermine the credibility of M.V.’s claim that he communicated to Defendant that he was under 18.  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 12 Defendant’s arguments fail. In United States v. Ogden, we found that a victim’s “online conversations” in which she “mentioned sending explicit images of herself” constituted “sexual behavior” under FRE 412. 685 F.3d 600, 604–05 (6th Cir. 2012). Under Ogden, the sexually explicit portions of M.V.’s profile are precisely the sort of “evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior” that FRE 412 prohibits. Id. That Defendant may have used this evidence to prove state of mind or impeach M.V.’s credibility is immaterial. As the district court found, either of those purposes still asks the jury to make an inference about M.V.’s sexual propensity: Defendant could not prove that it was reasonable for him to think that M.V. was an adult based on the sexually mature content in the profile without first proving that M.V.’s sexual history as presented on the app was that of a sexually mature adult. FRE 412 prohibits this type of evidence. Defendant argues without avail that United States v. Kettles, 970 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2020), requires us to find that FRE 412(a) did not apply to the sexually explicit portions of M.V.’s profile by virtue of the specific purposes for which Defendant wanted to use the profile. In Kettles, a defendant was allowed to cross examine the victim about prior false claims of sexual assault she had allegedly made. Id. at 642. The court allowed the defendant to do so because he was not trying to prove that she engaged in prior sexual behavior, but rather that she had made previous false statements about being assaulted. Id. Kettles, therefore, stands for the proposition that evidence indicating the victim’s history of lying will not be prohibited by FRE 412(a) just because the lie related to a sexual topic. In this case, the evidence that Defendant sought to admit necessarily went directly to M.V.’s sexual behavior—indeed, Defendant wanted to use that sexual behavior itself to impeach M.V.’s credibility. This is clearly prohibited by FRE 412. Defendant also advances an alternative argument that, if the evidence was covered by FRE 412(a), the court was required to hold an in camera hearing before deciding to exclude it. We do not need to reach this argument. A party seeking to admit evidence that is otherwise barred by FRE 412(a) under an FRE 412(b) exception must file a motion with the court 14 days before trial that “describes the evidence and states the purpose for which it is to be offered” and provide notice to the victim. Fed. R. Evid. 412(c)(1). Defendant took none of these steps and so  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 13 has not preserved this argument for our review. See United States v. Seymour, 468 F.3d 378, 387 (6th Cir. 2006). For these reasons we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding from evidence the sexually explicit portions of M.V.’s profile. II. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court on Count 1. Judges Moore and White write separately to explain why we REVERSE on Counts 2 and 3 and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 14 _________________ OPINION _________________ KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, opinion vacating Count 2 and Count 3. I agree that Stafford’s conviction on Count 1 must stand because the district court did not commit plain error.1 Here, I explain my conclusion that we must vacate Stafford’s convictions on Counts 2 and 3, each of which charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and (g)(1), with § 2243(a) as a chapter 109A predicate offense. Section 2423(b) is titled “Travel With Intent To Engage In Illicit Sexual Conduct.” It reads, in full: A person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, with intent to engage in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. Section 2423(g)(1) defines “illicit sexual conduct” to mean “a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Section 2423(h), in relevant part, states that “the term ‘intent’ shall be construed as any intention to engage in . . . illicit sexual conduct . . . at the time of the . . . travel.” Section 2243(a), which is part of chapter 109A, in turn provides: Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who— 1In addressing United States v. Buddi, 168 F.4th 439 (6th Cir. 2026), even Stafford acknowledges that that case did not “squarely address” the question at issue here as to Count 1. D. 39 (Appellant’s Response to Additional Citation). I cannot, therefore, find that the district court’s unchallenged jury instructions, which are in accordance with the views of some circuits, were plainly erroneous under this complex statutory scheme.  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 15 (1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (2) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. Section 2243(a) is a strict liability offense. In a prosecution of a substantive § 2243(a) offense, therefore, the government “need not prove that the defendant knew . . . (1) the age of the other person engaging in the sexual act; or (2) that the requisite age difference existed.” 18 U.S.C. § 2243(e). It is nevertheless an affirmative defense to a charge under § 2243(a) “that the defendant reasonably believed that the other person had attained the age of 16 years.” Id. § 2243(d). To convict a defendant under § 2423(b), the government must prove an actus reus (interstate travel), and a mens rea (intent). That is, the statute criminalizes an ordinarily innocuous act (interstate travel) when undertaken with a particular intent. Stafford’s appeal hinges on exactly what intent is required when § 2243(a) is charged as the predicate chapter 109A offense under § 2423(g)(1)’s definition of illicit sexual conduct. Stafford argues that “[p]roof has to be made that the defendant’s intent is that the sex for which he is traveling interstate will be with someone who is 12, 13, 14 or 15.” D. 13 (Appellant Br. at 45). The government, by contrast, focuses on “knowledge,” and argues that “[n]othing in the statutory language imposes a knowledge requirement for a victim’s age.” D. 25 (Appellee Br. at 38). “As usual, we start with the statutory text.” Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 46 (2020). Here, the text favors Stafford’s reading of the statute. Intention is “[t]he willingness to bring about something planned or foreseen.” Intention, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). “An act is intentional if, and in so far as, it exists in idea before it exists in fact.” Id. (quoting John Salmond, Jurisprudence 378 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)). In the criminal context, intent has a well-established meaning. A person “intends a result of his act (or omission) under two quite different circumstances: (1) when he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; and (2) when he knows that the result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) (quoting Wayne LaFave & Austin  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 16 Scott, Criminal Law 196 (1972)). Caselaw also distinguishes two types of intent: specific and general. A general-intent crime simply requires “proof of knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime,” whereas a specific-intent crime requires a showing of intent with respect to the elements that render it unlawful. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269–70 (2000). Section 2423(b) is a specific-intent crime. To convict, the government must do more than simply prove an intent to engage in interstate travel. In the law’s own terms, proof must be had of a defendant’s “intent to engage in . . . illicit sexual conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). This is evident three times over—reiterated by § 2423(b)’s heading, its text, and § 2423(h)’s rule of construction (“the term ‘intent’ shall be construed as any intention to engage in . . . illicit sexual conduct . . . at the time of the transportation or travel”). Section 2423(g)(1)’s definition of illicit sexual conduct has three components: (1) “a sexual act” (2) “with a person under 18 years of age” (3) “that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. § 2423(g)(1). The presence of each component is necessary. A sexual act alone is not illicit sexual conduct. Nor is a sexual act with a person under the age of 18 necessarily illicit sexual conduct. Only a sexual act with a person under the age of 18 that would also run afoul of chapter 109A (within federal jurisdiction) is illicit sexual conduct. As charged here, for an act to violate chapter 109A (if within federal territorial jurisdiction), it would have to be with someone who “has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years.” Id. § 2243(a)(1). The natural conclusion from this definition is that for a person to intend to engage in illicit sexual conduct, he must intend (1) to engage in a sexual act with (2) a person under 16.2 Thus, in a case charging a violation of § 2423(b) with § 2243(a) as a chapter 109A predicate, the government must prove that a defendant “consciously desire[d]” to engage in sexual activity with a person under 16, or knew that the result of his intended conduct would involve sexual activity with a person under 16. U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 445. 2In this case, because § 2243(a) is the predicate Chapter 109A offense, the “under 18 years of age” requirement in § 2423(g)(1) is redundant. That will not always be so, however, because Chapter 109A also contains offenses that make no reference to age. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242, 2244.  No. 24-1612 United States v. Stafford Page 17 It may appear strange at first blush that § 2423(b) imposes an intent requirement even where the predicate illicit sexual conduct is a strict liability offense. But our actions frequently have qualities not encompassed within the scope of our intent. Consider a hypothetical: you task me with buying an “grade-A bookshelf,” explaining that the term means a bookshelf that (1) is at least 36 inches wide and (2) can hold 300 pounds of books. I am forgetful, however. When I go out shopping, I am careful to measure prospective bookshelves to ensure their width, but do not inquire about their load-bearing capacity. I select a sufficiently wide bookshelf which happens to have a capacity of 310 pounds. In this scenario it is true (1) I intended to buy the bookshelf, and (2) as a matter of “strict liability,” it is a grade-A bookshelf. It does not follow, however, that what I intended to do was buy a grade-A bookshelf. My intent was simply to buy a more-than-36-inch-wide bookshelf. The same applies here. A defendant whose only intent in crossing state lines is to engage in a sexual act has not violated § 2423(b). The non-intended existence of external facts that would render that sexual act, if completed, “illicit sexual conduct” under § 2423(g), does not on its own place that illicit sexual conduct within the scope of his intent. The government resists this plain reading of the statute, but its arguments all fall short. To adopt its view of the statute, we would have to split the atom of “illicit sexual conduct” such that intent need only be shown as to its first component: sexual activity. That is like saying, in our example above, that anyone who looks for a wide bookshelf is looking for a grade-A bookshelf. Because § 2423(b) does not contain a m