Hannah Fine v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMarch 11, 2021
Docket1D20-0695
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D20-695
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HANNAH FINE,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Stephen A. Pitre, Judge.
March 11, 2021
ROWE, J.
This is an Anders * appeal of Hannah Fine’s judgment and
sentence following her plea to attempted first-degree murder,
aggravated battery with great bodily harm, and burglary of a
dwelling with an assault or battery. Fine sought sentencing as a
youthful offender and also asked for a downward departure
sentence. But the trial court sentenced Fine as an adult and denied
her downward departure request. After sentencing, Fine moved to
modify or reduce her sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(c). The trial court denied the motion. Our review
of the record reveals no error warranting reversal.
* Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Facts
From the age of six, Fine lived with her father. But when she
turned sixteen, she moved in with her mother, Candie Walker.
Walker, unlike Fine’s father, allowed Fine to drive without a
license, date anyone she wanted to date, and skip school.
After Fine began living with her mother, Walker confided in
Fine that she wanted J.C. dead because J.C. was dating Walker’s
ex-husband. Walker persuaded Fine to kill J.C. In preparation for
the murder attempt, Walker gave Fine a disguise to wear during
the attack on J.C. Fine then obtained a machete to use as the
murder weapon.
Soon after, Fine went to J.C.’s home. As she approached the
front door, Fine tried to cover her face and hair to conceal her
identity, but she decided not to wear the mask she brought with
her. When J.C. came out to her front porch to smoke a cigarette,
Fine attacked her with a machete. J.C. screamed for help. J.C.’s
twelve-year-old daughter, J.S., ran outside and tried to protect her
mother. Fine attacked J.S. with the machete, too. Fine then fled
the scene on foot. J.C. suffered several lacerations to the right side
of her body, including her kneecap, arm, and face. J.S. suffered an
acute laceration that almost severed her thumb from her left hand.
After the victims called the police and reported Fine as the
attacker, the police detained Fine and transported her to the police
station for interrogation. During questioning, Fine confessed to the
murder attempt. She admitted that she attacked J.C. and J.S. with
a machete. She told the police that Walker threatened to ground
her if she did not kill J.C. Fine told investigators that her boyfriend
drove her to J.C.’s house. After the attack, Fine fled the scene on
foot. And then she and her boyfriend abandoned the vehicle used
to drive to J.C.’s house. Fine then called her grandmother and
asked her to pick her up.
Based on Fine’s confession, investigators searched the
grandmother’s car. They found a long machete, a hoodie, gloves,
and a mask—all covered in blood. Fine continued to assist the
police with the investigation and her cooperation led to the arrest
of several co-defendants. She also agreed to testify at her mother’s
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trial. Fine’s testimony was instrumental in obtaining convictions
against her mother.
When it came to Fine’s prosecution, the State exercised its
discretion to charge the sixteen-year-old as an adult under section
985.557(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2018). The State charged Fine
with attempted first-degree or felony murder with a weapon or
firearm, aggravated battery with great bodily harm or a deadly
weapon, and burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery.
But based on Fine’s confession and cooperation in the
prosecution of her co-defendants, the State entered into a plea
agreement with Fine. She agreed to plea to the lesser-included
offense of attempted first-degree murder and to counts two and
three as charged—with the understanding that she could not be
sentenced to more than twenty years in state prison. The trial
court conducted a plea colloquy and found that Fine voluntarily
and knowingly entered her plea. Before imposing the sentence, the
court ordered the Department of Juvenile Justice to conduct a
predisposition investigation and prepare a predisposition report.
It also requested a presentence sentence investigation by the
Department of Corrections.
DJJ recommended that the trial court impose juvenile
sanctions and that Fine be placed in a high-risk commitment
facility. DOC recommended that if the trial court decided to impose
a prison sentence, the sentence should be near the lower limits of
an acceptable sentence. Fine’s scoresheet provided a lowest
permissible sentence of 156.75 months in state prison. Fine’s
counsel sought more lenient sentencing for Fine, asking the trial
court to impose juvenile sanctions or to impose a youthful offender
sentence.
In considering Fine’s sentencing requests, the trial court
heard from several witnesses. J.C. testified at the sentencing
hearing and explained how the attack affected her and her family.
She testified that when her daughter, J.S., tried to protect her,
Fine almost cut off her thumb. Before the attack, J.S. played the
violin and the flute and made straight A’s in school. Her grades
slipped after the attack, and J.S. could no longer play her
instruments.
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As to J.C., she spent the first eight months after the attack in
bed and was unable to move. She suffered from depression and
PTSD. J.C. was a single mother. Because of her injuries from the
attack, J.C. lost both of her jobs. She was limited in her ability to
find work due to her injuries. Even so, when it came to Fine’s
punishment, J.C. did not want to see Fine sentenced to twenty
years in prison. But she also did not want Fine to serve only two
years.
Next to testify at the sentencing hearing was John Bingham,
a licensed mental health counselor, who conducted a forensic
mental health evaluation of Fine. He testified on what he learned
about Fine’s upbringing and family dynamics. Bingham concluded
that Fine was easily influenced, gullible, and naïve. He explained
that Fine’s mother tried to control her and that Fine sought her
mother’s acceptance.
Last to testify at the hearing was Fine. She expressed remorse
for her actions.
Before imposing Fine’s sentence, the court observed: “There is
a lot of mitigation that would support a certain range of a sentence,
but one thing your attorney can’t do or you could not do through a
level of cooperation, although you may wish you could, is change
what occurred that night.” The court added:
There was much potential that you had and I am fully
aware of the statement made by your counsel, and I think
it’s accurate, but for your mother, you wouldn’t be here;
but, there’s nothing in the record and nothing I’ve heard
or seen to indicate that notwithstanding great pressure,
or somebody may consider great distress, then you could
have chosen otherwise. Not all of the guilt and blame can
be pointed to the mother. That’s not to suggest that
pointing fingers and blame is somehow not legitimate, it
just means that it’s not going to exonerate you for your
actions.
The trial court did not impose juvenile sanctions or grant
Fine’s requests for a youthful offender sentence or a downward
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departure. Instead, the trial court sentenced Fine to concurrent
sentences of 200 months in state prison on counts one and three
and a concurrent sentence of 180 months in state prison on count
two.
After sentencing, Fine filed a rule 3.800(c) motion seeking a
modification or reduction of her sentence. She argued that her
sentence should be reduced because the victim believed that a
shorter sentence would have been appropriate. The trial court
denied the motion, stating in its order that it had considered the
victim’s testimony and the points raised in Fine’s motion when it
imposed the original sentence. This timely appeal follows.
Analysis
In this Anders appeal, Fine’s appointed counsel was unable to
present any good-faith assertions of reversible error. Based on our
independent review of the record, we find no error by the trial
court.
As to Fine’s plea, the record shows that her plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered and that she did not preserve
any issues for appellate review. Sections 924.051(4) and 924.06(3),
Florida Statutes (2018), provide that a defendant who pleads no
contest or guilty generally may not appeal her judgment and
sentence unless she has reserved the right to appeal a legally
dispositive motion. See also Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A).
Fine entered her plea without reserving the right to appeal
and may therefore only raise on appeal issues that fall within one
of certain limited exceptions. See Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898,
902 (Fla. 1979) (“A plea of guilty cuts off any right to an appeal
from court rulings that precede the plea in the criminal process
including independent claims relating to deprivations of
constitutional rights that occur prior to the entry of the guilty
plea.”). These exceptions include challenges to the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, a violation of the plea agreement, an
involuntary plea, or a sentencing error. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii). But Fine does not raise any of these challenges.
And the record shows that the trial court conducted a plea colloquy
that substantially complied with the requirements of Florida Rule
5
of Criminal Procedure 3.172. The court explained the statutory
maximum for each of the charged offenses and that Fine’s plea
agreement meant that she could not receive more than twenty
years in prison. Fine represented that she had ample time to
discuss the plea with her counsel and that she understood the
rights she forfeited by entering a plea. The court repeatedly
informed Fine that her sentence was up to the court’s discretion.
Based on Fine’s representations, the court properly accepted her
plea as knowingly and voluntarily entered.
As to her sentences, the record shows no error in the trial
court’s imposition of Fine’s sentences. Each sentence is within the
statutory maximum for the offense. Attempted first-degree murder
is a first-degree felony punishable by up to thirty years in prison.
§§ 775.082(3)(b), 777.04(4), 782.04(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2018). The
trial court sentenced Fine to 200 months in prison for this offense.
Aggravated battery with great bodily harm or a deadly weapon is
a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years in prison.
§§ 775.082(3)(d), 784.045(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). The trial court
sentenced Fine to 180 months in prison for this offense. Burglary
of a dwelling with an assault or battery is a first-degree felony
punishable by life imprisonment. §§ 775.082(3)(b), 810.02(2)(a),
Fla. Stat. (2018). The trial court sentenced Fine to 200 months in
prison for this offense. And so, the trial court did not err in
imposing Fine’s sentences.
Nor did the trial court err when it denied Fine’s request for
the court to impose a youthful offender sentence. An appellate
court reviews a trial court’s decision on whether to impose a
youthful offender sentence for an abuse of discretion. See
McKinney v. State, 27 So. 3d 160, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Unless
the court believes that such a sentence would be appropriate, a
trial court is under no obligation to impose a youthful offender
sentence. Id. Here, the court considered Fine’s request, but
declined to impose a youthful offender sentence due to the
seriousness of the crimes Fine committed and the lasting effects of
Fine’s actions on the victims. On these facts, we find no abuse by
the trial court in its decision not to sentence Fine as a youthful
offender.
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As to the remaining sentencing decisions by the trial court—
its denial of Fine’s request for a downward departure sentence and
its order denying her rule 3.800(c) motion—neither decision is
subject to appellate review. An appellate court may review a trial
court’s denial of a request for a downward departure only in
limited circumstances. Wilson v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2615
(Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 20, 2020). Only when a trial court misconceives
its discretion to impose a departure sentence or when the court has
a policy to refuse to impose any downward departure sentences
may a defendant obtain appellate review of the trial court’s
decision. Id. Neither circumstance is present here. And so, this
Court may not review the trial court’s discretionary decision not to
downwardly depart in this appeal.
Similarly, we may not review the trial court’s discretionary
decision to deny Fine’s postconviction challenge to her sentences.
Fine filed a timely rule 3.800(c) motion asking the court to reduce
her sentences. The trial court denied the motion on the merits. And
thus, that decision is not subject to appellate review. See Mitchell
v. State, 719 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (explaining that a
rule 3.800(c) motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court and that an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review the
correctness of the decision).
For these reasons, finding no reversible error by the trial
court, we AFFIRM.
M.K. THOMAS and NORDBY, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; and Hannah Fine, pro
se, Appellant.
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Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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