United States v. Robert Smith, II
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-2171
JudgeJeffrey S. Sutton; David W. McKeague; Richard Allen Griffin
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0475n.06
Case No. 25-2171
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Nov 20, 2026
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
v. ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
ROBERT SMITH, II, )
Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION
)
Before: SUTTON; McKEAGUE and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. After starting a verbal altercation with another driver at a
traffic intersection, defendant Robert Smith and his friends followed him home and fired roughly
twenty rounds at him while he sat in his car. So when Smith pled guilty to firearm charges
stemming in part from that incident, the district court concluded that he used the firearm while
attempting to commit first-degree murder. That resulted in a base offense level of 33. On appeal,
Smith contends that decision was error because the shooting wasn’t premeditated. But because the
undisputed facts show that it was, we disagree and AFFIRM.
I.
Robert Smith and three of his friends went for a Sunday evening drive. It was a
dangerous—and illegal—one. William Douglas, the driver, was speeding upwards of 100 miles
per hour. Another one of Smith’s friends, Havier Jackson, sat in the front passenger seat with a
No. 25-2171, United States v. Smith
Glock 30 pistol—fitted with a machinegun conversion device—in hand. And Smith, despite his
prior felonies, sat in the driver’s side backseat with a Smith & Wesson M&P rifle by his side. They
also were using drugs. During the trip, Smith documented these highlights and posted them to his
Instagram account.
At some point during the ride, Smith and his friends stopped at a red light next to someone
driving a Chevy Equinox. A brief verbal exchange between Smith’s friends and the other driver
ensued. One of Smith’s friends yelled in the driver’s direction. And after the driver asked them
“what’s up,” another one of Smith’s friends responded that they weren’t “talking to [him].” The
Chevy driver returned home, which was a few blocks from the intersection, and backed into his
driveway. Shortly thereafter, while the victim was still in his car, Smith and his friends arrived.
They parked in front of the victim’s house, roughly ten to fifteen feet from his car. And then Smith
and one of his friends rolled down their windows, took out their guns, and fired 19 rounds at the
victim in four seconds, shattering his car’s windshield and filling the driver’s side of the car with
bullet holes. Then they took off. The other driver was unharmed.
But Smith seemed to think otherwise. Just minutes after the shooting, he posted two more
videos to his Instagram account in which he brandished his Smith & Wesson M&P rifle and
exclaimed “we just did that to that [expletive]” and that he “[d]ropped a body on Sunday” and “can
m[urk].” Sent. Hr’g Tr. R.182, PageID.1202, 1214-15. In other words, Smith was broadcasting
that he had just killed someone.
Four days later, Smith was arrested after he again brandished a firearm—this time, at a
restaurant—and was found with the same Glock 30 pistol (turned machinegun) that his friend used
during the shooting. Eventually, he pled guilty to three offenses arising from those two incidents:
(1) felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing the Smith & Wesson
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M&P rifle on the day of the shooting; (2) felon in possession of a firearm for possessing the Glock
30 on the day of his arrest; and (3) illegal possession of a machinegun under § 922(o) because the
Glock 30 was equipped with a machinegun conversion device.
In calculating Smith’s sentencing guidelines range, his Presentence Report recommended
applying U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(1) (through § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A)’s cross reference to § 2X1.1), which
applies when the defendant used or possessed a firearm while attempting to commit first-degree
murder. Section 2A2.1(a)(1) calls for a base offense level of 33. Smith objected to its applicability,
arguing, among other things, that he didn’t shoot at the victim, that he didn’t attempt to commit
murder, and that he lacked a specific intent to kill.
In resolving Smith’s objections, the district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing. After
the parties presented their positions, the district court concluded, by a preponderance of evidence,
that Smith shot at the victim and therefore intended to kill him. So it applied the attempted first-
degree murder cross reference. Smith now appeals, challenging the district court’s application of
that cross reference.
II.
Smith says that the district court’s application of the attempted first-degree murder cross
reference was error for substantive and procedural reasons. He first contends that it was error
because the district court’s factual findings do not show that Smith’s attempt to kill the victim was
premeditated. And he says that even if the record establishes premeditation, we should still reverse
because the district court did not make an explicit premeditation finding on the record, as required
by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. He’s wrong on both accounts.
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A.
Start with Smith’s substantive argument. The sentencing guidelines provide that a
defendant charged with a firearm offense receives a higher base level offense if they use a firearm
in connection with an attempt to commit murder. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), 2X1.1, 2A2.1.
But the guidelines differentiate the base offense starting point based on whether the attempted
murder would have been in the first degree. See § 2A2.1 (noting base offense level 33 for first-
degree murder but 27 otherwise). The sentencing guidelines, by way of the federal murder statute,
define first-degree murder as the “unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought”
that is “willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a); U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1
cmt. n.1. So for the attempted first-degree murder cross reference to apply, the government must
prove both an intent to kill and premeditation by a preponderance of evidence. See United States
v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gates, 461 F.3d 703, 708 (6th
Cir. 2006).
Smith challenges the cross-reference on narrow grounds. He does not dispute the district
court’s factual findings—including that he was in the car during the altercation and then fired
multiple rounds at the victim. Nor does Smith dispute that he intended to kill the victim when he
shot at him. Rather, he contends only that the district court’s factual findings do not show that his
attempted killing was premeditated, as the attempted first-degree murder cross reference requires.
So, the only question for us to decide is whether the undisputed facts show that Smith’s decision
to fire multiple rounds at the victim was premeditated such that the attempted first-degree murder
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cross reference applies, which is a legal determination that we review de novo.1 See United States
v. Coleman, 627 F.3d 205, 211 (6th Cir. 2010). We find that they do.
An attempted killing is premeditated if it “is the result of planning and deliberation.”
Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d at 371. But “no precise amount of time” is needed for a plan and
deliberation to form. United States v. Ely, 750 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2018). Sometimes, even
“seconds can suffice.” United States v. Goddard, __F.4th__, No. 24-3841, 2026 WL 3016196, at
*8 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2026). For an attempted killing to be premeditated, then, the defendant need
only have enough time to “be fully conscious” of his “intent to kill” after forming it. United States
v. Rishell, 837 F. App’x 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).
So, in practice, we often find premeditation even when the defendant didn’t have much
time to be fully conscious of his intent to kill. For example, in United States v. Frost, 521 F. App’x
484 (6th Cir. 2013), we found premeditation where the defendant—immediately after an encounter
with the victim on his lawn—ran inside, grabbed a gun, ran outside, and began shooting. Id. at
492. The time it took the defendant to retrieve the gun from the house, we concluded, was sufficient
for him to be fully conscious of his intent to kill. See id. Similarly, in United States v. Penaloza,
648 F. App’x 508 (6th Cir. 2016), we found premeditation where the defendant, a few minutes
after arguing with the victim, tracked him down and attempted to kill him with a handgun. Id. at
536–37. And, in United States v. Sanchez, 527 F. App’x 488 (6th Cir. 2013), we found
premeditation where the defendant got into a verbal dispute with the victim and, shortly after,
chased him down an alley and shot at him. Id. at 490-91, 493. In each of these cases, the defendants
had only minutes—even seconds—to become conscious of their intent to kill. Yet in each case,
1
The government contends that plain error review applies because, in its view, Smith forfeited his
premeditation argument by not objecting to the premeditation element below. We need not decide this issue,
however, because Smith’s challenge fails even under de novo review.
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we still found that there was enough time between the provocation and the defendant’s decision to
kill the victim for the defendant to be fully conscious of it.
But time isn’t the only factor. We often find that other aspects of “the facts and
circumstances preceding, surrounding, and following” an attempted killing indicate that it was
premeditated. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d at 371. For example, a defendant’s decision to fire multiple
rounds at the victim, as opposed to a single shot, can indicate premeditation. See Ely, 750 F. App’x
at 414 (concluding that the defendant shooting the victim “three times” showed that he “planned
to kill her”); United States v. Ingle, 460 F. App’x 593, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“eighteen”
shots supported premeditation). So too does a defendant’s decision to shoot at his target from close
range. See Goddard, __F.4th__ , 2026 WL 3016196, at *8. And so might a defendant’s statements
shortly after the attempt to kill. See United States v. Al-Din, 631 F. App’x 313, 333–34 (6th Cir.
2015) (finding defendant’s post-shooting statements were “a near admission that he formed an
intent to kill” and then “acted upon that intent”). Whether an attempted killing was premeditated,
then, largely “depends on . . . the circumstances.” Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d at 371.
Under these principles, Smith’s attempted murder was premeditated. First, consider the
timeline. The period between Smith’s encounter with the victim at the traffic stop and the shooting
might not have been “extensive.” Penaloza, 648 F. App’x at 537. Yet, as in Frost and Penaloza,
Smith and his friends still had plenty of time to plan their attempted killing and make calculated
decisions to further it. After the encounter, for instance, they “sought out” the victim by following
him home. Id. Smith and his friends had every opportunity to abandon their plans—by driving
away, for example—but they chose to follow the victim home instead. See United States v. Bishop,
No. 97-1175, 1998 WL 385898, at *7 (6th Cir. July 1, 1998) (finding premeditation where there
was an “interval of time” in which the defendant “could have backed off”). And critically, once
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they reached the victim, there was no “sudden provocation immediately before” Smith started
shooting. Penaloza, 648 F. App’x at 537. Rather, Smith and his friends parked in front of the
victim, took out their guns, and started firing at him while he sat in his car. So, Smith’s and his
friends’ deliberate actions after they initially encountered the victim demonstrate that Smith was
fully aware that he intended to kill the victim before deciding to shoot at him.
And the surrounding circumstances confirm this result. Smith (along with his friend)
collectively fired at the victim 19 times, suggesting Smith planned on killing him. See Ely, 750 F.
App’x at 414; Ingle, 460 F. App’x at 595; Goddard, __F.4th__, 2026 WL 3016196, at *8.
Moreover, Smith was only ten to fifteen feet from the victim when he shot at him, likewise
indicating the attempted killing was planned and deliberate. See Goddard, __F.4th__, 2026 WL
3016196, at *8. And the statements Smith made on Instagram only minutes after the shooting—
where he bragged that he just “dropped a body on Sunday” and “did that to that [expletive]—
amounted to “a near admission” that he was fully conscious of his intent to kill the victim. See Al-
Din, 631 F. App’x at 334. So collectively, these additional factors confirm that Smith was fully
aware that he intended to kill the victim when he shot at him.
Smith disagrees with this conclusion. In his view, there is not enough evidence to show
premeditation because he wasn’t the one driving the car, and his friends started the altercation, not
him. But those facts don’t change things. Even assuming Smith had no role in deciding to follow
the victim home after the altercation—an assumption that the record does not support—he was
still present during all the salient moments. He was in the car during the verbal altercation; during
the decision to seek out the victim; and during the decision to follow the victim home. At any of
those points, Smith could have decided against killing the victim. See Bishop, 1998 WL 385898,
at *7. But he didn’t. So, no matter who made the decisions in the car, Smith still had more than
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enough time in the minutes following the altercation to become “fully conscious” of his own intent
to kill and reflect on his decision. Rishell, 837 F. App’x at 390. And, either way, Smith’s lack of
control over the vehicle doesn’t explain why he decided to shoot at the victim multiple times from
a close distance. Nor does it explain why shortly after the shooting, he decided to brag on Instagram
that he had just “dropped a body.” When looking at Smith’s actions and all the surrounding
circumstances, the only explanation is that Smith planned to kill the victim.
To sum up: Smith had more than enough time between the verbal dispute at the intersection
and shooting to be fully conscious of his decision to kill. And the surrounding circumstances—
including the multiple shots fired, close proximity to the victim, and Smith’s post-shooting
statements—confirm that he deliberately and consciously intended to kill the victim. So, because
the district court’s undisputed factual findings established by a preponderance of evidence that
Smith’s intent to kill was premeditated, the district court did not err by applying the attempted
first-degree murder cross reference.
B.
Smith also contends that even if the record supports a premeditation finding (it does), we
should still reverse because the district court did not make an explicit premeditation finding on the
record (instead adopting the Presentence Report’s premeditation finding). True, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) requires that the district court rule on “any disputed portion of the
presentence report or other controverted matter,” which in this case might include finding
premeditation. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). Because Smith did not dispute the premeditation
element, he may never have triggered the district court’s independent obligation to rule on that
element by “identify[ing] the disputed fact with specificity [or] clarity.” United States v. Holt, 116
F.4th 599, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). But even if he did, since the undisputed
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facts establish premeditation—and, in turn, the attempted first-degree murder cross reference—
any error made by the district court in failing to make an explicit premeditation finding was
harmless. See United States v. Parrott, 148 F.3d 629, 633-34 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding district
court’s failure to “make independent findings with respect to the elements of the offense” harmless
where the defendant’s “own admissions” established that he committed a crime with specific
intent). Simply put, because the attempted first-degree murder cross reference was proper, the
district court’s failure to conclude on the record that its factual findings established premeditation
did not cause him “to receive a more severe sentence” than would have been imposed without that
alleged error. United States v. Gillis, 592 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
United States v. Harris, 552 F. App’x 432 (6th Cir. 2014), does not require a different
result. There, we reversed the district court’s application of the second-degree murder cross
reference because the “district court made no findings of fact” that were “relevant to the mens rea
required to prove second-degree murder.” Id. at 440. Here, however, the district court’s findings
of fact at the end of the two-day sentencing hearing, and other undisputed facts, established
premeditation and supported its application of the attempted first-degree murder cross reference.
In this context, then, the court’s failure to say the magic words—explaining why its factual findings
demonstrated premeditation—didn’t make a difference.
So, because the district court’s undisputed factual findings established Smith’s
premeditation, the district court’s failure to explicitly “rule on" premeditation—even assuming it
was an error—was harmless.
III.
For those reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
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