Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Jason Shane Bishop, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2024-001476 Appeal From Spartanburg County Grace Gilchrist Knie, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-473 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026 AFFIRMED E. Charles Grose, Jr., of Grose Law Firm, of Greenwood, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Brian Hollis Gibbs, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of Spartanburg, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Jason Shane Bishop appeals his seven-year sentence following his guilty plea for reckless homicide. On appeal, Bishop argues the sentencing court (1) mistakenly believed it lacked discretion to award him credit for time served on Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring (SCRAM), (2) mistakenly believed the sentence could not include home incarceration, and (3) improperly considered his initial charge when deciding to deny credit for time served on SCRAM and home incarceration. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. 1. We hold the sentencing court exercised its discretion because it explicitly stated it considered and gave credit for Bishop's time on SCRAM when it determined what sentence to pronounce. See In re M.H.B., 387 S.C. 323, 326, 692 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2010) ("A [sentencing court] has broad discretion in sentencing within statutory limits."); id. ("A sentence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion without evidentiary support."); State v. Hawes, 411 S.C. 188, 191, 767 S.E.2d 707, 708 (2015) ("A failure to exercise discretion amounts to an abuse of that discretion." (quoting Samples v. Mitchell, 329 S.C. 105, 112, 495 S.E.2d 213, 216 (Ct. App. 1997))); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-40 (2025) ("In every case in computing the time served by a prisoner, full credit against the sentence must be given for time served prior to trial and sentencing, and may be given for any time spent under monitored house arrest." (emphasis added)). 2. We hold Bishop's argument that the sentencing court believed home detention was not an available sentencing option because reckless homicide involved a mandatory minimum is unsupported by the record. See In re M.H.B., 387 S.C. at 326, 692 S.E.2d at 542 ("A sentence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion without evidentiary support."); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2910(A) (2018) (providing that a person who pleads guilty to "reckless vehicular homicide is guilty of a felony, and must be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both"); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-1530(A) (2025) ("[H]ome detention programs may be used as an alternative to incarceration for low risk, nonviolent adult and juvenile offenders as selected by the court if there is a home detention program available in the jurisdiction." (emphasis added)). 3. We hold Bishop's argument—that the sentencing court committed an error of law by improperly considering his initial charge as a reason for not granting credit for time served on SCRAM—is not preserved for appellate review because he did not object when the sentencing court referenced his initial charge at the hearing on the motion to reconsider his sentence. See State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21, 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits only to review errors of law which have been properly preserved . . . ."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court]. Issues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."). AFFIRMED.1 GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.