Full Opinion

25-1922-cr United States v. Maldonado UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., DENNIS JACOBS, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. 25-1922-cr CORY HARRIS, AKA HOP, DANIEL HERRING, AKA MIKE, FRANK JENKINS, JR, AKA FRIZZ, JARON LANGHORNE, AKA GHOST, MITCHELL MALDONADO, UNIQUE NEWELL, AKA TRILLA, ADAM PHILLIPS, KRYSTAL PINSONNEAULT, ANDREW ROBLES, MIGUEL ROBLES, LUIS ZABALA, AKA ANT, JEFFREY ELWELL, AKA J-BO, JOSE COLON, Defendants, RAHEEM MALDONADO, Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________ FOR APPELLEE: Amanda C. Weingarten, Jacob R. Fiddelman, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: John Buza, Konta Georges & Buza P.C., New York, New York. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (John G. Koeltl, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED in part as moot and the judgment of the district court, entered on July 31, 2025, is otherwise AFFIRMED. Defendant-Appellant Raheem Maldonado appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, followed by a new two-year term of supervised release, including six months of inpatient mental health treatment. Maldonado contends that: (1) the judgment should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he committed the contested specifications in violation of his conditions of supervised release; and (2) the sentence should be vacated because the district court improperly considered retributive factors in imposing its sentence, in contravention of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and 2 issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision. On January 8, 2025, the United States Probation Office filed an amended violation report, alleging that Maldonado had committed 15 violations of his conditions of supervised release. Fourteen specifications related to his alleged harassment and menacing of the mother of his four children (the “Victim”) in June 2024, September 2024, and January 2025. 1 One specification related to alleged use of marijuana. On April 3, 2025, the district court conducted a hearing on the alleged violations. At the hearing, Maldonado admitted to certain specifications, but denied the remaining specifications with respect to his alleged conduct in January 2025, including allegedly violating an order of protection and holding a gun to the Victim’s head and threatening to shoot her on the evening of January 4, 2025. To prove the contested specifications at the hearing, the government called three witnesses—namely, the Victim, one of the Victim’s sisters, and United States Probation Officer Tiffany Duque (who supervised Maldonado)—and also introduced exhibits including, inter alia, orders of protection, text messages, and police reports. On July 29, 2025, the district court issued oral findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that the government had sustained its burden of proof with respect to each of the contested specifications. The district court then revoked Maldonado’s term of supervised release and sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a new two-year term of supervised release, with six months to be served at an inpatient mental health treatment facility. 1 The government subsequently decided not to proceed on three of those specifications. 3 I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Maldonado argues that the evidence at the evidentiary hearing was insufficient to support the findings by the district court that the government proved the contested specifications. A district court may revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment if the court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). “The preponderance standard requires proof that the defendant’s violation of supervision was more likely than not.” United States v. Edwards, 834 F.3d 180, 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Because the standard of proof for revocation proceedings is lower than at a criminal trial, a district court may find that a defendant has committed another crime even in the absence of a conviction for that crime.” United States v. Peguero, 34 F.4th 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A district court’s finding that a defendant has violated conditions of supervised release is reviewed for abuse of discretion and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Glenn, 744 F.3d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted). A factual finding “is clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing all of the evidence, [the Court of Appeals] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d 597, 601 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “[w]e accord strong deference to a district court’s credibility determinations, particularly where that court based its findings on such determinations.” United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 811 (2d Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198, 215 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]e pay special deference to the district court’s credibility determination, and a factfinder who determines that a witness has been contradictory in some 4 respects may nevertheless find the witness entirely credible in the essentials of [her] testimony.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Maldonado asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he committed the contested specifications in violation of the conditions of his supervised release because, inter alia: (1) “[t]he court’s reliance on the testimonial accounts of the [Victim] and her supportive sister lacked meaningful corroboration,” (2) “[n]ot only was no firearm recovered, but no one testified that they even saw one at any point that night,” and (3) “the [Victim’s] background and conduct here as well as the surrounding circumstances undermine the reliability of her account to such a degree that any finding of the complainant as credible was clearly erroneous.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. We are unpersuaded. As a threshold matter, we have emphasized that “[a]ny lack of corroboration for a witness’s testimony—unless it is incredible on its face—goes merely to the weight of the evidence; the weight it is to be accorded is a matter for argument to the factfinder, not ground for reversal on appeal.” United States v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 2015). On this record, there is no basis to conclude that the Victim’s testimony was incredible on its face. Indeed, contrary to Maldonado’s contention, the Victim’s testimony was corroborated by: (1) her contemporaneous statements to the police on the night of the January 4, 2025 incident; (2) the testimony of Probation Officer Duque, who testified that, in the early morning hours of January 5, 2025, the Victim sent her a text message that Maldonado “put a gun to [her] head” and that she “thought . . . [she] was really going to die,” App’x at 179, and also, in a subsequent phone call with Officer Duque, provided more details regarding Maldonado’s threatening conduct during the January 4th incident; and (3) the testimony of the Victim’s sister who was on a three-way call with the Victim and another sister at the time of the January 4th incident with 5 Maldonado, during which, inter alia, she heard the Victim “pleading and yelling her kids’ names,” and “knew that [the Victim] was in trouble,” and called 911, id. at 159. The alleged conduct was also consistent with Maldonado’s history of domestic abuse, including the prior violation proceeding in which the district court found, after a hearing, that Maldonado assaulted and choked the Victim in 2021 and assaulted her again in 2022. Although Maldonado raises several arguments regarding the Victim’s credibility, “[a]ssessments of witness credibility and choices between competing inferences lie solely within the province of the” trier of fact. United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2010). Here, the district court explained why, notwithstanding Maldonado’s arguments, it found the Victim’s testimony to be credible: The defendant contends that the victim is not credible. Particularly because no gun was found. However, the absence of a gun does not discredit the victim’s otherwise credible testimony. There is simply no evidence of the extent of the search for the gun that would exclude the possibilities of how the gun was hidden or disposed of. The defendant also contends that the victim is not credible because the victim knew that the defendant was not to have contact with her, but voluntarily went to the home of the defendant’s mother and went to a party involving the defendant’s relatives. Those actions by the victim were certainly not wise, but simply placing herself in the situation does not excuse the defendant’s egregious conduct. The defendant knew that the victim was subject to an order of protection as well as an order from this Court that the defendant was not to have contact with the victim, but chose to violate those orders. Moreover, the victim’s testimony about the incident was credible and was supported by the contemporaneous observations of her sister and the fact that the victim reported the incident promptly to the police. App’x at 244–45. In short, we discern no basis to disturb the district court’s decision to credit the Victim’s testimony and, thus, find no clear error in its determination that the government had 6 proven the contested specifications by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 See also Peguero, 34 F.4th at 154 (holding that “it was well within the discretion of the district court to find the [victim’s statement] credible notwithstanding any purported inconsistencies in the record”). II. Sentencing Maldonado also argues that “[t]he district court’s sentence should be vacated because it departed from the forward-looking purpose of supervised release and impermissibly prioritized backward-looking retribution,” contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Esteras. Appellant’s Br. at 10. In particular, Maldonado contends that, “in explaining the sentence, the court implicitly elevated deterrence and incapacitation as the decisive factors, rather than demonstrating how the [18-month] custodial term was necessary to effectuate rehabilitation beyond the inpatient condition itself.” Id. at 12. However, we need not address this argument because Maldonado’s challenge to his term of imprisonment is moot. “Although a defendant’s release from prison will not necessarily moot his sentencing challenges if he remains under supervision at the time of his appeal, such challenges remain live only if there is more than a remote and speculative possibility that the district court could or would impose a reduced term of supervised release were we to remand the matter.” United States v. Simmons, 150 F.4th 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord United States v. Goklu, 173 F.4th 16, 27 (2d Cir. 2026). 2 Although Maldonado also ostensibly challenges the district court’s findings with respect to the two specifications that allege a violation of the district court’s no-contact orders on January 2 and 4, 2025, he raises no arguments in his brief regarding those findings and, thus, has waived any challenge to those specifications. See United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 170 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily, failure to include an argument in the appellate brief waives the argument on appeal.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In any event, the evidence at the hearing, including call logs from the Victim’s phone showing missed calls from Maldonado, was sufficient to support the district court’s findings as to those specifications. 7 Here, Maldonado has completed serving his 18-month term of imprisonment and is now serving his two-year term of supervised release. Moreover, on appeal, he does not challenge the term or conditions of his supervised release. Indeed, Maldonado acknowledges that, at resentencing, the defense successfully argued that the “most reasonable sentence would be an extension of supervised release with inpatient mental health treatment.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. Therefore, Maldonado’s challenge to his sentence does not present a live controversy and is dismissed as moot. See Simmons, 150 F.4th at 135 (“Given the lack of a challenge to [the defendant’s] term of supervision, it would be quite strange for us to conclude that a live controversy exists as to that issue.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). * * * We have considered Maldonado’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we DISMISS in part the appeal as moot and otherwise AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 8