United States v. Maldonado
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-1922-cr
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
25-1922-cr
United States v. Maldonado
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 16th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
DENNIS JACOBS,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 25-1922-cr
CORY HARRIS, AKA HOP, DANIEL HERRING,
AKA MIKE, FRANK JENKINS, JR, AKA FRIZZ,
JARON LANGHORNE, AKA GHOST,
MITCHELL MALDONADO, UNIQUE NEWELL,
AKA TRILLA, ADAM PHILLIPS, KRYSTAL
PINSONNEAULT, ANDREW ROBLES, MIGUEL
ROBLES, LUIS ZABALA, AKA ANT, JEFFREY
ELWELL, AKA J-BO, JOSE COLON,
Defendants,
RAHEEM MALDONADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
FOR APPELLEE: Amanda C. Weingarten, Jacob R. Fiddelman,
Assistant United States Attorneys, for Jay
Clayton, United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, New York,
New York.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: John Buza, Konta Georges & Buza P.C., New
York, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (John G. Koeltl, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED in part as moot and the judgment of the district
court, entered on July 31, 2025, is otherwise AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Raheem Maldonado appeals from the district court’s judgment
revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment,
followed by a new two-year term of supervised release, including six months of inpatient mental
health treatment. Maldonado contends that: (1) the judgment should be reversed because the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he committed the contested specifications in
violation of his conditions of supervised release; and (2) the sentence should be vacated because
the district court improperly considered retributive factors in imposing its sentence, in
contravention of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185
(2025). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and
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issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
On January 8, 2025, the United States Probation Office filed an amended violation report,
alleging that Maldonado had committed 15 violations of his conditions of supervised release.
Fourteen specifications related to his alleged harassment and menacing of the mother of his four
children (the “Victim”) in June 2024, September 2024, and January 2025. 1 One specification
related to alleged use of marijuana.
On April 3, 2025, the district court conducted a hearing on the alleged violations. At the
hearing, Maldonado admitted to certain specifications, but denied the remaining specifications
with respect to his alleged conduct in January 2025, including allegedly violating an order of
protection and holding a gun to the Victim’s head and threatening to shoot her on the evening of
January 4, 2025. To prove the contested specifications at the hearing, the government called
three witnesses—namely, the Victim, one of the Victim’s sisters, and United States Probation
Officer Tiffany Duque (who supervised Maldonado)—and also introduced exhibits including,
inter alia, orders of protection, text messages, and police reports.
On July 29, 2025, the district court issued oral findings of fact and conclusions of law,
determining that the government had sustained its burden of proof with respect to each of the
contested specifications. The district court then revoked Maldonado’s term of supervised
release and sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a new two-year term
of supervised release, with six months to be served at an inpatient mental health treatment
facility.
1
The government subsequently decided not to proceed on three of those specifications.
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I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Maldonado argues that the evidence at the evidentiary hearing was insufficient to support
the findings by the district court that the government proved the contested specifications.
A district court may revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment if the
court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of
supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). “The preponderance standard requires proof that
the defendant’s violation of supervision was more likely than not.” United States v. Edwards,
834 F.3d 180, 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Because the
standard of proof for revocation proceedings is lower than at a criminal trial, a district court may
find that a defendant has committed another crime even in the absence of a conviction for that
crime.” United States v. Peguero, 34 F.4th 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
“A district court’s finding that a defendant has violated conditions of supervised release
is reviewed for abuse of discretion and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” United
States v. Glenn, 744 F.3d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted). A
factual finding “is clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing all of the evidence, [the Court of
Appeals] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d 597, 601 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Moreover, “[w]e accord strong deference to a district court’s credibility
determinations, particularly where that court based its findings on such determinations.” United
States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 811 (2d Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d
198, 215 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]e pay special deference to the district court’s credibility
determination, and a factfinder who determines that a witness has been contradictory in some
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respects may nevertheless find the witness entirely credible in the essentials of [her] testimony.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Maldonado asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he
committed the contested specifications in violation of the conditions of his supervised release
because, inter alia: (1) “[t]he court’s reliance on the testimonial accounts of the [Victim] and
her supportive sister lacked meaningful corroboration,” (2) “[n]ot only was no firearm recovered,
but no one testified that they even saw one at any point that night,” and (3) “the [Victim’s]
background and conduct here as well as the surrounding circumstances undermine the reliability
of her account to such a degree that any finding of the complainant as credible was clearly
erroneous.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. We are unpersuaded.
As a threshold matter, we have emphasized that “[a]ny lack of corroboration for a
witness’s testimony—unless it is incredible on its face—goes merely to the weight of the
evidence; the weight it is to be accorded is a matter for argument to the factfinder, not ground
for reversal on appeal.” United States v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 2015). On this
record, there is no basis to conclude that the Victim’s testimony was incredible on its face.
Indeed, contrary to Maldonado’s contention, the Victim’s testimony was corroborated by: (1)
her contemporaneous statements to the police on the night of the January 4, 2025 incident; (2)
the testimony of Probation Officer Duque, who testified that, in the early morning hours of
January 5, 2025, the Victim sent her a text message that Maldonado “put a gun to [her] head”
and that she “thought . . . [she] was really going to die,” App’x at 179, and also, in a subsequent
phone call with Officer Duque, provided more details regarding Maldonado’s threatening
conduct during the January 4th incident; and (3) the testimony of the Victim’s sister who was on
a three-way call with the Victim and another sister at the time of the January 4th incident with
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Maldonado, during which, inter alia, she heard the Victim “pleading and yelling her kids’
names,” and “knew that [the Victim] was in trouble,” and called 911, id. at 159. The alleged
conduct was also consistent with Maldonado’s history of domestic abuse, including the prior
violation proceeding in which the district court found, after a hearing, that Maldonado assaulted
and choked the Victim in 2021 and assaulted her again in 2022.
Although Maldonado raises several arguments regarding the Victim’s credibility,
“[a]ssessments of witness credibility and choices between competing inferences lie solely within
the province of the” trier of fact. United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2010). Here,
the district court explained why, notwithstanding Maldonado’s arguments, it found the Victim’s
testimony to be credible:
The defendant contends that the victim is not credible. Particularly because no
gun was found. However, the absence of a gun does not discredit the victim’s
otherwise credible testimony. There is simply no evidence of the extent of the
search for the gun that would exclude the possibilities of how the gun was hidden
or disposed of.
The defendant also contends that the victim is not credible because the victim
knew that the defendant was not to have contact with her, but voluntarily went to
the home of the defendant’s mother and went to a party involving the defendant’s
relatives.
Those actions by the victim were certainly not wise, but simply placing herself in
the situation does not excuse the defendant’s egregious conduct. The defendant
knew that the victim was subject to an order of protection as well as an order from
this Court that the defendant was not to have contact with the victim, but chose
to violate those orders. Moreover, the victim’s testimony about the incident was
credible and was supported by the contemporaneous observations of her sister
and the fact that the victim reported the incident promptly to the police.
App’x at 244–45. In short, we discern no basis to disturb the district court’s decision to credit
the Victim’s testimony and, thus, find no clear error in its determination that the government had
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proven the contested specifications by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 See also Peguero, 34
F.4th at 154 (holding that “it was well within the discretion of the district court to find the
[victim’s statement] credible notwithstanding any purported inconsistencies in the record”).
II. Sentencing
Maldonado also argues that “[t]he district court’s sentence should be vacated because it
departed from the forward-looking purpose of supervised release and impermissibly prioritized
backward-looking retribution,” contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Esteras.
Appellant’s Br. at 10. In particular, Maldonado contends that, “in explaining the sentence, the
court implicitly elevated deterrence and incapacitation as the decisive factors, rather than
demonstrating how the [18-month] custodial term was necessary to effectuate rehabilitation
beyond the inpatient condition itself.” Id. at 12. However, we need not address this argument
because Maldonado’s challenge to his term of imprisonment is moot.
“Although a defendant’s release from prison will not necessarily moot his sentencing
challenges if he remains under supervision at the time of his appeal, such challenges remain live
only if there is more than a remote and speculative possibility that the district court could or
would impose a reduced term of supervised release were we to remand the matter.” United
States v. Simmons, 150 F.4th 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); accord United States v. Goklu, 173 F.4th 16, 27 (2d Cir. 2026).
2
Although Maldonado also ostensibly challenges the district court’s findings with respect to the two
specifications that allege a violation of the district court’s no-contact orders on January 2 and 4, 2025, he
raises no arguments in his brief regarding those findings and, thus, has waived any challenge to those
specifications. See United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 170 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily, failure to
include an argument in the appellate brief waives the argument on appeal.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In any event, the evidence at the hearing, including call logs from the Victim’s
phone showing missed calls from Maldonado, was sufficient to support the district court’s findings as to
those specifications.
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Here, Maldonado has completed serving his 18-month term of imprisonment and is now
serving his two-year term of supervised release. Moreover, on appeal, he does not challenge
the term or conditions of his supervised release. Indeed, Maldonado acknowledges that, at
resentencing, the defense successfully argued that the “most reasonable sentence would be an
extension of supervised release with inpatient mental health treatment.” Appellant’s Br. at 12.
Therefore, Maldonado’s challenge to his sentence does not present a live controversy and is
dismissed as moot. See Simmons, 150 F.4th at 135 (“Given the lack of a challenge to [the
defendant’s] term of supervision, it would be quite strange for us to conclude that a live
controversy exists as to that issue.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
* * *
We have considered Maldonado’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are
without merit. Accordingly, we DISMISS in part the appeal as moot and otherwise AFFIRM
the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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