United States v. Naquann Simmons
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-3409
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-3409
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
NAQUANN SIMMONS,
Appellant
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Judge Malachy E. Mannion, No. 3:24-cr-00270-001
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
Submitted: Nov. 10, 2026; Filed: November 16, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION *
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Naquann Simmons appeals his sentence. For the following reasons, we will
affirm.
I
Simmons pleaded guilty to two counts of aiding and abetting the making of false
statements in the acquisition of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(a)(6), and
924(a)(2). At sentencing, the District Court determined that his total offense level was
nineteen and his criminal history category was III, resulting in a Guidelines range of
This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding
*
precedent.
thirty-seven to forty-six months’ imprisonment, but the Court upwardly varied under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and imposed a 120-month sentence.
Simmons’s criminal history category was predicated on two prior convictions,
including a New York conviction for second-degree harassment based on a violation of an
order that barred contact with a victim. The violation occurred when Simmons texted the
victim to come to his house to pick up her belongings and then travelled to the victim’s
location four hours later. Simmons received a time-served sentence for this harassment
conviction.
Simmons appeals.
II 1
Under the Guidelines, misdemeanor and petty offense convictions generally count
toward a defendant’s criminal history score. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(c)
(U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025). Certain listed offenses, such as “[d]isorderly conduct or
disturbing the peace” and “[c]ontempt of court,” as well as “offenses similar to them,”
count for criminal history purposes only if “the sentence was a term of probation of more
than one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days,” or if “the prior offense
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review de novo a district
court’s interpretation of the Guidelines,” United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 105 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), but we review Simmons’s unpreserved challenge to the
application of the Guidelines for plain error, United States v. Barkers-Woode, 136 F.4th
496, 500 (3d Cir. 2025). To prevail under this standard, an appellant must show (1) an
error (2) that is plain and (3) that has affected his substantial rights. United States v.
Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 528 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
732-33 (1993)). We may exercise our discretion to correct such an error if it seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
2
was similar to an instant offense.” Id. § 4A1.2(c)(1). Since Simmons’s offense did not
involve probation or jail of more than thirty days, we must decide whether New York
second-degree harassment is “similar to” an offense excluded from receiving criminal
history points.
The Guidelines commentary instructs courts to consider several factors to
determine whether a prior offense is “similar to” disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace,
or another excluded offense, including:
(i) a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses;
(ii) the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of
punishment; (iii) the elements of the offense; (iv) the level of culpability
involved; and (v) the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates
a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct.
U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2 cmt. n.12(A). 2
Contrary to Simmons’s arguments, his harassment conviction was not “similar to”
disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, or contempt of court. We have held that
2
Administrative law principles govern whether “the [G]uidelines’ commentary
controls our interpretation of the [G]uidelines themselves.” United States v. Nasir, 17
F.4th 459, 469 (3d Cir. 2021) (en banc). Under such principles, we afford no deference
to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation when the regulation is unambiguous.
When the parties dispute whether consideration of the regulation is permitted, a court
must exhaust the traditional tools of statutory construction to determine whether the
regulation is genuinely ambiguous. Id. at 470-71 (citing Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558,
572-75 (2019)). We need not decide whether Application Note 12 should be afforded
deference under Nasir because no party challenges consideration of Application Note 12,
and the Government acknowledges that deference thereto does not impact the outcome
here. See United States v. Wise, 134 F.4th 745, 748 (3d Cir. 2025) (concluding that we
did not need to evaluate deference to the Guidelines commentary where the appellant did
not challenge such deference); United States v. Abreu, 32 F.4th 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2022)
(“We need not decide . . . whether we are bound by this commentary or its significance in
the wake of Kisor, for under either approach the result in this case is the same.”);
3
harassment under Pennsylvania law is not “similar to” disorderly conduct or disturbing
the peace because the harassment statute includes a specific mens rea and an actus reus
directed toward a person rather than the public, which reflects the different elements and
heightened culpability associated with Pennsylvania harassment. See United States v.
Elmore, 108 F.3d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 1997) (reaching this conclusion before the adoption of
Application Note 12). New York second-degree harassment is no different. Like
Pennsylvania, see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709(a), New York requires an “intent to
harass, annoy or alarm another person” for a harassment conviction, N.Y. Penal Law §
240.26. The intent element and the target of the act are missing from both the federal
definitions of disorderly conduct, Model Penal Code § 250.2(1), and contempt of court,
18 U.S.C. § 401. 3 Thus, Simmons’s prior conviction is not “similar to” an excluded
offense under the Guidelines, and the District Court properly awarded criminal history
points for the conviction. 4
Even if Simmons’s prior convictions were “similar to” disorderly conduct,
disturbing the peace, or contempt of court, the District Court did not plainly err in
counting his harassment offense toward his criminal history score. “An error is ‘plain’
3
We apply federal law to determine the meaning of the excluded offenses under
§ 4A1.2(c)(1). See Elmore, 108 F.3d at 25-26 (applying the Model Penal Code and
Black’s Law Dictionary to determine the meaning of disorderly conduct under §
4A1.2(c)(1)). Notably, federal contempt shares no elements with New York harassment.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 401, with N.Y. Penal Law § 240.26. In addition, the N.Y. Penal
Law contempt statute, § 215.50, also does not include the harassment statute’s specific
mens rea requirement or an actus reus directed toward another person.
4
Simmons’s conduct also reflects a pattern of criminal activity at risk to recur. In
committing harassment, Simmons violated a protective order involving the same victim
on two occasions within a four-hour period.
4
only if it is ‘clear or obvious’ in light of ‘the state of the law while the case under review
is on appeal.’” United States v. Abrams, 165 F.4th 784, 809 (3d Cir. 2026) (quoting
United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 530 (3d Cir. 2024)). We have never held that
New York harassment is “similar to” an excluded offense under the Guidelines. To the
contrary, we have held that a materially identical harassment statute was not “similar to”
disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace. See Elmore, 108 F.3d at 26. As a result, it
would not be clear or obvious that the District Court should have reached a different
conclusion. 5 Thus, even if the District Court erred, the error could not have been plain.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.
5
“‘[T]he lack of in-circuit case law on [a] specific question does not doom a
finding of plain error . . . so long as the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the
question have uniformly’ adopted an appellant’s position.” Abrams, 165 F.4th at 809
(third alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Scott, 14 F.4th 190, 198 (3d Cir.
2021)). Like us, one of our sister circuits has held that a harassment conviction requiring
an “intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person” is not “similar to” an excluded
offense under the Guidelines. United States v. Norman, 129 F.3d 1393, 1401 (10th Cir.
1997) (concluding that such harassment was not “similar to” excluded offenses). The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded that such harassment is “similar
to” excluded offenses in one case, United States v. Morales, 239 F.3d 113, 118-20 (2d
Cir. 2000), but the state of the law within that circuit is not clear or obvious. In two
unpublished opinions, that court has limited Morales’s holding to its facts. See United
States v. Detke, 650 F. App’x 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2016) (non-precedential); United States
v. Gordon, 126 F. App’x 12, 13 (2d Cir. 2005) (non-precedential). The Morales court
noted as “key circumstances” that the victim was the initial aggressor, and the defendant
hit back once in apparent self-defense, resulting in a harassment conviction. 239 F.3d at
118-19. Here, there is no indication that Simmons’s victim was the initial aggressor, and
Simmons twice violated a protective order in committing harassment, distinguishing the
instant case from Morales.
5