United States v. John Pollard
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 6, 2026
Docket26-1860
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 26-1860
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOHN COURTNEY POLLARD,
Appellant
_____________________________
Appeal from the U.S. District Court, W.D. Pa.
Chief Judge Cathy Bissoon, No. 1:24-cr-00031-001
Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
Submitted Sep. 23, 2026; Decided Nov. 6, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
PORTER, Circuit Judge. John Courtney Pollard threatened to kill an election worker
during the 2024 elections. He pleaded guilty to transmitting interstate threats and the
District Court sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment. Pollard argues that the District
Court procedurally erred at sentencing by not applying a four-level Sentencing Guidelines
reduction for threats evidencing little or no deliberation. But the record demonstrates that
the District Court would have imposed the same sentence if it calculated the advisory
Guidelines range with the reduction Pollard sought. We will affirm.
I
In September 2024, an election worker recruited volunteers over Facebook to watch
the polls on Election Day. Pollard sent the election worker a text message expressing
*
This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent.
interest. Nine minutes later, Pollard sent her three more text messages, each containing
threats of violent harm and death.
After the FBI traced the messages to Pollard, a grand jury indicted him with one
count of making interstate threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875. Pollard pleaded guilty
without a plea agreement.
Before the sentencing hearing, the government and Pollard informed the District
Court of their positions regarding the advisory Guidelines range. The government argued
for a two-level enhancement to the offense level because “the offense involved more than
two threats.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2A6.1(b)(2)(A) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n
2024). Applying that enhancement would have yielded an advisory Guidelines range of ten
to sixteen months’ imprisonment. Pollard argued for a four-level reduction to the offense
level because his “offense involved a single instance evidencing little or no deliberation.”
Id. § 2A6.1(b)(6)(B). Applying the reduction and not the enhancement would have made
Pollard’s advisory Guidelines range zero to six months’ imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court rejected applying the “more than two
threats” enhancement. It found Pollard’s offense conduct to be “more akin to a continuing
thought” expressed through three different text messages. App. 122. It also rejected the
reduction because Pollard showed “deliberation in getting the number,” “typing the
number” out, then “deciding to reach out with something that wasn’t a threat initially,” and
then “not having heard back, [to] reach out again with a threat.” App. 129.
Because it did not apply the enhancement or reduction, the District Court calculated
the total offense level to be ten and the criminal history category to be one, yielding an
2
advisory Guidelines range of six to twelve months’ imprisonment. After calculating the
advisory Guidelines range, the District Court heard testimony from Pollard’s victim. The
victim described the fear Pollard caused her to feel, which was compounded by political
violence in the lead-up to the 2024 election. The District Court also heard testimony from
one of Pollard’s acquaintances who described their long friendship. The District Court then
heard Pollard’s allocution.
The District Court sentenced Pollard to ten months’ imprisonment and one year of
supervised release and imposed a $5,000 fine. During sentencing, the District Court
explained that it had taken a “holistic view” of the case after balancing Pollard’s acceptance
of responsibility and lack of criminal history with the serious nature of the offense, the
need to protect the public, and the need for just punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
App. 148. The District Court said that “ten months would have been the Court’s sentence”
regardless of whether it applied the enhancement or reduction. Id. at 149. That’s because,
in the District Court’s judgment, “[t]here [was] no scenario under which a lesser sentence
would be sufficient.” Id. The District Court also explained that it determined a sentence of
imprisonment was “required” for general and specific deterrence. Id. at 150.
Pollard timely appealed. After he did so, the District Court reiterated its sentencing
decision when it denied Pollard’s motions for bond pending appeal and to postpone or
reschedule his self-report date.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). A miscalculation of the advisory
3
Guidelines range is a procedural error subject to harmless-error review. United States v.
Raia, 993 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2021). A Guidelines error is harmless when the record
demonstrates a “high probability” that the sentencing Guidelines miscalculation did not
affect the sentence imposed. United States v. Jackson, 132 F.4th 266, 278 (3d Cir. 2025)
(quoting Raia, 993 F.3d at 195). We have defined “high probability” to mean a “sure
conviction” that the district court would impose the same sentence. Raia, 993 F.3d at 195
(citation omitted).
III
Pollard argues that he was entitled to the little-or-no-deliberation reduction because
his threatening messages resulted from an aberrational impulse. The record demonstrates
“that the sentencing Guidelines range did not affect the actual sentence,” so we do not
decide whether the District Court erred when it declined to apply the
little-or-no-deliberation reduction. United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 387 (3d Cir.
2013) (citation modified).
The District Court said that it would have sentenced Pollard to ten months’
imprisonment regardless of the Guidelines enhancement or reduction. That type of
“explicit statement” by the Court “help[s] to improve the clarity of the record, promote[s]
efficient sentencing, and obviate[s] questionable appeals.” Id. at 389; cf. Molina-Martinez
v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 200–01 (2016) (explaining, on plain-error review, that the
record may demonstrate through “relevant statements by the judge” that a defendant was
not prejudiced by a Guidelines error).
4
Pollard attacks the District Court’s statement as a “generic disclaimer.” Appellant’s
Br. 39. But the record confirms that the Court meant what it said. It conducted a thorough
sentencing hearing after reviewing all the parties’ submissions, including their positions on
the advisory Guidelines range. It extensively discussed the facts concerning the
enhancement and reduction and ultimately decided not to apply either. Cf. Zabielski, 711
F.3d at 387–88 (explaining that the erroneous application of an enhancement is more likely
to be harmless where the District Court “correctly apprehended both the facts underlying
that enhancement and the significance of those facts”).
The District Court also discussed Pollard’s crime and life and thoughtfully
considered the parties’ arguments, describing the case as “one of the tougher cases” it had
decided. App. 140. The record shows that it “underst[ood] the facts of the case, grasp[ed]
their significance, and incorporate[d] them into a just sentence.” Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 388.
That is the “most important” aspect of sentencing. Id. The record shows “a high
probability” that the Court would have imposed the same sentence even if it calculated the
advisory Guidelines range with the reduction Pollard sought. Id. at 387. Thus, we find that
even if the District Court miscalculated the advisory Guidelines range, that error was
harmless.
We also reject Pollard’s other arguments for vacating his sentence. First, Pollard
argues that the difference in the Guidelines range could have been the difference between
incarceration and a non-carceral sentence, requiring remand. Under his proffered
Guidelines range, the District Court could have imposed a sentence of probation without
conditions of confinement. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 5C1.1(b) (U.S. Sent’g
5
Comm’n 2024). The Guidelines range the District Court calculated, in Zone B of the
sentencing table, permitted the Court to impose a sentence of probation with conditions of
confinement. Id. § 5C1.1(c)(3). We have never mandated remand based on whether the
advisory Guidelines range falls within Zone A or B of the sentencing table.1 The District
Court clearly explained its rationale for rejecting a non-carceral sentence.
Second, Pollard argues that the District Court did not calculate what the Guidelines
range would have been with the reduction and never recognized the need for a variance to
reach a ten-month sentence. But the record demonstrates it knew the different Guidelines
ranges and the necessity of a variance to reach its sentence under Pollard’s proffered range.
See Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 389–90. The Court stated that it would impose the same sentence
regardless of the reduction or enhancement. That statement necessarily means that it would
do so under three potential advisory Guidelines ranges: (1) the range the government
sought, with the enhancement; (2) the range Pollard sought, without the enhancement and
with the reduction; and (3) the range it calculated. As the enhancement and reduction were
the only disputed parameters that could have affected the Guidelines range, the District
Court obviously recognized that applying the reduction would require an upward variance
to ten months.
Finally, Pollard compares this case to United States v. Newkirk, 174 F.4th 336 (3d
Cir. 2026), where we held that a time-served sentence was substantively and procedurally
unreasonable, given a Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. Id. at 338. He
1
In the District Court, Pollard recognized that the Court had discretion to impose a
sentence of probation under “[e]ither assessment of the guideline range.” App. 90.
6
relies on our statement that the greater the variance from the Guidelines range, the “fuller
[the] explanation” for the sentence required. Id. at 344 (citation omitted). Unlike in
Newkirk, however, the District Court here provided a thorough explanation of its reasons
for the sentence imposed. And the difference between the bottom of Pollard’s proffered
Guidelines range and the sentence he received was ten months, not over seven years. Id. at
339. Thus, Newkirk does not help Pollard. In short, the record demonstrates that the District
Court would have sentenced Pollard to ten months’ imprisonment regardless of what the
Guidelines advised.
* * *
For the forgoing reason reasons, we will AFFIRM the District Court.
7