People v. Fontenot CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketD085326
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Fontenot CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085326
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(San Bernardino Super. Ct.
v. No. FBA1100269)
JOSE LUIS FONTENOT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Lisa M. Rogan, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Jose Luis Fontenot appeals from his third resentencing hearing
following his conviction of two murders and two direct appeals. He contends
the trial court erred in declining to dismiss two firearm enhancements
because, in finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, it failed to
appreciate the fact that he will be in prison for life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) regardless of any enhancements. We conclude that to the
extent there was error, it was harmless because the court clearly indicated
its view that dismissing the enhancements would not be in the interests of
justice on the record here. We therefore affirm the resentencing order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2011, Fontenot was charged with the murder of his stepfather
(Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and it was alleged that he personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death
in committing the offense (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)). While he was in
custody, the police learned that he was also responsible for killing a truck
driver in 2009, when he was 17 years old. (People v. Fontenot (Jan. 14, 2019,
D074575) [nonpub. opn.] (Fontenot I).) Accordingly, in November 2011, he
was also charged with the truck driver’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 2)
and with personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great
bodily injury and death in committing that offense. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–
(d).) The multiple murder special circumstance was also added to the
charges. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)
In September 2016, a jury deadlocked on count 1 and the court declared
a mistrial on that count. The jury convicted Fontenot of second degree
murder on count 2, however, and found true the firearm enhancement.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Following retrial on count 1, in February 2017, a jury convicted Fontenot
of first degree murder and found true the firearm enhancement and the
multiple murder special circumstance. The court originally sentenced
Fontenot to LWOP on count 1, consecutive to 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement. It stayed the sentence on count 2, but imposed a consecutive
term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement on that count.
On appeal in Fontenot I, we conditionally reversed count 2 and
remanded for the trial court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing based on
a change in the law prohibiting the prosecution from charging juveniles in
adult court in the first instance. We also directed the trial court on remand
to resentence Fontenot in light of its error in staying the term on count 2
(in the event it reinstated the conviction and sentence on that count) and
another change in the law granting the court discretion to strike the firearm
enhancements. On remand, the court found Fontenot was appropriately
tried in adult court, reinstated his conviction on count 2, and resentenced
him to LWOP on count 1, consecutive to 15 years to life on count 2, plus two
consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancements. (People v.
Fontenot (Apr. 26, 2023, D079573) [nonpub. opn.] (Fontenot II).)
On a second appeal, we again conditionally reversed count 2 and
remanded for the trial court to conduct another juvenile transfer hearing
based on a further amendment to the law requiring the prosecution to prove
a defendant is suitable for adult court by clear and convincing evidence.
(Fontenot II, supra, D079573.) We also ordered the trial court to resentence
Fontenot yet again, taking into account clarifications on its discretion to
strike or reduce the firearm enhancements and to impose concurrent terms.
(Ibid.) On remand, the juvenile court applied the heightened standard, found
Fontenot was suitable for adult court, and reinstated count 2.
3
With respect to his sentence, Fontenot urged the court to dismiss the
firearm enhancements based on yet another change in the law—namely,
amendments to section 1385 that require courts deciding whether to dismiss
enhancements in the interests of justice to place “great weight” on certain
mitigating factors, including the defendant’s juvenile age at the time of the
offenses and evidence establishing the offenses were connected to mental
illness. (Id., subd. (c)(2)(D) & (G).) To the extent the amended statute
required the court to consider public safety, Fontenot posited that dismissing
the enhancements could not endanger the community since his underlying
sentence was LWOP.
Fontenot testified at the resentencing hearing in support of his motion.
He explained that, around 2009, he began to experience mental health issues
and also started using methamphetamine occasionally. The combination
caused hallucinations and violent thoughts. He said he “may have been”
suffering from a mental health condition at the time of the first murder,
but his testimony was unclear as to whether he was having mental health
symptoms during the second. After he was in custody for these offenses, he
was diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. He began receiving
mental health treatment for the first time, including therapy and medication.
The prosecutor argued in response that dismissing the firearm
enhancements would not be in the interests of justice given the circumstances
of the offenses. He asserted that dismissal would endanger the public given
that Fontenot himself admitted his mental health conditions will “stay with
him” and that he committed the murders two years apart. The prosecutor
insisted that Fontenot “certainly would be a danger to the public” if he were
ever released from prison.
4
The resentencing judge was also the trial judge, and she remembered
the case well. In her view, “the evidence was quite clear” that mental health
issues did not play a role in either murder. She specifically recalled a 911
call “during which you could hear both the mother and the sister pleading
with the defendant before he shot [his stepfather] to not do it,” and there was
no indication in Fontenot’s responses that he was experiencing mental health
issues. The evidence instead showed that Fontenot shot his victims in
“reaction” to something “he did not like or that angered him ... .” The court
emphasized that the murders occurred two years apart, “giving the defendant
time to reflect and understand his actions,” and both offenses involved a
“very callous” and “vicious” use of a weapon, as both victims were shot in the
face.
“[T]aking all of that into consideration,” the court declined to dismiss or
reduce the enhancements. Addressing public safety in particular, the court
added: “Again, I’m taking those factors into consideration that being that
these two crimes were separated and distinct, removed by a long distance in
time, again, showing that there was and remains [in] this Court’s view a high
danger to the community because there was time to reflect.” (Italics added.)
DISCUSSION
Fontenot contends the court abused its discretion in declining to
dismiss the firearm enhancements. He specifically claims the court erred
in finding that dismissing the enhancements would endanger public safety
upon examining the circumstances of the two murders and concluding that
he “remains” a high danger to the community. He maintains the court was
supposed to look prospectively and decide whether, in light of his LWOP
sentence, dismissing the enhancements could result in any public danger.
5
Section 1385 generally requires the trial court to dismiss a sentence
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so. (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
In exercising its discretion to dismiss an enhancement, “the court shall
consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that” certain enumerated mitigating circumstances are present. (Id., subd.
(c)(2).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Ibid.) In
this context, “ ‘[e]ndanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (Ibid.)
Distilled down, this means that unless the court finds that dismissing
an enhancement would endanger public safety, the court has discretion to
impose or dismiss an enhancement “provided that it assigns significant value
to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.” (People
v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029 (Walker).) “In other words, if the
court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence
of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize
even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of
the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Ibid.) Conversely, if the
court finds that dismissing an enhancement would endanger public safety,
it is quite unlikely that dismissal would further the interests of justice,
notwithstanding the applicability of any mitigating factors listed in section
1385, subdivision (c)(2). (Walker, at p. 1033.)
6
In deciding whether dismissing a sentence enhancement would
endanger public safety, “the current dangerousness of the defendant is an
appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether
dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public ... .” (People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228 (Gonzalez), italics added.) But
“a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will
impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. A currently dangerous
defendant who will be released from prison within a short timeframe might
be found by the trial court to pose a greater danger to the public than a
defendant who is currently dangerous but who has no prospect of release
from prison until he is elderly.” (Ibid., italics added.) If the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term, the court should also take into account
that his release from prison will depend on approval from the Board of Parole
Hearings and, for murder convictions, the Governor, who will assess the
defendant’s dangerousness when he becomes eligible for parole. (Ibid.)
We review the trial court’s finding that dismissing one or more
sentence enhancements would endanger public safety for an abuse of
discretion. (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.) “As relevant
here, ‘an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on
impermissible factors ... or on an incorrect legal standard.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, we agree with Fontenot that it seems the court did not
meaningfully consider the fact that, even if it dismissed the firearm
enhancements, he would still be in prison for the rest of his life, with no
possibility of parole. In finding that dismissing the enhancements would
endanger public safety, the court focused on its belief that he “was and
remains” a danger to the community. While a defendant’s past and present
dangerousness is a factor to consider, it is not the only factor, especially in a
7
case like this where the defendant is going to be in prison for life regardless
of any enhancements. (See Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)
In any event, remanding for the court to resentence Fontenot yet again
is not warranted. Even if the court found that dismissing the enhancements
would not endanger the community, it would still need to decide whether
dismissing them was in the interests of justice. (See Walker, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1029.) And here, the court made clear it believed justice would
not be served if it imposed any lesser sentence. (See Gonzalez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 231 [“when a trial court misapprehends the scope of its
sentencing discretion, a remand is not warranted if ‘the record “clearly
indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion
“even if it had been aware that it had such discretion” ’ ” (ibid.)]; accord
People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424.) Fontenot invited the court to
place “great weight” on two mitigating factors—his mental health and his
youth. As to the former, the court found that the evidence failed to show
the murders were “connected to” his mental health issues. (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(D).)2 And as to the latter, although Fontenot was a juvenile (17 years
old) at the time of the 2009 murder (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(G)), the court
2 We reject Fontenot’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing
to file a written resentencing brief with his various psychological reports
attached. Counsel provided evidence of Fontenot’s mental health history by
asking the court, who presided over the trial proceedings and remembered
the case well, to take judicial notice of the reports and by having Fontenot
testify at the resentencing hearing. We see no reasonable probability the
court would have exercised its discretion more favorably had counsel
presented the same information in a different format. (See People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 [defendant must show “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different”].)
8
apparently found this circumstance “ ‘neutralize[d]’ ” by the fact that he
committed yet another murder two years later (Walker, at p. 1029).3 The
court also emphasized the brutality of shooting the victims in the face as an
aggravating factor tipping the scales toward imposing the enhancements.
Indeed, the court declined to even reduce the firearm enhancements. On
this record, we conclude that any error in deciding whether dismissal would
endanger public safety was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The resentencing order is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
3 In referring to evidence of “countervailing factors” that may
“ ‘neutralize even the great weight’ ” of a legislatively recognized mitigating
circumstance (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029), the Supreme Court did
not specify whether or to what extent it is significant that the countervailing
factor relates to the mitigating circumstance. Here, however, we note that
the trial court’s comments themselves indicate they were factually related.
9