United States v. Williams

Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 27, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 24-7073 (D.C. No. 6:23-CR-00185-JFH-1) EDWARD JAY WILLIAMS, (E.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before HARTZ, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ Edward Jay Williams pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter in Indian country following a motorcycle accident that resulted in the death of Williams’s passenger. Williams was driving without a valid motorcycle license while drunk and under the influence of marijuana. Based on these aggravating facts, and Williams’s extensive history of driving under the influence and other drug- and alcohol-related convictions, the district court imposed a sentence of ninety-six months’ After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined * unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 2 imprisonment—the statutory maximum. Williams appeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantially above-guidelines sentence. We disagree. We hold that Williams waived his procedural challenge below by failing to object to the proceedings in a non-generalized manner. We further hold that the district court adequately weighed the § 3553(a) factors and explained its reasons for the upward variance. It therefore did not substantively abuse its discretion in imposing Williams’s sentence. Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. I. Williams turned forty-six years old on December 8, 2022. As part of his birthday celebration, he and his friends drank shots of whiskey and smoked marijuana. Soon thereafter, Williams and his friend, Clint Walker, decided to ride their motorcycles together. Williams’s romantic partner of eight years, M.R., rode on the back of Williams’s motorcycle. Neither rider wore a helmet. At some point during the ride, Williams ran into the back of Walker’s motorcycle, causing Williams to lose control of his motorcycle and crash. M.R. was ejected from the motorcycle and sustained fatal injuries. Both Williams and Walker admitted to drinking before the accident. Walker told police he drank “a substantial amount,” while Williams claimed to have only consumed “a small amount” of alcohol. R. Vol. II at 5–6. A blood alcohol test indicated an ethyl alcohol content of 0.148 for Walker and 0.138 for Williams, both significantly above the Oklahoma legal limit of 0.08. Police also discovered multiple 2  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 3 Oxycodone pills in Williams’s possession that were prescribed to another individual. Neither Williams nor Walker had a valid driver’s license to operate a motorcycle. Williams pleaded guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter in Indian country in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1151, and 1153. The Probation Office proceeded to compile a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) that detailed Williams’s extensive criminal history. From 1998 to 2010, Williams was convicted of reckless driving, attempting to illegally take a deer, driving under the influence (“DUI”), public drunkenness, and four other alcohol-related crimes. In 2011, Williams was convicted of another DUI, as well as public intoxication. Between 2016 and 2018, Williams was arrested on three separate occasions and eventually pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of marijuana, two counts of possession of methamphetamine, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of unlawful use of a police radio. In 2021, Williams pleaded guilty in tribal court to possession of marijuana and methamphetamine. And in 2023, Williams pleaded no contest in tribal court to criminal conspiracy. In total, Williams had previously been convicted of twenty counts across state and tribal courts, including fifteen counts related to drug or alcohol abuse. 1 1 Consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines, only eight of these convictions were considered when calculating Williams’s Criminal History Category. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(e) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2024) (excluding prior sentences of less than one year and one month that were imposed more than ten years prior to the instant offense); id. § 4A1.2(i) (excluding sentences imposed by tribal courts). 3  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 4 After accounting for Williams’s acceptance of responsibility in this case, the PSR recommended forty-six to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment based on the applicable Sentencing Guidelines provisions. Before sentencing, however, the government moved for a five-level departure and/or upward variance and, consequentially, requested the statutory maximum ninety-six-month sentence. The government argued that Williams’s extremely reckless conduct, high blood alcohol level, history of alcohol and drug abuse, and other criminal history warranted this higher sentence. The government also suggested that the district court should consider Walker’s ten-year state court sentence—which arose from his similar conduct in the same motorcycle accident—to avoid “disparate sentencing . . . between defendants.” R. Vol. I at 14. Williams timely objected to the government’s motion. He argued that it would be improper for the court to consider Walker’s ten-year state court sentence because it would create a disparity between federal sentences. R. Vol. I at 21–22 (citing United States v. Branson, 463 F.3d 1110, 1112 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Adjusting federal sentences to conform to those imposed by the states where the offenses occurred would . . . create disparities within the federal system, which is what § 3553(a)(6) is designed to discourage.”)). Williams also argued more generally that an upward departure or variance would be inappropriate under the facts of his case. At sentencing, the district court heard argument on the motion from both parties. The government contended that, even if the court did not consider the possibility of a disparity between Walker’s and Williams’s sentences, Williams’s 4  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 5 previous DUIs and other drug-related convictions “show[ed] a blatant disregard for the law and someone who has not learned their lesson.” R. Vol. III at 42. This “pattern,” the government claimed, “ultimately caught up with [Williams], resulting in the death of the victim in this case.” Id. And based on the remaining sentencing factors, the government argued the proper way to hold Williams accountable was to apply the statutory maximum sentence of ninety-six months’ imprisonment. Williams responded that, were the district court to consider Walker’s state court sentence, it should take into account that “state sentences are often carried out differently, and [Walker] would likely only serve three to four years.” Id. at 43. He additionally argued that the guidelines range in the PSR already accounted for Williams’s criminal history and noted that Williams’s DUI convictions were more than a decade old. After hearing from Williams and three of the victim’s family members, the district court proceeded with sentencing and determined that Williams’s case warranted an upward variance. The court started by noting that Sentencing Guideline § 5K2.14 authorized an upward departure to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense when the “public health or safety was significantly endangered.” R. Vol. III at 67. The court then identified “the totality of the circumstances regarding the offense of conviction, [Williams’s] prior convictions, and his history of drug use,” individually and in combination, as justifying a variance. Id. at 68. In particular, the court noted that Williams’s “blood alcohol content was nearly twice 5  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 6 the legal limit” 2 and that he had a “significant criminal history,” including “two prior DUI convictions, and two prior drug offenses.” Id. at 68–69. As such, “[a] guideline sentence here would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense, would not promote respect for the law, would not provide just punishment for [the] offense. It would not adequately deter criminal conduct.” Id. The district court ultimately sentenced Williams to ninety-six months’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum for involuntary manslaughter—followed by a three-year term of supervised release. It summarized its sentencing determination as follows: [B]ased upon the factors I outlined just a moment ago, a sentence outside the advisory guideline range is reasonable and sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the requirements and objectives set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]. The sentence is needed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, serve as an adequate deterrent to Mr. Williams, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense, as well as provide correctional treatment for the defendant in the most effective manner. Id. Following the imposition of the sentence, the district court encouraged Williams to take advantage of drug treatment programming while incarcerated and asked defense counsel whether he had anything further to add on behalf of Williams. 2 The district court initially asserted that Williams’s blood alcohol content was 0.147—a misstatement of Walker’s reading—and not Williams’s actual, slightly lower reading of 0.138. Id. at 68. However, this error was corrected by the government, prompting the court to state that it “stand[s] corrected” but that it still “stand[s] by [its] previous statement to state that that is almost twice the legal limit.” Id. at 75. 6  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 7 Williams’s counsel responded by “object[ing] to the sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable” without further elaboration. Id. at 74. The court noted the objection and adjourned the hearing. Williams now appeals. II. Consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), courts must impose sentences that are “‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with’ the four identified purposes of sentencing: just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation.” Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62, 67 (2017) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). More specifically, § 3553(a) instructs sentencing courts to consider seven enumerated factors, including the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” the applicable sentencing range established by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities” between similarly situated defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In doing so, the court “must ‘engage in a holistic inquiry of the § 3553(a) factors’ while respecting the unique circumstances of each individual defendant.” United States v. Guevara-Lopez, 147 F.4th 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149, 1174 (10th Cir. 2014)). On appeal, “we review sentences imposed by the district court for reasonableness.” United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1091 (10th Cir. 2019). A sentence must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Id. Procedural reasonableness looks at “whether the district court committed any error in calculating 7  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 8 or explaining the sentence.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009)). Substantive reasonableness considers “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Friedman, 554 F.3d at 1307). Williams challenges his sentence on both procedural and substantive grounds. We discuss, and reject, his arguments in turn below. A. 1. The procedural reasonableness inquiry “focuses on the manner in which the sentence was calculated.” United States v. Masek, 588 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009). A sentence is therefore procedurally unreasonable when the district court “fail[s] to calculate (or improperly calculat[es]) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to consider the § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). To preserve a claim of procedural error on appeal, a defendant must have raised the issue before the district court, as appellate courts generally do not consider issues not passed upon below. United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019). This practice is particularly intuitive when the alleged procedural error relates to a district court’s explanation of a sentence: Where a defendant fails to 8  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 9 “alert the court that its explanation was inadequate,” the court has no opportunity to “cure any error by offering the necessary explanation.” United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). Further, “a party does not preserve an issue merely by presenting the issue to the district court in a vague and ambiguous manner or by making a fleeting contention before the district court.” United States v. Ansberry, 976 F.3d 1108, 1125 (10th Cir. 2020) (citation modified); see also United States v. DeRusse, 859 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 2017) (declining to address one of the government’s sentencing challenges for failure to “raise[] a sufficiently specific objection” before the district court). When a defendant fails to object to an alleged procedural flaw below, we generally review for plain error. See United States v. Jackson, 82 F.4th 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2023). But when a defendant “fails to preserve an issue [below] and also fails to make a plain-error argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the issue waived (rather than merely forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all.” Leffler, 942 F.3d at 1196. 2. Williams argues the district court committed procedural error by inadequately explaining (1) how the need to avoid sentencing disparities justified Williams’s sentence and (2) why Williams’s criminal history warranted an upward variance. 3 3 Williams’s third claim of procedural error was withdrawn in his Reply Brief based on his acknowledgment that the claim was not adequately preserved. 9  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 10 However, Williams only objected to his sentence on procedural grounds in a sweeping and generalized way before the district court. See R. Vol. III at 74 (“We object to the sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.”). No specific procedural issues—and certainly not the issues now raised on appeal—were identified for the court to address. Without an objection containing the requisite specificity, the district court was robbed of the ability to “cure any error by offering the necessary explanation.” Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1247. While Williams did raise a specific concern about basing an upward variance on Walker’s state court sentence in his written sentencing memorandum, his procedural reasonableness claims on appeal rest upon the alleged failure of the court to explain the sentence, not upon its supposed disagreement with Williams’s arguments. As such, Williams needed to “alert the court that its explanation was inadequate, which ordinarily would require an objection after the court had rendered sentence.” Id. Accordingly, we conclude that Williams failed to preserve his claim of procedural error. And since Williams has “also fail[ed] to make a plain-error argument on appeal,” we deem the issue waived “and decline to review the issue at all—for plain error or otherwise.” Leffler, 942 F.3d at 1196. B. 1. In contrast to procedural reasonableness challenges, “when [a defendant’s] claim is merely that the sentence is unreasonably long, we do not require [him] to 10  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 11 object in order to preserve the issue.” United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Generally, claims of substantive reasonableness need not be raised in district court.”); but see United States v. Garley, 186 F.4th 1237, 1256 (10th Cir. 2026) (Hartz, J., concurring) (writing separately “to note that [Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020)] has been read as saying that claims of substantive reasonableness need not be preserved [but] does not really say that”). Accordingly, we review the substantive reasonableness of Williams’s sentence for an abuse of discretion, rather than for plain error. See United States v. Lucero, 130 F.4th 877, 886–87 (10th Cir. 2025). “A substantive challenge concerns the reasonableness of the sentence’s length and focuses on the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and the sufficiency of the justifications used to support the sentence.” United States v. Lente, 647 F.3d 1021, 1030 (10th Cir. 2011). If the district court “properly weighs the § 3553(a) factors and offers valid reasons for the chosen sentence,” we will uphold even a substantial variance. United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298, 1304 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). We apply this standard with “substantial deference to the district court,” and accordingly, we will reverse only if a sentence is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Peña, 963 F.3d 1016, 1024 (10th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). This deference derives from the district court’s “superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.” 11  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 12 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Nevertheless, our appellate review is robust and “must not be regarded as a rubber stamp.” United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 836 (10th Cir. 2008). Additionally, we “do not apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences outside the guidelines range.” Cookson, 922 F.3d at 1090. But when reviewing a district court’s decision to impose a lengthier sentence than recommended by the guidelines, we “must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (quotation marks omitted). “A ‘major’ variance should have ‘a more significant justification than a minor one.’” Lente, 759 F.3d at 1158 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). In sum, to obtain reversal a defendant must establish that the sentence imposed “exceed[s] the bounds of permissible choice, given the facts and the applicable law.” United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007)). 2. Williams offers five arguments in support of his claim that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. None persuade us. First, Williams argues there was no compelling reason for an above-guideline sentence, let alone the statutory maximum, because “no facts removed this case from the mine-run of drunk driving involuntary manslaughter cases.” Aplt. Br. at 13. We 12  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 13 disagree. As the district court noted, Williams had a blood alcohol content significantly above the legal limit, and he also smoked marijuana before the crash. Further, Williams was driving without a valid motorcycle license, and neither Williams nor M.R. was wearing a helmet. These aggravating facts bring Williams’s conduct outside of the “mine-run” case. And, as the district court correctly noted, courts are empowered to depart, or vary, upward to reflect the seriousness of the offense conduct if the offense “significantly endangered” the “public health[] or safety” consistent with 2024 Sentencing Guideline § 5K2.14. Second, Williams claims his sentence creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity with other federal defendants who committed the same crime with similar records. In particular, Williams points to data from the Sentencing Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing Information (“JSIN”) platform that indicates that none of the seven other defendants sentenced between 2018 and 2022 with Williams’s criminal history score and offense level received an above-guideline sentence. In his view, the district court must have improperly relied on the government’s comparison to Walker’s state court sentence given that the district court cited avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities as a justification for Williams’s sentence. While we acknowledge Williams’s sentence creates a disparity vis-à-vis his identified comparators, we reject his contention that this disparity is unwarranted. We agree that district courts must take into consideration the need to avoid creating unwarranted sentencing disparities, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), and we have counseled courts to “meaningfully comment[] on the unwarranted sentence- 13  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 14 disparities factor before imposing [ ] a large variance,” Guevara-Lopez, 147 F.4th at 1186. Here, while not specifically addressing the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, the district court meaningfully discussed how the aggravating offense characteristics and Williams’s “significant criminal history” would have rendered a within-guidelines sentence inadequate. R. Vol. III at 68–69. The enumeration of these considerations “adequately explained [the court’s] reasons for the sentence imposed.” Guevara-Lopez, 147 F.4th at 1187. As such, the “bare national statistics” pulled from JSIN “cannot defeat the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation.” Id.; see also Lucero, 130 F.4th at 887 (“[R]eports on national averages are not dispositive because they do not provide information into a defendant’s individual history and characteristics, and [the defendant] does not explain how he is similarly situated with those of the national average.”). Relatedly, there is no evidence that the district court improperly relied on Walker’s state sentence in determining Williams’s sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the government did not dispute Williams’s argument that reliance on state court sentences would be improper; instead, the government justified its requested sentence without referencing this argument. See R. Vol. III at 42. And at no point did the district court reference Walker’s sentence when imposing Williams’s sentence. Third, Williams contends that the district court improperly based the upward variance on his criminal history—a criminal history that was already accounted for in his guideline calculation. 14  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 15 Again, we disagree. The district court discussed both the number and the nature of Williams’s offenses, emphasizing his previous drug- and alcohol-related convictions. The content of these prior convictions is important because there are many ways in which defendants can accumulate criminal history points; here, Williams’s unrelenting accumulation of drug and alcohol convictions is suggestive of a higher likelihood that he will recidivate. Further, many of these prior convictions—including both of Williams’s DUIs—did not actually generate criminal history points because of their age or because they were imposed by a tribal court system. As such, the district court was well within its rights to vary upward on the basis of Williams’s “prior convictions[] and his history of drug use.” Id. at 68; see also U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3 (2024) (authorizing an upward departure to account for the inadequacy of the defendant’s criminal history category, such as when relevant prior sentences are not included in a defendant’s criminal history computation). Fourth, Williams asserts that the district court gave no weight to his acceptance of responsibility. However, the district court did not ignore Williams’s acceptance of responsibility. In fact, it explicitly noted Williams’s acceptance of responsibility had been accounted for in the advisory guideline range. We can thus reasonably infer that the court found that Williams’s acceptance of responsibility was insufficient to mitigate against the other aggravating considerations present in this case. To override this determination would be to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors, which goes beyond our standard of review. See United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 15  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 16 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A]s long as the balance struck by the district court among the factors set out in § 3553(a) is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable, we must defer to that decision even if we would not have struck the same balance in the first instance.”). Fifth, Williams suggests that the district court improperly based his sentence on the need to provide correctional treatment. He correctly notes that district courts may not “impos[e] or lengthen[] a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.” Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 332 (2011). Nonetheless, we reject this argument because it misconstrues the district court’s statements. The court simply stated that, alongside the other § 3553(a) considerations, the need to “provide correctional treatment for the defendant in the most effective manner” justified the sentence. R. Vol. III at 69. And after imposing the sentence, the court would go on to suggest that Williams “take advantage of the tools that would be offered to you if you participate in [the] drug treatment program” while incarcerated. Id. at 74. These stray remarks are insufficient to support the claim that the district court altered Williams’s sentence to allow him to complete correctional programming or promote his rehabilitation. Unlike the court in Tapia, which crafted the defendant’s sentence to be “long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program,” 564 U.S. at 334, the district court in this case merely (1) listed one of the § 3553(a) factors—which expressly instruct district courts to consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to provide the defendant with . . . correctional treatment in the most effective manner”—and (2) encouraged Williams to participate in the drug treatment programs 16  Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 17 offered in prison. This does not amount to the substantial connection between the length of the sentence and a district court’s statement regarding correctional treatment or rehabilitation that we have previously found problematic. See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1118 (10th Cir. 2017) (concluding the district court erred when it “expressly predicated the imposed sentence, in part, on th[e] desire” to give the defendant “enough time in prison to turn his life around”); United States v. Mendiola, 696 F.3d 1033, 1042 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding the district court erred when it imposed a significant upward variance “for the express purpose of giving [the defendant] enough time to participate in a 500-hour prison drug and alcohol rehabilitation program” (citation modified)). We cannot fault the district court in this case for merely reciting the § 3553(a) factors and briefly “suggest[ing]” to Williams that he “participate in [a] drug treatment program” while in prison. R. Vol. III at 74; see also Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334 (“A court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs. To the contrary, a court properly may address a person who is about to begin a prison term about these important matters.”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence. 17 Appellate Case: 24-7073 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 18 III. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. Entered for the Court Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge 18