United States v. Hector Ciprian
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-2504
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-2504
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
HECTOR CRUZ CIPRIAN,
Appellant
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, D.N.J.
Judge Jamel K. Semper, No. 2:24-cr-00781-001
Before: HARDIMAN, MCKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
Submitted: Nov. 16, 2026; Filed: November 18, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION ∗
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Hector Cruz Ciprian appeals his judgment of sentence imposed on revocation of his
supervised release. We will affirm.
I
In 2021, Cruz Ciprian, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, pleaded
guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to false
representation of a social security number and aggravated identity theft in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
∗
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to Third Circuit I.O.P.
5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
The District Court sentenced Cruz Ciprian to 30 months’ imprisonment and three
years’ supervised release. One condition of his supervised release prohibited him from
returning to the United States, if deported, “without prior permission of the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security.” App. 11. In August 2022, after completing his term
of imprisonment, Cruz Ciprian was deported to the Dominican Republic.
Cruz Ciprian had unlawfully returned to the United States by 2023. In July 2024,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers arrested him at Newark Liberty International
Airport, and a grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
indicted him on charges of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1).
Citing that criminal charge, his probation officer petitioned for revocation of his supervised
release. In February 2025, Cruz Ciprian pleaded guilty to illegal reentry and made his initial
appearance on the revocation petition.
In July 2025, the District Court held back-to-back sentencing hearings on the
supervised release violation and the illegal reentry conviction. Each hearing had its own
case number and transcript, and the second hearing started immediately after the first. For
the supervised release violation, the Government recommended a sentence within the
Guidelines range, which was eight to 14 months. Defense counsel requested a sentence of
time served, which “would be about 14 months.” App. 64.
Before the Court pronounced sentence on the supervised release violation, the Court
engaged in the following exchange with counsel for Cruz Ciprian:
COURT: Does Mr. Ciprian wish to address the Court on this matter or does he want
me to just roll into sentencing?
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DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, Your Honor, given that we probably have—that we
and the government probably have more arguments to make—
COURT: You’ll save your water.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yeah, but I mean, Mr. Cruz—
COURT: I understand.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: —Mr. Cruz—I just worry about him being confused if he’s
asked to speak now. He’s certainly expressed to me that he’s very sorry for violating
his terms of supervised release.
COURT: And just for clarity purposes, he is not confused about what’s happening
today with respect to sentencing for violation of supervised release and sentencing
for the offense he pled guilty to; correct?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Not at all, Your Honor.
COURT: But I understand his position. Do you want to talk to him briefly or I can
just roll into it?
INTERPRETER: I’m sorry, Your Honor. Let me go over there.
(Off-the-record discussion between defendant and his counsel.)
...
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, Mr. Cruz waives his right to allocute on the
[violation of supervised release].
COURT: Thank you, sir.
App. 64–65. The Court then found that Cruz Ciprian violated his supervised release,
revoked his term of supervision, and sentenced him to 14 months’ imprisonment to run
consecutive to any previous sentence.
Before transitioning to sentencing on the illegal reentry conviction, the Court added
that “[w]e are going to give a sentence coming up now; so I just want the record to be clear
it is the Court’s intent that this violation of supervised release be consecutive to what the
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Court will impose next.” App. 67. Defense counsel objected that it was “premature to rule”
that the supervised release revocation sentence would run consecutive to “a sentence that
Your Honor has not yet imposed.” App. 67–68. The Court clarified that, “when we get to
the next part of the sentencing I will hear you. To the extent that you say something that
persuades the Court, I will entertain that; but that is the Court’s position and that is the basis
for its sentencing with respect to the [violation of supervised release].” App. 68. The
Government took no position on whether the sentences for violation of supervised release
and the illegal reentry conviction should be consecutive.
The District Court then proceeded to sentencing on the illegal reentry conviction.
Given Cruz Ciprian’s extensive criminal history, his Guidelines range was 24 to 30 months’
imprisonment and up to three years’ supervised release. The Government recommended a
sentence within the Guidelines. Counsel for Cruz Ciprian again requested a time-served
sentence (about 14 months’ imprisonment). The Court then stated: “Mr. Ciprian, you have
the right to address the Court and to speak on your own behalf. . . . I see you rising. I’ll
hear from you, sir.” App. 97. Cruz Ciprian then gave a lengthy allocution, taking
responsibility and expressing regret.
The District Court rejected Cruz Ciprian’s request for a downward variance and
sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutive to the 14-month sentence it
had imposed for the supervised release violation.
Cruz Ciprian timely appealed only his revocation sentence.
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II 1
A
Cruz Ciprian first argues that the District Court erred by failing to personally address
him and advise him of the right to allocute before imposing sentence for his violation of
supervised release. Because Cruz Ciprian did not raise this objection during his violation
of supervised release sentencing, we review for plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia,
759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). To obtain relief, Cruz Ciprian must show:
“(1) there was an ‘error’; (2) the error was ‘plain’; (3) the error prejudiced or ‘affect[ed]
substantial rights’; and (4) not correcting the error would ‘seriously affect[] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Greenspan, 923
F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 734–36
(1993) (alterations in original)).
A district court’s failure to personally address a defendant when inviting him to
allocute is generally plain error. Greenspan, 923 F.3d at 156. The court must
“unambiguously address . . . the defendant” and “leave no room for doubt that the
defendant has been issued a personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing.” United States
v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
To be plain, an error must be “obvious on the face of the record.” Greenspan, 923 F.3d at
156; see also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). Here, the Court made a
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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third-person invitation for Cruz Ciprian to allocute, to which his counsel responded. After
an off-the-record discussion with Cruz Ciprian assisted by an interpreter, his counsel
represented to the Court that Cruz Ciprian waived his right to allocute at that time and
would allocute during sentencing on the illegal reentry conviction. Although we have no
direct precedent for this type of allocution error, we assume that the Court’s failure to
unambiguously address Cruz Ciprian personally was plain error.
It is not clear that this error affected Cruz Ciprian’s “substantial rights.” We presume
prejudice when a defendant shows an allocution error “could have played a role in the
district court’s sentencing decision.” United States v. Plotts, 359 F.3d 247, 249–50 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting Adams, 252 F.3d at 287) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “[w]e have
never held this presumption is irrebuttable.” Greenspan, 923 F.3d at 156. The Government
seeks to rebut this presumption by arguing that Cruz Ciprian essentially received a time-
served sentence for his violation of supervised release, so the District Court could not have
imposed a lower sentence. We need not resolve this issue, however, because Cruz Ciprian
does not satisfy the fourth element of plain-error review.
Even assuming Cruz Ciprian can meet the first three elements, the District Court’s
error does not “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Greenspan, 923 F.3d at 147 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We “sparingly” exercise discretion to grant relief under the fourth element of plain-error
review, id. at 157 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), considering “the
seriousness of the error in the context of the entire case,” Adams, 252 F.3d at 285.
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We are unconvinced that the District Court’s failure to personally invite Cruz
Ciprian seriously affected the legitimacy of the proceedings. The record shows the Court
invited allocution (albeit indirectly), allowed counsel to consult privately with Cruz
Ciprian, and moved on only after assuring itself that Cruz Ciprian understood the
proceedings and after counsel indicated to the Court that Cruz Ciprian waived allocution
at that time. The record does not indicate that he misunderstood his right to allocute or did
not knowingly waive allocution for his revocation sentencing. To the contrary, Cruz Ciprian
did not object when his counsel told the Court that he was waiving allocution, and just one
hour later, he provided a lengthy allocution on his sentencing for the illegal reentry
conviction. Since there is no indication that the allocution error “seriously” affected the
“fairness” or “integrity” of his sentencing for the violation of supervised release, we decline
to exercise our discretion to grant him relief.
Because Cruz Ciprian has failed to clear the high bar for plain-error review, we will
not vacate the District Court’s sentence on that basis.
B
Cruz Ciprian also requests resentencing because the District Court “prematurely”
ran his sentence for the violation of supervised release offense consecutively to his sentence
for the illegal reentry offense, which the Court imposed approximately an hour later.
Ciprian Br. 22–23, 30. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), “[i]f multiple terms of imprisonment
are imposed on a defendant at the same time, . . . the terms may run concurrently or
consecutively.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Cruz Ciprian contends that the Court could not run
his sentences consecutively because the illegal reentry sentence “had not yet [been]
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imposed.” Ciprian. Br. 26. Because Cruz Ciprian objected to the Court’s decision as
“premature” when sentenced on the violation of supervised release, we exercise plenary
review of this statutory interpretation issue. United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 851 (3d
Cir. 2006).
We reject Cruz Ciprian’s argument that the District Court violated § 3584(a). First,
Cruz Ciprian embraces a cramped reading of § 3584(a), such that a district court may run
terms of imprisonment consecutively only if they are imposed exactly “at the same time.”
No court has adopted such a narrow reading. Cruz Ciprian urges this Court to join a
“chorus” of circuits that “unanimously agree[] . . . the plain language of § 3584(a) bars
district courts from running a sentence consecutive to a sentence that has not yet been
imposed in another federal case.” Ciprian Br. 13. But those circuit courts have merely read
§ 3584(a) to prohibit one federal district court from preemptively running a sentence
consecutively to a sentence imposed either in a pending proceeding before a different
federal district court or in any future proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Ramon, 958
F.3d 919, 922 (10th Cir. 2020) (precluding a federal district court from ordering a sentence
to run consecutively to any federal sentences imposed by a later court). Cruz Ciprian’s
sentences were imposed within one hour of each other by the same judge. There is thus no
concern that a “first court would be usurping the sentencing authority that § 3584(a)
declares belongs exclusively to the second court.” Id.
Second, even if we adopted Cruz Ciprian’s narrow reading of § 3584(a), the District
Court did not make a final decision whether to run the two sentences consecutively until
after the Court imposed sentence for his illegal reentry conviction. When sentencing him
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on the violation of supervised release, the Court merely stated its “intent” to run the
sentences consecutively and reserved final judgment on this issue until after it heard
arguments and Cruz Ciprian’s allocution for the illegal reentry conviction. App. 67–68. The
Court’s forecasting of its intent did not deprive Cruz Ciprian “of a decision made with the
benefit of full information.” Ciprian Br. 30. Therefore, the District Court did not violate
§ 3584(a).
* * *
For the stated reasons, we will affirm.
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