Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 25-2880 ___________________________ United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Courtney Antron Brown, Jr. Defendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City ____________ Submitted: October 19, 2026 Filed: November 6, 2026 [Unpublished] ____________ Before KELLY, BENTON, and JUSTIN D. SMITH, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. Courtney Antron Brown, Jr. pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court * varied upward from a maximum guidelines range * The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. sentence of 71 months, sentencing him to 84 months in prison. Brown appeals. Having jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, this Court affirms. Brown believes that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court (1) varied upward based on criminal history already accounted for by the guidelines and (2) failed to properly account for mitigating factors in Brown’s history and characteristics. This Court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). It “will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.” Id. at 464. I. Brown contends that the district court improperly varied upward based on criminal history already accounted for by the guidelines. But here, the district court properly applied the § 3553(a) factors, concluding that Brown’s criminal history justified the variance. Zeroing in on his adult criminal activity, the district court noted that, despite Brown’s youth, he had an extensive criminal history involving violence and needed to be deterred from further criminal conduct. “It is well-settled that factors taken into account in calculating the advisory guidelines range can form the basis of an upward variance and that a sentencing court may vary upward based on criminal history already accounted for by the Guidelines.” United States v. Ivory, 146 F.4th 693, 698 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion by doing so here. -2- II. Brown also argues that the district court failed to properly account for mitigating factors. These include his age, upbringing, and lack of education. However, at Brown’s request, the district court heard testimony from Brown’s mother about his childhood. The district court specifically cited that testimony and Brown’s age as mitigating factors when it declined to adopt the government’s request for a 96-month sentence and instead imposed an 84-month sentence. As the district court explained, “I believe this is a seven-year sentence. And I want to reduce that 96-month term by one year, again, based on the positive aspects his mother talked to the Court about and in light of Mr. Brown’s very young age.” “Mere disagreement with how the district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors does not justify reversal.” United States v. Johnson, 151 F.4th 978, 985 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). The district court found the testimony from Brown’s mother and his age compelling and noted that as a part of the sentencing colloquy. Brown may believe that the district court should have given these factors more weight, but it was not a clear error of judgment for the district court to weigh them differently than Brown would have. ******* Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. ______________________________ -3-