United States v. Zachary Rugen
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-12342
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-12342
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ZACHARY RUGEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00057-VMC-AEP-1
____________________
Before GRANT, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Zachary Rugen pleaded guilty to wire fraud and illegally
possessing a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 60
months of imprisonment. On appeal, Rugen argues that his
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sentence should be vacated because (1) the district court did not
give him advance notice that it would consider an upward
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines, and (2) his sentence was
procedurally unreasonable. Both arguments are meritless.
We therefore affirm.
I.
In April of 2019, Rugen began to work as a contract
employee at RMS Protective Services, a small cybersecurity service
provider. But before starting at RMS, Rugen had developed a
criminal history. In 2012, he pleaded guilty to impersonating a
DEA agent on multiple occasions—one of which involved him
crashing his car into another driver, exiting his vehicle while
holding a handgun, forcibly unbuckling the other driver’s seatbelt,
and then instructing the other driver to show his license. In May
of 2013, he pleaded guilty to a hit-and-run that caused over $1,000
in property damage. And in October of that same year, he was
found guilty of driving while intoxicated.
RMS was aware of Rugen’s DWI conviction (but not the
other convictions). Even so, it decided to hire him as a contractor.
According to RMS’s operations officer, Rugen portrayed himself as
“a broken person who had risen above his personal faults and was
a changed man,” and the company accepted this explanation
because it believed “in the power of redemption.”
Over the next two years, Rugen assumed more
responsibilities at RMS. In January of 2021, RMS hired Rugen as a
full-time employee, giving him the title “Director of Global
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25-12342 Opinion of the Court 3
Personnel Management” and entrusting him with sensitive
financial information. Around that same time, RMS secured a new
contract to provide cybersecurity services to a large facility in
France, and it tasked Rugen with managing much of the job.
But instead of faithfully carrying out his duties at RMS,
Rugen charted a different course—one that involved embezzling
over $500,000 from RMS through its French contract. Over the
course of about a year, Rugen falsified invoices received from
French companies, used those invoices to overcharge RMS, and
then funneled the excess funds into a bank account that he could
siphon from. Rugen then used nearly all of the money to enrich
himself and his family. Most of it went toward his personal
gambling outings at a Florida casino; a vacation to Disney World
got upward of $20,000; and another chunk was used for his
children’s private school tuition. In total, Rugen used at least
$473,372.01 of his fraudulent proceeds.
By March of 2022, RMS discovered that Rugen was making
unauthorized payments to himself. But the company did not
immediately seek any legal action against Rugen. In fact, it “kept
him on for another six to seven months” as he “continually made
promises to pay.”
But by May of 2023, Rugen had not made good on his
promises, and the FBI got involved. Agents interviewed Rugen,
who admitted to most of the alleged embezzlement. The agents
also searched his home, where they discovered, among other
things, multiple 9mm handguns and several 9mm rounds.
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Rugen was arrested and charged with wire fraud under
18 U.S.C. § 1343. He was also charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition under
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Rugen accepted a plea
agreement, which required him to pay about $473,372.01 in
restitution.
At sentencing, the district court heard testimony about the
harm that Rugen’s embezzlement caused to RMS and its
employees. For instance, the prosecutor read a victim statement
from RMS’s owner and CEO, Lyndon Brentnall. Brentnall claimed
that Rugen had “refused to pay a number of companies and
individuals monies for work,” that he “cared little for the
employees in France,” and that he spent most of his time “boasting
online about being a millionaire.” Brentnall also stated that
multiple RMS employees had their jobs “placed in jeopardy by his
lies.” Another RMS official, Matthew Nelson, claimed that the
company had “no insurance” to address Rugen’s embezzlement
because the company at that time “was literally four people.”
Afterward, the district court told Rugen’s counsel that it was
“considering varying upward from the guidelines” based on this
testimony. Although the prosecution only sought 46 months of
imprisonment, the district court stated that it felt compelled to give
a longer sentence because it was “so troubled by somebody taking
money from their own employer.” The court believed that RMS
had shown Rugen “all the consideration in the world” and offered
him “a great opportunity for somebody who has his criminal
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25-12342 Opinion of the Court 5
history.” As the court saw it, Rugen had stolen “from somebody
who [had] shown faith in [him] and opened the door to [him] and
hired [him] and made him part of [its] family,” which was “such an
abuse of trust.” The district court concluded that the
recommended guideline range would not “punish him enough for
what he did” and that “an upward variance [was] in order.”
Rugen’s counsel objected. In particular, he shared what he
called his “understanding” that the district court needed to give
“notice of any upward variance” before sentencing. The court
rejected this argument by telling Rugen’s counsel, “I don’t know
what you’re talking about,” and stating that it has “never given
notice before the sentencing.”
The district court then sentenced Rugen to 60 months’
imprisonment “[a]fter considering the advisory sentencing
guidelines and all of the factors identified in” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Rugen timely appealed his sentence.
II.
We review legal questions about the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure de novo. United States v. Spears, 443 F.3d 1358,
1361 (11th Cir. 2006). When a defendant challenges the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence, we review legal issues de novo and
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d
621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010). 1
1 The government argues that Rugen failed to object to the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence before the district court, which would call for
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III.
Rugen raises two challenges to his sentence. First, he argues
that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure entitled him to
advance notice of the district court’s “upward departure” from the
guideline range. And second, he argues that his sentence was
procedurally unreasonable. Neither contention has merit.
A.
The district court did not commit any error by giving Rugen
an “upward departure” without advance notice. That is so for one
simple reason: the court did not impose an “upward departure” at
all. Instead, it imposed an upward variance, which requires no
advance notice.
When it comes to the Sentencing Guidelines, “departures”
and “variances” are two distinct concepts. A variance is a sentence
imposed “outside the guidelines range” when a court does not
think that the proposed range will “adequately further the purposes
reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Hall, 965 F.3d 1281,
1295 (11th Cir. 2020). The power to vary is simply a consequence
of the advisory nature of the Guidelines, which allows district
plain error review. United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2006).
When Rugen’s counsel was asked if he had “any objections to the sentence or
to the manner in which the Court pronounced [the] sentence,” he responded
“Yes, Judge. We object to the upward variance.” We need not decide whether
this statement was sufficiently “clear and simple” to preserve Rugen’s
procedural reasonableness challenge because his challenge is meritless under
either standard of review. Id. at 819.
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courts to impose above-guideline and below-guideline sentences
on a case-by-case basis. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249,
1258–59 (11th Cir. 2015). A departure, on the other hand, is “a term
of art” under the Guidelines. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708,
714 (2008). Departures are authorized by specific provisions in the
Guidelines that call for “non-Guidelines sentences” under special
circumstances. Id.; see, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (downward departure
for defendants who provide substantial assistance to authorities).
A district court must give notice if it is considering a departure, but
not if it is considering a variance. Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 715–16;
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h).
Here, the district court unquestionably imposed a variance
rather than a departure. To tell the difference, we look to “the
court’s reasoning” for indicia of a variance—especially whether it
refrained from citing “a specific guidelines departure provision,”
whether “its rationale was based on the § 3553(a) factors,” and
whether it determined that “the guidelines range was inadequate”
in light of the defendant’s conduct. Hall, 965 F.3d at 1296. And,
under that approach, all signs point to a variance: the district court
repeatedly stated that “an upward variance [was] in order,” never
cited any specific departure provision, and made clear that it was
going above the guidelines range because the recommended
sentence would not “punish [Rugen] enough for what he did.”
Rugen’s sole argument to the contrary relies on a stray
remark by the district court. At one point during sentencing, the
district court said the following: “[T]he government has asked for
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a guideline sentence and the guidelines are advisory. I can depart
upwards. I can depart downwards.” But in this context, the district
court’s use of the word “depart” while discussing the advisory
nature of the Guidelines was undoubtedly a slip of the tongue. As
we already explained, variances are enabled by the advisory nature
of the Guidelines, whereas departures are enabled by specific
provisions in the Guidelines. And, regardless, we do not give
dispositive weight to a district court’s statement that it granted an
“upward departure” when it “actually granted a variance.” United
States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1316 (11th Cir. 2009). For the
reasons stated, the district court imposed an upward variance
during Rugen’s sentencing, and no advance notice was required.
B.
Rugen next asserts that the district court failed to adequately
address the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, as well as “several factors
warranting a lower sentence.”
We disagree. Rugen never explains what factors he believes
the district court overlooked. And in any case, we conclude that
the sentence was procedurally reasonable.
Procedural reasonableness requires district courts to
“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
When a district court imposes a variance, it must “offer a
justification sufficient to support the degree of the variance.”
United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).
Although this requires district courts to consider the § 3553(a)
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sentencing factors, it is not necessary to explicitly discuss each of
them as if they were a checklist. Id.
Here, the record provides ample explanation for the district
court’s decision. The court repeatedly said that it was imposing an
upward variance on Rugen because of his “abuse of trust,” the need
to “discourage other people” from doing what Rugen did, and its
belief that the guideline range would not “punish him enough for
what he did.” These concerns correspond to several of the § 3553
factors, which the court expressly stated that it had considered.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (“circumstances of the offense”);
id. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (“seriousness of the offense”); id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)
(“adequate deterrence”). We cannot conclude that the court failed
to adequately explain its decision.
* * *
We AFFIRM Rugen’s sentence.