Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 25-2179 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. JONATHAN LÓPEZ-DÍAZ, Defendant, Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge] Before Gelpí, Lynch, and Dunlap, Circuit Judges. Andrew S. McCutcheon, First Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom Rachel Brill, Federal Public Defender, and Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellant. Maarja T. Luhtaru, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee. November 13, 2026 DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Jonathan López-Díaz admitted the violation of bank robbery and illegal possession of a firearm in 2014. After serving a prison sentence for those crimes, López commenced a term of supervised release. Since then, the district court has twice revoked López's supervised release due to repeated violations of his conditions of supervision, including several positive tests for cocaine and marijuana and his admitted use of those drugs. Following López's second revocation, the district court sentenced him to twelve months' imprisonment with no further term of supervision to follow. López appeals that sentence, arguing that the district court misclassified his conditions of release violation conduct, improperly considered retributive factors, and imposed a procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence. We reject López's challenges and thus affirm. I. On July 2, 2014, López pleaded guilty to bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); on November 3, 2014, he was sentenced and subsequently served a ninety-three-month term of imprisonment. Upon completion of that term, on January 24, 2020, he began a five-year term of supervised release. Just over two years later, the United States Probation Office ("USPO") reported to the - 2 - district court that López had violated his supervised release conditions based on domestic violence complaints and a protection order filed against him by his ex-girlfriend. The district court subsequently revoked López's supervised release, and López served a thirteen-month term of imprisonment. He began a second, three-year term of supervised release on April 13, 2023. On October 3, 2025, USPO filed a motion notifying the district court that López had violated the conditions of his second term of supervised release, specifically the conditions to "not unlawfully possess controlled substances" and "refrain from the unlawful use of controlled substances." USPO's motion reported that López tested positive for cocaine four times between September and November 2024 and once for marijuana in September 2025, and that he signed admission forms on four of these occasions. It further reported that López admitted to using controlled substances in August 2024, after which he was enrolled in a random drug testing program and entered an inpatient treatment program that he completed in February 2025. According to the motion, López tested negative for all controlled substances four times between October 2024 and February 2025 and "expressed . . . willingness to remain receiving treatment services." USPO asked the district court to take no adverse action at that time. The district court took no action, instead then ordering that López "remain in the random drug testing program" - 3 - and "attend to all treatment services as instructed by the probation officer." On October 20, 2025, just seventeen days after USPO filed its initial motion, it filed a supplemental motion notifying the court of an additional violation. Specifically, the supplemental motion provided that López violated the condition that he "follow the instructions of the probation officer" by declining to complete his Post-Conviction Risk Assessment questionnaire, despite several follow-ups from his probation officer. According to the supplemental motion, López's probation officer informed him of "the consequences that he might face as a result of not following . . . instructions" and told López "that the [c]ourt w[ould] be informed [of] his noncompliant behavior." The supplemental motion requested that a summons be issued to López to appear before the court "to show cause why his supervised release term should not be revoked." Two more USPO motions followed in quick succession. On October 30, 2025, USPO filed a second supplemental motion notifying the court of additional violations by López. The second supplemental motion reported that López had again violated the conditions to "not unlawfully possess controlled substances" and "refrain from the unlawful use of controlled substances." It noted that López tested positive for marijuana on October 16, 2025. On November 20, 2025, USPO filed a third supplemental motion - 4 - notifying the court that López had violated additional conditions by failing to "notify [his] probation officer within 72 hours" of receiving various traffic citations and failing to attend a scheduled appointment with his drug treatment provider. At his revocation hearing, López did not contest the USPO's reported violations of his conditions of supervised release. His counsel argued, however, that in calculating López's guidelines range, the court should classify his violations as Grade C rather than Grade B. When the court noted binding precedent indicating that López's conduct amounted to a Grade B violation, his counsel contended that the mandatory revocation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583, and the Sentencing Guidelines distinguish positive drug tests from the possession required for a Grade B violation. Counsel refrained, however, from "get[ting] into hypotheticals about how [López could have] conceivably smoke[d] marijuana without actually physically possessing" it. López's counsel then addressed various factors that he argued should mitigate López's sentence, including that López had "apologize[d] to his probation officer," had "receiv[ed] dual diagnosis treatment with a therapist" to address "mental health issues," was "in a stable and supportive relationship with his partner," had been present with his children, had "been working extremely hard in a very difficult job" operating "complicated machinery," and had achieved "economic stability" through a - 5 - contract with Puerto Rico's Department of Housing. Counsel requested that the court decline to impose a sentence of incarceration and instead "focus on [López's] rehabilitation and reintegration to the community," proposing additional conditions of supervised release, such as "a curfew with electronic monitoring" and "increasing the number of days of treatment." The government, on the other hand, sought revocation of López's supervised release. It highlighted López's history of noncompliance with his conditions of supervised release, even after the court declined to act upon the violations reported in USPO's first motion. The government further argued that López had committed a Grade B violation for possessing controlled substances under Puerto Rico law, referencing First Circuit precedent "h[olding] that a defendant's positive [drug] test result and admission of drug use are evidence of . . . possession of . . . controlled substances." And despite acknowledging López's "positive changes" as recounted by his counsel, the government argued that López's disrespect for his probation officer and failure to comply with supervised release conditions justified a longer sentence. The government thus requested nine months of imprisonment with no term of supervision to follow. López's counsel raised several points in rebuttal. He argued that a nine-month sentence would be inconsistent with Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025); emphasized that - 6 - López's communication with his probation officer had improved and that he "no longer ha[d] positive[] [drug tests] in the quantity and types that he had before"; and suggested that López's violations did not indicate that he was "thumbing [his] nose at supervision," and "[s]o giving up on [] López" was not "the reaction that the Supreme Court has instructed." Counsel again requested that the court instead permit López to "complete the rest of his supervision term . . . with additional conditions." In his allocution, López apologized to his probation officer for declining to fill out the questionnaire. López admitted to "ma[king] mistakes" and testing "positive several times," but he insisted that he had "tried to amend [his] conduct and do things in a positive way while struggling with [his] addiction and attending the help that [he was] assigned" by the court. López concluded by requesting the opportunity to "complete [his supervised release] sentence" so that he could "continue to work and be with [his] family." After hearing from the parties, the district court discussed the Supreme Court's decision in Esteras. The court acknowledged that, under Esteras, it could not consider the need that the sentence "reflect the seriousness of the offense or promote respect for the law or provide just punishment." At the same time, the court stated that Esteras does allow the court "to - 7 - afford adequate deterrence to protect the public from additional crimes by the defendant." The court continued: What is confusing about the Esteras case is, what do you do in cases like Mr. López's and others . . . where there has been more than one revocation? Are two revocations sufficient to reflect the seriousness of an offense and to promote respect for the law? Are three? Are four? Are five? We just don't know. And I think that's the point that [Justice] Alito was making in his dissent. That appellate judges . . . don't realize what the practical effects of their opinions are. So when can a revocation consider just punishment? Never? According to Esteras, never. But that's what makes it impractical because what happens when there's a second proceeding or a third proceeding or a fifth proceeding? We've had all of those. So that's what it is -- I'm sure that not only confuses me but confuses most of district judges as Justice Alito says in his dissent. The district court found that López had violated his conditions of supervised released as provided in USPO's motions, and so it revoked his term of supervised release. The court went on to find that López had committed a Grade B violation because his "[u]se of controlled substances involve[d] possession" of those substances, which constitutes a crime under Puerto Rico law with "a term of imprisonment of more than one year." Accordingly, the court calculated an advisory guidelines range of six to twelve months' imprisonment, based on López's Criminal History Category of II and Grade B violation. - 8 - Turning to López's sentence, the district court stated that it considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3583, emphasizing "the nature and circumstances of . . . López's violation[s], as well as his history and characteristics." The court remarked that it was López's second revocation and that "[h]is first revocation was for new criminal conduct involving domestic violence." The court noted that López "requested further supervision" with "stricter" conditions; however, it stated that López "ha[d] shown that he [wa]s unable to comply with the law or the conditions of supervision imposed on him." Although it observed that "[f]rom October 2024 to February 2025 [López] tested negative [for] all controlled substances" and that López had completed an inpatient treatment program in February 2025, the court concluded that López had "shown a lack of commitment to the supervision process by possessing and using controlled substances," including "six positive results [for] cocaine and/or marijuana." That included two positive tests for marijuana after López started receiving outpatient treatment in February 2025. The court additionally noted López's "fail[ure] to report contacts with law enforcement within seventy-two hours" as required. Finally, the court highlighted that López "refused to answer the probation officer's questionnaire, was disrespectful to the probation officer and the treatment provider," and, even though he apologized, he did so "only after he was told by the probation officer that he was going - 9 - to be referred to the [c]ourt" for revocation proceedings. The court concluded that "López ha[d] not taken advantage of the opportunities provided to him by the [c]ourt or the probation officer that allowed him to remain on supervision while receiving treatment services." Based on his "pattern of noncompliant behavior, the breach of trust, and his history and characteristics," the court imposed a top-of-the-guidelines sentence of twelve months' imprisonment with no term of supervision to follow. López's counsel objected to this sentence on several grounds. First, counsel argued that the court focused on López's violation conduct only and ignored his "large pattern of compliance in terms of the lack of positives over" the year prior. Second, counsel argued that the court violated Esteras by considering the prior revocation of López's supervised release. Third, counsel argued that the court incorrectly classified López's violation conduct as a Grade B, rather than a Grade C, violation. Fourth, counsel argued that the court failed to conduct an "individualized assessment" by "focus[ing] on retribution to the exclusion of" López's "reintegration and rehabilitation." The district court reiterated that it had already discussed its reasoning for finding a Grade B violation and that it did consider both López's negative drug tests from October 2024 to February 2025 and his completion of an inpatient program in - 10 - February 2025. The court nonetheless granted López's request to self-surrender a week later so that he could tend to outstanding work and family obligations, on the condition that he complete a daily urinalysis until then. This appeal ensued. II. "[W]e ordinarily review sentences imposed following revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion." United States v. Rodríguez–Meléndez, 828 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Under this multi-faceted abuse-of-discretion umbrella, we review the sentencing court's factual findings for clear error, its legal conclusions and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and its judgment calls for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mendoza-Maisonet, 962 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); United States v. Colón-Maldonado, 953 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2020). Applying these standards and considering the three arguments raised by López on appeal, we conclude that López's sentence should be affirmed. A. Classification of Violation Conduct López first contends that the district court misclassified his violation conduct as a Grade B violation based on an improper conclusion that he possessed -- rather than just - 11 - used -- controlled substances.1 The court applied § 7C1.1(a) of the guidelines, which defines Grade B violations as "conduct constituting [a non-Grade A] federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year," and Grade C violations as "conduct constituting . . . a federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or less" or "a violation of any other condition of supervised release." U.S.S.G. § 7C1.1(a)(2), (3) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2025). The court found that the conduct at issue constituted a Grade B violation, not a Grade C violation, because López's "[u]se of controlled substances involve[d] possession" of those substances -- a crime under Puerto Rico law with "a term of imprisonment of more than one year." López argues that the district court erred by purportedly inferring drug possession from positive drug tests, and that the latter cannot constitute a Grade B violation. We disagree with the premise of López's argument. The district court never suggested that it relied solely on López's positive drug 1 The parties dispute whether this issue is a legal or factual one. The government asserts that it is factual and that the district court did not "clearly err" in finding that López possessed drugs. López, on the other hand, argues that it is a question of whether "testing positive and admitting use . . . can, as a matter of law, be classified as felony 'possession,'" calling for de novo review. For the reasons we explain below, even giving López the benefit of the de novo review standard, we conclude the district court did not err. - 12 - tests to support a finding of possession. To the contrary, the record included other evidence supporting possession: López's own concessions. At his revocation hearing, López declined to contest the violations asserted by USPO in its motions, including separate violations for "unlawful[ly] us[ing] . . . controlled substances" and "unlawfully possess[ing] controlled substances." López also declined to challenge factual allegations that he (1) signed admission forms with respect to three positive cocaine tests between September and November 2024 and one positive marijuana test in September 2025; and (2) "admitted a relapse in the use of controlled substances" in August 2024. The court thus had before it López's own admissions of use and possession along with the positive drug tests. The district court could rely on these facts in concluding that López committed a Grade B violation under § 7C1.1(a) of the guidelines. In United States v. Brennick, 337 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2003), we held that a positive drug test, along with a defendant's confession to his probation officer that he had used cocaine, sufficed to support a conviction for drug possession under state law and, in turn, support a Grade B violation under § 7B1.1(a) of the guidelines2 for purposes of determining a revocation sentence. 2 Section 7B1.1(a) in the then-applicable version of the Guidelines Manual, which the sentencing court applied to the defendant in United States v. Brennick, 337 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. - 13 - Id. at 109, 111–12. We explained that although we had "no reason to doubt" that a state court would accept the "powerful scientific evidence" of a positive drug test alone as sufficient to show possession, "the evidence was not limited to th[at] drug test" because the defendant also "confessed to using drugs." Id. at 111. That "corroborated confession," we remarked, was "sufficient to uphold a conviction" for drug possession under state law. Id. at 112 (emphasis omitted). The logic of Brennick squarely applies here: López tested positive for controlled substances several times, signed admission forms regarding those positive tests and separately admitted to relapsing in his use of controlled substances, and did not contest allegations by USPO that he violated his conditions of supervised release by both using and possessing controlled substances. Our decision in United States v. Dow, 990 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1993), also supports our decision here. In Dow, a defendant on supervised release tested positive for marijuana on eleven occasions. Id. at 23. He also admitted to the violation of his supervised release condition not to "purchase, possess, use, distribute or administer any narcotic or other controlled substance." Id. Based on that evidence, the sentencing court found that the defendant "possess[ed]" a controlled substance as 2003), is equivalent to § 7C1.1(a) of the November 2025 Guidelines Manual, under which López was sentenced. - 14 - provided by the mandatory revocation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), during his term of supervised release. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that "the use or consumption of marijuana, evidenced solely by laboratory analysis of urine samples, [could] not constitute 'possession.'" Id. We rejected that argument, reasoning that the defendant's admission of the violation, "which was voluntary, knowing and made with advice of counsel," belied a conclusion that "he was not 'in the possession of a controlled substance,' as stated in § 3583(g)." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)). Indeed, the defendant had not "limit[ed] his plea to accepting the results of the laboratory analyses of his urine samples"; to the contrary, he "admitted the possession and use of a narcotic or controlled substance." Id. Like the defendant in Dow, López admitted the violations asserted by USPO in its revocation motions; in doing so, López admitted to independent violations for "unlawful use" and "unlawful[] possess[ion]" of controlled substances. The law-of-the-circuit doctrine instructs that we are "bound by prior panel decisions that are closely on point." United States v. Mao, 174 F.4th 245, 252 (1st Cir. 2026) (quoting United States v. Wurie, 867 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2017)). Brennick and Dow compel the conclusion that the district court did not err in finding that López possessed controlled substances and thus committed a Grade B violation. - 15 - López nevertheless seeks to avail himself of one of our "extremely narrow" and "hen's-teeth-rare" exceptions to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine, id. (quoting Wurie, 867 F.3d at 34), namely, that "authority that postdates the original decision, although not directly controlling, nevertheless offers a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light of fresh developments, would change its collective mind," id. at 252-53 (quoting Lassend v. United States, 898 F.3d 115, 124 n.6 (1st Cir. 2018)). In his view, following certain amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 3583 in 1994 and 2002 (collectively, the "Amendments"), "there is every reason to believe that" the panels in Dow and Brennick would have reached different holdings today. According to López, the Amendments "reflect Congress' recognition that drug use is often tied to addiction and such issues should first be addressed through testing and treatment." Most central to his argument here, López highlights Congress' 2002 addition of the more-than-three-positive-tests trigger for mandatory revocation under subsection (g)(4), which he asserts distinguished mere drug positives from "possession" under subsection (g)(1). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1), (4).3 3 López also highlights three amendments to § 3583 implemented by the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 110505(1)–(3), 20414(c), 108 Stat. 1831, 2016, 2017 (1994): (1) the addition of a mandatory condition that defendants refrain from "unlawful use of a controlled substance" and submit to drug testing, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); (2) the addition - 16 - Nothing in the Amendments indicates that the panel in either Brennick or Dow would have "change[d] its collective mind" and held that positive drug tests, plus the defendant's admission of drug use, cannot establish possession. Mao, 174 F.4th at 253 (quoting Lassend, 898 F.3d at 124 n.6). Our decision in Brennick actually postdated the Amendments, thus confirming that they would not change the panel's decision-making under materially similar facts. See 337 F.3d 107. Even setting this aside, we are not persuaded that the Amendments would have affected our determinations regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in either case. López argues that the 2002 adoption of subsection (g)(4) meaningfully changed the statute. Section 3583(g) provides the grounds for mandatory revocation of supervised relief. Among those grounds are subsection (g)(1), which calls for revocation when the defendant "possesses a controlled substance," and -- after 2002 -- subsection (g)(4), which calls for revocation when the defendant "tests positive for illegal controlled substances more than [three] times over the course of [one] year." of a requirement that courts consider whether "the availability of appropriate substance abuse treatment programs, or a[] [defendant]'s current or past participation in such programs, warrants an exception" to mandatory revocation for "a defendant who fails a drug test," id.; and (3) the elimination of a mandatory minimum imprisonment term and inclusion of a requirement that a discretionary sentence not "exceed the maximum term" of authorized imprisonment, id. § 3583(g). - 17 - 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1), (4). López asserts that subsection (g)(4) "would serve no function" if a single failed drug test could equate to "possession" under subsection (g)(1) and that, accordingly, López's failed drug tests cannot alone support a finding of possession. The argument misses the mark. The district court here did not even apply subsection (g) because that provision deals with mandatory, not discretionary, revocation. Brennick did not apply that subsection, either. See 337 F.3d at 109. Instead, like the district court, Brennick applied the applicable version of § 7C1.1(a) of the guidelines, then appearing at § 7B1.1(a), in classifying the defendant's violation conduct. See id. Brennick applied the same provision to materially similar facts; it controls and remains sound precedent. Moreover, although Dow preceded the 2002 amendment to § 3583(g) and did apply that provision, it too remains good law. Other circuits have reinforced Dow's reasoning after the 2002 amendment. In United States v. Hammonds, 370 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit recognized that "undisputed evidence of drug use, as shown by a positive drug test, together with evidence that the defendant's use was knowing and voluntary," supports a finding that the defendant "possessed the drug" under the mandatory revocation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1). Id. at 1037. The Hammonds court rejected the argument that López makes here that such a rule renders the more-than-three-positive-tests trigger in - 18 - subsection (g)(4) meaningless. Id. It reasoned that whereas subsection (g)(4) "requires revocation of a defendant's term of supervised release where the defendant tests positive for illegal controlled substances at least four times in one year," by contrast subsection (g)(1) "requires revocation only where the district court finds that the defendant had the required mens rea" -- namely, where a preponderance of the evidence shows that he "knowingly and voluntarily used the drug." Id. That mens rea requirement, according to the court, "sufficiently distinguishes [subsection (g)(1)] from subsection (g)(4) so that the latter provision may apply in circumstances where the former does not." Id.4 Accordingly, López's positive drug tests, corroborated by his own admissions of drug use and possession, sufficed to establish possession. The district court did not err in 4 Notably, the Tenth Circuit relied on the "unremarkable observation that a person cannot use a drug without possessing it" to support a finding of knowing and voluntary use by the defendant. United States v. Hammonds, 370 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. McAfee, 998 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1993)). The court cited various other circuits that have likewise equated knowing and voluntary drug use with possession. Id. at 1035-36. In other words, where a defendant tests positive for controlled substances, and no evidence suggests that "ingestion of [those] controlled substances was accidental or inadvertent or in any way not in [the defendant's] control," the "natural inference" is that the defendant "possessed [them] before using them." United States v. Patlan, 31 F.4th 552, 558 (7th Cir. 2022). We need not, however, rely on any such inference here given that López expressly admitted to using drugs. - 19 - concluding that López committed a state "offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year" supporting a Grade B violation. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.1(a)(2). B. Application of Esteras López next argues that the district court erred by considering "retributive factors" when fashioning his revocation sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), in violation of Esteras v. United States. López contends that various aspects of the district court's sentencing rationale improperly considered "backward-looking, retributive factors Esteras prohibits." We disagree. In Esteras, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court "may not consider the retributive purpose of [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(2)(A) before revoking supervised release." 606 U.S. at 203. Thus, a sentencing court may not consider "the seriousness of the offense," "respect for the law," and "just punishment for the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Looking to the language of the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the Court reasoned that despite referencing most of the sentencing factors under § 3553(a), the statute excluded reference to the retributive factors provided in § 3553(a)(2)(A), which suggested that "Congress did not intend for courts to consider" those factors. Esteras, 606 U.S. at 195. The Court therefore concluded that "when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised - 20 - release, . . . a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution." Id. at 196. Noting, however, that "§ 3553(a)(2)(A) speaks only to the 'offense,'" which "can mean only the underlying criminal conviction," the Court cabined its holding to bar retributive considerations for only the "underlying criminal conviction" and declined to address whether a court may consider retribution for "violation of the conditions of the supervised release." Id. at 194 n.5 (emphasis omitted). The Court recognized, but "t[ook] no position" on, the Sentencing Commission's existing policy that "the sentence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision" and that "in revocation proceedings, a court may 'sanction' an offender's 'breach of trust.'" Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, intro. 3(b) (Nov. 2024)). López first contends that the district court's disregard for Esteras is evidenced by its opening remarks, which critiqued the opinion. We disagree. The district court did suggest that Justice Alito made a "good point" in his dissent that appellate judges are often viewed by trial judges as "liv[ing] in a world of airy abstractions" where they "do not give enough thought to the practical effects of their holdings." Id. at 208 (Alito, J., dissenting). It further criticized Esteras as being - 21 - "impractical." Despite its criticism, however, the district court emphasized that Esteras precluded it, in fashioning López's revocation sentence, from "consider[ing] . . . the need for the sentence impose[d] [to] reflect the seriousness of the offense or promote respect for the law or provide just punishment." By contrast, the court noted that it could consider the need to "afford adequate deterrence to protect the public from additional crimes by the defendant and to provide the defendant with needed educational, vocational training, medical care, et cetera." The record confirms that the district court refrained from relying on the retributive considerations in § 3553(a)(2)(A) when sentencing López. It instead considered López's "pattern of noncompliant behavior" as evidenced by his repeated supervised release violations, his "breach of trust" with the court, and "his history and characteristics." In particular, the court highlighted that "[t]his [wa]s [López's] second revocation"; that López "ha[d] shown that he [wa]s unable to comply with the law or the conditions of supervision imposed on him"; that López had "shown a lack of commitment to the supervision process by possessing and using controlled substances," including "six positive results [for] cocaine and/or marijuana"; and that even when "referred to outpatient treatment," López "continued to use controlled substances." The court also noted López's "refus[al] to answer the probation officer's questionnaire" and - 22 - "disrespect[]" towards "the probation officer and the treatment provider" and concluded that "López ha[d] not taken advantage of the opportunities provided to him . . . that allowed him to remain on supervision while receiving treatment services." Absent from the court's analysis was any reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) or the retributive factors precluded by Esteras. We further note that the district court expressly said that it did not consider the retributive factors in § 3553(a)(2)(A). Rather, the court stated that it considered only the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583, emphasizing "the nature and circumstances of . . . López's violation[s], as well as his history and characteristics." We give substantial weight to the district court's statement that it did not consider the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors. See United States v. López-Felicie, 109 F.4th 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Santiago- Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 233 (1st Cir. 2014)). López interprets the record differently. He insists that the district court's statements concerning his prior revocation and failure to "take[] advantage of the opportunities provided to him" through his supervised release revealed its intention to "punish" him for "prior proceedings." This argument, however, is also unavailing. Importantly, the district court's statements do not speak to López's "underlying criminal conviction," the only - 23 - conduct for which Esteras precludes retributive considerations. 606 U.S. at 194 n.5. Esteras did not address what a court may consider with respect to a defendant's "violation of the conditions of the supervised release," id. (emphasis omitted),5 and thus did not overturn our Circuit's precedent permitting consideration of the nature and circumstances of post-offense violations. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Ayala, 101 F.4th 80, 89 (1st Cir. 2024) (applying the principle that "a defendant who violates the conditions of his supervised release breaches the trust that the court has extended to him" and affirming an upwardly variant revocation sentenc