United States v. Alfredo Graham, III
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26-11571
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 26-11571
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALFREDO GRAHAM, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00009-AW-MAF-4
____________________
Before ABUDU, KIDD, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alfredo Graham, III, appeals his sentence of 24 months’ im-
prisonment followed by 364 days of supervised release, upon revo-
cation of his supervised release for violating several conditions of
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2 Opinion of the Court 26-11571
release. Graham argues the District Court abused its discretion by
imposing a sentence 14 months above the high-end of the applica-
ble guidelines range.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2020, a federal grand jury charged Graham in a supersed-
ing, multi-defendant indictment with conspiracy to commit wire
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Count One), and aggravated
identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c) (Count Nine).
Graham pleaded guilty to both counts pursuant to a written plea
agreement. Based on a total offense level of 11 and a criminal his-
tory category of II, Graham’s guidelines range was 10 to 16 months’
imprisonment for Count One and 24 months’ imprisonment for
Count Nine, to run consecutively to Count One. The District
Court sentenced Graham to a total of 12 months’ imprisonment:
two months for Count One followed by ten months consecutive as
to Count Nine, followed by 3 years of supervised release. The Dis-
trict Court also ordered Graham to pay restitution in the amount
of $53,823.00. Graham did not appeal his original sentence.
A. The First Violation of Supervised Release
Graham began supervised release on June 17, 2022. On April
14, 2023, a probation officer alleged Graham violated his supervised
release by committing misdemeanor battery and falling behind on
restitution payments. Graham admitted to committing the battery
and was sentenced to one day of imprisonment (with credit for
time served) and three years (minus one day) of supervised release.
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B. The Instant Violation of Supervised Release
In March 2026, a probation officer filed a second petition al-
leging Graham violated his supervised release. The probation of-
ficer amended the petition in April 2026. The amended petition al-
leged Graham had violated the conditions of his supervised release
by:
(1) committing another battery in 2026;
(2) having violent contact with another individual;
(3) failing to notify the probation officer within 72
hours of being arrested or questioned by law enforce-
ment and receiving a citation for failing to carry or
exhibit vehicle registration and driver’s license;
(4) failing to notify the probation officer of being ar-
rested or questioned by law enforcement and receiv-
ing a citation for having a sign or covering on wind-
shield;
(5) and (6) travelling outside the Northern District of
Florida without permission on two separate occa-
sions; and
(7) violating the conditions of his pretrial release in a
pending domestic violence case.
At the revocation hearing, Graham admitted to violations 3,
5, and 6, and the Government declined to pursue the remaining
violations. The District Court advised Graham that his admissions
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4 Opinion of the Court 26-11571
exposed him to a maximum of two years imprisonment and an ad-
ditional term of supervised release. Graham acknowledged that he
understood the potential sentence and confirmed his admissions to
each violation. The District Court accepted his admissions and de-
termined that, based on his criminal history category of II and the
Grade C violations, the applicable guidelines range was four to ten
months’ imprisonment.
The Government then introduced evidence to show Gra-
ham’s history and characteristics under the § 3553(a) factors, and
that Graham had trouble complying with the terms of supervised
release. It introduced, without objection: (1) the police report re-
flecting Graham’s most recent battery charge, (2) the “no contact
order” with the victim, entered following the battery, and (3) a later
police report showing that Graham was at the victim’s house when
he was arrested for violating the terms of his supervised release.
After consulting with probation, the Government recom-
mended incarceration without an additional term of supervised re-
lease because Graham’s conduct suggested that further supervision
would be ineffective. The Court responded:
Why wouldn’t the answer be to do both [incarcera-
tion and supervision]? I get that he’s not doing well on
supervision. He’s had lots of opportunities and got a
below-guideline sentence initially, got a below-guide-
line sentence on the last revocation. And I can under-
stand from probation’s perspective that it might not
go well, but we do have the public protection and de-
terrence aspect of things. I mean, I look at this case
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26-11571 Opinion of the Court 5
and the deterrence is a big piece of things. This is
somebody who is just not avoiding unlawful activi-
ties. Not complying with these requirements that are
designed to protect the public. I would think, if for no
other reason than public protection and deterrence,
an additional term of supervision would be appropri-
ate.
In response, the Government explained that it had relied on
the probation officer’s recommendation: “Probation deals with this
person on a very regular basis and has . . . perhaps, the best insight
as to where they’re at and what to do with them at this point.”
The Court then asked the probation officer to explain her
recommendation against additional supervision. The probation of-
ficer stated that, based on her experience supervising Graham, Gra-
ham’s repeated conduct while on supervised release suggested he
would continue “to do what he wants to do regardless of what
[probation] [had] to say about it.” The officer further explained that
Graham failed to make consistent monthly restitution payments
and instead only made lump-sum payments after probation inter-
vened. The probation officer believed Graham made payments
only when confronted with the possibility of further court proceed-
ings.
The Court allowed Graham to respond to the Govern-
ment’s evidence. Graham addressed the police report reflecting his
most recent battery charge. He stated, “this is not a standard do-
mestic violence case,” and explained he adamantly denied the
charge and intend[ed] to fight the charge if the state proceeded with
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6 Opinion of the Court 26-11571
prosecution. He argued that, although the 911 caller had reported
physical contact, the victim’s sworn written affidavit did not de-
scribe “any sort of punching, kicking, anything that would typically
be there with domestic violence.
Graham then emphasized that the instant revocation pro-
ceeding concerned only his admitted violations of failing to report
law enforcement encounters and travelling to Georgia without
permission. He characterized his admitted violations as “technical”
and requested a sentence at the bottom of or below the guidelines
range, without an additional term of supervised release.
The District Court sentenced Graham to 24 months’ impris-
onment followed by 364 days of supervised release. The Court also
announced that Graham’s conditions of release would generally re-
main unchanged, except that the prior condition prohibiting vio-
lent contact with the alleged victim would be replaced with a con-
dition prohibiting any contact with her.
In explaining the sentence, the Court first noted that the cal-
culated guidelines range was four to ten months’ imprisonment.
The Court then stated that it agreed with the probation officer that
Graham was an individual who would “do what he wants to do.”
The Court continued:
If I look at the history and characteristics here, we
have someone who has committed crimes before the
fraud that led to this initial underlying case. He got a
below-guideline sentence then based on [an] expecta-
tion that he learned his lesson and was going to start
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26-11571 Opinion of the Court 7
living in compliance with the law and what’s required
of him. Then he did not [live in compliance with the
law] and had this earlier domestic violence incident
that led to another below-guideline sentence of only
one day incarceration followed by a new term of su-
pervised release. . . . Again, this was an incident
where someone, you know, after the initial below-
guideline sentence, has an opportunity to get through
this term of supervised release and just doesn’t com-
ply. And in addition to that, has this other criminal ep-
isode. Then is back on a new term of supervised re-
lease, and we’re seeing the violations that we have
now.
The Court also rejected Graham’s characterization of the admitted
violations as minor technical infractions.
The Court stated that the “biggest consideration” and “big-
gest driver” of the above-guidelines sentence was the need to deter
future misconduct by Graham and the need to protect the public.
In particular, the Court stated that Graham’s previous below-
guidelines sentences had failed to deter Graham from further mis-
conduct. The Court stated that it made an individualized determi-
nation, considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, the violation re-
port, and the sentencing guidelines in arriving at the sentence.
After the District Court imposed the sentence, Graham ob-
jected to the overall reasonableness of the sentence. The Court
overruled the objection but noted it for the record. Graham timely
appealed.
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II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Graham argues that the District Court abused its
discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence of 24
months’ imprisonment followed by 364 days of supervised release.
He contends that the sentence, which exceeded the advisory guide-
lines range of 4 to 10 months’ imprisonment and represented the
statutory maximum, was greater than necessary to achieve the sen-
tencing goals under § 3553(a) and § 3583.
A. Legal Standard
When a defendant violates the terms of his supervised re-
lease, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) permits district courts to revoke the
defendant’s supervised release and impose a prison term. United
States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2016). Before doing so,
however, the district court must consider “the factors set forth in
section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6),
and (a)(7).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The court may not consider the
retributive factor in § 3553(a)(2)(A). Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S.
185, 188, 195, 145 S. Ct. 2031, 2037, 2040–41 (2025).
We review the substantive reasonableness of a district
court’s sentence upon revoking supervised release for abuse of dis-
cretion. United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2023). In
doing so, “we examine whether the sentence is substantively rea-
sonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the
§ 3553(a) factors.” Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936. The party challenging
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the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable.
Id.
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to af-
ford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant
weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac-
tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174
(11th Cir.2006) (en banc)).
A district court must state the reasons for its imposition of a
particular sentence, but it need not state that it explicitly considered
each of the § 3553(a) factors or discuss each factor. United States v.
Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2023). Instead, the district
court’s acknowledgment that it considered the § 3553(a) sentenc-
ing factors and the parties’ arguments is sufficient. Id. Additionally,
“the weight to be accorded to any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and we will
not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors.”
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022). Further,
“[a] district court’s failure to specifically mention certain mitigating
factors do[es] not compel the conclusion that the sentence crafted
in accordance with the § 3553(a) factors was substantively unrea-
sonable.” United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1330 (11th Cir.
2024) (internal quotation marks omitted, second alteration in orig-
inal). The district court need not discuss all mitigating evidence. Id.
“Instead, [a]n acknowledgment the district court has considered
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10 Opinion of the Court 26-11571
the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original).
If the district court determines that a sentence outside the
advisory guidelines range is warranted, it must consider the extent
of the variance and ensure that a compelling justification supports
the degree of variance. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50, 128
S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We may take the degree of the variance into
account, but we do not presume a sentence outside the guideline
range is unreasonable, and we accord due deference to the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors support its chosen deci-
sion. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
“We will only vacate a defendant’s [revocation] sentence if
we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district
court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
of reasonableness sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936 (internal quotation omitted).
B. Reasonableness
Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by im-
posing a sentence above the sentencing guidelines’ range after find-
ing it was necessary to deter further criminal conduct by Graham
and to protect the public.
First, the Court did not fail to consider relevant sentencing
factors or give significant weight to improper considerations. As
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26-11571 Opinion of the Court 11
detailed above, the Court considered at length the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant. It noted Graham’s repeated violations of his supervision
conditions, even after he received two below-guidelines sentences,
and it considered Graham’s repeated violations as evidence that
those sentences had not achieved sufficient deterrence. Because
§ 3583(e) expressly permits consideration of the need to deter fu-
ture criminal conduct and protect the public, the Court reasonably
concluded that a more substantial sentence was necessary to ad-
dress Graham’s continued misconduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Trailer,
827 F.3d at 936.
Second, although Graham characterizes the admitted viola-
tions (failure to report a law enforcement encounter and two in-
stances of unauthorized travel) as merely “technical,” the District
Court acted within its discretion by rejecting that characterization.
The violations demonstrated to the Court that Graham continued
to disregard supervision requirements even after his first revoca-
tion proceeding.
Third, the District Court did not disregard Graham’s miti-
gating circumstances. Graham emphasized his employment, pro-
gress toward becoming a productive member of society, and the
absence of controlled substances in his system. The District Court
heard those arguments and expressly stated that it had considered
everything presented at the hearing, the § 3553(a) factors, and the
advisory guidelines. Because the Court was not required to discuss
each mitigating factor individually, the record does not establish
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12 Opinion of the Court 26-11571
that the Court abused its discretion by failing to mention specific
mitigating factors. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th at 1330. The Court acted
within its discretion in assigning greater weight to Graham’s re-
peated noncompliance, the need for deterrence against future of-
fenses, and the need to protect the public. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th at
1265.
III. CONCLUSION
The District Court conducted an individualized assessment
of the facts, balanced competing considerations, and appropriately
determined that Graham’s sentence was warranted by the facts of
the case. The District Court’s sentence was reasonable and did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.