Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 1 of 13 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13074 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ALEXANDER LESZCZYNSKI, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00155-MSS-SPF-1 ____________________ Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Alexander Leszczynski appeals his below-guidelines sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment for wire and bank fraud. He argues that the district court clearly erred in denying him a USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 2 of 13 2 Opinion of the Court 25-13074 two-point acceptance of reasonability reduction, and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. After review, we affirm. I. Background Leszczynski was charged with eight counts related to wire and bank fraud and illegal monetary transactions. Part of his fraud scheme involved submitting fraudulent Payment Protection Program (“PPP”) loans during the COVID-19 pandemic and “filing a fraudulent warranty deed purporting to transfer property owned by two homeowners to a fictitious corporation he controlled.” United States v. Leszczynski, No. 24-14067, 2025 WL 2826935, at *1 (11th Cir. 2025) (unpublished). While awaiting trial in the fraud case, Leszczynski attempted to hire a hitman, who happened to be an undercover agent, to kill those homeowners. Id. As a result of his actions, Lesczynski was also charged in a separate case with attempted murder-for-hire and obstruction of justice. Id. In the fraud case, Leszczynski initially entered a written plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of wire fraud and one count of bank fraud in exchange for the government dropping the remaining fraud charges.1 United States v. Leszczynski, No. 23-13335, 2024 WL 3103305, at *2 (11th Cir. 2024) (unpublished). However, after entering a plea before the 1 At this same hearing, Leszczynski also entered an open plea of guilty to the attempted murder-for-hire and obstruction of justice charges. Leszczynski, 2024 WL 3103305, at *2 n.1. He was ultimately sentenced to 200 months’ in the murder-for-hire case. United States v. Leszczynski, No. 24-14067, 2025 WL 2826935, at *2 (11th Cir. 2025) (unpublished). USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 3 of 13 25-13074 Opinion of the Court 3 magistrate judge but before the district court had accepted his plea, Leszczynski filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that another person “was responsible for all the alleged fraud” and that he had been coerced and manipulated into taking a plea. Id. A few days later, he filed a motion to clarify, stating that he wanted to maintain his plea. Id. At a hearing on the motion, Leszczynski stated that “he wasn’t sure” what he wanted to do about his plea while simultaneously stating that “he wanted to pursue a not guilty by reason of insanity defense.” Id. at *3. The district court determined that there was no legal or medical basis for withdrawal of the plea and it adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation thereby accepting the plea. Id. It then sentenced Leszczynski to 210 months’ imprisonment. Id. Leszczynski appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, and we vacated the district court’s decision, concluding that “Leszczynski had the right to withdraw his plea ‘for any reason or no reason’ prior to the district court accepting the plea” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(1). Id. On remand, Leszczynski then entered an open plea of guilty to all eight fraud-related counts. Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). In calculating the guidelines range, the probation officer included a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on Leszczynski’s prior attempts to have someone else confess. Additionally, the probation officer indicated that Leszczynski was not eligible for an acceptance of responsibility reduction because of his prior attempts to withdraw his initial plea claiming he was USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 4 of 13 4 Opinion of the Court 25-13074 innocent and his efforts to persuade others to confess to his crimes. The PSI also noted that, after learning that the government had seized funds in one of his accounts, Leszczynski attempted to have the funds released by submitting a forged Presidential Pardon to the company. Based on a total offense level of 36 and criminal history category of II, the guidelines range was 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. 2 Concerning Leszczynski’s personal history, the PSI indicated that Leszczynski was physically and sexually abused by his father as a child, and that he was sexually abused at the age of 17 by a male couple for whom he did lawn work. He never reported any of the abuse. In 2018, Leszczynski was Baker Acted (i.e., he was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold in Florida) for three days after law enforcement responded to an argument he was having with a woman, and law enforcement questioned him as to whether he was suicidal. He was also placed on suicide watch while in jail after he ingested a razor blade. 3 In his sentencing memorandum, Leszczynski objected to the guidelines calculation, arguing that he should have received a two- level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because after the 2 Counts One, Two, and Three (Wire Fraud) carried a statutory maximum of 20 years’ each. Counts Four and Five (Bank Fraud) carried a statutory maximum of 30 years’ each. And Counts Six, Seven, and Eight (Illegal monetary transactions) carried a statutory maximum of 10 years’ each. 3 He claimed he ingested the razor blade by accident and that another inmate had put the blade in his food. USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 5 of 13 25-13074 Opinion of the Court 5 remand of his case, he pleaded guilty to all eight counts and had engaged in rehabilitative efforts by taking several educational courses in prison and attending church. He maintained that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors supported a downward variance sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment to run concurrently to his sentence in the murder-for-hire case. In support of his requested sentence, he pointed out that (1) his guidelines range was inflated in “large part by the intended loss amount,” which was significantly higher than the actual loss amount because he had not spent any of the money from the fraud scheme; (2) he had been a model inmate over the last two years; and (3) his personal history and mental health issues related to the sexual abuse he suffered as a teen. The government in turn argued for a guideline 262-month sentence to run consecutively to Leszczynski’s sentence in his murder-for-hire case. The government maintained that a sentence at the top of the guidelines range was appropriate based on Lesczynski’s conduct, including that (1) he had sent letters threatening the victims of his warranty deed scheme; (2) he had submitted a forged presidential pardon in an attempt to resecure seized funds; and (3) his offenses caused not only financial harm but also emotional trauma for the homeowner victims that he tried to have killed. At sentencing, Leszczynski argued that the only basis for denying an acceptance of responsibility reduction was based on his pre-remand conduct, but he maintained that the appropriate focus should be on his more recent post-remand conduct which USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 6 of 13 6 Opinion of the Court 25-13074 demonstrated “nothing but acceptance of responsibility.” The government argued that his more recent positive conduct did not outweigh his prior actions which undermined any contention that he accepted responsibility. Further, the government maintained that Leszczynski still did not really accept responsibility as evidenced by recent letters he sent to his mother and friends asking for assistance in “trying to obtain his previously forged fake pardon” and to “find out if it’s legal to pay off the President.” Finally, the government noted that generally where, as here, the defendant received an enhancement for obstruction of justice, an acceptance of responsibility reduction is not appropriate. The district court inquired as to whether Leszczynski had any recent disciplinary history, and the government asserted that there was a battery incident in 2024 where Leszczynski and another inmate “threw water at each other” and a second incident where Leszczynski had to be moved because Leszczynski was threatening another inmate’s girlfriend. 4 Leszczynski argued that the letters to his mother were “not serious requests at seeking a pardon,” and even if they were, “attempting to seek a Presidential pardon ha[d] nothing to do with acceptance of responsibility.” As for his statement about paying off 4 The government did not know how Leszczynski threatened her, but “assume[d] it was verbal.” Leszczynski’s counsel maintained that he denied threatening anyone. USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 7 of 13 25-13074 Opinion of the Court 7 the president, he also wrote “LOL” after it which indicated that he was not serious. The district court noted that the letters certainly undermined any acceptance of responsibility argument. However, the court concluded that, even without the letters, Leszczynski had not accepted responsibility as evidenced by his efforts to have the homeowner victims murdered “and all the other conduct that led to his other conviction associated with the circumstances of this case.” Accordingly, the district court adopted the guidelines calculation in the PSI, concluding that Leszczynski’s advisory guidelines range was 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. Lesczynski then reiterated his arguments from his sentencing memorandum as to why a downward variance was appropriate. Leszcynski then made a statement to the court, apologizing for his behavior and requesting mental health treatment so that he could become a productive member of society. The government asserted that a consecutive 262-month sentence was appropriate to address the financial harm plus the harm to the homeowner victims whom he tried to have killed. The district court varied downward and imposed a total sentence of 168 months’ to run consecutively to the murder-for- hire sentence, to be followed by five years’ supervised release. The district court explained that in determining the sentence it had considered the parties’ arguments, all the parties’ submissions, and the § 3553(a) factors. It further explained that it granted a variance to account for the inflation of the guidelines range based on the USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 8 of 13 8 Opinion of the Court 25-13074 intended loss as opposed to actual loss and to account for Leszczynski’s personal history, “including his unstable upbringing, his past childhood trauma, and his untreated mental health issues.” This appeal followed. II. Discussion Leszczynski argues that the district court clearly erred in concluding that he was ineligible for an acceptance of responsibility reduction and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We address each argument in turn. A. Acceptance of Responsibility Focusing solely on his post-remand conduct, Leszczynski argues that the district court clearly erred in concluding that he had not demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. A defendant is entitled to a two-point reduction of his offense level if he clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Importantly, “[a] defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment [for acceptance of responsibility] as a matter of right.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.3). Rather, to determine whether the reduction applies, the district court must consider, among other factors, the timeliness of the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and whether he truthfully admitted that he engaged in the conduct comprising the offenses of conviction and “any additional relevant conduct for which he is accountable under § 1B1.3.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.1(A), (H)); see also United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1022–23 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Although a guilty plea can constitute significant USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 9 of 13 25-13074 Opinion of the Court 9 evidence of acceptance of responsibility, it may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility.”). “We review the factual findings upon which the denial of the acceptance reduction is based for clear error.” United States v. Roosevelt Coats, 8 F.4th 1228, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021). “[T]he determination of whether a defendant has adequately manifested acceptance of responsibility is a flexible, fact sensitive inquiry” to which we give “great deference.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Thus, we will not set aside a district court’s determination that a defendant is not entitled to a § 3E1.1 adjustment unless the facts in the record clearly establish that the defendant has accepted responsibility.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1022–23. Generally, “[a]n adjustment . . . for acceptance of responsibility is not warranted when a defendant’s conduct results in an enhancement for obstruction of justice.” United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 765 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). Here, the district court did not clearly err in determining that Leszczynski had not clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. Although Leszczynski pleaded guilty to all eight fraud counts on remand, his prior conduct was clearly inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. He filed a motion to withdraw his initial plea maintaining that someone else was responsible for the offenses, and he made multiple attempts to persuade others to confess to his offenses. He also attempted to hire someone to murder the homeowner victims who were set to be witnesses USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 10 of 13 10 Opinion of the Court 25-13074 against him. While he argues that the district court should have focused more on his positive post-remand conduct, the district court was well within its authority to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether his overall conduct was inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility. 5 Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1022–23. Furthermore, Leszczynski also received an obstruction of justice enhancement, which he did not challenge. This enhancement supports the conclusion that an acceptance of responsibility reduction was not warranted. Singh, 291 F.3d at 765. In light of the record before us, we cannot say that “the record clearly establish[es] that [Leszcynski] has accepted responsibility.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1022–23. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief. B. Substantive Reasonableness Leszczynski argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to give appropriate weight and consideration to his untreated mental health issues, the sexual abuse he suffered in childhood, that he spent almost none of the fraudulent proceeds, and that the intended loss amount over inflated the guidelines range. 5 Leszczynski takes issue with the district court’s reliance on the letters that he sent to his mother and friend which purportedly undermined any allegation that he had accepted responsibility. However, we need not address the letters because the district court concluded that, even without the letters, an acceptance of responsibility reduction was not warranted based on the totality of the circumstances and Leszczynski’s prior conduct. As we explain above, this determination was not clearly erroneous. USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 11 of 13 25-13074 Opinion of the Court 11 We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, asking whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court must issue a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a)(2), which include the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id. § 3553(a)(1), (6). Importantly, the weight given to a particular § 3353(a) factor “is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and it is not required to give “equal weight” to the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). “We will not second guess the weight given to a § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable under the circumstances.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). A district court “imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 12 of 13 12 Opinion of the Court 25-13074 to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256 (quotations omitted). “Because that rarely happens, it is only the rare sentence that will be substantively unreasonable.” Id. (quotations omitted). And it is even rarer for a downward variance sentence to be vacated on substantive reasonableness grounds. Id. at 1270. The burden rests on the party challenging the sentence to show “that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” Id. We will “vacate the sentence if, but only if, we ‘are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)). Here, Leszczynski’s argument that the district court failed to consider and give appropriate weight to his untreated mental health issues, the sexual abuse he suffered in childhood, that he spent almost none of the fraudulent proceeds, and that the intended loss amount over inflated the guidelines range is belied by the record. The district court expressly stated that it varied downward from the advisory guidelines range based on these considerations. Although Leszczynski quarrels with how the district court weighed these factors and believes that the court USCA11 Case: 25-13074 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 13 of 13 25-13074 Opinion of the Court 13 should have varied downward more because of them, the weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. Leszczynski has not shown that the district court weighed the sentencing factors unreasonably, “and we will not substitute our judgment” for that of the district court. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356 (quotation omitted). Moreover, Leszczynski’s below guidelines 168-month sentence is well below the possible statutory maximum, which is another indicator of reasonableness. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a sentence that is below the statutory maximum is another indicator of reasonableness). Accordingly, we conclude that his sentence is substantively reasonable. AFFIRMED.