Don R. Clark, Jr. v. City of St. Louis, Missouri
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26-1461
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 26-1461
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Don R. Clark, Jr.; Adonis H. Clark; Sherrie Clark-Torrence; Ashley Boureima
Mourou; A.C., a minor, by and through her mother and next friend, Necole Fisher
individually and as the surviving children of Decedent, Don Clark, Sr.
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
City of St. Louis, Missouri; Nicholas Manasco, in his individual capacity; Thomas
Strode, in his individual capacity
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri – St. Louis
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Submitted: September 24, 2026
Filed: November 16, 2026
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, L.R. SMITH, and TRAYNOR, Circuit Judges.
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TRAYNOR, Circuit Judge.
Detective Thomas Strode of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department
(SLMPD) obtained a warrant to search Don Clark’s residence for illegal guns and
narcotics. As officers entered the residence, Clark shot at the officers but missed.
Officer Nicholas Manasco responded by shooting Clark, killing him. Clark’s
children sued Strode, Manasco, and the City of St. Louis, alleging violations of the
Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and state law. The district court1
granted the officers’ and City’s motion for summary judgment, which Clark’s
children challenge on appeal. We affirm.
I
In May of 2016, Strode received information from a confidential source in
reference to the 4000 block of California Avenue in St. Louis, Missouri. The
confidential source advised several houses on the block were being used to store
illegal narcotics, U.S. currency obtained from distributing the narcotics, and
firearms. The confidential source stated heroin, crack cocaine, and marijuana were
being distributed on the block. Over time, additional confidential sources and
informants flagged the block as a drug-trafficking hub. More specifically, Strode’s
sources and informants identified six addresses involved in drug trafficking,
including Clark’s.
Strode provided one confidential source with photographs from governmental
databases. From the photographs, the confidential source identified Clark and others
as individuals involved in distributing narcotics on the 4000 block. The source told
Strode that Clark “was distributing quantities of marijuana from his residence at
4023 California” and “allowed other individuals from the area to store illicit
narcotics and weapons at [his] residence.” Later, a confidential informant
communicated to Strode that he observed the distribution of controlled substances
at Clark’s residence and other addresses. The informant also claimed to be “familiar
with” Clark, was “aware that he sells marijuana from the residence,” and “stated that
individuals from the block . . . store[d] narcotics and firearms inside [his] residence.”
1
The Honorable Joshua M. Divine, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District and Western District of Missouri.
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Over the course of several weeks during the investigation, Strode conducted
periodic surveillance on the block and the residences flagged by confidential sources
and informants. At the same time, he identified behavior at several of the residences
that “was consistent with the information that had been provided to [him] by the
Confidential Informants and the Confidential Sources.” On January 23, 2017, Strode
“observed foot and vehicle traffic consistent with narcotic trafficking activity” at
several of the residences, including Clark’s. On February 20, 2017, Strode spoke
with a confidential informant who advised him that “there were firearms and
narcotics being stored” in several of the residences, including Clark’s, within the
past twenty-four hours. The next day, Strode submitted a warrant affidavit
requesting a no-knock warrant for Clark’s residence. A judge of the Circuit Court of
the City of St. Louis approved the warrant the same day.
Following issuance of the warrant, Strode submitted a “Mobile
Reserve/SWAT Search Warrant Operations Plan” to the SLMPD SWAT supervisor.
The plan noted Strode’s investigation concerned “weapons and narcotics being
stored at [the] residence,” listed Clark’s prior arrests—including for unlawful use of
a weapon, felonious restraint, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated—and cited
a concern there would likely be handguns on the property. The SWAT team plan
detailed various safety measures, including a drive-by of the target home, a briefing
from Strode, and a use of force review, among various other actions. These measures
were completed by 7:30 pm on February 21, 2017.
Later that night, the SWAT team, including Manasco and three other officers,
executed the search warrant for Clark’s residence. The SWAT team breached the
door with a ram, with officers shouting “Police, search warrant!” The parties dispute
whether the announcement occurred before or during the breach of the door. An
officer deployed a flash-bang device. As Manasco entered the residence, he heard a
gunshot and felt a bullet go by him. Multiple officers testified they heard a gunshot
as well. As Manasco entered the front room, he saw Clark standing in the right corner
of the room. Clark was holding a pistol extended from his body and pointing it right
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at Manasco. Believing Clark was a threat, Manasco fired seven or eight shots at
Clark, killing him. Clark dropped his handgun after Manasco shot him.
A subsequent search of the residence produced a .45 caliber Glock handgun,
boxes of bullets, heroin, hydrocodone, suspected marijuana and other drugs.
Photographs taken after the shooting depict Clark’s body by his bed, a bullet casing
near his body, a bullet hole in the front door, and a bullet on the ground on the other
side of the door.
Clark’s children later sued Strode, Manasco, the City of St. Louis, and others,
asserting claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law. The
district court dismissed several counts in whole or in part, and dismissed all
defendants except Strode, Manasco, and the City. The remaining counts, on which
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers and the City, are
the subject of this appeal: (1) claims against Strode under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
unreasonable search and seizure and insufficient investigation; (2) a claim against
Strode under § 1983 for unlawful authorization of a SWAT team; (3) a claim against
Manasco under § 1983 for unreasonable use of force; (4) derivative Monell claims
against the City of St. Louis; and (5) a claim under Missouri law against Strode for
wrongful death.
II
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Iowa Coal Mining Co. v.
Monroe Cnty., 257 F.3d 846, 852 (8th Cir. 2001). “Summary judgment is appropriate
if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “After
reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court
will affirm the decision if there are no genuine issues of material fact.” Jordan v.
NUCOR Corp., 295 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2002). “When the moving party has
carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show
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that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
On appeal, Clark’s children claim the SLMPD officers conducted an unlawful
search because Strode intentionally included false information in his warrant
affidavit or at least included information with reckless disregard for its accuracy.
“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires a truthful factual showing sufficient to
constitute probable cause in a sworn affidavit.” Williams v. City of Alexander, 772
F.3d 1307, 1313 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A plaintiff can establish a
violation of the Fourth Amendment by proving (1) “that a false statement knowingly
and intentionally, or with reckless disregard to the truth, was included in the
affidavit,” and (2) “that the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to provide
probable cause.” Id. at 1311 (citation omitted) (discussing Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978)). “The test for determining whether an affiant’s statements were
made with reckless disregard for the truth is whether, after viewing all the evidence,
the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or
had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.” United
States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Satisfying
this test is “not lightly met.” Id. The party challenging the warrant affidavit bears
“the burden of proving the intentional or reckless inclusion of false statements in a
warrant affidavit.” United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1443 (8th Cir. 1995).
Clark’s children fail to satisfy this demanding burden. As the record
demonstrates, Strode had multiple leads suggesting illegal drug activity was
occurring in, around and inside Clark’s residence. Several confidential sources and
informants flagged the block as a drug-trafficking hub. A confidential source
specifically identified Clark as one of the individuals involved in distributing
narcotics on the block, and stated that Clark allowed others to use his residence to
store illicit narcotics and weapons. Likewise, a confidential informant told Strode
that he observed the distribution of controlled substances at Clark’s residence and
was “familiar with” Clark. Strode had good reason to rely on this information
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because, as he noted in his affidavit, both the confidential source and informant had
“been used in the past and [had] proven to be reliable.” See Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325, 331–32 (1990) (explaining when “an informant is shown to be right about
some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged, including the
claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity”). Strode independently
verified the information provided by all the confidential sources and informants by
periodically surveilling the block over the course of several weeks, during which he
“observed foot and vehicle traffic consistent with narcotic trafficking activity” at
Clark’s residence. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983) (recognizing “the
value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work”).
With these leads and his own observations, Strode had ample reason to believe there
was “a fair probability contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found in
[Clark’s residence].” See United States v. Shockley, 816 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir.
2016) (citation modified).
To substantiate their claim Strode deliberately or recklessly included false
information in his warrant affidavit, Clark’s children rely on several declarations by
close associates of Clark, including his son, in-home nurse, landlord and a neighbor.
Each one declares he or she never observed illegal narcotics or narcotics distribution
at Clark’s residence. Clark’s children also point to his older age and numerous
physical infirmities to cast doubt on Clark’s capacity to participate in illegal
narcotics distribution. Clark was 63 years old, and his infirmities included poor
vision, poor hearing, diabetes, limited mobility and chronic pain from arthritis. Clark
had no criminal convictions, though he did have a significant history of arrests.
This information, however, does not establish that Strode must have
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the information he and his confidential
sources collected regarding narcotics storage and distribution at Clark’s residence,
much less prove Strode deliberately or recklessly included false information in his
warrant affidavit. Butler, 594 F.3d at 961; Ozar, 50 F.3d at 1443. While several close
associates claimed they never observed narcotics distribution at Clark’s residence
and Clark suffered from several medical conditions, the information Strode relied
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on was provided by his sources and substantiated by his own observations. It was
not knowingly or recklessly included as false information in the warrant affidavit.
Even with all inferences made in favor of Clark’s children, this line of argument is
unsupported by the record. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007) (noting
that at the summary judgment stage, all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party “to the extent supportable by the
record”) (emphasis in original).
Taken together, the facts cited by Clark’s children create nothing more than
“some metaphysical doubt” regarding whether Strode intentionally or recklessly
included false information in his warrant affidavit. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475
U.S. at 586. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Strode.
III
A
Clark’s children claim Strode improperly sought a no-knock warrant for
Clark’s residence under false pretenses. Generally, officers should knock and
announce their presence before executing a search warrant on a home. See Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (holding the knock and announce principle “is
an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment”).
However, officers do not need to make an announcement prior to every entry.
Id. at 934 (“The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should
not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law
enforcement interests . . . the common-law principle of announcement was never
stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances.”). A
no-knock entry is justified if officers have “a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous
or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for
example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S.
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385, 394 (1997). “This showing is not high . . . .” Id. “When determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists, courts must evaluate the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the police officers had a particularized and objective basis for
their conclusion.” United States v. Scroggins, 361 F.3d 1075, 1081 (8th Cir. 2004).
This basis “can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.” White, 496 U.S. at 330.
In this case, a knock and announce entry posed great danger to law
enforcement. First, Strode was aware of Clark’s criminal history, including prior
arrests for unlawful use of a weapon, felonious restraint, and assault. While these
arrests did not ultimately result in convictions, the arrests were still relevant to
Strode’s dangerousness assessment. See Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 966–67 (8th
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (finding a no-knock warrant justified based on “reasonable
suspicion that an armed and potentially dangerous resident will be present” because
the plaintiff’s son had recently been arrested for possession of a sawed-off shotgun).
Second, as referenced previously, the confidential sources and informants told
Strode about the narcotics distributions and narcotics and firearms storage they
observed occurring at Clark’s residence and he corroborated these tips with his own
surveillance. Critically, on February 20, 2017, a confidential informant told Strode
that he had observed narcotics and firearms being stored in Clark’s residence within
the past twenty-four hours, the day before Strode sought the warrant.
These considerations unquestionably provided Strode with an objectively
reasonable basis to request a no-knock warrant. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394;
Scroggins, 361 F.3d at 1081. To do otherwise could have been highly dangerous for
law enforcement. Accordingly, summary judgment for Strode was appropriate.
B
Similarly, Clark’s children argue Strode’s decision to authorize a SWAT team
to execute the no-knock warrant was unreasonable and thus a violation of Clark’s
Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held Strode was entitled to qualified
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immunity on this claim. “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless
(1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
This Court need not address whether Strode violated Clark’s rights because
the alleged right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. See Nord v.
Walsh Cnty., 757 F.3d 734, 738–39 (holding that “[u]nless both [qualified immunity
analysis] questions are answered affirmatively, a [defendant] is entitled to qualified
immunity”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding courts
are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs
of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first”). In Davis v. City of
Little Rock, this Court held that as of September 2017, “it was not clearly established
that using a SWAT team to execute a search warrant, without reason to believe a
SWAT team was necessary, violated the Constitution.” 122 F.4th 326, 330 (8th Cir.
2024) (citation omitted). The search warrant for Clark’s residence was executed on
February 21, 2017, before September 2017.
Clark’s children contend Davis conflicts with this Court’s prior decision in
Z.J. v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners, in which the Eighth Circuit held
that “[a]n officer’s decision to authorize a SWAT team to execute a warrant can, in
some cases, constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.” 931 F.3d 672, 688 (8th Cir.
2019). However, Z.J. was decided in 2019, two years after the relevant events in this
case. Accordingly, even if the SWAT team’s execution of the no-knock warrant was
unreasonable and a violation of Clark’s Fourth Amendment rights, it was not
“clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d
1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2012).
Because it was not clearly established at the time of the incident that deploying
a SWAT team to execute the no-knock warrant violated Clark’s constitutional rights,
Strode is entitled to qualified immunity on the SWAT team claim.
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IV
Clark’s children also contend the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on their excessive force claim. They assert there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether Clark was standing with a gun in his hands and
pointing it towards the officers when they entered Clark’s residence. “The use of
deadly force is reasonable where an officer has probable cause to believe that a
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.” Ellison v.
Lesher, 796 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689
F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012)). More specifically, “[a]n officer’s use of deadly force
is objectively reasonable against armed suspects who point their gun toward
officers.” Smith v. Kilgore, 926 F.3d 479, 486 (8th Cir. 2019).
The district court properly held that Manasco’s use of deadly force was
reasonable under the circumstances. Manasco testified that as officers breached the
door to Clark’s residence and entered, he heard a gunshot and felt the air moving as
a bullet went by him. Multiple officers on the scene corroborated Manasco’s
testimony, stating they also heard or felt a shot go by them as they breached the door
to Clark’s residence. Photos taken after Manasco shot Clark show a bullet hole in
the front door, a bullet on the ground on the other side of the door, and a shell casing
next to Clark’s body. Multiple officers also corroborated Manasco’s testimony that
he saw Clark holding a gun with his arms extended and pointed at officers. Physical
evidence, including the ballistics rod bullet trajectory estimate and the location of
the shell casing, supports Manasco’s account of events.
Against this, Clark’s children have failed to “respond by submitting
evidentiary materials of specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue for
trial.” Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2018). They point to
circumstantial evidence such as Clark’s physical infirmities, including difficulties
raising his arms and carrying items. However, a handgun is not as heavy as the items
Clark’s son claims Clark needed help lifting. In fact, Clark’s daughter testified that
Clark kept a handgun under his pillow. Similarly, his son’s contention that Clark
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was too infirm to get out of bed and stand is contradicted by the position Clark’s
body was found in following the shooting, which indicates he was standing and
facing the door.
Ultimately, the evidence establishes there is no genuine dispute that Clark
pointed a gun and fired a shot at Manasco. Shooting Clark was an objectively
reasonable response. Smith, 926 F.3d at 486.
V
Clark’s children also raise related Monell claims against the City of St. Louis,
including for maintaining unconstitutional police department policies and failing to
train officers in assessing when deploying a SWAT team is necessary. A
municipality “may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations if the
‘violation resulted from (1) an ‘official municipal policy,’ (2) an ‘unofficial custom,’
or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.’” Corwin v. City of
Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
389 (1989)). However, a municipality cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action absent
an underlying constitutional violation. Partridge v. City of Benton, 929 F.3d 562,
567 (8th Cir. 2019); Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2002). When
there is no underlying constitutional violation, municipal liability does not attach.
See Moore v. City of Desloge, 647 F.3d 841, 849 (8th Cir. 2011) (“This circuit has
consistently recognized a general rule that, in order for municipal liability to attach,
individual liability first must be found on an underlying substantive claim.”).
Since we find no individual liability for either Strode or Manasco on an
underlying substantive claim, the municipal liability claim fails.
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VI
Clark’s children also challenge the district court’s decision to grant official
immunity to Strode on their wrongful death claim under Missouri law. Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 537.080. Under Missouri law, official immunity “protects public officials
sued in their individual capacities from liability for alleged acts of negligence
committed during the course of their official duties for the performance of
discretionary acts.” State ex rel. Love v. Cunningham, 689 S.W.3d 489, 494–95 (Mo.
2024) (en banc) (citation omitted). Official immunity does not apply “when a public
official acts in bad faith or with malice.” Id. at 495. In this context, bad faith or
malice requires an “actual intent to cause injury.” Id. at 496. Moreover, “official
immunity applies to recklessness to the same extent as negligence.” Id. at 497–98.
As mentioned above, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Strode
negligently or recklessly included false information in his warrant affidavit, let alone
intended to harm Clark. Id. at 496. Since Strode did not act in bad faith or with
malice, he is entitled to official immunity.
VII
The district court’s order granting summary judgment is affirmed.
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