Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Session CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN THE PEOPLE, B350057 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YA108742) v. COREY SESSION, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed. Jennifer Peabody and Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stefanie Yee, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ___________________ Corey Session appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after he pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and admitted the special allegation that he suffered a prior strike conviction. Session contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his pretrial motion for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.1 He argues that clear and convincing evidence did not rebut the presumption under section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), that his mental disorders were a significant factor in the commission of the robbery. He further argues that substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Session’s mental disorders were not a significant factor in the commission of the robbery. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Offense and Information On the afternoon of November 2, 2023, Session entered the liquor aisle of a Jons International Marketplace in Torrance, placed several bottles of champagne into a bag, and exited the store without paying. Store employee José Flores saw Session take the bottles, and after Session walked past the checkout stand, Flores said to him, “Excuse me” and “Stop.” Session then ran out the door and into the parking lot, and Flores ran after him. 1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 When they were both in the parking lot a short distance from the store, Session stopped running and turned back to face Flores. Session and Flores were about 10 feet apart. Session moved his hand toward his right front pocket of his jacket and said to Flores, “‘I’m gonna fuck you up, N—ger!’” Fearful that Session was armed and was going to kill him, Flores stopped in his tracks and allowed Session to walk away. Session, still carrying the alcohol, walked in a normal manner through the parking lot and across the street. Flores flagged down a police patrol car, and a police officer apprehended Session in the vicinity within 10 minutes after the incident. Session consented to a search, and officers found a folding knife inside his right jacket pocket and six bottles of Luc Belaire alcohol (with an aggregate value of $153) in Session’s bag. On January 24, 2024 the People filed an information charging Session with one count of second degree robbery (§ 211). The information specially alleged Session suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (d); 1170.12), specifically, a 2013 robbery conviction. B. Session’s Motion for Mental Health Diversion On June 26, 2025 Session moved for mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. Session argued he was eligible for diversion because he had been recently diagnosed by a qualified expert with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and an unspecified mood disorder, which were significant factors in Session’s commission of the robbery because he struggled with high levels of “fear arousal,” leading to impulsive behavior. Further, the expert opined Session would not pose an 3 unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community. Session submitted the February 19, 2025 forensic evaluation performed by Kevin Booker, Ph.D., a forensic specialist in psychology and behavioral medicine. Dr. Booker examined Session on February 18, 2025 and reviewed a police report and complaint filed in connection with Session’s June 16, 2024 arrest for possession of a firearm by a felon. Dr. Booker’s report does not reflect that he reviewed any records pertaining to the 2024 robbery or discussed the robbery with Session. Dr. Booker diagnosed Session with chronic, severe PTSD, with symptoms that developed after an April 2023 incident in which Session was shot in the back of his head on the street and was hospitalized for a lengthy period. Session reported to Dr. Booker that he experienced frequent, intrusive memories of the shooting, which caused Session to be hypervigilant and paranoid about his surroundings and the potential for random violence. Further, he experienced an exaggerated startle response, for example, he would “jump[] violently and take[] cover behind walls” if he heard a loud noise. Dr. Booker also diagnosed Session with an unspecified complex mood disorder dominated by feelings of irritability, sadness, and extreme anxiety and fear. Dr. Booker opined that Session was “usually able to modulate his emotional experience,” but “if or when he . . . is faced with acute stress from ‘perceived’ fear, he may act impulsively and without thinking to alleviate this negative emotion.”2 Dr. Booker further opined that “the presence of PTSD 2 Boldface, italics, and underlining in Dr. Booker’s report are omitted. 4 and a complex mood/anxiety disorder appear to be predominate in terms of qualifying the impairment in his current, overall psychological functioning and primary precipitants to his legal involvement.” Dr. Booker reported that Session had not previously received mental health treatment for PTSD but he had a desire to participate in treatment. Dr. Booker concluded Session was a feasible candidate for mental health diversion and that “referral to a highly structured PTSD treatment program would likely reduce his chances of re-offending” if the treatment specifically targeted PTSD. Further, Dr. Booker opined that “[a] mental health referral in this instance would likely not pose a risk of Mr. Session committing a super-strikable offense.” In their opposition, the People argued there was an insufficient nexus between Session’s PTSD diagnosis and the 2024 robbery; Session’s conduct during the robbery and extensive criminal history showed that he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety and would likely commit a super strike offense in the future; and Session’s multiple arrests and criminal charges in the two years after the robbery showed he was unsuitable for diversion. The People summarized Session’s criminal history and attached records relating to six of his arrests. Several of Session’s arrests or convictions involved shoplifting and related crimes. For example, in 2013 he was convicted of second degree robbery after he and an accomplice stole several bottles of tequila from a Hermosa Beach supermarket and the accomplice threw a bottle at a manager who confronted them. Session was arrested after he and the same accomplice stole liquor from an El Segundo supermarket less than a half hour later. In January 2023 Session was charged 5 with misdemeanor shoplifting after he carried $412 of cologne out of a Monrovia beauty supply store in his pants. He was detained when he got into a car with his wife, Laqurisha Session, and officers recovered from the car another $853 of beauty products that the officers suspected were stolen. In June 2025 Session was arrested for petty theft, conspiracy, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor after he and his 16-year-old son carried $300 of cologne out of a Glendora beauty supply store; Session admitted to the police that he had stolen cologne from a West Covina beauty supply store earlier that day. After the November 2023 robbery, Session was charged twice with felonies in connection with incidents involving violence or threats of violence. First, on December 4, 2023 Session was arrested for corporal injury to a spouse and assault with a deadly weapon, among other charges, after he allegedly pulled a semiautomatic handgun on Laqurisha when she arrived home, and told her “one bullet has your name on it.” He brandished the gun for over three hours, ranted and threatened to beat her with it, and “cocked” the trigger at least once. Laqurisha told police she and Session had argued earlier that morning, and when she opened a kitchen drawer, Session had grabbed a butcher’s knife and made four stabbing motions toward her stomach; the fourth motion cut Laqurisha’s hand. The charges against Session were later dismissed. Second, as discussed, in June 2024 Session was arrested and later charged with possession of a firearm by a felon—the case for which Dr. Booker conducted the February 2025 forensic evaluation. Los Angeles Police officers detained Session as a suspect in an alleged assault with a deadly weapon and found a semiautomatic pistol in his right pocket. Session told the police 6 that Laqurisha had approached him in distress, telling him she had been chased by another man. Session then followed that man to his home and got into a confrontation with the man’s father, who tried to explain to Session that the man was autistic. Session’s adult criminal history included numerous other convictions, including misdemeanor spousal battery (in 2008 and 2022), misdemeanor theft (in 2010), vehicle theft (in 2014 and 2016), and grand theft (two separate convictions in 2016). C. The Hearing on Mental Health Diversion The trial court held a hearing on Session’s motion on September 17, 2025. At the outset of the hearing, the court stated it had read and considered the parties’ submissions. Session’s lawyer proffered evidence that in February 2025 Session had enrolled in a substance abuse recovery program, and agencies were working to enroll him in a residential treatment program and to provide housing assistance. The lawyer argued that Session’s criminal record did not show any danger that Session would commit a super strike offense, Session was trying to get his life on track, and allowing Session to continue in the substance abuse recovery program while also undergoing mental health diversion would benefit the community by rehabilitating him and preventing future offenses. The prosecutor argued, among other things, that Dr. Booker’s report did not establish a nexus between Session’s PTSD and the robbery because Dr. Booker considered only the facts of the 2024 firearm case and did not have “our facts in mind when he rendered his opinion.” After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court denied Session’s motion for mental health diversion. The court 7 recognized that it was required under the mental health diversion statute to “presume a nexus” between Session’s diagnosed mental health disorders and the charged offense “unless there is substantial clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” However, the court found the People’s evidence, primarily the police reports relating to Session’s criminal history, showed there was no “nexus between a [PTSD] diagnosis and why he’s robbing.” The court explained, “If you look at the facts of these cases in almost each one of these theft related cases, which are really thefts of high-end alcohol and thefts of very high-end cosmetic products, like high-end perfumes, it appears to me that [Session] is running a business for himself and his family. Some of these he’s involving his minor son in the actual thefts, and some of them he’s involving his wife in the actual thefts.” Moreover, Session stole similar high-value products from multiple stores on the same day, often “hitting” different locations over a broad geographic area. The court concluded, “I don’t see the connection between these crimes and [PTSD]. He’s creating the stress in each of these things.” The trial court gave “very little weight” to Dr. Booker’s opinion generally and found his evaluation did not present evidence of a nexus with the robbery. The court observed that Dr. Booker failed to provide an “overall picture of [Session’s] pending alleged criminality,” “completely ignored” the facts of the robbery case (relying instead on the firearm case), and “said nothing in terms of whether or not there is a nexus.” The only reference to a nexus to any crime was a single line in the report stating that Session’s PTSD and mood disorder appeared to be the “primary precipitants to his legal involvement,” which the court found was “frankly insufficient.” Moreover, the report 8 detailed how Session’s PTSD, arising from being shot, meant that Session was terrified of being killed randomly, leading Session to suffer chronic hypervigilance. Assuming this were true, it “flies in the face” of Session’s theft-related crimes, where he was “creating the anxiety, creating the . . . need for [hypervigilance], bringing weapons to these crimes. I don’t see the nexus.” The trial court also found the police reports of the cases involving violence were “very, very disturbing,” and they led the court to conclude that “if he’s untreated in his mental health treatment that he’s likely to commit a super strike.” The court stated that it had made “a list of the violence seeping into many of these crimes,” including the December 2023 domestic violence incident where Session threatened to kill Laqurisha with both a knife and a gun and the June 2024 firearm incident involving the autistic man. The court concluded, “[j]ust those factors on multiple occasions with severe threats of violence with guns and knives I think there is a very real possibility that he would commit a super strike.” Finally, the trial court cited Session’s outstanding bench warrant and failure to appear for trial in the firearm case and the fact Session had been charged with three new felonies as evidence Session was “not reliable to engage in mental health treatment” and was “far from suitable for mental health diversion.” D. Session’s No Contest Plea and Sentencing On October 17, 2025, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Session pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and admitted he suffered a prior strike conviction for robbery in 2013. 9 The trial court sentenced Session to the lower term of two years for the robbery, doubled to four years under the three strikes law. Session timely appealed, and the trial court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause. DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 1001.36 gives trial courts the discretion to grant pretrial diversion for individuals suffering from certain mental health disorders.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626; see People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147-1148.) Under pretrial diversion, the trial court may postpone prosecution at any time in the judicial process, either temporarily or permanently, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment. (Frahs, at p. 626; Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn); Whitmill, at p. 1148.) “The Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to apply as broadly as possible.” (Whitmill, at p. 1149; see Frahs, at p. 632.) Under section 1001.36, a defendant must be both eligible and suitable for mental health diversion. “Section 1001.36, subdivision (e), places the burden on the defendant ‘to make a prima facie showing that the defendant will meet the minimum requirements of eligibility for diversion and that the defendant and the offense are suitable for diversion.’” (See Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) A defendant is eligible under section 1001.36, subdivision (b), if (1) the defendant has been diagnosed by a qualified mental health expert with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the DSM, “excluding 10 antisocial personality disorder and pedophilia”; and (2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. (See People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 451-452 (Tourville); Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.) With respect to the second eligibility requirement that the defendant’s mental disorder must have been “a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense,” section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), provides: “If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. A court may consider any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense.” The statute specifies four factors that must be met for a defendant to be suitable for diversion: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to diversion and agrees to waive his or his speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) if treated in the community, the defendant will not pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in 11 section 1170.18.”3 (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4); see Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) “An unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), means “‘an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new violent felony’” within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), which felonies are ‘colloquially referred to as “super strikes.”’ [Citation.] ‘Those super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors under the age of 14.’” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679 (Gomez); accord, Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) In determining whether a defendant will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community, “[t]he court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Even if a defendant meets all the statutory eligibility and suitability criteria, the trial court retains discretion to deny 3 The Legislature recently amended section 1001.36, effective January 1, 2027, replacing “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18,” with “a substantial and undue risk to the physical safety of another person.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 18, § 1.) The amended language does not apply to Session’s motion. 12 diversion. (People v. Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 53; Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) “This residual discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised ‘“consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.”’” (Vaughn, at p. 135; see Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 453.) We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for mental health diversion for an abuse of discretion. (Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135; People v. Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147.) A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. (Vaughn, at p. 135; Whitmill, at p. 1147.) A court also abuses its discretion “when its decision exceeds the bounds of reason or is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 588.) We review the trial court’s finding whether the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense for substantial evidence. (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079; People v. Oneal, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 589 [noting § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), “requires the court to review ‘relevant and credible evidence,’” which is a “quintessential factfinding process”].) Because the prosecution must show by clear and convincing evidence that a mental disorder was not a significant factor, we determine “whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996; accord, Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 688.) We also “must view the record in the light most favorable to the 13 prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B., at p. 996; accord, Gomez, at p. 688.) B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding That Session Was Ineligible for Mental Health Diversion Because There Was No Nexus Between His Mental Disorders and the Robbery Session contends the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Session’s PTSD and mood disorder were not motivating, causal, or contributing factors to his commission of the robbery under section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2). Specifically, he argues the court should have given more weight to Dr. Booker’s report, and there was no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that there was a nexus between his mental disorders and the robbery. Substantial evidence supported the court’s ineligibility finding. As a threshold matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Dr. Booker’s report—the only evidence Session submitted in support of his diversion motion—did not provide evidence of a nexus. It is undisputed that Dr. Booker evaluated Session in connection with the 2024 firearm charge, not the 2023 robbery, and there is nothing in Dr. Booker’s report or the record that indicates Dr. Booker was aware of the robbery or Session’s history of retail theft. Consequently, Dr. Booker’s conclusion that “the presence of PTSD and a complex mood/anxiety disorder appear to be . . . primary precipitants to [Session’s] legal involvement” did not address whether Session’s 14 mental disorders played any role in Session’s commission of the robbery. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving little weight to Dr. Booker’s opinions (other than that Session suffered from qualifying mental disorders). As discussed, Dr. Booker opined that Session’s PTSD and mood disorder caused him to be anxious, hypervigilant in public, and fearful of random violence, and Session was prone to act impulsively when he was under acute stress from a perceived fear. As the court reasoned, however, there was no evidence Session acted impulsively during the 2023 robbery, and further, the symptoms of Session’s disorders were inconsistent with the fact Session planned a crime that predictably created acute stress (as opposed to responding to random violence). There was no basis to infer Session, given his experience with prior similar thefts, did not understand the dangers of stealing from the supermarket and the possibility a store employee might try to stop him. Rather, as Flores testified at the preliminary hearing, Session acted like an experienced thief who threatened to “fuck up” a store employee who had followed him out of the store, and then Session casually walked across the parking lot. Further, the trial court acknowledged it was statutorily required to presume a nexus between Session’s mental disorders and the robbery absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) But it found the police reports from Session’s retail thefts and robberies showed there was no nexus between his PTSD and his commission of the robberies. Instead, for more than a decade, and prior to the events leading to his diagnoses, Session exhibited a well-defined modus operandi, which the court described as essentially “running a 15 business” by stealing valuable items from large retailers. With or without accomplices (often his family members), Session would walk into a store during the daytime, pick up high-value items (typically bottles of alcohol or cologne), conceal them, and carry them out the door. He would frequently return to the same store or steal from another store on the same day. Arrests for thefts with this pattern occurred before and after the April 2023 shooting that gave rise to Session’s PTSD. Session argues the trial court abused its discretion by assuming that Session’s commission of thefts that sometimes evolved into Estes4 robberies “were designed for financial gain,” and therefore, Session’s “depression and PTSD couldn’t have been a factor in [his] criminality.” As discussed, the court did not rely exclusively on Session’s pattern of thievery and financial motive. In any event, the question on appeal is not whether it is possible that Session’s disorders could have played a role in any of the retail thefts, but whether substantial evidence supported the court’s finding it was highly probable they did not factor in the 2023 robbery. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 995-996; Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 688.) The fact that Session again and again pursued the same deliberate conduct, confronted the same risks with the same predictable consequences (including the intervention of store employees), and did not modulate his behavior after he began to suffer from PTSD 4 In People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28, the Court of Appeal held that a defendant who uses or threatens to use force when confronted by a store employee after taking property from the store is guilty of robbery. Cases in which theft is elevated to robbery based on similar circumstances are commonly referred to as Estes robberies. 16 and a mood disorder is substantial evidence that his disorders were not contributing, causal, or motivating factors in the 2023 robbery.5 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. FEUER, J. We concur: MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J. 5 Because we affirm the trial court’s finding Session was ineligible for mental health diversion, we do not address whether he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety or his suitability for diversion. 17