Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 543 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-26-157 RANDY COAKER Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. WESTERN DISTRICT [NO. 16JCR-18-1482] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE RANDY F. PHILHOURS, JUDGE AFFIRMED RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge Randy Joe Coaker appeals the Craighead County Circuit Court’s revocation of his suspended sentence. On appeal, Coaker argues that the circuit court erred by admitting the medical examiner’s testimony and an autopsy report because the evidence violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We affirm. On July 3, 2019, Coaker pled guilty to arson, and he was sentenced to a ten-years suspended sentence. On September 25, 2025, the State filed an amended petition to revoke Coaker’s suspended sentence, alleging that Coaker had been arrested for aggravated death by delivery and had committed the offenses of unlawful use of a communication device and delivery of a controlled substance. It also alleged that Coaker had repeatedly associated with individuals who had been convicted of felonies, engaged in criminal activity, and used controlled substances and that he had not paid restitution, fines, and court costs. On November 5 and December 8, 2025, the court held a revocation hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, Coaker objected to the State’s introducing the autopsy report of Tracy Marlar, the victim of the aggravated-death-by-delivery charge, on the basis of hearsay and a Confrontation Clause violation. Specifically, he argued that the autopsy report was based on a toxicology report, and he pointed out that the State did not intend to call the toxicologist. The court overruled the objection. The State then presented evidence that on March 5, 2024, Coaker called 911 to report that Marlar was slumped in a car and was unresponsive. Marlar was pronounced dead, and on suspicion of an overdose, her body was sent to the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory for an autopsy. Dr. Steven Erickson testified that he is a medical examiner at the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory and performed Marlar’s autopsy. He explained that because the laboratory was overwhelmed, Marlar’s specimens were sent to a consulting laboratory for toxicology. He stated that the toxicology report showed that Marlar tested positive for fentanyl and clonazepam, and he explained that “the fentanyl . . . is the main character in this death.” The State introduced Erickson’s autopsy report, and the cause of death is listed as “Fentanyl and Clonazepam Intoxication.” During Erickson’s testimony, Coaker again made a Confrontation Clause objection to his testimony about the toxicology results, and the court overruled his objection. 2 Bryan Bailey testified that he works for the Jonesboro Police Department and that he investigated Marlar’s death. He explained that he reviewed text messages between Coaker and Marlar about Marlar’s buying drugs from Coaker. Bailey explained that Marlar was wanting to buy hydrocodone pills. At the time, [Coaker] was unable to get any but he had M30s. She sent money originally. Whenever she found that he didn’t have the hydros, that he had the other ones, she requested some money back from him. Bailey stated that their messages included a photo and a video message of commonly pressed fentanyl pills, or “M30s,” and he explained that Coaker told Marlar the pills were strong. Bailey also discussed markings on the pills and stated that “the outsides of the pills aren’t like you would get . . . from a pharmacy.” Bailey further testified that Coaker messaged Marlar that an individual named Carlos “fronted me 5 dros” and Coaker hoped “they are all pure fenty.” The State introduced text-message records, including the photo and video, and it also introduced CashApp records showing that Marlar paid Coaker $400 on March 4, 2024, and that Coaker had sent back $100. The State additionally played a recorded interview with Coaker in which Coaker admitted he sold six pills to Marlar and retained some pills for himself. He also stated that he thought the pills in the photos on his phone were “Roxicodone . . . just pure codone [sic].” At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the court found that Coaker had violated the conditions of his suspended sentence “by arranging drug deals by using a communication 3 device and delivering controlled substances by a preponderance of the evidence using a communication device.” The court made no finding on the allegation that Coaker committed aggravated death by delivery, disregarded the allegation that Coaker failed to pay, and found that the State did not prove that Coaker associated with a known felon or individuals who used controlled substances. The court sentenced him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed. In a revocation proceeding, the circuit court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his suspension, and on appellate review, we do not reverse the circuit court’s decision unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. McElroy v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 244. Because the burdens are different, evidence that is insufficient for a criminal conviction may be sufficient for a suspended-sentence revocation. Id. Given that the preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of credibility and weight to be given testimony, we defer to the superior position of the circuit court to decide these matters. Linton v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 497, 724 S.W.3d 673. Furthermore, the State need only prove that the appellant committed one violation of the conditions to revoke appellant’s sentence. Id. On appeal, Coaker argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting the autopsy report and the medical examiner’s testimony because the evidence violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. He asserts that the evidence contained out-of-court statements from the toxicologist that fentanyl was found in Marlar’s system, and he points out that the toxicologist did not testify. Coaker further claims that the admission was not 4 harmless error because without the toxicology results, the State presented no evidence that he possessed or delivered a controlled substance. Trial error involving the Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses is subject to a harmless-error analysis. Green v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 291, 461 S.W.3d 731. Whether a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless error depends on a variety of factors, including the importance of the witness’s testimony in the State’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross- examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the State’s case. Id. (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001)). In Green, this court affirmed the circuit court’s revocation decision despite its error in permitting an out-of-court statement in violation of the defendant’s right to confront witnesses. 2015 Ark. App. 291, 461 S.W.3d 731. We held that the error was harmless because there was other evidence that supported the revocation, rendering the out-of-court statement unnecessary. Id.; see also Roston v. State, 362 Ark. 408, 208 S.W.3d 759 (2005) (holding that the circuit court’s violation of the Confrontation Clause was harmless error because other evidence supported the court’s revocation decision). Similarly, in this case, even assuming the admission violated the Confrontation Clause, other evidence supports the revocation of Coaker’s suspended sentence. The court did not revoke because Coaker committed aggravated death by delivery. The court found 5 that Coaker had violated his suspended sentence by committing unlawful use of a communication device. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-404(b) (Repl. 2024) requires proof that Coaker used a communication device in “committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act constituting a felony” under the controlled-substance chapter. Here, the State introduced phone messages in which Coaker discussed selling “M30s” and hydrocodone as well as Coaker’s recorded interview during which he admitted providing Marlar with six pills. The State also introduced a photo and video from the messages, and an officer identified the pills in the photo and video as commonly pressed fentanyl, or “M30s.” Accordingly, the evidence referencing the toxicology results was unnecessary for the State to prove that Coaker’s suspended sentence should be revoked; therefore, the alleged error was harmless. Affirmed. KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and HARRISON, J., agree. Law Offices of John Wesley Hall, by: Samantha J. Carpenter, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 6