Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 87114-5-I Respondent, ORDER DENYING MOTION v. FOR RECONSIDERATION AND WITHDRAWING AND KARL FREDERICK SCHWEIZER, SUBSTITUTING OPINION Appellant. The appellant, Karl Schweizer, has filed a motion for reconsideration of the opinion filed on August 17, 2026. The court has considered the motion, and the panel has determined that the motion should be denied but the opinion should be withdrawn and a substitute opinion filed; now, therefore, it is ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is denied; and it is further ORDERED that the opinion filed on August 17, 2026 is withdrawn; and it is further ORDERED that a substitute unpublished opinion shall be filed. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 87114-5-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION KARL FREDERICK SCHWEIZER, Appellant. BIRK, J. — Karl Schweizer pleaded guilty to rape of a child in the second degree and child molestation in the second degree, both with domestic violence designations. The sentencing court ordered a special sexual offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), which included numerous community custody conditions. Upon the State’s petition for revocation, the court concluded Schweizer violated his community custody conditions and his Internet Safety Plan (ISP) and revoked his SSOSA. Schweizer appeals, challenging the court’s admission of hearsay evidence and the constitutionality of several community custody conditions, and asserting legal challenges to his revocation proceedings. We affirm. I A In 2018, Schweizer pleaded guilty to rape of a child in the second degree and child molestation in the third degree, both with domestic violence designations. Schweizer admitted that he had digitally penetrated his younger daughter’s vagina No. 87114-5-I/2 when she was between 12 and 14 years old. He also admitted he touched his older daughter’s buttocks under her clothes when she was between 14 and 16 years old. Before the sentencing hearing, Schweizer moved for a SSOSA. Schweizer’s presentence report presented an excerpt from an evaluation by Ted Neiland, a sexual deviancy treatment provider, which stated that Schweizer should participate in specialized sex offender treatment. Schweizer also asked that imposed conditions not “unduly restrict his Internet usage.” He asked that the court “authorize Internet usage for work and personal business so long as it is approved by his treatment provider and employs the use of monitoring and filtering software for any non-work Internet enabled devices.” In Neiland’s report, Neiland stated Schweizer’s wife had noticed that early on in their marriage, Schweizer had problems playing online role-playing games and that Schweizer had admitted he was addicted to pornography. In Neiland’s interviews with Schweizer, Schweizer told Neiland he had an addiction to legal pornography. Schweizer also recounted a story where he planned a sexual assault of a classmate in high school, going so far as using a fake name to buy a stun gun for the plan. Neiland’s recommendations for treatment included that Schweizer “should not view pornography or engage in sexual chatting on the Internet,” “he should install monitoring and/or blocking software on any personal computer or Internet capable device to prevent his accessing inappropriate/deviant materials on-line or to use the Internet to engage in sexual chat or arrange to meet 2 No. 87114-5-I/3 with others for sex,” and he “shall participate in specialized treatment, make satisfactory treatment progress, and follow all treatment rules.” At the sentencing hearing, the State opposed granting Schweizer’s motion for a SSOSA. Referencing Neiland’s evaluation of Schweizer, the State raised concerns about the sexual assault Schweizer had planned when he was in high school, which included using a fake name as a step in the plan. The State also expressed opposition because of the progression of Schweizer’s sexually deviant behavior, which included “sexually deviant pornography such as forced rape pornography.” The State proposed community custody conditions 16 through 26 of appendix 4.2 of Schweizer’s judgment and sentence. Schweizer argued his self-reporting was evidence that he would be amenable to treatment. In discussing the proposed community custody conditions, Schweizer stated, “[M]y only request is that on condition No. 26, which is the one of the ones regarding the internet, that we strike everything after the first sentence. The broad language there prohibiting . . . owning any computer parts . . . is unnecessary.” He stated further, “I will concede the nexus that [the State] draws with the use of pornography in terms of limitations on the internet.” He further added, “I think simply saying that you may not possess or maintain access to a computer unless specifically authorized by your community corrections officer [CCO] is—should be sufficient.” The court granted Schweizer’s motion and ordered a SSOSA. The court imposed a total of 151 months and suspended the sentence conditioned on 3 No. 87114-5-I/4 Schweizer serving 12 months and successfully completing community-based treatment. The court imposed all the State’s requested community custody conditions, except for the disputed condition, which the court modified to prohibit Schweizer from possessing or maintaining a computer unless specifically authorized by his supervising CCO. B In December 2022, the State petitioned to revoke Schweizer’s SSOSA, citing nine violations of his community custody conditions. The State alleged Schweizer had unapproved physical contact with a minor; initiated unsupervised contact with a minor; frequented areas where children’s activities regularly occurred; possessed, accessed, and/or viewed sexually explicit materials; possessed and maintained access to an unauthorized computer; had contact with one of his daughters; possessed a firearm; failed to comply with Department of Correction (DOC) rules by threatening, obstructing, or assaulting a staff member; and failed to comply with sex offender treatment by being terminated from the treatment program. Schweizer admitted he watched an adult movie at his mother’s residence and that he viewed erotic images while setting up his new laptop. The court found, among other things, Schweizer viewed sexually explicit materials and ordered 240 days confinement, 30 days each for eight found violations, but the court did not revoke his SSOSA. Schweizer was released from confinement on June 9, 2023. 4 No. 87114-5-I/5 On June 26, 2023, the State petitioned again to revoke Schweizer’s SSOSA, alleging Schweizer accessed the internet and viewed sexually explicit material. In the DOC report, the CCO reported Schweizer admitted that on June 10, 2023, he watched a movie containing nudity and sex scenes at his mother’s residence. Schweizer challenged the violation by asserting that the internet condition as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Schweizer also challenged the sexually explicit material condition as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and argued that, if it is constitutional, the movies he watched did not meet the definition of sexually explicit. Schweizer noted during oral argument that he challenged a few more community custody conditions in a list provided to the State. Schweizer did not list those conditions at oral argument, and the record does not contain a list of challenged conditions sent to the State. The court concluded the conditions were constitutional as written and found both violations supported. The court ordered 120 days of confinement, 60 days for each violation, but the court did not revoke Schweizer’s SSOSA. The court credited Schweizer’s time served towards his confinement, which allowed him to be released from custody as he had been confined before the hearing longer than the time ordered. The court suggested the parties file a document containing the previous community custody conditions and newly agreed updated community custody conditions, which the parties did and filed with the court as amended appendix 4.2. Schweizer was released from custody on March 25, 2024. 5 No. 87114-5-I/6 C On May 29, 2024, the State petitioned for revocation of Schweizer’s SSOSA. The State alleged that on May 15-16, 2024 Schweizer accessed the internet without CCO or treatment provider approval; possessed, accessed, or viewed sexually explicit materials; failed to abide by his treatment plan by possessing/viewing pornographic material; failed to abide by his treatment plan by being alone at his mother’s residence; and failed to abide by his treatment plan by not following his ISP. The notice of violation filed by the DOC included an e-mail sent by Schweizer to CCO Christopher Knight, which indicated Schweizer was going to “test” whether the Accountable2You software worked on an iPhone by accessing “sites that have triggered alerts.” The report also included screenshots of viewing history on a smart TV at his mother’s residence, and screenshots of an iPhone showing viewing history of movies and television shows containing nudity and sex scenes. And it included redacted images of screenshots of scenes from one of the television shows as well as photos taken of a screen displaying documents entitled “DOC evidenceExhibits2022.pdf.” Also included were photos of a smart television screen displaying two recent searches for “Nymphomaniac” and “I Spit on Your Grave.” NYMPHOMANIAC (Zentropa Entertainments 2013); I SPIT ON YOUR GRAVE (Deja Vu 1978). In the CCO’s report, he stated he searched the internet for “Nymphomaniac” and “I Spit on Your Grave” and attached summaries he found describing the films 6 No. 87114-5-I/7 as depicting a promiscuous life and lengthy rape scene respectively. He also stated he collected the screenshots from a website that had short clips of every time nudity was displayed in one of the television shows Schweizer searched for. The CCO also included quotations from Schweizer’s ISP, which included conditions that Schweizer would not watch smart televisions by himself and would not use Internet connected devices for viewing entertainment after 10 p.m. and before 6 a.m. Schweizer denied the violations. Schweizer argued the Internet condition was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Schweizer also challenged the sexually explicit materials condition as vague and overbroad. At the revocation hearing, Schweizer argued the court should not consider the Internet searches as they were hearsay. Schweizer also argued there was no evidence presented he was at his mother’s residence alone. He argued that “[s]ome of the things they pulled off the—of his computer—and actually, . . . mentioned this too, to CCO Knight. It was from prior violations. It wasn’t current.” The State moved to admit as evidence a version of the DOC report that contained unredacted images from CCO Knight’s search. Schweizer did not object. Schweizer moved to admit exhibit 2, which was a letter from Schweizer’s treatment provider, Matthew Platte. The court did not find Schweizer violated his community custody conditions by being alone at his mother’s residence, pointing to a lack of evidence that he had 7 No. 87114-5-I/8 been there alone. The court did find the other four violations were supported, and revoked Schweizer’s SSOSA. Schweizer appeals. II “A SSOSA sentence may be revoked at any time if there is sufficient proof to reasonably satisfy the court that the offender has violated a condition of the suspended sentence or failed to make satisfactory progress in treatment.” State v. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d 689, 705, 213 P.3d 32 (2009); RCW 9.94A.670(11). “Revocation of a suspended sentence due to violations rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 705-06. “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the decision of the court is ‘manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.’ ” Id. at 706 (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in revoking a suspended sentence where the offender’s violation of a condition ‘presented a risk to the safety or welfare of society.’ ” State v. Smith, 34 Wn. App. 2d 925, 946, 572 P.3d 469 (2025) (quoting McCormick, 166 Wn.2d at 706). A Schweizer argues the sentencing court erred by denying him his right to confront witnesses against him by failing to conduct the requisite good cause analysis for admitting hearsay in revocation proceedings. We conclude that 8 No. 87114-5-I/9 Schweizer failed to raise this objection in the trial court and cannot raise it for the first time in this court under RAP 2.5(a)(3).1 “When confronted with revocation of a qualified or conditional liberty, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that limited Fourteenth Amendment due process guaranties apply.” State v. Bao Dinh Dang, 178 Wn.2d 868, 883, 312 P.3d 30 (2013) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972)). An offender’s rights at a revocation hearing include the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses unless there is articulable good cause for disallowing confrontation. Id. A sentencing court’s revocation of a SSOSA implicates “a conditional liberty dependent on the observance of special terms and conditions.” Id. “The minimal due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is not absolute.” State v. Dahl, 139 Wn.2d 678, 686, 990 P.2d 396 (1999). While the rules of evidence do not apply in SSOSA revocation hearings, ER 1101(c)(3); RCW 9.94A.030(5), “hearsay evidence should be considered only if there is good cause to forgo live testimony.” Dahl, 139 Wn.2d at 686. “Good cause is defined in terms of ‘difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses in combination with demonstrably reliable or clearly reliable evidence.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Nelson, 103 Wn.2d 760, 765, 697 P.2d 579 (1985)). 1 The State argues Schweizer invited this error. However, where Schweizer objected to the court’s consideration of the Internet searches as a foundation to support a violation, the State does not show how Schweizer affirmatively assented to their admission. See State v. Tatum, 23 Wn. App. 2d 123, 128-29, 514 P.3d 763 (2022) (“We distinguish between a mere failure to object to an error and the sort of action that affirmatively assents to it; only the latter invites error.”). 9 No. 87114-5-I/10 Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” ER 801. While Schweizer objected to the evidentiary nature of the Internet searches, he does not show he objected to any of the hearsay evidence on due process grounds, confrontation, or the requirement of finding good cause. He recognizes he did not object to the introduction of the treatment provider’s statements. He acknowledged this evidence when he argued not that it was not properly before the court, but only that his violation of those rules should not be held against him: Mr. Schweizer drafted an [ISP] that he reviewed with Mr. Platte, his treatment provider and was provided to his CCO. These are not conditions of his community custody contained in Amended Appendix 4.2 and any violation of his self-imposed [ISP] should not be used as a violation of his community custody. Schweizer failed to object on the grounds he now asserts on appeal. Because he failed to object on due process grounds, Schweizer must show his due process challenge to the court’s admission of the searches and treatment provider’s statements meets the manifest constitutional error standard. RAP 2.5(a) states that “[t]he appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court.” This court may review issues raised for the first time on appeal that propose a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right,” which requires actual prejudice, meaning the appellant must plausibly show that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences. RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 584, 355 P.3d 253 (2015). “[T]he focus of the actual 10 No. 87114-5-I/11 prejudice must be on whether the error is so obvious on the record that the error warrants appellate review.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99-100, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). Schweizer asserts admitting the Internet search evidence affected his due process rights, but he does not show this error was manifest. The images in the report from the show “Sex Life” as well as the images of the search history establish that the descriptions of three films were not the central evidence of sexually explicit material found in Schweizer’s possession. SEX LIFE: SEASON ONE (Netflix 2021). In addition, even though the CCO’s written report describing the agreed treatment rules was hearsay, Schweizer did not object to that level of hearsay in the trial court and does not object to it in this court.2 Further, had Schweizer objected on confrontation grounds, it is clear CCO Knight, who was present in court, could have 2 In his motion for reconsideration, Schweizer argues again that the trial court “erred when it considered statements in his CCO’s report that were purportedly from his treatment provider.” And he argues that this court overlooked one of his arguments, claiming we are wrong to say he has never objected to the level of hearsay of the CCO’s written report, pointing to his Brief of Appellant at pages 12-13, 21-25, and 28. Schweizer is wrong. In the cited pages of his Brief of Appellant, Schweizer objects to treatment provider Platte’s out-of-court statements, arguing that the report claims that Platte gave the CCO copies of the treatment plan and ISP, but that “Mr. Platte did not testify at the revocation hearing.” Later, Schweizer argues again that “Mr. Platte did not testify at the revocation hearing” and that “[t]he State failed to establish how Mr. Platte’s statements fell within any exception to the general rule against hearsay.” But at no time has Schweizer complained about the court’s reliance on CCO Knight’s out- of-court statements in CCO Knight’s report, and none of the sections of Schweizer’s briefing referenced in his motion for reconsideration do so. And Schweizer did not object to the specific portions of CCO Knight’s report where Knight asserted what he understood were the terms of the treatment plan based upon Schweizer and him signing it together. Schweizer failed in the trial court to object on due process grounds, and his neglect to address each level of hearsay at issue only reinforces his failure to show manifest error affecting a constitutional right. 11 No. 87114-5-I/12 attested to his statements in his report. Schweizer does not show actual prejudice, and as a result, no manifest error occurred at the revocation hearing. B Schweizer argues he never received notice that an e-mail he sent would be used as a basis for finding any of the alleged violations met or as a basis for revoking his SSOSA. We disagree. Minimal due process afforded defendants in revocation hearings includes “written notice of the claimed violations.” Dahl, 139 Wn.2d at 683. “[P]roper notice must set forth all alleged parole violations so that a defendant has the opportunity to marshal the facts in [their] defense.” Id. at 684. “Due process requires that the State inform the offender of the specific violations alleged and the facts that the State will rely on to prove those violations.” Id. at 685. Here, the State’s petition for revocation identified two relevant bases for the violations: failure to seek approval from the CCO for Internet access and failure to abide by the ISP as recommended by the treatment provider and his community custody conditions requiring him to participate and make progress in treatment. In discussing these violations in the context of Schweizer’s e-mail, CCO Knight stated in his report that “Mr. Schweizer never indicated that he was going to ‘test’ the software during [our] meeting [the day before] nor was he given any sort of permission to do so.” Schweizer argues the court’s oral ruling shows that it considered an unknown e-mail as a basis for the violations because it was the only specific piece 12 No. 87114-5-I/13 of evidence identified, which it could not do because saying one is not going to comply does not equate to noncompliance. Schweizer also argues that the e-mail does not show that Schweizer is not making progress in his treatment. Schweizer argues consideration of the e-mail for these purposes was a non-statutorily authorized basis for revocation. After hearing the parties’ arguments on whether revocation should be granted, the court stated, But there is just continual violation. I do think Mr. Schweizer has had an opportunity, clearly, to engage, but he has also chosen to violate. I think that, at least to this Court, one of the most concerning aspects of the current violation, there’s actually this email that’s sent, saying, I’m going to violate the conditions that have been put on me. I’m to [sic] going to not follow what DOC has said. So in Mr. Schweizer’s own words, he is not going to follow any direction from this Court. Or I should say it differently. There’s clear evidence he’s not going to follow the conditions. That also is supported by the fact this is now the third time that we are back, really addressing similar issues. So at this point, based on the four proven violations, the SSOSA would be revoked. In context, the court revoked Schweizer’s SSOSA because of a pattern of violations, for which it considered the e-mail Schweizer sent CCO Knight probative of intent to commit a violation. The court did not rely solely on the e-mail in finding the violations supported, and the court’s revoking Schweizer’s SSOSA was statutorily authorized because the court revoked it based on four proven violations. Schweizer argues the e-mail shows he was only going to test the software, noting there is no e-mail where he says he will not follow any conditions set by the DOC and the court. However, Schweizer does not show where his community custody conditions or ISP permit him to test filtering software by accessing sites 13 No. 87114-5-I/14 he knows he is forbidden from visiting without DOC or treatment provider approval. Where Schweizer had known of his community custody condition requiring DOC approval for non-employment related Internet access since his plea of guilty and has committed this violation before, it was not untenable for the sentencing court to consider the e-mail as probative of a violation of that condition. III Schweizer argues the court erred in revoking his SSOSA by basing it on violations of unconstitutional community custody conditions. Courts review community custody conditions for abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 744, 487 P.3d 893 (2021). A court abuses its discretion if the discretion is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Id. “It is manifestly unreasonable to impose an unconstitutional condition of community custody.” Id. However, limitations on fundamental rights are permissible if they are sensitively imposed. Id. A The State argues Schweizer invited error. Excluding the condition prohibiting viewing or possessing sexually explicit material, which we conclude is not overbroad, we agree with the State. “The invited error doctrine ‘precludes a criminal defendant from seeking appellate review of an error [they] helped create, even when the alleged error involves constitutional rights.’ ” State v. Tatum, 23 Wn. App. 2d 123, 128, 514 P.3d 763 (2022) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Carson, 179 Wn. App. 961, 973, 14 No. 87114-5-I/15 320 P.3d 185 (2014), aff’d, 184 Wn.2d 207, 357 P.3d 1064 (2015)). An error is invited when it is the product of an affirmative, knowing, and voluntary act. Id. “We distinguish between a mere failure to object to an error and the sort of action that affirmatively assents to it; only the latter invites error.” Id. at 128-29. It is the State’s burden to prove the error was invited. Id. at 129. “[T]he invited error doctrine may preclude a defendant who received a SSOSA from challenging conditions of that sentence.” Smith, 34 Wn. App. 2d 940. In Smith, this court concluded the defendant invited error when he received as a benefit a “ ‘high value’ SSOSA” but did not object or challenge “any of his sentencing conditions at his original sentencing hearing, on direct appeal from his judgment and sentence, or at multiple subsequent review hearings.” Id. at 943. The court highlighted the sentencing court’s acknowledgement of the defendant’s request for the conditions and its recognition that the defendant’s psychosexual evaluation report required the conditions. Id. Smith is analogous. Here, based upon his sexually assaulting his daughters, Schweizer’s psychosexual report proposed terms of community custody that suggested restrictions on his Internet usage to prevent his looking at “inappropriate/deviant materials,” and suggested Schweizer be restricted from chat rooms. It also reported an incident where Schweizer used a fake name in a plan to sexually assault a classmate while he was in high school. 15 No. 87114-5-I/16 To that end, Schweizer did not dispute conditions 23 and 26, restrictions on Internet access and computer possession, for being overbroad at his sentencing hearing, conceding a nexus between his Internet usage and pornography addiction. He initially agreed to these conditions at his sentencing hearing and did not object at either of his review hearings or his first revocation hearing to these conditions. Nor did he object to conditions 24 and 25, prohibiting him from using computer chat rooms or a false identity on the computer, until his third revocation hearing. At his second revocation hearing, Schweizer’s counsel noted there was agreement on conditions in proposed amended appendix 4.2 and did not challenge these conditions then. Schweizer has invited error regarding these conditions. B Schweizer argues community custody condition 21 preventing him from viewing or possessing sexually explicit material is unconstitutionally overbroad. This court addressed a nearly identical condition in State v. J.H.-M., 28 Wn. App. 2d 757, 760, 538 P.3d 644 (2023), aff’d, 4 Wn.3d 648, 566 P.3d 847 (2025). There, the defendant was adjudicated guilty of rape in the second degree, and the court imposed a SSOSA with a community custody condition prohibiting the possession or viewing of sexually explicit materials. Id. at 759. This court concluded limiting access to sexually explicit materials, “whether the materials depict acts involving children or adults, is related to the goal of rehabilitation.” Id. at 765. It noted that “ ‘[i]t is both logical and reasonable to conclude that a convicted person who cannot suppress sexual urges should be prohibited from 16 No. 87114-5-I/17 accessing sexually explicit materials, the only purpose of which is to invoke sexual stimulation.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Nyugen, 191 Wn.2d 671, 686, 425 P.3d 847 (2018)). Here, where Schweizer pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his daughters, the condition prohibiting him from possessing or viewing sexually explicit material is reasonably related to his offense, sensitively imposed, and designed to further his rehabilitation. C Schweizer argues the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he viewed sexually explicit material and accessed the Internet without treatment provider approval. We disagree. “A SSOSA sentence may be revoked at any time if there is sufficient proof to reasonably satisfy the court that the offender has violated a condition of the suspended sentence or failed to make satisfactory progress in treatment.” McCormick, 166 Wn.2d at 705. “Proof of violations need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt but only must ‘reasonably satisfy’ the court the breach of condition occurred.” State v. Badger, 64 Wn. App. 904, 908, 827 P.2d 318 (1992) (quoting State v. Kuhn¸ 81 Wn.2d 648, 650, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972)). Here, the State presented sufficient proof to reasonably satisfy the court the violations had occurred. CCO Knight’s report included excerpts from Schweizer’s treatment plan outlining that he would not view or possess sexually explicit material. His treatment provider’s letter stated, “While Mr. Schweizer does appear 17 No. 87114-5-I/18 to have violated the terms of his community supervision, treatment rules and the [ISP], I do not believe the violations to be significant and directly offense related.” Based upon the CCO’s report and treatment provider’s letter, there was sufficient evidence to conclude Schweizer did not have permission to view the show or the folder, both containing sexually explicit material. IV Schweizer filed a statement of additional grounds, arguing the State violated evidentiary rules around its exhibit 1, the court denied him the opportunity to testify, the DOC did not have a reasonable basis to search his property, and the DOC violated due process. We disagree. A Schweizer argues the court erred in admitting State’s exhibit 1 because he did not get a chance to review the unredacted images, which would help him determine whether the State had taken sexually explicit images from old Internet search history, the images may have been sent in response to a Public Records Act, ch. 42.56 RCW, request, or his treatment provider may have approved of him viewing them. A defendant has a due process right to receive disclosure of evidence against them. Dahl, 139 Wn.2d at 683. However, Schweizer does not argue the State did not disclose evidence against him; rather, he argues the evidence against him does not support the State’s claimed bases for violation or it can be refuted. The State clearly explained the nature of the exhibit and the reason the State admitted the unredacted version—to limit public display of sexually 18 No. 87114-5-I/19 explicit materials. Schweizer does not show at the revocation hearing that he argued for exclusion of the State’s exhibit 1 for those purposes and fails to show a due process violation. Schweizer argues the State withheld relevant evidence by truncating a quotation about R-rated movies, failed to include timestamps of the search histories for viewing videos on his iPhone, and did not review the laptop in its possession to see whether “Sex Life: Season One” had been watched. He offers these as rationales for why he was prejudiced by the court’s not doing a good cause analysis. He neither objected to these deficiencies nor cites to any legal authority suggesting that the State had an obligation to present its evidence of the violations in a particular way. To the extent he alleges the State took evidence out of context, he was heard in response at the hearing and never made such an argument. None of the alleged errors Schweizer argues the court made in admitting evidence were objected to at the hearing and Schweizer fails to show any practical or identifiable consequences to support manifest constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3). B Schweizer argues the court erred in denying him allocution until after finding the violations were met. “Though there is a limited procedural due process right to allocution, there is no separate federal or state constitutional right to allocution.” State v. Canfield, 154 Wn.2d 698, 707, 116 P.3d 391 (2005). Although “[d]ue 19 No. 87114-5-I/20 process requires that a defendant be given an opportunity to be heard in person at a revocation hearing,” a defendant must assert their right of allocution in order to preserve it for error. Id. Because Schweizer did not assert his right of allocution before the violations were found met, he has waived these challenges. C Schweizer argues the CCO did not have a reasonable suspicion to search his property based upon a notification from Accountable2You that Schweizer had viewed sexually explicit materials at 2:45 a.m. “[I]t is constitutionally permissible for a CCO to search an individual based only on a ‘well-founded or reasonable suspicion of a probation violation,’ rather than a warrant supported by probable cause.” State v. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d 296, 302, 412 P.3d 1265 (2018) (quoting State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 628, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009)). A search is reasonable if “an officer has a well-founded suspicion that a violation has occurred.” State v. Massey, 81 Wn. App. 198, 200, 913 P.2d 424 (1996). Here, the e-mail alerts provided a well-founded suspicion that Schweizer violated his community custody conditions. His conditions prohibited him from viewing sexually explicit material, and the e-mail alert sent to CCO Knight showed Schweizer watching “Sex Life: Season One.” D Schweizer argues that the CCO and the DOC did not perform a preliminary fact-finding investigation and hearing nor afford Schweizer the chance to explain 20 No. 87114-5-I/21 himself prior to their arresting him and that the CCOs were not neutral in their investigation of him. Schweizer does not show his due process rights were violated. He cites Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485, for the proposition that the CCOs were required to conduct a preliminary hearing before his revocation hearing. However, Morrissey makes clear that someone other than the arresting CCO makes findings that the defendant violated their community custody conditions at a hearing after arrest. Id. In accord, the court determined that Schweizer committed the violations. The record reflects Schweizer had a revocation hearing by an independent judicial officer where Schweizer could put on evidence and be heard. Schweizer argues his CCOs were biased against him in investigating his violation. Schweizer alleges CCO Knight did not contact his treatment provider before searching him or arresting him, CCO Knight did not review evidence with him, and CCO Knight and CCO Stoose searched his spare phone without a nexus to the suspected violations. However, none of these actions show bias where the CCOs had a reasonable suspicion from the e-mail alerts to suspect Schweizer might have violated his community custody conditions. Schweizer argues the cumulative error doctrine should apply to SSOSA revocation hearings, and he argues these errors support dismissing the State’s petition for SSOSA revocation as opposed to remanding it for correction. However, 21 No. 87114-5-I/22 because Schweizer has shown no error the sentencing court made, and because we affirm, we do not reach these issues. Affirmed. WE CONCUR: 22