Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 544 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-25-698 FRANKLIN BROOMFIELD Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 14CR-23-34] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, JR., APPELLEE JUDGE AFFIRMED BART F. VIRDEN, Judge Franklin Broomfield appeals the Columbia County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. We affirm. I. Relevant Facts On June 22, 2023, Broomfield pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance- Schedule I/II, methamphetamine or cocaine; and possession of drug paraphernalia to ingest or inhale in case number 14CR-23-24. On June 6, 2024, Broomfield was sentenced to five years’ probation. The terms and conditions of his probation included that he must obey all federal and state laws, local ordinances, and court orders; he must not sell, distribute, or possess any controlled substances; he must pay all court-ordered fines, fees, and/or restitution and a monthly supervision fee; and he must pay the costs and/or fines to the Columbia County Sheriff’s Department. Additionally, Broomfield was ordered to pay “all financial obligations in 14CR-17-84 and 19-92.” The sentencing order was entered on December 26, 2024. On June 3, 2025, the State filed a petition to revoke Broomfield’s probation. In the petition, the State alleged that in March, Broomfield committed the following offenses: he possessed a controlled substance-Schedule I/II, methamphetamine or cocaine greater than 10 grams but less than 200 grams; he tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine; and he was $70 in arrears on his supervision fees and $2,497 in arrears in court costs. At the hearing on July 3, Broomfield’s probation supervisor, George Barnes, testified that Broomfield signed and initialed every term of his probation on the conditions-of- probation document. Barnes recalled that in March 2025, Broomfield tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine twice and once for marijuana. Later that month, Broomfield was arrested for possessing a controlled substance. Barnes testified that Broomfield was delinquent $70 on his supervision fees and $2,497 on costs, fines, and fees to the sheriff’s office. On cross-examination, Barnes stated that the police report from Broomfield’s March arrest stated that Broomfield possessed methamphetamine or cocaine, but he was not aware of whether the substance had been tested by the crime lab. Barnes explained that Broomfield had checked in with him regularly and had been forthcoming about his drug use. Broomfield had not explained why he fell behind on his payments but told Barnes that he had been taking care of his mother. Rebecca Ganaway testified that she keeps the payment records for the Columbia County Sheriff’s Office, and the records 2 showed that Broomfield had not made any payments toward his court-ordered fines, fees, and costs in case No. 14CR-23-34. She testified that in the instant case, he was in arrears $375, and she was unaware of any other delinquent payments in previous cases. Officer Kyle Jensen of the Magnolia Police Department testified that in March 2025, he conducted a traffic stop of a white GMC Yukon for having a broken taillight. Officer Jensen ascertained that Broomfield was driving the vehicle, and there was a female passenger asleep in the passenger seat. The passenger, Lastasia Willis, seemed to be having a medical problem, so Officer Jensen helped her into his patrol car and called an ambulance. After help arrived, Officer Jensen continued investigating the traffic stop and obtained Broomfield’s consent to search the vehicle. In the center console, closer to the driver’s side, Jensen found 12.4 grams of a white crystal-like substance that, in his experience as a police officer, appeared to be methamphetamine. Broomfield and Willis denied that the substance belonged to them, and Officer Jensen arrested them both for constructive possession of a controlled substance. He could not recall if he field-tested the substance, and he did not know whether the crime-lab report had been completed. From the bench, the circuit court found that Broomfield’s positive drug tests in March 2025 constituted a violation of probation. The court determined that paying the costs related to this case and two previous cases were conditions of Broomfield’s probation. Because Broomfield had made no payments in this case, there was willful nonpayment “at least for part of that period of time, which would also constitute a violation of his probation.” The court also found that Broomfield had violated the terms of his probation by 3 constructively possessing a controlled substance. The court sentenced Broomfield to six years for each conviction, to run consecutively, for a total of twelve years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Division of Correction. Broomfield timely filed his notice of appeal, and this appeal followed. II. Discussion On appeal, Broomfield propounds three arguments for reversal. First, he argues that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he constructively possessed the methamphetamine because the reasonable hypothesis that it belonged to Willis was not excluded. Second, Broomfield contends that Barnes’s testimony that he tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and marijuana in March 2025 “leaves open the question as to whether proper, reliable, and accurate testing had occurred to demonstrate that such substances were in Mr. Broomfield’s system in violation of the conditions of his probation.” Third, Broomfield asserts that due to periods of unemployment, his nonpayment was not willful, and the court’s findings regarding nonpayment in case No. 14CR-23-34 were against the preponderance of the evidence. His arguments fail. To revoke a suspended imposition of sentence or probation, the circuit court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably violated a condition of the probation or suspension. Springs v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 364, at 3, 525 S.W.3d 490, 492. The State’s burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is lower than that required to convict in a criminal trial, and evidence that is insufficient for a conviction may be sufficient for a revocation. Id. The State does not have to prove every allegation in its 4 petition, and proof of only one violation is sufficient to sustain a revocation. Mathis v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 49, at 3, 616 S.W.3d 274, 277. We will uphold the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. Because the determination of a preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of credibility and weight to be given to the testimony, we defer to the circuit court’s superior position to do so. Farris v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 188, 686 S.W.3d 602. We now address Broomfield’s argument regarding the lack of scientific testing on his positive test for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and marijuana. He argues there was no proof by a preponderance of the evidence that he willfully violated the terms of his probation by using illegal substances because there was no scientific testing confirming Barnes’s testimony. He is wrong. In Danner v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 466, at 5, 655 S.W.3d 555, 558, the circuit court’s revocation of Danner’s probation was based in part on her probation officer’s testimony and her own testimony that she had used marijuana before she obtained a medical marijuana card. Danner argued that her “probation should not be revoked on testimony and without confirmation by scientific testing.” We affirmed the revocation, holding that testimony regarding a positive drug test constitutes sufficient evidence of a violation. Because the State need only prove one violation of the terms and conditions of a defendant’s probation in order to support a revocation, it is not necessary to consider Broomfield’s other arguments regarding the circuit court’s findings that he violated the terms 5 and conditions of his probation by committing new criminal offenses and his failure to make payments on restitution, fines, and fees. Affirmed. GLADWIN and TUCKER, JJ., agree. Ryan Wolf, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Laura K. Shue, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 6