Franklin Broomfield v. State of Arkansas
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 544
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-25-698
FRANKLIN BROOMFIELD Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 14CR-23-34]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, JR.,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
Franklin Broomfield appeals the Columbia County Circuit Court’s revocation of his
probation. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
On June 22, 2023, Broomfield pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance-
Schedule I/II, methamphetamine or cocaine; and possession of drug paraphernalia to ingest
or inhale in case number 14CR-23-24. On June 6, 2024, Broomfield was sentenced to five
years’ probation. The terms and conditions of his probation included that he must obey all
federal and state laws, local ordinances, and court orders; he must not sell, distribute, or
possess any controlled substances; he must pay all court-ordered fines, fees, and/or
restitution and a monthly supervision fee; and he must pay the costs and/or fines to the
Columbia County Sheriff’s Department. Additionally, Broomfield was ordered to pay “all
financial obligations in 14CR-17-84 and 19-92.” The sentencing order was entered on
December 26, 2024.
On June 3, 2025, the State filed a petition to revoke Broomfield’s probation. In the
petition, the State alleged that in March, Broomfield committed the following offenses: he
possessed a controlled substance-Schedule I/II, methamphetamine or cocaine greater than
10 grams but less than 200 grams; he tested positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamine; and he was $70 in arrears on his supervision fees and $2,497 in arrears
in court costs.
At the hearing on July 3, Broomfield’s probation supervisor, George Barnes, testified
that Broomfield signed and initialed every term of his probation on the conditions-of-
probation document. Barnes recalled that in March 2025, Broomfield tested positive for
amphetamines and methamphetamine twice and once for marijuana. Later that month,
Broomfield was arrested for possessing a controlled substance. Barnes testified that
Broomfield was delinquent $70 on his supervision fees and $2,497 on costs, fines, and fees
to the sheriff’s office. On cross-examination, Barnes stated that the police report from
Broomfield’s March arrest stated that Broomfield possessed methamphetamine or cocaine,
but he was not aware of whether the substance had been tested by the crime lab. Barnes
explained that Broomfield had checked in with him regularly and had been forthcoming
about his drug use. Broomfield had not explained why he fell behind on his payments but
told Barnes that he had been taking care of his mother. Rebecca Ganaway testified that she
keeps the payment records for the Columbia County Sheriff’s Office, and the records
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showed that Broomfield had not made any payments toward his court-ordered fines, fees,
and costs in case No. 14CR-23-34. She testified that in the instant case, he was in arrears
$375, and she was unaware of any other delinquent payments in previous cases. Officer Kyle
Jensen of the Magnolia Police Department testified that in March 2025, he conducted a
traffic stop of a white GMC Yukon for having a broken taillight. Officer Jensen ascertained
that Broomfield was driving the vehicle, and there was a female passenger asleep in the
passenger seat. The passenger, Lastasia Willis, seemed to be having a medical problem, so
Officer Jensen helped her into his patrol car and called an ambulance. After help arrived,
Officer Jensen continued investigating the traffic stop and obtained Broomfield’s consent to
search the vehicle. In the center console, closer to the driver’s side, Jensen found 12.4 grams
of a white crystal-like substance that, in his experience as a police officer, appeared to be
methamphetamine. Broomfield and Willis denied that the substance belonged to them, and
Officer Jensen arrested them both for constructive possession of a controlled substance. He
could not recall if he field-tested the substance, and he did not know whether the crime-lab
report had been completed.
From the bench, the circuit court found that Broomfield’s positive drug tests in
March 2025 constituted a violation of probation. The court determined that paying the costs
related to this case and two previous cases were conditions of Broomfield’s probation.
Because Broomfield had made no payments in this case, there was willful nonpayment “at
least for part of that period of time, which would also constitute a violation of his probation.”
The court also found that Broomfield had violated the terms of his probation by
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constructively possessing a controlled substance. The court sentenced Broomfield to six years
for each conviction, to run consecutively, for a total of twelve years’ imprisonment in the
Arkansas Division of Correction.
Broomfield timely filed his notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Broomfield propounds three arguments for reversal. First, he argues that
the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he constructively possessed
the methamphetamine because the reasonable hypothesis that it belonged to Willis was not
excluded. Second, Broomfield contends that Barnes’s testimony that he tested positive for
amphetamines, methamphetamine, and marijuana in March 2025 “leaves open the question
as to whether proper, reliable, and accurate testing had occurred to demonstrate that such
substances were in Mr. Broomfield’s system in violation of the conditions of his probation.”
Third, Broomfield asserts that due to periods of unemployment, his nonpayment was not
willful, and the court’s findings regarding nonpayment in case No. 14CR-23-34 were against
the preponderance of the evidence. His arguments fail.
To revoke a suspended imposition of sentence or probation, the circuit court must
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably violated a
condition of the probation or suspension. Springs v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 364, at 3, 525
S.W.3d 490, 492. The State’s burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is lower than that
required to convict in a criminal trial, and evidence that is insufficient for a conviction may
be sufficient for a revocation. Id. The State does not have to prove every allegation in its
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petition, and proof of only one violation is sufficient to sustain a revocation. Mathis v. State,
2021 Ark. App. 49, at 3, 616 S.W.3d 274, 277. We will uphold the circuit court’s findings
unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. Because the
determination of a preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of credibility and
weight to be given to the testimony, we defer to the circuit court’s superior position to do
so. Farris v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 188, 686 S.W.3d 602.
We now address Broomfield’s argument regarding the lack of scientific testing on his
positive test for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and marijuana. He argues there was no
proof by a preponderance of the evidence that he willfully violated the terms of his probation
by using illegal substances because there was no scientific testing confirming Barnes’s
testimony. He is wrong. In Danner v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 466, at 5, 655 S.W.3d 555, 558,
the circuit court’s revocation of Danner’s probation was based in part on her probation
officer’s testimony and her own testimony that she had used marijuana before she obtained
a medical marijuana card. Danner argued that her “probation should not be revoked on
testimony and without confirmation by scientific testing.” We affirmed the revocation,
holding that testimony regarding a positive drug test constitutes sufficient evidence of a
violation.
Because the State need only prove one violation of the terms and conditions of a
defendant’s probation in order to support a revocation, it is not necessary to consider
Broomfield’s other arguments regarding the circuit court’s findings that he violated the terms
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and conditions of his probation by committing new criminal offenses and his failure to make
payments on restitution, fines, and fees.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and TUCKER, JJ., agree.
Ryan Wolf, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Laura K. Shue, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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