Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-10553 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 1 of 8 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-10553 ____________________ COLBURN CLIFTON GOODEN KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus DEPUTY CODY JETT, DET. JONATHAN SMITH, Defendants-Appellees, GREGG WILLIAMS, Defendant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-01376-MMH-LLL ____________________ Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge: USCA11 Case: 24-10553 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 2 of 8 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10553 This appeal requires us to decide whether two police officers are entitled to qualified immunity for seizing Colburn Clifton Gooden Kelly without an arrest warrant. Because the officers had probable cause to suspect Kelly of illegal drug activity, they are en- titled to qualified immunity. So, we affirm the summary judgment in their favor. I. BACKGROUND Detective Jonathan Smith saw a black male sell drugs to a confidential informant. The dealer left the scene in a red vehicle with a white female passenger. Detective Smith briefly followed the vehicle but, to protect the informant’s identity, he did not stop the vehicle. Minutes later, a dispatcher told Deputy Cody Jett about an anonymous tip that Heather McDonald would be arriving in a red Hyundai at a local McDonald’s restaurant. The tipster stated that there was a warrant out for her arrest, which Deputy Jett verified. The report also claimed that a black male would be driving the ve- hicle, that the black male was known to carry a firearm, and that the driver and McDonald possessed heroin. And the tipster alleged that the vehicle was being used to deal drugs. Deputy Jett went to the McDonald’s restaurant. There, he saw a vehicle matching the tipster’s description, McDonald stand- ing at the passenger side of the vehicle, and a black male sitting in the driver’s seat. He also saw another individual at the driver’s side window. The driver was later identified as Colburn Clifton Gooden Kelly. USCA11 Case: 24-10553 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 3 of 8 24-10553 Opinion of the Court 3 When Deputy Jett approached the vehicle, the individual standing at the driver-side window fled. Meanwhile, Kelly got out of the vehicle and walked with McDonald toward the restaurant. Deputy Jett called McDonald by her first name, and both she and Kelly turned around. Deputy Jett instructed them to come back to- ward him, sit on the curb, and keep their hands out of their pockets. At first, Kelly and McDonald both complied. But McDonald soon tried to flee. Deputy Jett tackled her before noticing that Kelly had his hands in his pockets. Deputy Jett then drew and aimed his firearm at Kelly and ordered him to show his hands. Kelly com- plied. Deputy Jett called for backup. Backup officers arrived with a canine, and Kelly was handcuffed. A canine sniff alerted officers to drugs in the vehicle about ten minutes after Deputy Jett initially detained Kelly. Meanwhile, Kelly remained seated on the curb for about 40 more minutes. Detective Smith arrived at the scene and asked for Kelly’s consent to search the vehicle. Kelly declined. Another officer spoke with Kelly and encouraged him to cooperate. Kelly then admitted drugs were in the vehicle and consented to a vehicle search. But before officers searched the vehicle, they obtained a warrant based on Kelly’s admission and the canine sniff. Detective Smith arrested Kelly at the scene for driving with a suspended or revoked license. Kelly was later indicted for that of- fense, see FLA. STAT. § 322.34(2)(b), and on several drug charges, see id. §§ 893.13(1)(a)(1), 893.13(6)(a), 893.135(1)(b)(1)(a), USCA11 Case: 24-10553 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 4 of 8 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10553 893.135(1)(c)(1)(a), 893.135(1)(c)(1)(c). After unsuccessfully moving to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle search and his state- ments to police, Kelly pleaded no contest to all charges. Kelly then filed this suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Detective Smith and Deputy Jett seized him without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Kelly’s suit was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The district court ex- plained that it was “unable to conclude” at that “stage of the case” “that Kelly’s Fourth Amendment claims against [the officers] and the related convictions are logically contradictory” so that Heck barred the suit. Both the officers and Kelly later moved for summary judg- ment. The officers again raised Heck but also argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers. It concluded that Heck barred Kelly’s complaint because, if successful, the judgment would “nec- essarily imply the invalidity of his . . . convictions,” and “Kelly’s ar- gument that there was no lawful basis to detain him . . . would nec- essarily bear on the admissibility of all that followed—including the K-9 sniff” and “Kelly’s admission.” The district court did not ad- dress qualified immunity. USCA11 Case: 24-10553 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 5 of 8 24-10553 Opinion of the Court 5 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and may affirm based on any ground supported by the rec- ord.” McGriff v. City of Miami Beach, 84 F.4th 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). III. DISCUSSION The district court resolved this case based on Heck, but we decline to do the same. To the extent that Deputy Jett and Detective Smith contend that Heck bars Kelly’s claims because they share a “nucleus of operative fact” with at least one of his convictions, we disagree. See Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “a common nucleus of operative fact” between any offense for which a plaintiff was convicted and “the offense un- derlying his [section] 1983 claim” is necessary for Heck to apply— not that it is sufficient). Instead, as the district court acknowledged, Heck’s application to cases about the Fourth Amendment invokes “doctrines like independent source[,] . . . inevitable discovery, and . . . harmless error,” which could mean that a judgment in favor of Kelly “would not necessarily imply that [his] conviction [i]s unlaw- ful.” The applicability of those doctrines raises potentially thorny issues that we need not address in the light of a more straightfor- ward basis to affirm. We can resolve this appeal based on qualified immunity. When an officer establishes that his challenged conduct was “a dis- cretionary function[,] . . . the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Miller v. USCA11 Case: 24-10553 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 6 of 8 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10553 Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 129 F.4th 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). To meet that burden, “[t]he plaintiff must . . . establish that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged vio- lation.” Id. (citation modified). To prove that officers violated the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff alleging a seizure without legal process must prove false arrest, that is, an arrest without probable cause. See Richmond v. Ba- dia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180 (11th Cir. 2022). “An arrest . . . occurs when the government . . . asserts lawful authority to which the subject accedes.” Id. And “probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983). “[I]t does not require anything close to conclusive proof or proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was in fact committed, or even a finding made by a preponderance of the evi- dence.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019). So, it “is not a high bar.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (citation modified). An anonymous tip can supply probable cause for an arrest in conjunction with authorities’ “independent investi- gative work . . . corroborati[ng] . . . the [tip’s] predictions.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 244; cf. Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (stating that, for reasonable suspicion, the investigation must validate the tip’s “reliab[ility] in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person”). Kelly does not contest that Deputy Jett and Detective Smith were performing discretionary functions when they seized him. USCA11 Case: 24-10553 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 7 of 8 24-10553 Opinion of the Court 7 We address “on a claim-by-claim and defendant-by-defendant ba- sis” whether Kelly satisfied his burden to rebut the officers’ entitle- ment to qualified immunity. Miller, 129 F.4th at 1333. Because Dep- uty Jett and Detective Smith did not violate the Constitution, we need not decide whether any right Kelly asserted was clearly estab- lished—that is, whether “it is at least arguable” that they had prob- able cause to arrest him. Marbut v. Phillips, 176 F.4th 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). Deputy Jett is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate Kelly’s constitutional rights. We assume without decid- ing that when Deputy Jett first ordered Kelly to sit on the curb and keep his hands out of his pockets, he seized Kelly to a degree that required probable cause. But cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–27 (1968) (holding that officers need only reasonable suspicion to con- duct certain stops). Even under that assumption, the anonymous tip and Deputy Jett’s observations together supplied probable cause to detain Kelly. The tipster said a red Hyundai would be at a local McDonald’s. Deputy Jett saw a vehicle matching that description at that location. The tipster said a black male would be driving and Heather McDonald would be with him. Deputy Jett saw a black male driver in the vehicle and Heather McDonald standing beside the passenger-side of the vehicle. The tipster said they would be dealing drugs. Deputy Jett saw a man standing beside the driver- side of the vehicle, who then fled as Deputy Jett approached—con- duct a reasonable officer would understand is consistent with a drug transaction. And finally, the tipster said that there was a war- rant out for McDonald’s arrest. Deputy Jett verified that there was USCA11 Case: 24-10553 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 8 of 8 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10553 a warrant out for McDonald and recognized her when he arrived at the scene. When Deputy Jett called out to the woman by McDonald’s first name, she and Kelly responded by turning around. Deputy Jett’s initial investigation verified enough of the tipster’s report for Deputy Jett to have probable cause to suspect Kelly of criminal drug activity. Deputy Jett did not violate the Con- stitution. Detective Smith is also entitled to qualified immunity. Be- cause probable cause existed when Deputy Jett first detained Kelly, there was also probable cause when Deputy Smith arrived at the scene and at every point thereafter. See Scott v. City of Miami, 139 F.4th 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2025) (explaining that, once established, probable cause is “vitiated” only if officers learn of “exculpatory evidence [that] did not merely make it less likely probable cause existed but obviously and irrefutably established” its absence (em- phasis omitted) (citation modified)). Detective Smith also did not violate the Constitution. IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of Detective Smith and Deputy Jett.