Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13829 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 1 of 5 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13829 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus KEENAN JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cr-20326-BB-1 ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Keenan Johnson, a former detective with the Miami-Dade Police Department, appeals his convictions for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). Johnson authored a search warrant affidavit USCA11 Case: 25-13829 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 2 of 5 2 Opinion of the Court 25-13829 that led to the seizure of evidence used against Eugene Jones in a federal fraud prosecution. Jones moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Johnson had intentionally or recklessly made material misstatements and omissions in the affidavit. At the Jones suppres- sion hearing (presided over by Judge Altonaga), Johnson was the sole witness for the government’s effort to resist suppression of the evidence. Johnson lied several times about the cell number ending in 8005 belonging to him, leading the United States to dismiss the prosecution against Jones. Johnson was subsequently charged with perjury during his testimony at the Jones suppression hearing and was convicted on two counts of perjury with respect to his false statements concerning the 8005 number. We write only for the parties who are already familiar with the facts. Therefore, we include only so many of the facts as are appropriate to understand our opinion. We review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010). A conviction for perjury under § 1623(a) requires the gov- ernment to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony was: (1) false, (2) material, and (3) made with knowledge of its fal- sity. United States v. De La Torre, 634 F.2d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 1981). For a statement to be material, the false statement must have “a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the USCA11 Case: 25-13829 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 3 of 5 25-13829 Opinion of the Court 3 decision of the decision making body to which it was addressed.” United States v. Johnson, 485 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) (quota- tion omitted). Even if the statement did not actually influence the tribunal, it is sufficient if it could have possibly influenced it. Id. In a hearing to determine if probable cause exists for a search warrant or whether the evidence should be suppressed because of deliberate falsity, courts employ the Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978), doctrine, which states “a defendant must [] show that the affiant made false statements or omissions intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth” (the first step of the Franks analysis); and “that the false statements or omissions were neces- sary to the finding of probable cause”(the second step of the Franks analysis). United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178, 1197 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). In the second step of the Franks analysis, a false statement is not “necessary to the finding of proba- ble cause” if—setting aside the false statements—the remaining evidence would still provide probable cause. In other words, a Franks analysis contains a more demanding materiality element that requires the false statement or omission to be outcome-deter- minative of the probable cause issue. See id. Here, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to find that Johnson’s false statements about the 8005 number at the sup- pression hearing were material. See Johnson, 485 F.3d at 1270. John- son’s false statements regarding the 8005 number were capable of influencing Judge Altonaga, as shown by the fact she delayed ruling on the motion to suppress until it was discovered who owned the USCA11 Case: 25-13829 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 4 of 5 4 Opinion of the Court 25-13829 8005 number in order to address the veracity of Johnson’s testi- mony. Id. As the affiant, Johnson’s credibility was central to the issue before Judge Altonaga because, at the first step of the Franks analysis, she had to assess whether Johnson “intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth” made false statements or omissions in his warrant affidavit. See, e.g., Goldstein, 989 F.3d at 1197; Johnson, 485 F.3d at 1270. Thus, Johnson’s false statements were obviously highly relevant to Judge Altonaga’s resolution of the first step of the Franks analysis. Moreover, there was evidence that Johnson’s false state- ments had a significant impact on Johnson’s credibility. For exam- ple, AUSA Dobin (the prosecutor in the Jones case) testified at Johnson’s trial that she made the decision to dismiss the federal fraud case against Jones because she believed that she no longer had a credible witness in Johnson (the author of the warrant affida- vit in the Jones case and the only witness for the government at the Jones suppression hearing). She also believed that Judge Altonaga would have suppressed the evidence uncovered during Johnson’s search of Jones’s car. Under all of the facts and circumstances here, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence on the basis of which a reasonable jury could find that Johnson’s false statements had a natural tendency to influence or were capable of influencing Judge Altonaga’s decision in the suppression hearing in the Jones case. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is USCA11 Case: 25-13829 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 5 of 5 25-13829 Opinion of the Court 5 AFFIRMED.