Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Troy Christopher Stevenson, Jr., Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2024-000890 Appeal From Richland County Daniel Coble, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-476 Submitted October 22, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Clarence Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Solicitor Byron E. Gipson, all of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Troy Christopher Stevenson, Jr. appeals his conviction for murder and sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Stevenson argues the trial court erred in (1) failing to exclude evidence concerning a defective brake light based on the State's late disclosure; (2) denying his motion for a directed verdict; and (3) charging the jury on accomplice liability. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. 1. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude evidence of the defective brake light because the court required the defense to inspect the vehicle before the State introduced the challenged evidence and Stevenson failed to demonstrate resulting prejudice. See Rule 5(c), SCRCrimP (providing that if a party discovers additional evidence or material previously requested and subject to discovery, the party must "promptly notify the other party . . . or the court of the existence of the additional evidence"); Rule 5(d)(2), SCRCrimP (providing that when a party fails to comply with Rule 5, the trial court may "permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances" and the court may "specify the time, place and manner of making the discovery and inspection and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just"); State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 150, 498 S.E.2d 212, 221 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Sanctions for noncompliance with disclosure rules are within the discretion of the trial [court] and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 453-54, 503 S.E.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Once a Rule 5 violation is shown, reversal is required only where the defendant suffered prejudice from the violation."), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617, 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999). 2. We hold the trial court properly denied Stevenson's directed verdict motion because, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tended to prove his guilt. See State v. Elders, 386 S.C. 474, 480, 688 S.E.2d 857, 860 (Ct. App. 2010) ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, an appellate court must employ the same standard as the trial court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."); id. ("This court will reverse a trial court's ruling on a directed verdict motion if no evidence supports the trial court's decision or the ruling is controlled by an error of law."); State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 101, 610 S.E.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. at 101, 610 S.E.2d at 863 ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."). The State presented evidence that Stevenson communicated with individuals connected to an earlier shooting at his mother's residence, received the victim's address shortly before the murder, and traveled into the area of the victim's address around the time of the murder, as reflected by the cell-site evidence. The State also presented surveillance footage of a black sedan passing the victim's address at the time ShotSpotter detected the gunfire, testimony that what appeared to be a muzzle flash was visible on the surveillance footage as the sedan passed, and evidence Stevenson regularly drove a black Honda similar to the sedan depicted in the footage. 3. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in charging accomplice liability. See State v. Simmons, 384 S.C. 145, 178, 682 S.E.2d 19, 36 (Ct. App. 2009) ("In reviewing jury charges for error, this [c]ourt must consider the [trial] court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial."); State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court]'s decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Brown, 362 S.C. 258, 262, 607 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 2004) ("If there is any evidence to support a jury charge, the trial [court] should grant the request."); State v. Campbell, 443 S.C. 182, 194, 904 S.E.2d 441, 447 (2024) ("[A]ccomplice liability can be proven by circumstantial evidence . . . ."); id. at 193, 904 S.E.2d at 446-47 (stating an accomplice liability charge is appropriate when a defendant "personally commit[s] the crime or [is] present at the scene of the crime and intentionally, or through a common design, aid[s], abet[s], or assist[s] in the commission of that crime through some overt act" (quoting State v. Condrey, 349 S.C. 184, 194, 562 S.E.2d 320, 325 (Ct. App. 2002))); State v. Johnson, 444 S.C. 442, 449-50, 908 S.E.2d 102, 107 (2024) (holding a trial court "should charge the law of accomplice liability" in a gunshot murder case when there is any evidence the defendant "had a mutual plan or agreement with another person to commit the murder" and the other person fired the fatal shot); id. at 449-51, 908 S.E.2d at 106-07 (finding an accomplice liability charge was warranted when the record contained evidence the defendant had planned the murder, arrived at the scene with an unidentified companion, and the circumstances permitted a reasonable inference that if the companion was the shooter, he acted in concert with the defendant). The evidence included testimony that the surveillance footage appeared to show two occupants in the black sedan that passed the victim's residence at the time of the shooting and that the shots could have been fired through the passenger-side window by either the driver or a passenger. The State also presented evidence linking Stevenson to a similar black Honda and placing his phone in the area after he received the victim's address shortly before the shooting. Thus, the evidence permitted a reasonable inference that if Stevenson was driving and the passenger fired the shots, the two were acting pursuant to a mutual plan. AFFIRMED.1 THOMAS, KONDUROS, and CURTIS, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.