People v. Wallace CA2/7
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketB338652
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26 P. v. Wallace CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B338652
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA099476)
v.
DESHAWN WALLACE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel B. Feldstern, Judge. Affirmed as
modified and remanded with directions.
Edward J. Haggerty, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Deshawn Wallace appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of first degree murder and possession of a firearm
by a felon. He argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of Wallace’s prior violence against his girlfriend, who
was a witness for the prosecution; (2) the instruction on contrived
self-defense misstated the law; (3) substantial evidence did not
support the instructions on self-defense as an initial aggressor
and contrived self-defense; (4) the instruction on perfect self-
defense misstated the law; (5) the court should have sua sponte
instructed on heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter;
(6) Wallace’s counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
request instructions on adoptive admissions and on provocation
as a basis for second degree murder; (7) the prosecutor committed
misconduct in his closing argument; (8) the cumulative effect of
the errors resulted in an unfair trial; (9) he is entitled to
additional custody credits; and (10) the court erred in imposing
various fines.
We remand with directions to issue a new abstract of
judgment reflecting Wallace’s correct custody credit. We also
direct the court to give Wallace the opportunity to assert an
excessive fines challenge to the restitution fine, pursuant to
People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 (Kopp). Otherwise, we affirm.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Evidence
1. Background
Wallace lived in an apartment building with his girlfriend
Desiree B.1 and their child. Desiree’s friend Jennifer P. also lived
in the building with her three children and her boyfriend Avak
Sofiyev. Sofiyev struggled with drug addiction, and when he was
on drugs he sometimes slept in his car rather than in the
apartment. His car was parked in a designated space in the
building’s underground garage.
On December 10, 2022, Wallace went into the garage and
approached Sofiyev’s car while holding a gun and wearing gloves,
a mask, and a hooded sweatshirt with the hood up. Wallace
opened the car door, and Sofiyev got out. After the two men
briefly spoke, Wallace shot Sofiyev twice, killing him.
2. Events preceding the shooting
On December 8, two days before the shooting, Officer
Michael Juatco with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
responded to a radio call of a citizen arrest at a dollar store.
When he arrived, he saw two men holding Wallace on the floor.
A store employee said Wallace was fighting with a customer and
employees. Wallace was very upset and “yelling aggressively”
that he “didn’t do anything.” Juatco handcuffed Wallace and put
him in the back of his police car but ultimately released him.
Later that day, Desiree talked to Jennifer about what
happened at the store. Desiree said Wallace went to the store
1 We refer to the witnesses by their first name and last
initial to protect their privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4).)
3
with Sofiyev. Wallace got into an argument with a customer, and
someone called the police. Sofiyev left the store and took
Wallace’s car keys with him. According to Desiree, Wallace “was
really pissed of[f] and … he wanted the car keys back.” Jennifer
gave Sofiyev’s number to Desiree so Desiree could contact him
and coordinate the return of the keys. After Desiree called
Sofiyev, she asked Jennifer not to tell Wallace about the phone
call. Desiree was “scared” that Wallace would be upset she had
talked to Sofiyev.
That same day, Kimberly M., who lived in the same
apartment building, stopped by Wallace’s apartment to socialize.
Wallace asked Kimberly if she had any bullets. She told him she
did and invited him to her apartment. Wallace went to her
apartment, looked at the bullets, and said they were the wrong
caliber. He told her he needed .380-caliber bullets, and he asked
Kimberly to ask her roommate if he had any. The roommate
later told Kimberly he did not have any, and Kimberly relayed
this to Wallace.
The next day, December 9, Sofiyev still had not returned
Wallace’s keys. Jennifer called Sofiyev and told him to return
them. Sofiyev brought the keys to the building’s laundry room
and left them in a broken dryer. Jennifer picked up the keys and
gave them to Desiree.
Throughout that day and the next, Wallace was “extremely
pissed” at Sofiyev and “acting a little bit erratic,” according to
Jennifer. On one occasion, Wallace told Jennifer, “I am going to
fucking shoot [Sofiyev]. Watch this.” On another occasion,
Wallace texted Sofiyev, “[W]hen I see you, … I am going to come
for you,” and “[Y]ou are going to have to answer for what you
4
did.” During that time, Sofiyev avoided Jennifer’s apartment
because he wanted to give Wallace “a few days to calm down.”
On the day of the shooting, December 10, at 8:30 a.m.,
Wallace went to a liquor store near his apartment. He stayed in
the store for about an hour and spoke to one of the store owners,
Allen, at length. Surveillance video (that included audio) from
inside the store captured their conversation, and the People
played the footage at trial.
Wallace described the events at the dollar store two days
earlier. He said he got into an argument with another customer,
and the two men started wrestling. The customer tackled
Wallace to the ground, and seven other customers got on top of
Wallace and held him down until the police arrived. Wallace
believed he did nothing wrong and the incident was racially
motivated.
Wallace explained that while the customers were on top of
him, they pinned down his limbs, and one person had his knee on
Wallace’s chest and neck. Wallace said he could not move or
breathe, and he thought they were going to kill him. Wallace saw
Sofiyev standing nearby, but Sofiyev did not do anything to help
him and left the store without him. According to Wallace, Sofiyev
also went into Wallace’s car and took Wallace’s house keys, mail
key, and key to a rental U-Haul.
Wallace told Allen that he “fel[t] like [he] got raped” by the
people holding him down and Sofiyev “let [him] get raped.”
Wallace was also angry that Sofiyev had his keys and could be
making copies of them. Wallace told Allen, “Bro, I need to find
him, I’ll tell you. Like, I get mad, I start shaking.”
Wallace explained that Sofiyev lived in his car, which was
parked in a parking spot in the apartment building’s garage.
5
Wallace said, “[H]e’s done, bro. He’s done. Just the fact he did
some weird shit and just stood there and did that. I was like, all
right bro, I’m going … [to] attack you for everything you got, and
every time I see you, I’m going to beat you the fuck up, I’m going
to knock your teeth out, I’m going to … take a bat to your fucking
head. … I’m going to go … in the garage.”
Later that afternoon, at 3:00 p.m., Wallace returned to the
liquor store and spent another hour inside the store.
Surveillance footage showed Allen gave Wallace some gloves.
Wallace put them on, said, “I don’t touch nothing,” and laughed.
Wallace left the liquor store and walked directly to the apartment
building’s parking garage. As he walked to the garage, he pulled
up his hood on his sweatshirt and put on a face mask.
3. The shooting
Surveillance video from inside the garage captured the
shooting, and the People played the footage for the jury. LAPD
Detective Clifford Parchman narrated the events captured on
video. According to Parchman, the video showed Wallace enter
the garage, walk directly to Sofiyev’s car, and open the rear
passenger door. Sofiyev stepped out of his car and the two men
“appear[ed] to have a conversation with each other” while
“circling around [the] vehicle.”
At some point, Sofiyev stood with his back to the garage
wall and remained in that area while the two men talked.
Sofiyev raised his arm, and then there was “movement from
[Wallace’s] arm.” Parchman testified that at the time Sofiyev
lifted his arm, “there [was] no evidence” that Sofiyev was holding
anything or that an object fell from Sofiyev’s hand. Wallace then
pulled out a gun, fired it at Sofiyev, and ran toward a stairwell.
6
Shortly before the shooting, Antonio M. was sitting in his
parked car in the building’s garage. He told police he heard an
argument followed by two or three gunshots. He then saw
someone, who was wearing a sweatshirt with the hood up,
running toward the stairwell.2
At the time of the shooting, Jennifer was in her apartment
and received calls and texts from neighbors that Sofiyev had been
shot. Jennifer called Desiree and the two went to Sofiyev’s car in
the parking garage. The passenger car door was open, and
Sofiyev was on the floor. Desiree called 911 and performed CPR
on Sofiyev until the police arrived. Jennifer testified that neither
she nor Desiree removed any item, including a gun, from the
scene.
Sofiyev died from two gunshot wounds: one to the chest and
one to the upper back.
4. The police investigation
LAPD officers arrived at the scene and spoke to Jennifer
and Desiree. The women said they did not know who shot
Sofiyev and they did not find a gun at the scene.
Officers searched the area near Sofiyev and found two
expended casings and no weapons. Later, a bullet was recovered
from Sofiyev’s body. A forensic analysis of the recovered bullet
and two expended casings showed they were all .380 caliber.
Shortly after the police arrived, Jennifer said that a
neighbor named Alma Chavez could have been the shooter.
LAPD Officer Andrew Mejia went to Chavez’s unit to investigate.
While there, he noticed the blinds moving in the window located
2 At trial Antonio denied talking to the police about the
shooting.
7
between Chavez’s unit and the unit belonging to Desiree and
Wallace. Mejia knocked on Wallace’s apartment door, and a child
opened it. Mejia saw Wallace inside and asked if the window was
part of his apartment. Wallace falsely said it was not and closed
the door.
Later, Wallace left his apartment and went to the building
courtyard where other neighbors were gathered. He looked calm
and did not appear like he had been involved in the shooting.
Officers obtained the surveillance video of the shooting and
showed it to Jennifer and Desiree separately. Jennifer identified
Wallace as the shooter. After Desiree watched the video, she
approached Jennifer and said, “ ‘Jen, just give me one more day
with him.’ ” Jennifer interpreted that statement to mean Desiree
knew who the shooter was.
5. Wallace’s arrest
On the day of the shooting, around 9:00 p.m., LAPD
Detective Fernando Avila went to the liquor store near Wallace’s
apartment building to obtain surveillance footage. When he
arrived, Wallace was inside the store. Within earshot of Wallace,
Avila asked a store employee for permission to review the store’s
footage. The employee called the owner of the store and handed
the phone to Avila. Over speakerphone, Avila told the owner that
a shooting had occurred nearby, that it was possible the suspect
came out of the nearby parking lot, and that the liquor store’s
camera may have captured the event. The owner agreed to come
to the store in 30 minutes.
Avila then left the store, at which point Wallace
approached the employee, looked at the security cameras inside
the store, and asked the employee, “That there. Those working?”
The employee responded yes, to which Wallace replied, “I got to
8
please. Can I talk to [the store manager] before?” The employee
did not answer and instead asked Wallace which flavored tobacco
he wanted to buy. Wallace said, “I don’t know … celebratory.”
At some point later, Jennifer walked near the liquor store
and saw Wallace outside. He was on the phone and had his back
to her. Jennifer looked at him and said, “ ‘How are you going to
tell my kids what you did to their dad?’ ” He said, “I will see you
later, babe” and gestured as if blowing a kiss. Jennifer called the
police and described Wallace’s location. Shortly after, officers
arrived and arrested Wallace.
B. Defense Evidence
1. Expert testimony
Thomas Guzman-Sanchez testified as an expert in audio
and video forensics. He testified that he edited the video of the
shooting using tools to sharpen the image, freeze the frames, and
zoom in. Based on the edited video, he testified that seconds
before the shooting, the individual previously identified as
Sofiyev appeared to reach his arm up, and “there appear[ed] to be
an extension of pixel … from [his] arm.” Seconds later, “there
appear[ed] to be a region of pixels … descending or falling from
the area” near Sofiyev, and the pixels were “a pseudo rectangular
shape.” Then the individual identified as Wallace appeared to
raise his arm up.
Guzman-Sanchez also testified that he used audio tools to
magnify the audio in the surveillance video. He captured a brief
conversation between two men shortly before the shooting. One
man said, “What if it’s in your face?” The second man replied, “I
told you don’t fuck with me,” to which the first man responded,
“Homie fucked up.”
9
2. Wallace’s testimony
Wallace testified that on December 8, 2022, he agreed to
help Sofiyev steal from a dollar store. When they arrived,
Wallace created a distraction inside the store so Sofiyev could
steal something. Wallace talked on the phone “a little louder
than [he] normally would,” and a customer attacked him,
throwing him to the ground. Other customers got involved and
held Wallace down until police arrived. Sofiyev did not intervene
in the fight, left the store before police arrived, and took
Wallace’s keys with him. Wallace admitted he was “extremely
angry” at Sofiyev at that time because of the way Sofiyev acted.
Wallace testified that about two months before the shooting
he purchased a gun. He denied that on December 8 he asked his
neighbor if she had any .380 caliber bullets.
Wallace acknowledged that on the morning of the shooting,
he went to the liquor store and made multiple comments about
harming Sofiyev. He admitted he said that if anyone wanted to
defend Sofiyev, “they [were] going to get shot.” He admitted he
had stuck his arm out, put his fingers out as if he was holding a
gun, and said, “Pop, pop.” Wallace testified that he did not “mean
any of the things that [he] said,” he said them simply to “sound
tough,” and he “wasn’t mad [at Sofiyev] anymore.” In fact,
Wallace feared Sofiyev because he believed Sofiyev had a gun.
Wallace testified that later in the day, he went to the
apartment building’s garage looking for Sofiyev in order to
“defuse the situation so it wouldn’t turn into something bigger
than it was.” When he got to Sofiyev’s car, he opened the door
and said, “What’s up, bro? What’s going on? Where you been at?”
Sofiyev became angry and “mumbl[ed] stuff” under his breath.
The two paced around the car, and Sofiyev pulled out a gun.
10
Wallace told him to calm down, but Sofiyev pointed the gun at
Wallace and said, “What if I put it in your face?” Wallace used
his left hand to try “to knock the gun.” At the same time, Wallace
pulled a gun from his jacket pocket and fired at Sofiyev. Wallace
said he “was scared for [his] life” and ran off.
Wallace acknowledged that he saw Jennifer after the
shooting near the liquor store and that she asked him, “[W]hy did
[he] shoot [Sofiyev].” Wallace denied that he responded to her
verbally or blew her a kiss.
C. Jury Instructions, Verdict, and Sentencing
The trial court instructed the jury with the following
relevant jury instructions: murder with malice aforethought
(CALCRIM No. 520), first degree murder (CALCRIM No. 521),
justifiable homicide (CALCRIM No. 505), self-defense (CALCRIM
No. 3470), right to self-defense: initial aggressor (CALCRIM
No. 3471), right to self-defense: contrived self-defense (CALCRIM
No. 3472), and voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 571).
The jury found Wallace guilty of first degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and possession of a firearm by a
3
felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The jury also found true
that Wallace personally used a firearm in the commission of the
murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
Wallace waived his right to a jury trial on aggravating
factors, and the trial court found four of them true. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2).) The court sentenced
Wallace to 25 years to life for the murder plus 10 years for the
firearm enhancement. For count 2, the court imposed the middle
term of two years and stayed execution of the sentence.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
11
DISCUSSION
A. Evidence of Wallace’s Prior Bad Acts
Wallace argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of his prior violent acts against Desiree. He argues this evidence
was both inadmissible character evidence under Evidence Code
section 1101 and unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section
352. We conclude the evidence was admissible.4
1. Relevant testimony
At trial, Desiree testified she was Wallace’s girlfriend and
they had been together for six years. They continued to talk
while he was in custody, and she did not want to get him in
trouble. She testified she did not remember any of the people or
events related to the murder. She said she did not remember
Jennifer or Sofiyev, the incident at the dollar store, discovering
Sofiyev’s body, calling 911, or talking to police. As Desiree
explained, it was a “traumatic event,” and she “just completely
blocked it out.”
During the direct examination of Kimberly, Wallace’s
neighbor, the following exchange took place:
Q: How would you describe the relationship
between Jen[nifer] and [Sofiyev] and [Wallace]
and Desiree?
A: … So [Wallace] and Desiree, fights, police,
things of that nature. Constantly pretty much.
…
Q: I want to focus on what you said about the
couples. Just focusing on [Wallace] and
4 Because Wallace’s claim fails on the merits, we need not
address the People’s argument regarding forfeiture.
12
Desiree, how would you describe their
relationship with one another?
A: Not good.
Q: What makes you say that?
A: Police pounding on their door. Him coming
over and helped us patch the wall, glass door
broken that he broke. Child services come
over….
During her direct examination, Jennifer gave similar
testimony:
Q: What was Desiree and [Wallace]’s relationship
like, from your observations?
A: Not good.
Q: What makes you say that?
A: He was very violent with her.
Q: How do you know that?
A: Because she called me one time, and I went
downstairs. And she had the baby, and he was
yelling at her. And I was trying to take the
baby away from them because they were
arguing. And he was just right in her face.
And, he … kind of pushed her.
…
Q: When you say that he pushed her, are you talking—
A: [Wallace].
Q: Pushed Desiree?
A: Yes.
Q: Was she holding the baby?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened?
13
A: Basically I got in the middle of it, and I told
[Wallace] to calm down. You know, go take a
walk. Just chill out. You know, I’ll take
Desiree upstairs. We’ll [play] with my kids and
just distract him. And he wound up jumping
over the fence for the balcony and leaving.
Later, Jennifer testified about the balcony door in Wallace
and Desiree’s apartment. During that testimony, the following
exchange took place:
Q: Do you know how or why the door was broken?
A: It was broken from an altercation that they had.
That’s what Desiree had told me.
Q: An altercation that who had?
A: [Wallace] and Desiree.
Q: And Desiree told you that [Wallace] and her were
fighting, and as a result of whatever happened
between them, the door was broken?
A: Correct.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of
evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mataele (2022)
13 Cal.5th 372, 413.) We will not disturb a court’s decision to
admit or exclude evidence “ ‘ “ ‘unless there is a showing that the
trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner
resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 413-414.)
The court did not abuse its discretion.
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), prohibits the
admission of uncharged prior bad acts “if offered to prove conduct
in conformity with that character trait, sometimes described as a
14
propensity to act in a certain way.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 405-406.) However, this provision
does not preclude the admission of uncharged acts when relevant
to prove some other fact, including “to support or attack the
credibility of a witness.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (c); see
Wheeler, at p. 406 [“If an uncharged act is relevant to prove some
fact other than propensity, the evidence is admissible, subject to
a limiting instruction upon request.”].)5 “ ‘Evidence that a
witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is
relevant to the credibility of that witness and is therefore
admissible. [Citations.] An explanation of the basis for the
witness’s fear is likewise relevant to her credibility and is well
within the discretion of the trial court.’ ” (People v. Sandoval
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 429-430; see People v. Valencia (2008)
43 Cal.4th 268, 302 [“Evidence of fear is relevant to the witness’s
credibility.”].)
Wallace’s prior violent behavior involving Desiree gave
Desiree a reason to fear him. (See People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th
1, 31 (Case) [evidence that witness had seen defendant commit
violent acts was admissible to show witness feared telling police
the truth].) Evidence of the couple’s violent relationship was thus
relevant to the credibility of Desiree as a witness because it could
explain the discrepancy between her detailed statements to the
police and her later testimony at trial that she could not
remember any of the events related to the murder. (See People v.
Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869 [evidence of defendant’s
5 Wallace did not request a limiting instruction at trial with
respect to the testimony of his prior behavior toward Desiree.
The trial court was not required to give such an instruction sua
sponte. (See People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 293.)
15
prior threats to witness explained why witness’s former
testimony differed from later testimony].)
Wallace contends there was no direct evidence that Desiree
feared Wallace. However, Desiree told Jennifer that she was
“scared” that Wallace would be upset at her for talking to Sofiyev.
Moreover, the jury could have reasonably inferred from Wallace’s
violent acts against Desiree that she feared him. The trial court
thus did not abuse its discretion in determining the evidence was
admissible under Evidence Code section 1101.
Nor did the court abuse its discretion by not excluding the
evidence under Evidence Code section 352. Under that provision,
trial courts have discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will require undue time consumption, will
confuse or mislead the jury, or poses a substantial risk of undue
prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The incidents Kimberly and
Jennifer described were far less inflammatory than the evidence
of the murder charge—the incidents of domestic violence did not
involve a high level of violence, and there was no evidence
Desiree had sustained any injuries. (See Case, supra, 5 Cal.5th
at pp. 31-32 [“Defendant claims this evidence was ‘highly
inflammatory,’ but evidence that defendant punched [one person]
in the mouth and struck [another] on the leg with a poker pales
in comparison to the circumstances of the charged crimes: the
execution-style slaying of two victims during a robbery.”]; People
v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405 [prior bad act’s prejudicial
effect is “decreased” if it is “no more inflammatory than the
testimony concerning the charged offenses”].) Thus, there is little
chance a juror would be moved to convict Wallace for a murder he
did not commit in order to punish him for his relatively minor
16
acts of violence against Desiree or merely because the jurors
determined he was a violent person. (Case, at p. 32.)
Moreover, the prosecution devoted very little time to the
evidence of Wallace’s prior bad acts. There was no mention of
them during closing arguments, and the testimony about them
spanned approximately three pages of the reporter’s transcript.
(See People v. Pierce (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 893, 901 [prejudicial
effect diminished where testimony about prior offense “involved
only 17 pages of transcript”].) Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting testimony about his prior acts of
violence against Desiree.6
B. Instructions on Initial Aggressor Self-defense and Contrived
Self-defense
Wallace argues the court prejudicially erred by instructing
the jury with CALCRIM No. 3471, the instruction on initial
aggressor self-defense, and CALCRIM No. 3472, the instruction
on contrived self-defense. He contends CALCRIM No. 3472, as
given, misstated the law. He also contends substantial evidence
did not warrant either instruction. We are not persuaded.
CALCRIM No. 3472 correctly stated the law, and any error in
6 For these same reasons, Wallace’s constitutional challenges
fail. Wallace argues the admission of testimony about his prior
violent acts violated his constitutional right to due process,
arguing the Due Process Clause protects against the introduction
of evidence that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair. As discussed, the challenged testimony
was admissible for valid, non-propensity purposes and was not
unduly prejudicial.
17
instructing on CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472 based on a lack of
substantial evidence was harmless.7
1. Relevant background
The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3471 that
“[a] person who starts a fight has a right to self-defense only if:
1. He actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting; and 2. He
indicated, by word or by conduct, to his opponent, in a way that a
reasonable person would understand, that he wanted to stop
fighting and he had stopped fighting. If the defendant meets
these requirements, (he/she) then had a right to self-defense if
the opponent continued to fight.”
The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3472
that “[a] person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she
provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to
use force.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued Wallace
was guilty of first degree premeditated murder. According to the
prosecutor, Wallace planned to kill Sofiyev because he felt
betrayed by him. To carry out his plan, Wallace approached
Sofiyev’s car “wearing a mask, having a loaded gun in his pocket,
[and] wearing gloves.” Wallace opened the car door and argued
with Sofiyev until Sofiyev got out. Then Wallace “corner[ed]”
Sofiyev and shot him twice. As to Wallace’s theory of self-
defense, the prosecutor argued there was “absolutely no evidence”
7 At trial, Wallace objected to CALCRIM No. 3472 on the
basis that it was not supported by substantial evidence, but he
did not make any further objections as to CALCRIM Nos. 3472 or
3471, i.e., on grounds that it misstated the law or lacked
substantial evidence. We need not reach the issue of forfeiture
because we determine Wallace’s contentions fail on the merits.
18
of self-defense: no evidence Sofiyev had a gun, nor any evidence
Wallace believed he was in danger of being killed.
Defense counsel argued Wallace was not guilty of murder
because he acted in self-defense. Counsel asserted that Wallace
approached Sofiyev’s car to speak to Sofiyev and “calm everything
down.” Wallace opened Sofiyev’s car door, Sofiyev got out, and
the two men talked. Counsel argued that Wallace “did not take
any action towards [Sofiyev]. He didn’t get violent with [Sofiyev].
He did not try to attack him. He did nothing.” Sofiyev “pulled
out the gun on [Wallace],” at which point Wallace fired his gun.
During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor referred to
CALCRIM No. 3472. She argued, “A person does not have a right
to self-defense if he provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to
create an excuse to use force. In other words, you cannot plan a
murder, set up a murder, and then go to execute the murder.
And then when the person that you are going to murder
justifiably, lawfully tries to defend themselves, you kill him, pop,
pop. … There is a jury instruction for this, ladies and gentlemen,
because you know you are not allowed to do that.”
2. CALCRIM No. 3472 was correct
Wallace contends the trial court failed to sua sponte
instruct the jury with a complete and accurate version of
CALCRIM No. 3472. He specifically contends the court should
have instructed with the following bracketed language in
CALCRIM No. 3472: “However, if the defendant used only non-
deadly force, and the opponent responded with such sudden and
deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the
fight, then the defendant had the right to defend (himself/herself)
with deadly force and was not required to try to stop fighting.”
(CALCRIM No. 3472.) The trial court did not err.
19
“ ‘[T]he trial court is required to instruct the jury on the
general principles of law that are closely and openly connected
with the evidence and that are necessary to the jury’s
understanding of the case.’ ” (People v. Morales (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 978, 990.) “In the absence of a request for a
particular instruction, a trial court’s obligation to instruct on a
particular defense arises ‘ “only if [1] it appears the defendant is
relying on such a defense, or [2] if there is substantial evidence
supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent
with the defendant’s theory of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Dominguez
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1148.)
“In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the
credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was
evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.)
The trial court does not have a duty to give instructions based
solely on conjecture and speculation. (People v. Young (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1200.) “ ‘Errors in jury instructions are
questions of law, which we review de novo.’ ” (People v.
Fenderson (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 625, 642.)
In People v. Eulian (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324 (Eulian),
the trial court gave the same single-sentence jury instruction as
given in this case, and the Court of Appeal concluded “CALCRIM
No. 3472 … is generally a correct statement of law.” (Id. at
p. 1333; see People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761
[approving materially identical CALJIC analog to CALCRIM
No. 3472].) However, the Eulian court acknowledged that under
the holding of People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940
(Ramirez), CALCRIM No. 3472 “might require modification in the
20
rare case in which a defendant intended to provoke only a
nondeadly confrontation and the victim responds with deadly
force.” (Eulian, at p. 1334, italics added.) After Eulian was
decided, the Judicial Council of California modified CALCRIM
No. 3472, effective September 2022, to add a bracketed second
sentence for use only in such rare cases. (See Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 3472, citing Eulian and Ramirez.)
Wallace contends his case is such a rare case and likens it
to Ramirez. In Ramirez, defendants sought out rival gang
members intending to start a fight. (Ramirez, supra,
233 Cal.App.4th at p. 944.) A fistfight broke out, and one of the
rival gang members raised his hand, holding an object that
looked like a gun. (Id. at p. 945.) One of the defendants pulled a
gun from his pocket and fatally shot the rival gang member.
(Ibid.) The trial court instructed the jury on contrived self-
defense using a former version of CALCRIM No. 3472 that did
not include the current bracketed language. (Ramirez, at
pp. 945.) In closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly invoked
CALCRIM No. 3472 to argue that the defendant had no right to
claim self-defense because he instigated the fistfight. (Ramirez,
at p. 946.)
The Ramirez court concluded that generally, “CALCRIM
No. 3472 states a correct rule of law in appropriate
circumstances,” including where a defendant “contrives a ‘deadly’
assault” and the victim justifiably responds with deadly force.
(Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) However, “under
the facts before the jury,” CALCRIM No. 3472 “did not accurately
state governing law.” (Ramirez, at p. 947.) The court explained
that “the instructions and the prosecutor’s argument erroneously
required the jury to conclude that in contriving to use force, even
21
to provoke only a fistfight, defendants entirely forfeited any right
to self-defense.” (Id. at p. 953.)
Ramirez is distinguishable. First, unlike in Ramirez,
defense counsel did not rely on the theory that Wallace sought to
provoke non-deadly force. Rather, counsel claimed Wallace did
“nothing” to provoke Sofiyev. Second, the prosecutor did not
argue that Wallace forfeited his right to self-defense if he
contrived to use any amount of force, even non-deadly force. The
prosecutor argued Wallace did not have a right to self-defense
because he “plan[ned] a murder, set up a murder, and then …
execute[d] the murder.” This was appropriate. (See Ramirez,
supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 947 [“[W]hen a defendant contrives
a ‘deadly’ assault [citation], there can be no incommensurate or
unjustifiable response by the victim: he or she is fully entitled to
use deadly force and the defendant has no right to claim self-
defense against those deadly measures.”].)
Third, substantial evidence did not support giving the
bracketed language. There is no evidence Wallace intended to or
did in fact use non-deadly force. According to Wallace’s
testimony, he approached Sofiyev intending to “defuse the
situation.” Wallace opened Sofiyev’s car door and said, “What’s
up Bro? What’s going on? Where you been at?” Sofiyev grabbed
a gun and pointed it at him, at which point Wallace pulled his
gun out of his pocket and fired at Sofiyev.
Wallace points to the video surveillance of the shooting,
arguing it “provided an unclear picture of what had transpired
between Wallace and [Sofiyev] prior to shooting” and the jury
could have believed Wallace “push[ed] or grab[bed]” Sofiyev. At
most, the video shows “movement from [Wallace’s] arm.” But,
this occurred after Sofiyev lifted his arm. As such, it does not
22
constitute substantial evidence that Wallace intended to provoke
a nondeadly confrontation. Accordingly, this is not the “rare
case” in which CALCRIM No. 3472 is legally incorrect without
the bracketed being given. (Eulian, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1334.)
3. Any error in instructing with CALCRIM Nos. 3471
and 3472 was harmless
Wallace contends substantial evidence did not warrant
instructing the jury on CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472. We
conclude any such error was harmless.
“ ‘It is error to give an instruction [that], while correctly
stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the
case.’ ” (People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177, 205.) “ ‘A trial
court must give a requested instruction only if it is supported by
substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to deserve jury
consideration.’ ” (People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 848.) We
review the trial court’s decision to give a particular instruction de
novo. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206.)
Assuming the trial court erred by instructing the jury with
CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472 because there was insufficient
evidence to support them, the error was harmless. When a court
gives an instruction that correctly states the law but has no
application to the facts of the case, reversal is required only if it
is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable
to the defendant absent the error. (People v. Guiton (1993)
4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129-1130; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836; see also People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 [“giving
an irrelevant or inapplicable instruction is generally ‘ “only a
technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal” ’ ”].)
23
The trial court fully instructed the jury on the right to self-
defense with CALCRIM No. 3470, and nothing in the initial
aggressor or contrived self-defense instructions prevented the
jury from evaluating the evidence of Wallace’s self-defense claim.
The trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 200
that “[s]ome of these instructions may not apply, depending on
your findings about the facts of the case” and that the jury shou