Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 P. v. Wallace CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN THE PEOPLE, B338652 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PA099476) v. DESHAWN WALLACE, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel B. Feldstern, Judge. Affirmed as modified and remanded with directions. Edward J. Haggerty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. __________________________ Deshawn Wallace appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. He argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Wallace’s prior violence against his girlfriend, who was a witness for the prosecution; (2) the instruction on contrived self-defense misstated the law; (3) substantial evidence did not support the instructions on self-defense as an initial aggressor and contrived self-defense; (4) the instruction on perfect self- defense misstated the law; (5) the court should have sua sponte instructed on heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter; (6) Wallace’s counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request instructions on adoptive admissions and on provocation as a basis for second degree murder; (7) the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument; (8) the cumulative effect of the errors resulted in an unfair trial; (9) he is entitled to additional custody credits; and (10) the court erred in imposing various fines. We remand with directions to issue a new abstract of judgment reflecting Wallace’s correct custody credit. We also direct the court to give Wallace the opportunity to assert an excessive fines challenge to the restitution fine, pursuant to People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 (Kopp). Otherwise, we affirm. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Prosecution Evidence 1. Background Wallace lived in an apartment building with his girlfriend Desiree B.1 and their child. Desiree’s friend Jennifer P. also lived in the building with her three children and her boyfriend Avak Sofiyev. Sofiyev struggled with drug addiction, and when he was on drugs he sometimes slept in his car rather than in the apartment. His car was parked in a designated space in the building’s underground garage. On December 10, 2022, Wallace went into the garage and approached Sofiyev’s car while holding a gun and wearing gloves, a mask, and a hooded sweatshirt with the hood up. Wallace opened the car door, and Sofiyev got out. After the two men briefly spoke, Wallace shot Sofiyev twice, killing him. 2. Events preceding the shooting On December 8, two days before the shooting, Officer Michael Juatco with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) responded to a radio call of a citizen arrest at a dollar store. When he arrived, he saw two men holding Wallace on the floor. A store employee said Wallace was fighting with a customer and employees. Wallace was very upset and “yelling aggressively” that he “didn’t do anything.” Juatco handcuffed Wallace and put him in the back of his police car but ultimately released him. Later that day, Desiree talked to Jennifer about what happened at the store. Desiree said Wallace went to the store 1 We refer to the witnesses by their first name and last initial to protect their privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) 3 with Sofiyev. Wallace got into an argument with a customer, and someone called the police. Sofiyev left the store and took Wallace’s car keys with him. According to Desiree, Wallace “was really pissed of[f] and … he wanted the car keys back.” Jennifer gave Sofiyev’s number to Desiree so Desiree could contact him and coordinate the return of the keys. After Desiree called Sofiyev, she asked Jennifer not to tell Wallace about the phone call. Desiree was “scared” that Wallace would be upset she had talked to Sofiyev. That same day, Kimberly M., who lived in the same apartment building, stopped by Wallace’s apartment to socialize. Wallace asked Kimberly if she had any bullets. She told him she did and invited him to her apartment. Wallace went to her apartment, looked at the bullets, and said they were the wrong caliber. He told her he needed .380-caliber bullets, and he asked Kimberly to ask her roommate if he had any. The roommate later told Kimberly he did not have any, and Kimberly relayed this to Wallace. The next day, December 9, Sofiyev still had not returned Wallace’s keys. Jennifer called Sofiyev and told him to return them. Sofiyev brought the keys to the building’s laundry room and left them in a broken dryer. Jennifer picked up the keys and gave them to Desiree. Throughout that day and the next, Wallace was “extremely pissed” at Sofiyev and “acting a little bit erratic,” according to Jennifer. On one occasion, Wallace told Jennifer, “I am going to fucking shoot [Sofiyev]. Watch this.” On another occasion, Wallace texted Sofiyev, “[W]hen I see you, … I am going to come for you,” and “[Y]ou are going to have to answer for what you 4 did.” During that time, Sofiyev avoided Jennifer’s apartment because he wanted to give Wallace “a few days to calm down.” On the day of the shooting, December 10, at 8:30 a.m., Wallace went to a liquor store near his apartment. He stayed in the store for about an hour and spoke to one of the store owners, Allen, at length. Surveillance video (that included audio) from inside the store captured their conversation, and the People played the footage at trial. Wallace described the events at the dollar store two days earlier. He said he got into an argument with another customer, and the two men started wrestling. The customer tackled Wallace to the ground, and seven other customers got on top of Wallace and held him down until the police arrived. Wallace believed he did nothing wrong and the incident was racially motivated. Wallace explained that while the customers were on top of him, they pinned down his limbs, and one person had his knee on Wallace’s chest and neck. Wallace said he could not move or breathe, and he thought they were going to kill him. Wallace saw Sofiyev standing nearby, but Sofiyev did not do anything to help him and left the store without him. According to Wallace, Sofiyev also went into Wallace’s car and took Wallace’s house keys, mail key, and key to a rental U-Haul. Wallace told Allen that he “fel[t] like [he] got raped” by the people holding him down and Sofiyev “let [him] get raped.” Wallace was also angry that Sofiyev had his keys and could be making copies of them. Wallace told Allen, “Bro, I need to find him, I’ll tell you. Like, I get mad, I start shaking.” Wallace explained that Sofiyev lived in his car, which was parked in a parking spot in the apartment building’s garage. 5 Wallace said, “[H]e’s done, bro. He’s done. Just the fact he did some weird shit and just stood there and did that. I was like, all right bro, I’m going … [to] attack you for everything you got, and every time I see you, I’m going to beat you the fuck up, I’m going to knock your teeth out, I’m going to … take a bat to your fucking head. … I’m going to go … in the garage.” Later that afternoon, at 3:00 p.m., Wallace returned to the liquor store and spent another hour inside the store. Surveillance footage showed Allen gave Wallace some gloves. Wallace put them on, said, “I don’t touch nothing,” and laughed. Wallace left the liquor store and walked directly to the apartment building’s parking garage. As he walked to the garage, he pulled up his hood on his sweatshirt and put on a face mask. 3. The shooting Surveillance video from inside the garage captured the shooting, and the People played the footage for the jury. LAPD Detective Clifford Parchman narrated the events captured on video. According to Parchman, the video showed Wallace enter the garage, walk directly to Sofiyev’s car, and open the rear passenger door. Sofiyev stepped out of his car and the two men “appear[ed] to have a conversation with each other” while “circling around [the] vehicle.” At some point, Sofiyev stood with his back to the garage wall and remained in that area while the two men talked. Sofiyev raised his arm, and then there was “movement from [Wallace’s] arm.” Parchman testified that at the time Sofiyev lifted his arm, “there [was] no evidence” that Sofiyev was holding anything or that an object fell from Sofiyev’s hand. Wallace then pulled out a gun, fired it at Sofiyev, and ran toward a stairwell. 6 Shortly before the shooting, Antonio M. was sitting in his parked car in the building’s garage. He told police he heard an argument followed by two or three gunshots. He then saw someone, who was wearing a sweatshirt with the hood up, running toward the stairwell.2 At the time of the shooting, Jennifer was in her apartment and received calls and texts from neighbors that Sofiyev had been shot. Jennifer called Desiree and the two went to Sofiyev’s car in the parking garage. The passenger car door was open, and Sofiyev was on the floor. Desiree called 911 and performed CPR on Sofiyev until the police arrived. Jennifer testified that neither she nor Desiree removed any item, including a gun, from the scene. Sofiyev died from two gunshot wounds: one to the chest and one to the upper back. 4. The police investigation LAPD officers arrived at the scene and spoke to Jennifer and Desiree. The women said they did not know who shot Sofiyev and they did not find a gun at the scene. Officers searched the area near Sofiyev and found two expended casings and no weapons. Later, a bullet was recovered from Sofiyev’s body. A forensic analysis of the recovered bullet and two expended casings showed they were all .380 caliber. Shortly after the police arrived, Jennifer said that a neighbor named Alma Chavez could have been the shooter. LAPD Officer Andrew Mejia went to Chavez’s unit to investigate. While there, he noticed the blinds moving in the window located 2 At trial Antonio denied talking to the police about the shooting. 7 between Chavez’s unit and the unit belonging to Desiree and Wallace. Mejia knocked on Wallace’s apartment door, and a child opened it. Mejia saw Wallace inside and asked if the window was part of his apartment. Wallace falsely said it was not and closed the door. Later, Wallace left his apartment and went to the building courtyard where other neighbors were gathered. He looked calm and did not appear like he had been involved in the shooting. Officers obtained the surveillance video of the shooting and showed it to Jennifer and Desiree separately. Jennifer identified Wallace as the shooter. After Desiree watched the video, she approached Jennifer and said, “ ‘Jen, just give me one more day with him.’ ” Jennifer interpreted that statement to mean Desiree knew who the shooter was. 5. Wallace’s arrest On the day of the shooting, around 9:00 p.m., LAPD Detective Fernando Avila went to the liquor store near Wallace’s apartment building to obtain surveillance footage. When he arrived, Wallace was inside the store. Within earshot of Wallace, Avila asked a store employee for permission to review the store’s footage. The employee called the owner of the store and handed the phone to Avila. Over speakerphone, Avila told the owner that a shooting had occurred nearby, that it was possible the suspect came out of the nearby parking lot, and that the liquor store’s camera may have captured the event. The owner agreed to come to the store in 30 minutes. Avila then left the store, at which point Wallace approached the employee, looked at the security cameras inside the store, and asked the employee, “That there. Those working?” The employee responded yes, to which Wallace replied, “I got to 8 please. Can I talk to [the store manager] before?” The employee did not answer and instead asked Wallace which flavored tobacco he wanted to buy. Wallace said, “I don’t know … celebratory.” At some point later, Jennifer walked near the liquor store and saw Wallace outside. He was on the phone and had his back to her. Jennifer looked at him and said, “ ‘How are you going to tell my kids what you did to their dad?’ ” He said, “I will see you later, babe” and gestured as if blowing a kiss. Jennifer called the police and described Wallace’s location. Shortly after, officers arrived and arrested Wallace. B. Defense Evidence 1. Expert testimony Thomas Guzman-Sanchez testified as an expert in audio and video forensics. He testified that he edited the video of the shooting using tools to sharpen the image, freeze the frames, and zoom in. Based on the edited video, he testified that seconds before the shooting, the individual previously identified as Sofiyev appeared to reach his arm up, and “there appear[ed] to be an extension of pixel … from [his] arm.” Seconds later, “there appear[ed] to be a region of pixels … descending or falling from the area” near Sofiyev, and the pixels were “a pseudo rectangular shape.” Then the individual identified as Wallace appeared to raise his arm up. Guzman-Sanchez also testified that he used audio tools to magnify the audio in the surveillance video. He captured a brief conversation between two men shortly before the shooting. One man said, “What if it’s in your face?” The second man replied, “I told you don’t fuck with me,” to which the first man responded, “Homie fucked up.” 9 2. Wallace’s testimony Wallace testified that on December 8, 2022, he agreed to help Sofiyev steal from a dollar store. When they arrived, Wallace created a distraction inside the store so Sofiyev could steal something. Wallace talked on the phone “a little louder than [he] normally would,” and a customer attacked him, throwing him to the ground. Other customers got involved and held Wallace down until police arrived. Sofiyev did not intervene in the fight, left the store before police arrived, and took Wallace’s keys with him. Wallace admitted he was “extremely angry” at Sofiyev at that time because of the way Sofiyev acted. Wallace testified that about two months before the shooting he purchased a gun. He denied that on December 8 he asked his neighbor if she had any .380 caliber bullets. Wallace acknowledged that on the morning of the shooting, he went to the liquor store and made multiple comments about harming Sofiyev. He admitted he said that if anyone wanted to defend Sofiyev, “they [were] going to get shot.” He admitted he had stuck his arm out, put his fingers out as if he was holding a gun, and said, “Pop, pop.” Wallace testified that he did not “mean any of the things that [he] said,” he said them simply to “sound tough,” and he “wasn’t mad [at Sofiyev] anymore.” In fact, Wallace feared Sofiyev because he believed Sofiyev had a gun. Wallace testified that later in the day, he went to the apartment building’s garage looking for Sofiyev in order to “defuse the situation so it wouldn’t turn into something bigger than it was.” When he got to Sofiyev’s car, he opened the door and said, “What’s up, bro? What’s going on? Where you been at?” Sofiyev became angry and “mumbl[ed] stuff” under his breath. The two paced around the car, and Sofiyev pulled out a gun. 10 Wallace told him to calm down, but Sofiyev pointed the gun at Wallace and said, “What if I put it in your face?” Wallace used his left hand to try “to knock the gun.” At the same time, Wallace pulled a gun from his jacket pocket and fired at Sofiyev. Wallace said he “was scared for [his] life” and ran off. Wallace acknowledged that he saw Jennifer after the shooting near the liquor store and that she asked him, “[W]hy did [he] shoot [Sofiyev].” Wallace denied that he responded to her verbally or blew her a kiss. C. Jury Instructions, Verdict, and Sentencing The trial court instructed the jury with the following relevant jury instructions: murder with malice aforethought (CALCRIM No. 520), first degree murder (CALCRIM No. 521), justifiable homicide (CALCRIM No. 505), self-defense (CALCRIM No. 3470), right to self-defense: initial aggressor (CALCRIM No. 3471), right to self-defense: contrived self-defense (CALCRIM No. 3472), and voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 571). The jury found Wallace guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and possession of a firearm by a 3 felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The jury also found true that Wallace personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Wallace waived his right to a jury trial on aggravating factors, and the trial court found four of them true. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2).) The court sentenced Wallace to 25 years to life for the murder plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement. For count 2, the court imposed the middle term of two years and stayed execution of the sentence. 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 11 DISCUSSION A. Evidence of Wallace’s Prior Bad Acts Wallace argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior violent acts against Desiree. He argues this evidence was both inadmissible character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101 and unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. We conclude the evidence was admissible.4 1. Relevant testimony At trial, Desiree testified she was Wallace’s girlfriend and they had been together for six years. They continued to talk while he was in custody, and she did not want to get him in trouble. She testified she did not remember any of the people or events related to the murder. She said she did not remember Jennifer or Sofiyev, the incident at the dollar store, discovering Sofiyev’s body, calling 911, or talking to police. As Desiree explained, it was a “traumatic event,” and she “just completely blocked it out.” During the direct examination of Kimberly, Wallace’s neighbor, the following exchange took place: Q: How would you describe the relationship between Jen[nifer] and [Sofiyev] and [Wallace] and Desiree? A: … So [Wallace] and Desiree, fights, police, things of that nature. Constantly pretty much. … Q: I want to focus on what you said about the couples. Just focusing on [Wallace] and 4 Because Wallace’s claim fails on the merits, we need not address the People’s argument regarding forfeiture. 12 Desiree, how would you describe their relationship with one another? A: Not good. Q: What makes you say that? A: Police pounding on their door. Him coming over and helped us patch the wall, glass door broken that he broke. Child services come over…. During her direct examination, Jennifer gave similar testimony: Q: What was Desiree and [Wallace]’s relationship like, from your observations? A: Not good. Q: What makes you say that? A: He was very violent with her. Q: How do you know that? A: Because she called me one time, and I went downstairs. And she had the baby, and he was yelling at her. And I was trying to take the baby away from them because they were arguing. And he was just right in her face. And, he … kind of pushed her. … Q: When you say that he pushed her, are you talking— A: [Wallace]. Q: Pushed Desiree? A: Yes. Q: Was she holding the baby? A: Yes. Q: What happened? 13 A: Basically I got in the middle of it, and I told [Wallace] to calm down. You know, go take a walk. Just chill out. You know, I’ll take Desiree upstairs. We’ll [play] with my kids and just distract him. And he wound up jumping over the fence for the balcony and leaving. Later, Jennifer testified about the balcony door in Wallace and Desiree’s apartment. During that testimony, the following exchange took place: Q: Do you know how or why the door was broken? A: It was broken from an altercation that they had. That’s what Desiree had told me. Q: An altercation that who had? A: [Wallace] and Desiree. Q: And Desiree told you that [Wallace] and her were fighting, and as a result of whatever happened between them, the door was broken? A: Correct. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 413.) We will not disturb a court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence “ ‘ “ ‘unless there is a showing that the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 413-414.) The court did not abuse its discretion. Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), prohibits the admission of uncharged prior bad acts “if offered to prove conduct in conformity with that character trait, sometimes described as a 14 propensity to act in a certain way.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 405-406.) However, this provision does not preclude the admission of uncharged acts when relevant to prove some other fact, including “to support or attack the credibility of a witness.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (c); see Wheeler, at p. 406 [“If an uncharged act is relevant to prove some fact other than propensity, the evidence is admissible, subject to a limiting instruction upon request.”].)5 “ ‘Evidence that a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is therefore admissible. [Citations.] An explanation of the basis for the witness’s fear is likewise relevant to her credibility and is well within the discretion of the trial court.’ ” (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 429-430; see People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 302 [“Evidence of fear is relevant to the witness’s credibility.”].) Wallace’s prior violent behavior involving Desiree gave Desiree a reason to fear him. (See People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 31 (Case) [evidence that witness had seen defendant commit violent acts was admissible to show witness feared telling police the truth].) Evidence of the couple’s violent relationship was thus relevant to the credibility of Desiree as a witness because it could explain the discrepancy between her detailed statements to the police and her later testimony at trial that she could not remember any of the events related to the murder. (See People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869 [evidence of defendant’s 5 Wallace did not request a limiting instruction at trial with respect to the testimony of his prior behavior toward Desiree. The trial court was not required to give such an instruction sua sponte. (See People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 293.) 15 prior threats to witness explained why witness’s former testimony differed from later testimony].) Wallace contends there was no direct evidence that Desiree feared Wallace. However, Desiree told Jennifer that she was “scared” that Wallace would be upset at her for talking to Sofiyev. Moreover, the jury could have reasonably inferred from Wallace’s violent acts against Desiree that she feared him. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in determining the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101. Nor did the court abuse its discretion by not excluding the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. Under that provision, trial courts have discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will require undue time consumption, will confuse or mislead the jury, or poses a substantial risk of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The incidents Kimberly and Jennifer described were far less inflammatory than the evidence of the murder charge—the incidents of domestic violence did not involve a high level of violence, and there was no evidence Desiree had sustained any injuries. (See Case, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 31-32 [“Defendant claims this evidence was ‘highly inflammatory,’ but evidence that defendant punched [one person] in the mouth and struck [another] on the leg with a poker pales in comparison to the circumstances of the charged crimes: the execution-style slaying of two victims during a robbery.”]; People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405 [prior bad act’s prejudicial effect is “decreased” if it is “no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses”].) Thus, there is little chance a juror would be moved to convict Wallace for a murder he did not commit in order to punish him for his relatively minor 16 acts of violence against Desiree or merely because the jurors determined he was a violent person. (Case, at p. 32.) Moreover, the prosecution devoted very little time to the evidence of Wallace’s prior bad acts. There was no mention of them during closing arguments, and the testimony about them spanned approximately three pages of the reporter’s transcript. (See People v. Pierce (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 893, 901 [prejudicial effect diminished where testimony about prior offense “involved only 17 pages of transcript”].) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony about his prior acts of violence against Desiree.6 B. Instructions on Initial Aggressor Self-defense and Contrived Self-defense Wallace argues the court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3471, the instruction on initial aggressor self-defense, and CALCRIM No. 3472, the instruction on contrived self-defense. He contends CALCRIM No. 3472, as given, misstated the law. He also contends substantial evidence did not warrant either instruction. We are not persuaded. CALCRIM No. 3472 correctly stated the law, and any error in 6 For these same reasons, Wallace’s constitutional challenges fail. Wallace argues the admission of testimony about his prior violent acts violated his constitutional right to due process, arguing the Due Process Clause protects against the introduction of evidence that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. As discussed, the challenged testimony was admissible for valid, non-propensity purposes and was not unduly prejudicial. 17 instructing on CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472 based on a lack of substantial evidence was harmless.7 1. Relevant background The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3471 that “[a] person who starts a fight has a right to self-defense only if: 1. He actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting; and 2. He indicated, by word or by conduct, to his opponent, in a way that a reasonable person would understand, that he wanted to stop fighting and he had stopped fighting. If the defendant meets these requirements, (he/she) then had a right to self-defense if the opponent continued to fight.” The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3472 that “[a] person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.” During closing argument, the prosecutor argued Wallace was guilty of first degree premeditated murder. According to the prosecutor, Wallace planned to kill Sofiyev because he felt betrayed by him. To carry out his plan, Wallace approached Sofiyev’s car “wearing a mask, having a loaded gun in his pocket, [and] wearing gloves.” Wallace opened the car door and argued with Sofiyev until Sofiyev got out. Then Wallace “corner[ed]” Sofiyev and shot him twice. As to Wallace’s theory of self- defense, the prosecutor argued there was “absolutely no evidence” 7 At trial, Wallace objected to CALCRIM No. 3472 on the basis that it was not supported by substantial evidence, but he did not make any further objections as to CALCRIM Nos. 3472 or 3471, i.e., on grounds that it misstated the law or lacked substantial evidence. We need not reach the issue of forfeiture because we determine Wallace’s contentions fail on the merits. 18 of self-defense: no evidence Sofiyev had a gun, nor any evidence Wallace believed he was in danger of being killed. Defense counsel argued Wallace was not guilty of murder because he acted in self-defense. Counsel asserted that Wallace approached Sofiyev’s car to speak to Sofiyev and “calm everything down.” Wallace opened Sofiyev’s car door, Sofiyev got out, and the two men talked. Counsel argued that Wallace “did not take any action towards [Sofiyev]. He didn’t get violent with [Sofiyev]. He did not try to attack him. He did nothing.” Sofiyev “pulled out the gun on [Wallace],” at which point Wallace fired his gun. During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor referred to CALCRIM No. 3472. She argued, “A person does not have a right to self-defense if he provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force. In other words, you cannot plan a murder, set up a murder, and then go to execute the murder. And then when the person that you are going to murder justifiably, lawfully tries to defend themselves, you kill him, pop, pop. … There is a jury instruction for this, ladies and gentlemen, because you know you are not allowed to do that.” 2. CALCRIM No. 3472 was correct Wallace contends the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury with a complete and accurate version of CALCRIM No. 3472. He specifically contends the court should have instructed with the following bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 3472: “However, if the defendant used only non- deadly force, and the opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the right to defend (himself/herself) with deadly force and was not required to try to stop fighting.” (CALCRIM No. 3472.) The trial court did not err. 19 “ ‘[T]he trial court is required to instruct the jury on the general principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the evidence and that are necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.’ ” (People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 990.) “In the absence of a request for a particular instruction, a trial court’s obligation to instruct on a particular defense arises ‘ “only if [1] it appears the defendant is relying on such a defense, or [2] if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1148.) “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.) The trial court does not have a duty to give instructions based solely on conjecture and speculation. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1200.) “ ‘Errors in jury instructions are questions of law, which we review de novo.’ ” (People v. Fenderson (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 625, 642.) In People v. Eulian (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324 (Eulian), the trial court gave the same single-sentence jury instruction as given in this case, and the Court of Appeal concluded “CALCRIM No. 3472 … is generally a correct statement of law.” (Id. at p. 1333; see People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761 [approving materially identical CALJIC analog to CALCRIM No. 3472].) However, the Eulian court acknowledged that under the holding of People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940 (Ramirez), CALCRIM No. 3472 “might require modification in the 20 rare case in which a defendant intended to provoke only a nondeadly confrontation and the victim responds with deadly force.” (Eulian, at p. 1334, italics added.) After Eulian was decided, the Judicial Council of California modified CALCRIM No. 3472, effective September 2022, to add a bracketed second sentence for use only in such rare cases. (See Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3472, citing Eulian and Ramirez.) Wallace contends his case is such a rare case and likens it to Ramirez. In Ramirez, defendants sought out rival gang members intending to start a fight. (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 944.) A fistfight broke out, and one of the rival gang members raised his hand, holding an object that looked like a gun. (Id. at p. 945.) One of the defendants pulled a gun from his pocket and fatally shot the rival gang member. (Ibid.) The trial court instructed the jury on contrived self- defense using a former version of CALCRIM No. 3472 that did not include the current bracketed language. (Ramirez, at pp. 945.) In closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly invoked CALCRIM No. 3472 to argue that the defendant had no right to claim self-defense because he instigated the fistfight. (Ramirez, at p. 946.) The Ramirez court concluded that generally, “CALCRIM No. 3472 states a correct rule of law in appropriate circumstances,” including where a defendant “contrives a ‘deadly’ assault” and the victim justifiably responds with deadly force. (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) However, “under the facts before the jury,” CALCRIM No. 3472 “did not accurately state governing law.” (Ramirez, at p. 947.) The court explained that “the instructions and the prosecutor’s argument erroneously required the jury to conclude that in contriving to use force, even 21 to provoke only a fistfight, defendants entirely forfeited any right to self-defense.” (Id. at p. 953.) Ramirez is distinguishable. First, unlike in Ramirez, defense counsel did not rely on the theory that Wallace sought to provoke non-deadly force. Rather, counsel claimed Wallace did “nothing” to provoke Sofiyev. Second, the prosecutor did not argue that Wallace forfeited his right to self-defense if he contrived to use any amount of force, even non-deadly force. The prosecutor argued Wallace did not have a right to self-defense because he “plan[ned] a murder, set up a murder, and then … execute[d] the murder.” This was appropriate. (See Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 947 [“[W]hen a defendant contrives a ‘deadly’ assault [citation], there can be no incommensurate or unjustifiable response by the victim: he or she is fully entitled to use deadly force and the defendant has no right to claim self- defense against those deadly measures.”].) Third, substantial evidence did not support giving the bracketed language. There is no evidence Wallace intended to or did in fact use non-deadly force. According to Wallace’s testimony, he approached Sofiyev intending to “defuse the situation.” Wallace opened Sofiyev’s car door and said, “What’s up Bro? What’s going on? Where you been at?” Sofiyev grabbed a gun and pointed it at him, at which point Wallace pulled his gun out of his pocket and fired at Sofiyev. Wallace points to the video surveillance of the shooting, arguing it “provided an unclear picture of what had transpired between Wallace and [Sofiyev] prior to shooting” and the jury could have believed Wallace “push[ed] or grab[bed]” Sofiyev. At most, the video shows “movement from [Wallace’s] arm.” But, this occurred after Sofiyev lifted his arm. As such, it does not 22 constitute substantial evidence that Wallace intended to provoke a nondeadly confrontation. Accordingly, this is not the “rare case” in which CALCRIM No. 3472 is legally incorrect without the bracketed being given. (Eulian, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334.) 3. Any error in instructing with CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472 was harmless Wallace contends substantial evidence did not warrant instructing the jury on CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472. We conclude any such error was harmless. “ ‘It is error to give an instruction [that], while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.’ ” (People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177, 205.) “ ‘A trial court must give a requested instruction only if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to deserve jury consideration.’ ” (People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 848.) We review the trial court’s decision to give a particular instruction de novo. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206.) Assuming the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472 because there was insufficient evidence to support them, the error was harmless. When a court gives an instruction that correctly states the law but has no application to the facts of the case, reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error. (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129-1130; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see also People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 [“giving an irrelevant or inapplicable instruction is generally ‘ “only a technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal” ’ ”].) 23 The trial court fully instructed the jury on the right to self- defense with CALCRIM No. 3470, and nothing in the initial aggressor or contrived self-defense instructions prevented the jury from evaluating the evidence of Wallace’s self-defense claim. The trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 200 that “[s]ome of these instructions may not apply, depending on your findings about the facts of the case” and that the jury shou