Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 P. v. Biggs CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Lassen) THE PEOPLE, C103660 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. v. 2023CR0090155) EDWARD HAROLD BIGGS, Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Edward Harold Biggs repeatedly struck Marty Ashley in the head with an axe handle, disfiguring Ashley’s face and ending his life. The reason for the violent attack was, as defendant put it, “vigilante justice.” Defendant believed Ashley had stolen property from him, and “the cops didn’t do anything about it.” A jury found defendant guilty of premeditated first degree murder and aggravated mayhem, finding that he used a deadly weapon during the commission of the crimes. The trial court sentenced him to serve 26 years to life in state prison. Defendant now claims (1) the trial court should have instructed the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter; (2) defendant’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury instruction that provocation can reduce murder from first to second degree; (3) the trial court abused its 1 discretion by denying defendant’s postconviction Marsden1 motion; (4) the trial court violated Penal Code section 6542 by failing to stay the sentence imposed for either the murder or the aggravated mayhem count; and (5) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to accurately reflect the sentence imposed. As we explain, the evidence did not support an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Defendant’s ineffective assistance and Marsden claims also lack merit. We therefore affirm the convictions and enhancement findings. However, as the People concede, the trial court should have stayed the sentence imposed for either the murder or the aggravated mayhem count. We will vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing with directions to stay execution of the sentence imposed for either the murder count or the aggravated mayhem count. Although the abstract of judgment currently contains an inaccuracy, we need not correct it because a new abstract of judgment will be prepared following the new sentencing hearing. BACKGROUND On October 20, 2023, Ashley lived in rural Lassen County with his wife, C.A., and son, M.A. Another young man, O.G., was also staying at the house. That afternoon, Ashley was working on his car at the bottom of the driveway when defendant pulled up to the house, parked his truck on the street with the engine still running, and got out with an axe handle. C.A. was inside the house talking to O.G. when defendant arrived. Although her view of Ashley was partially obstructed, she could see “someone with a stick” was swinging it at her husband. She and O.G. ran outside to make sure Ashley was okay. O.G. saw defendant standing over Ashley with the axe handle. They both saw defendant 1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 run to his truck and drive away, leaving Ashley on the street in a pool of his own blood, “struggling to just breathe.” Multiple blows from the axe handle caused “a severe laceration on his head” and knocked out several teeth. C.A. got on the ground and held Ashley’s hand. O.G. called 911 while M.A., who had been at a neighbor’s house, ran over and tried to resuscitate Ashley. Emergency responders arrived at the house a short time later and attempted life- saving measures, but Ashley died from blunt force head injuries at the scene. Law enforcement put out a “be-on-the-look-out broadcast” for defendant and his truck. He was pulled over about an hour later on Highway 36 in Tehama County. The blood- covered axe handle was in the truck bed. Defendant was arrested and transported to the Tehama County Jail. While he was being moved into the patrol car for transport, defendant volunteered that he had been “ripped off for $20,000 worth of chainsaws,” the police had not done anything about it, so he “took vigilante justice.” At the jail, defendant asked the transporting officer “if someone stole his stuff, if he was able to beat them up,” adding “that he was not looking to kill the motherfucker” and “just wanted to beat him within an inch of his life.” Detectives interviewed defendant at the Tehama County Jail. At the start of the interview, defendant said he was in jail because he was “fucking tired of people stealing” from him, adding: “If you guys can’t do something about it, I just did. Okay? It’s justification.” After again saying that he was in jail because he was tired of people stealing from him, defendant changed his story, stating: “I wasn’t there. I didn’t do it. I didn’t fucking do nothing to this guy. Brought it upon himself. I got alibis.” Defendant continued to deny that he was there, suggesting that he wanted a group of bikers called the Misfits to rough up Ashley, not kill him. During the next three days, defendant made phone calls to his son from the Tehama County Jail. In one call, defendant said that he “got drunk” and “blacked out” and did not remember what happened. In another call, defendant said he killed Ashley 3 because nothing was ever done about the thefts, which infuriated him. Defendant told his son that he “pulverized” Ashley and “couldn’t stop,” but Ashley swung at him first. As part of a further call, defendant admitted bringing the axe handle with him to Ashley’s house, but said “he used it as a walking stick.” He claimed that Ashley “swung at him” when he confronted him about the thefts, “so he stepped to the side, and then struck him” with the axe handle. Defendant was moved to the Lassen County Jail three days after the murder. During the drive, defendant said he did not intend to kill Ashley, he did so in self- defense, and he lied during his previous interview because he did not know someone saw him do it. At the jail, defendant called a woman he was apparently dating. She asked him what she should tell her daughter. Defendant said: “Well, tell her the truth. Tell her I killed the motherfucker. He stole from me.” Defendant then claimed, for the first time, that he thought Ashley had a gun or a knife. As defendant put it: “ ‘He attacked me. He threatened to kill me. … So I walked up there with the pickaxe handle. He swung at me. I stepped to the side, and then I hit that motherfucker. And then I blacked out, and don’t know how many times I hit him, but I kept hitting him.’ ” Defendant added that he lied to detectives about hiring the Misfits. Later, defendant apologized to the detectives for lying about the Misfits. He told them he thought Ashley had a gun or a knife and that Ashley attacked him first. Defendant also told a correctional officer that he confronted Ashley about taking his chainsaws, Ashley swung at him, and, as defendant put it, “ ‘I defended myself. I killed the motherfucker. Sorry about his luck.’ ” Defendant made similar statements to a second correctional officer, adding: “ ‘He swung at me, so I had a pickaxe handle, and I smashed his fucking head in, and he no longer sucks my air.’ ” 4 DISCUSSION I Defendant contends the trial court should have instructed the jury, sua sponte, on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder because “[t]here was substantial evidence that [he] was intoxicated to the point where he was not conscious of [beating Ashley to death].” Murder is “the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or implied. (§ 188.) “It is express ‘when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature,’ i.e., an intent to kill unlawfully. [Citations.] It is implied ‘when an unlawful killing results from a willful act, the natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, performed with conscious disregard for that danger.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Parker (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1267.) “Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder.” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942.) Involuntary manslaughter is “the unlawful killing of a human being without malice” during “the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony,” or during “the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection.” (§ 192, subd. (b).) “ ‘Unconsciousness, if not induced by voluntary intoxication, is a complete defense to a criminal charge.’ [Citations.] However, ‘[w]hen a person renders himself or herself unconscious through voluntary intoxication and kills in that state, the killing is attributed to his or her negligence in self-intoxicating to that point, and is treated as involuntary manslaughter.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 463 (Nieves).) “Unconsciousness does not mean that the actor lies still and unresponsive. Instead, a person is deemed ‘unconscious’ if he or she committed the act without being conscious thereof. [Citation.]” (People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 313 (Haley).) 5 “ ‘A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, whether or not the defendant so requests, whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.’ [Citation.]” (Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 463.) In declining to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, the trial court impliedly determined that there was no substantial evidence that defendant’s voluntary intoxication rendered him unconscious at the time that he beat Ashley to death. Our review of this determination is de novo. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218.) The only evidence that defendant was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication when he killed Ashley is his statement to his son in a phone call from the Tehama County Jail, in which he claimed he was “drunk” and “blacked out” and did not remember what happened. However, this self-serving statement was made after defendant made numerous other statements clearly indicating that he was conscious of his actions. Defendant left town immediately after the murder, with the blood-covered axe handle in the back of his truck. His efforts to fabricate an alibi, even one that implicated him in a beating-for-hire plot involving the Misfits, suggest that he was “aware of his actions … and therefore not unconscious” when he beat Ashley to death. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1228 (Rangel).) Moreover, defendant said in a phone call with his son that “if there was a way out, he wanted to try to find his way out” of trouble. Defendant also told his son that he killed Ashley because “nothing was ever done” about the thefts and that he was “infuriated.” He then claimed that Ashley swung at him first, asserting self-defense for the first time. Defendant’s statements to his son, viewed as a whole, clearly indicate that he was conscious of his actions, and that he was trying to avoid responsibility for them. Defendant also told the woman he called from the Lassen County Jail that he “ ‘killed the motherfucker’ ” because Ashley stole from him, but he thought Ashley had a gun or a knife. Although defendant repeated the “blacked out” line when talking to her, he 6 couched it in different terms. Instead of being drunk and blacked out entirely, he claimed that he was defending himself when he “ ‘hit that motherfucker’ ” with the axe handle, and then he “blacked out” and did not remember how many times he hit him. Viewed in their entirety, defendant’s statements provide strong evidence that he was conscious of his actions when he killed Ashley. (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1227 [the defendant’s statements, including “that he ‘put those motherfuckers on ice,’ ” supported conclusion that he was not unconscious during the murders]; see also Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 313 [the defendant’s ability to “recount in great detail his actions on the night of the murder” supported conclusion that he was not unconscious].) Leaving the truck running when he approached Ashley with the axe handle suggests defendant was planning to make a quick escape after beating Ashley. Whether defendant intended to kill Ashley, as the jury found, or “beat him within an inch of his life” as he later claimed, leaving the truck running could reasonably be construed as having “presence of mind.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 424.) And his statement that he was “drunk” and “blacked out,” when viewed in light of his actions and other statements, is not substantial enough to support an involuntary manslaughter instruction. (Id. at pp. 422-424 [the defendant’s statement that he was “high” and did not know what was going through his mind did not support an involuntary manslaughter instruction where other evidence demonstrated he was not unconscious at the time of the killing].) Defendant points to evidence that one of the interviewing detectives was informed that defendant was “highly intoxicated” when he was arrested following the murder. However, the officer who relayed that information to the detective did not himself observe any extreme intoxication. He testified: “I may have relayed [that information] to [the detective], but it was relayed to me from … my partners.” No one testified to observing defendant in a state of extreme intoxication. The detective testified that at the time of the interview, which was conducted the same night, he did not observe any signs that defendant was intoxicated. But even if defendant was highly intoxicated when he 7 killed Ashley, that is not enough to support an instruction on involuntary manslaughter due to unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication. (See People v. Turk (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1368, 1379 [evidence that the defendant was “ ‘real drunk,’ ” “ ‘pretty hammered,’ ” and “ ‘stumbling everywhere’ ” near the time of the killing was “insufficient to support a finding that he was unconscious at the time of the killing”].) What is missing is evidence that defendant was “so ‘grossly intoxicated’ so as to be unconscious” when he beat Ashley to death. (Id. at p. 1379, quoting People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 516.) In any event, any error in failing to instruct on involuntary manslaughter was harmless. As in Rangel, “[t]he prosecution proceeded on a theory of premeditated murder, and the [trial] court instructed the jury on the effect of voluntary intoxication on defendant’s ability to premeditate and deliberate. The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder[] … and therefore necessarily found he had premeditated and deliberated despite his use of alcohol. These mental states are incompatible with unconsciousness.” (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1228, fn. omitted.) “ ‘[I]n view of the actual verdict returned by the jury … there is no reasonable or plausible basis for finding that [any assumed] instructional error affected the jury’s verdict.’ [Citation.]” (Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 314.) II Defendant also claims his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request CALCRIM No. 522, which would have informed the jury that provocation can reduce murder from first to second degree.3 3 CALCRIM No. 522 states, in relevant part: “Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree … . The weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or second degree murder.” 8 “Provocation may indeed reduce murder from first to second degree. [Citation.] But an instruction that provocation may be sufficient to raise reasonable doubt about premeditation or deliberation, such as … CALCRIM No. 522, is a pinpoint instruction to which a defendant is entitled only upon request where evidence supports the theory. [Citation.] The trial court is not required to give such an instruction sua sponte. [Citation.]” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 378.) Defendant’s trial counsel made no such request. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficiency resulted in prejudice. (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.) “ ‘Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.” [Citation.] If the record “sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,” an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” [Citations.]’ ” (Ibid.) Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails at the first step of this analysis. The record sheds no light as to why defense counsel did not request CALCRIM No. 522, and he was not asked to provide an explanation. However, a rational tactical purpose appears to this court. As defense counsel argued in his closing argument, the provocation relied upon by defendant in this case is Ashley’s purported actions of threatening to kill defendant and taking the first swing after defendant confronted him about the thefts. CALCRIM No. 522 would have instructed the jury to determine whether this provocation reduced the murder from first to second degree. But the defense strategy was to seek a verdict of voluntary manslaughter on a heat of passion theory, i.e., that defendant, 9 provoked by Ashley’s conduct, reacted out of passion rather than from judgment, and that the provocation was sufficient to cause an ordinary person of average disposition to so react.4 The jury was properly instructed on this theory of voluntary manslaughter. And defense counsel specifically argued: “Ashley’s reaction [to defendant confronting him about the thefts] is to threaten him. Get the fuck out of here, whatever. I’m going to kill you, swings at him, and [defendant] reacts. That’s voluntary manslaughter.” Thus, defense counsel appears to have made a rational tactical choice to argue to the jury that defendant was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter, and not to argue that he was guilty of second degree murder. Defense counsel’s failure to ask for CALCRIM No. 522 was consistent with this rational tactical decision. Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim therefore fails. III Defendant further asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his postconviction Marsden motion. “Criminal defendants are entitled to competent representation. If a defendant cannot afford to hire an attorney, one must be appointed for the defendant.” (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 690 (Smith).) However, “ ‘a defendant has no absolute right to more than one appointed attorney.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Where a defendant makes a Marsden motion seeking substitution of appointed counsel, “the trial court must give the defendant an opportunity to explain the reasons for desiring a new attorney” and “ ‘must consider any specific examples of counsel’s inadequate representation that the defendant wishes to enumerate. Thereafter, substitution is a matter of judicial discretion. Denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would “substantially impair” the defendant’s right to 4 The defense also sought an acquittal on a self-defense theory, and in the alternative, a verdict of voluntary manslaughter on an imperfect self-defense theory. 10 assistance of counsel. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 690-691.) This standard “applies equally preconviction and postconviction.” (Id. at p. 694.) Defendant made two Marsden motions in this case. He does not challenge the trial court’s handling of his first motion. However, because defendant repeated many of the same complaints about his appointed counsel in the second motion, we briefly recount the proceedings in both. The first motion was raised pretrial. At the hearing on the motion, defendant complained that he had 51 people that he wanted to testify, but he had not heard back from them or from the defense investigator. Defendant also stated that he wanted the prosecutor disqualified, but counsel “just [gave him] a scowl, like ‘You’re kidding me.’ ” Defendant apparently wanted the prosecutor disqualified because she did not seek to prosecute Ashley or other people defendant claimed had stolen property from him. Defendant also complained that his attorney would not file a Pitchess5 motion for records pertaining to the officer who investigated the prior thefts, “to find out behind the scenes why nobody was arrested and charged with these crimes.” In addition, defendant faulted his attorney for “trying to get [him] to take a deal” and not providing him with discovery until eight or nine months before trial. Asked to respond, defense counsel explained that the investigator, “who has been doing this for 25 years, 30 years,” spoke to defendant “multiple times” and “reached out to all the witnesses that were given to her,” but only two of them responded. Defense counsel followed up with those potential witnesses, and only one indicated a willingness to testify. Many of the other witnesses defendant sought to have testify had “absolutely no relevance at all to this case.” With respect to disqualifying the prosecutor, defense counsel stated that he had no legal or factual basis to file such a motion. Defense counsel 5 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. 11 also stated that he “met with [defendant] multiple times at the jail,” that defendant gave him the same information each time they met, and that he was prepared to represent defendant at trial. Defense counsel added that defendant had “an idea of what the case is about” that did not line up with “what is admissible in court.” Defense counsel further stated that defendant “has had discovery in this case for many, many months.” The trial court denied the Marsden motion. As mentioned, defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Defendant’s second Marsden motion was made postconviction. Defendant complained that his attorney told two potential witnesses not to testify, did not discuss “any tactics of self-defense” with him, “always wanted [him] to take a deal,” “never responded back to … any of [his] letters,” “advised [him] not to testify,” and failed to file the aforementioned Pitchess motion. The trial court responded that whether to call specific witnesses is “what [you] call a trial tactical decision.” Defendant explained that the witnesses he sought to have testify knew about Ashley’s “drug dealing and his thievery.” He also claimed he had witnesses who could testify that an officer came to his house for one of the thefts and told him that the District Attorney would not prosecute anyone for it. The trial court told defendant that he could raise that issue on appeal. The trial court also stated: “I’ve seen [defense counsel] in trial numerous times in the seven years I’ve been on the bench. I didn’t see anything in the trial itself that stood out to me as being ineffective. I think there were trial tactics that [defense counsel] presented, and what I presume is … based on his experience and knowledge as to what he thought might be most effective. I don’t know that a Marsden motion at this point in time is particularly warranted.” Defendant again complained about the failure to prosecute Ashley and others for the thefts. The trial court brought defendant’s focus back to the Marsden motion and indicated that it was denying the motion. Defendant responded: “I want to fire him. I don’t like his tactics. He doesn’t come out like he’s defending me. He tells me – he’s a surrogate prosecutor. Take a deal. He’s never once discussed tactics to 12 defend me.” Asked if he had anything to add, defense counsel stated: “I don’t think I need to go further.” Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion because “it did not fully address each of [his] complaints against his attorney, deeming them instead matters to be raised on direct appeal.” But this was defendant’s second Marsden motion, raising essentially the same complaints raised in his first Marsden motion, and the trial court did fully address those complaints at the first hearing. Defendant does not provide this court with any authority holding that, in these circumstances, the trial court must provide a second comprehensive assessment of his complaints. In accordance with Marsden and Smith, the trial court gave defendant an opportunity to explain the reasons he wanted to “fire” his attorney, and absent any showing to the contrary, we must presume that the trial court properly considered the complaints before denying the motion. (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 690; Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 123-125; see also People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 762.) Defendant relies on Smith for the proposition that complaints raised as part of a postconviction Marsden motion must be assessed by the trial court “to determine whether it is feasible to continue on with current counsel or whether a new attorney needs to be appointed to investigate filing a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Although the court in Smith stressed that a “defendant is entitled to competent representation at all times, including presentation of a new trial motion,” the court equally stressed “that new counsel should not be appointed without a proper showing. A series of attorneys presenting groundless claims of incompetence at public expense, often causing delays to allow substitute counsel to become acquainted with the case, benefits no one. The court should deny a request for new counsel at any stage unless it is satisfied that the defendant has made the required showing. This lies within the exercise of the trial court’s discretion, which will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 695-696.) 13 Defendant argues that the trial court’s comments in denying the second Marsden motion were “contradictory” because the court cited “trial tactics” as the reason defense counsel did not call certain witnesses, but then acknowledged that it did not know “the reason for the trial tactics on who to call and who not to call.” However, the trial court did not need to know defense counsel’s reasoning in order to point out, quite correctly, that the decision “[w]hether to call certain witness[es] is generally a matter of trial tactics.” (People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905 (Williams).) Disagreements about such tactics do not require substitution of appointed counsel unless they “ ‘signal a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (Ibid.) Defendant’s complaints did not signal such a breakdown in the relationship. He simply disagreed with defense counsel about whether the witnesses should have testified. But his own statements about the testimony he hoped they would have provided demonstrated they would not have helped his cause. If anything, such testimony would have bolstered the prosecution’s argument that defendant had a strong motive to kill Ashley for stealing his property, and the fact that Ashley evaded prosecution for the thefts caused defendant to seek, as he put it, vigilante justice. Defendant further faults the trial court for rejecting his complaints based on the court’s personal familiarity with defense counsel from other cases. But one isolated comment about having observed defense counsel in other cases over the years does not persuade this court that the trial court improperly based its decision on the court’s “confidence in the current attorney and observations of that attorney’s previous demonstrations of courtroom skill.” (People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 753.) Indeed, immediately after making this comment, the trial court stated: “I didn’t see anything in the trial itself that stood out to me as being ineffective.” Defendant acknowledges that the trial court may rely on its own observations of defense counsel during trial, but claims that his “chief complaints involved matters that were not 14 observable by the court,” such as the failure to call witnesses, whether defendant and counsel adequately discussed self-defense, and counsel’s advice to defendant not to testify. We have already discussed the failure to call witnesses. We also note that whether to advise a defendant to take the stand “goes to the heart of trial tactics” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 444), as does determining which defenses to pursue. (In re Alcox (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 657, 665-666.) Defendant himself stated honestly at the hearing: “I don’t like his tactics.” But again, that does not warrant substitution of appointed counsel absent a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 905.) Defendant did not demonstrate such a breakdown occurred. Finally, defendant’s reliance on People v. Carter (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1092 is misplaced. There, the defendant was committed to a state hospital pending trial on a petition to commit him as a sexually violent predator. After awaiting trial for more than 12 years, he filed a pro se Marsden motion and a pro se motion to dismiss the petition. The trial court denied the Marsden motion and declined to rule on the motion to dismiss. (Id. at p. 1095.) However, because defense counsel stated at the Marsden hearing that she could not ethically pursue the motion to dismiss, the trial court told the defendant that he would need to represent himself in pursuing that motion. But defendant made no further effort to pursue the motion to dismiss. (Id. at pp. 1097-1098.) The California Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not properly consider the Marsden motion in the context of the “interrelated” motion to dismiss the petition. (Id. at pp. 1099, 1101-1102.) The court explained that “the [trial] court should not have simply determined whether [counsel] had ‘done her job’ up to that point but should have asked whether a conflict of interest would have prevented [her] from effectively investigating and potentially litigating [the defendant’s] motion to dismiss.” (Id. at p. 1101.) 15 Unlike Carter, this case does not involve interrelated motions; defendant did not file or suggest that he wanted to file a new trial motion at the time the Marsden hearing was held. And defense counsel in this case did not make any affirmative statement that he could not ethically investigate or pursue such a motion on defendant’s behalf. We acknowledge that the potential for a new trial motion exists any time a defendant makes a postconviction Marsden motion. However, as the Smith court held, “[a] defendant has no greater right to substitute counsel at the later [postconviction] stage than the earlier [preconviction stage].” (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 694.) At both stages, the defendant must show that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would substantially impair the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel. (Id. at pp. 690-691.) And we reverse only if the defendant demonstrates the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. (Ibid.) Defendant has not carried his burden in this regard. IV Defendant contends the trial court violated section 654 by failing to stay the sentence imposed for either the murder or the aggravated mayhem count. We agree the trial court should have stayed one of those sentences. Section 654 precludes multiple punishment for “a single act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Assad (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.) “ ‘The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the defendant. … [I]f the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the trial court may impose punishment for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Akins (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 331, 338-339.) Whether a defendant harbored multiple criminal objectives is a question of fact, the trial court’s determination of which must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Nubla (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 719, 730.) 16 Multiple punishment for first degree murder and aggravated mayhem has been allowed in certain circumstances. For example, in People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, the defendant stabbed the victim with the intent to kill. The victim fought back by putting her fingers in his eyes. The defendant then bit down on her fingers, resulting in the aggravated mayhem. Substantial evidence supported a finding that he had “a separate objective and intent” when he bit the victim, i.e., “to retaliate against her for using her fingers to injure him.” (Id. at p. 739.) However, as the People concede, no separate objective and intent exists in this case. Defendant struck Ashley multiple times with the axe handle intending to kill him. Even if he also intended to disfigure Ashley in the process, that intent was not separate and independent from his intent to kill. Indeed, as in People v. Bui (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1002, where the same shooting resulted in convictions for attempted murder and mayhem, “[t]here was no evidence defendant had independent objectives for the two crimes that would justify multiple punishment.” (Id. at p. 1015.) The People nevertheless argue that remand is unnecessary and urge this court to order correction of the abstract of judgment to reflect a stay of the sentence imposed for aggravated mayhem. We disagree. As amended by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which went into effect January 1, 2022, section 654 allows the trial court to exercise its discretion in choosing whether to punish defendant for first degree murder or aggravated mayhem. (§ 654, subd. (a) [an “act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions” (italics added)]; Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.) Contrary to the People’s argument on appeal, the trial court did not clearly indicate at the sentencing hearing that it would have exercised its discretion to punish defendant for the murder count as opposed to the aggravated mayhem count. We will therefore vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing with directions to stay execution of the sentence imposed for either the murder conviction or the aggravated mayhem conviction. 17 (See People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [where the trial court is unaware of sentencing discretion, “the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion’ ”].) V Finally, as the People also concede, the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the sentence imposed. However, we need not order correction of the abstract of judgment because a new abstract of judgment will be prepared following the new sentencing hearing. DISPOSITION The convictions and enhancement findings are affirmed, the sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing with directions to stay execution of the sentence imposed for either the murder conviction or the aggravated mayhem conviction. Following the new sentencing hearing, the trial court is directed to prepare a new abstract of judgment accurately reflecting the new sentence and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. /S/ MAURO, Acting P. J. We concur: /S/ BOULWARE EURIE, J. /S/ MESIWALA, J. 18