Curry v. State

Devin K. Curry v. State of Maryland, No. 13, September Term, 2025. Opinion by Getty, Joseph M., J. HEADNOTES: RECORDS – ELECTRONIC RECORDS – SECURITY SETTINGS FOR RECORD ITEMS IN MARYLAND ELECTRONIC COURTS SYSTEM Maryland Electronic Courts (“MDEC”) is the electronic case management processing and record-keeping system used in the State of Maryland’s court system. Files marked in MDEC for access by “Judge/Court Personnel Only” are not visible as docket entries or included in the Appeal Index for the case. When a document does not appear as a docket entry or as part of the Appeal Index for a case, counsel should not assume the document was not properly filed or does not exist without first consulting the appropriate court personnel to request access to files marked with heightened security settings in MDEC. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 122131001 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 13 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ DEVIN K. CURRY v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Graeff, Shaw, Getty, Joseph M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Getty, J. ______________________________________ Filed: October 5, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.10.05 15:56:17 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  Appellant, Devin K. Curry, was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for first-degree murder. He was tried before a jury from July 9 through 12, 2024, which resulted in a mistrial. This interlocutory appeal stems solely from events which occurred after the jury began its deliberations. As the jury was deliberating, there were two instances in which the court communicated with the jury without first informing and consulting counsel. In one of these communications, the jury indicated that they would not be able to reach a unanimous verdict. The court then declared a mistrial sua sponte, over defense counsel’s objection. Following the mistrial, Mr. Curry’s attorney filed a Motion to Dismiss for Double Jeopardy. The court denied Mr. Curry’s motion to dismiss,1 and this appeal followed. On appeal, Mr. Curry presents three questions for our review, which we have rephrased for brevity and clarity:2 1 Two different judges of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City presided over Mr. Curry’s trial and the hearing on his motion to dismiss. We hereinafter refer to the former as the “trial judge” and the latter as the “motions judge.” 2 Mr. Curry’s verbatim questions presented are: I. Did the Trial Judge Violate Mr. Curry’s Constitutional Rights and Maryland Rule 4-326(d) by communicating with the jury outside Mr. Curry’s Presence about Matters Directly Pertaining to the Trial; by not Notifying Mr. Curry and his Attorney of the Communications and Inviting them to State Their Position on the Record, Before Responding to the Communications; and by Failing to Ensure Compliance with Rule 4-326(d), thereby Committing Clear, Reversible Error? II. Did the Trial Judge Erroneously Declare a Mistrial, by Failing to Analyze Whether there was Manifest Necessity for a Mistrial, without Adequate Consideration and after Rejecting Two Reasonable Alternatives.  1. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion by communicating with the jury outside of Mr. Curry’s presence and without first informing and consulting Mr. Curry’s counsel? 2. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion by declaring a mistrial? 3. Did the motions judge err in denying Mr. Curry’s motion to dismiss? As we shall explain, we conclude that the first question presented is moot due to the trial judge’s subsequent declaration of a mistrial. We answer the second and third questions in the negative, and we conclude the opinion with a note on the Maryland Electronic Courts (“MDEC”) security settings. Finally, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. BACKGROUND Mr. Curry allegedly shot and killed Daniel Pitts on April 14, 2022. He was indicted by a grand jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on May 11, 2022, and his trial commenced on July 9, 2024. After two and a half days of trial, counsel concluded their closing arguments around midday on July 11. The jury was dismissed for lunch and instructed to begin deliberations when they returned at around 1:00 p.m. At 4:30 p.m., the jury gave a note to the court requesting the trial recording in its entirety.3 The following morning, the trial judge convened the parties to advise them of the jury’s request. III. Did the Motions Judge Erroneously Affirm the Mistrial by Committed Errors of Fact and Failing to Recognize that the Trial Court Violated Rule 4-326(d) and Mr. Curry’s Constitutional Rights. 3 In his brief, Mr. Curry argues that he should receive a new trial because the clerk of the court failed to comply with Md. Rule 4-326(d)(3), which provides that “the clerk shall enter in the electronic or paper file each written communication from the jury or a juror and each written response by the judge[.]” As we will discuss further at the conclusion of this opinion, the jury notes were included in the record, but were only visible in the Maryland Electronic Courts (“MDEC”) system to the trial court judge and court personnel. Counsel 2  THE COURT: Thank you. There was a question from the jurors. Madam Clerk, could I have the question please. THE CLERK: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Westus (phonetic), can we please have court recordings in the entirety? So they want to play the whole trial over again, but first, David King’s testimony. I’ll hear from you, [Counsel for the State]. [THE STATE]: Your Honor, this statute, I think, that gives the Court the authority to play testimony and let the jury review evidence, I believe is 4- 231. It gives the Court authority to make that decision as long as it’s not lopsided towards one side or the other. That’s my understanding of the statute. So that’s all the State [has] to say. I would defer to the defense. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I use my phone? Sorry, Your Honor. And for the record, Rule 4-326 does give the Court authority to send back any evidence the jury requests to hear. It’s the defense position that they should be authorized or allowed to relisten to testimony that they deem is necessary for them— THE COURT: So they deem the whole trial necessary. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, it seems to me that they are potentially having a dispute over what was or was not said by certain witnesses. I think that’s probably crucial to their ability to make a determination in this case. So I’d ask that they’d be permitted to listen to whatever they need to in order to make a determination in this case. THE COURT: Thank you. I’m going to deny your request. I told the jury that they must go on their own memory of the case and their notes, and that’s the Court’s ruling. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Understood, Your Honor. We will note our objection. After several more hours of deliberations, the trial judge reconvened the parties later that afternoon to inform them of the jury’s progress. could not see the documents listed as docket entries or as part of the Appeal Index, because of the security setting in MDEC. 3  THE COURT: Thank you. It’s my understanding—I spoke to the jurors, and that they could not come to a unanimous decision on any of the charges. They were out for a good almost five hours yesterday and all of today, and I am planning on declaring a mistrial. Did you want to make a record, either one of you? [THE STATE]: No, Your Honor. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would ask—may I have a brief moment to confer with Mr. Curry? (Pause.) [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor. Was there any indication from the jurors about where they were and whether there was a significant minority or minimal minority; whether they were 11 to 1 or 6 to 6? Because if there is a huge gap between verdicts—or reaching a verdict here— unanimity, I should say—then I think it might be pointless to request an Allen charge. But if they’re pretty close, I think the defense would request an Allen charge and ask them to consider. I know we’re close to the end of the day, but this would give them some time to— The trial judge then asked counsel to approach the bench and advised that the jury had a split of nine votes to three in favor of convicting Mr. Curry.4 Counsel returned to their respective trial tables and defense counsel made a request for an Allen charge in open court.5 4 Although the trial judge revealed that he had spoken with the jurors, he did not place on the record the facts concerning how he learned of the deadlock and the split in votes between the jurors, or how he came to speak with the jurors. 5 An “Allen charge,” or an “Allen-type” charge, is a jury instruction derived from the United States Supreme Court case Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), in which the judge asks the jury to “conciliate their differences and reach a verdict.” Simms v. State, 240 Md. App. 606, 613 n.1 (2019) (citations omitted). Maryland’s Allen-type instruction can be found in Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:01, which reads: 4  THE COURT: Did you want to make the record? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. The defense would make a request for an Allen charge given the current standing of the jurors. We’d ask that those in the minority continue—reconsider their position in order to reach a unanimous verdict. THE COURT: I’m going to deny your request, Counsel. The juror has made it very clear that they aren’t close, and the parties are not changing their position. They’ve tried since all of yesterday and all of today, and that wasn’t happening. So this Court will grant a mistrial. Thank you. The jury was brought back into the courtroom and the foreperson confirmed that they had been unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial judge then declared a mistrial and dismissed the jurors. The jury’s verdict sheet is included in the record, on which the following was handwritten in printed letters: “Couldn’t come to a decision. I declared a mistrial.” The sheet was signed and dated by the jury foreperson.6 Defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss for Double Jeopardy on October 17, 2024, arguing that the trial judge failed to pursue any reasonable alternatives to declaring The verdict must be the considered judgment of each of you. In order to reach a verdict, all of you must agree. In other words, your verdict must be unanimous. You must consult with one another and deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. During deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views. You should change your opinion if convinced you are wrong, but do not surrender your honest belief as to the weight and effect of the evidence only because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict. 6 The verdict sheet did not include a time stamp, so it is unclear if the sheet was given to the trial judge before or after his discussion with the jury concerning the deadlock. 5 a mistrial, citing the trial judge’s decision not to provide the trial recording to the jury when requested and not to give an Allen charge when the deadlock was revealed. A hearing was held on February 24, 2025, after which the motions judge issued a Memorandum Order denying the motion. In the order, the motions judge explained: Of course, the court is required to consider whether the trial judge considered alternatives to granting the mistrial. The trial judge, who oversaw the case, and who was confident, based on what had been conveyed to him, that the juror factions were resolute in their positions, did not abuse his discretion when he exercised his discretion in favor of granting a mistrial. He did not fail to recognize he had discretion either to deny the request for an Allen charge or to offer an Allen charge and require additional deliberations. Neither did he fail to consider whether additional time would likely result in the jury reaching a verdict as he was convinced the jurors were not going to move from their positions. And, although Defendant now contends the court should have essentially provided the [full] transcript to the jury, he did not re-raise the issue once the deadlock was revealed. Even had the judge declined to do so in an effort to address the deadlock, the judge’s discretion, if exercised in that regard, would have been well within acceptable standards. In short, the judge exercised, but did not abuse his discretion when he determined an Allen charge would not yield results given the specific posture of the case. Consequently, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. The motions judge’s order was entered on February 25, 2025, and Mr. Curry timely noted his appeal on March 3, 2025. DISCUSSION I. Communications with the Jury Mr. Curry’s first argument on appeal is that the trial judge abused his discretion by communicating with the jurors ex parte, both in responding to their request and in discussing their inability to reach a unanimous verdict. Mr. Curry claims that these 6 communications were a violation of his right to be present at all phases of trial and of Maryland Rule 4-326(d).7 Notably, the State does not challenge the factual underpinning of this claim of error, saying in its brief that Mr. Curry’s claim is “substantiated” and had “ample record support[.]” Instead, the State contends that the issue is not properly before this Court because there is no remedy available to Mr. Curry. We agree and find that the issue is moot. “A question is moot if, at the time it is before the court, there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide.” Broadway v. State, 202 Md. App. 464, 486 (2011) (quoting Mercy Hospital v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 561 (1986)). In the context of Rule 4-326(d), our Supreme Court has been clear that a trial or judgment is not valid “[i]f the communication [from the jury] is not disclosed [to counsel] in a timely fashion or there has been no chance for input[.]” Grade v. State, 431 Md. 85, 97 (2013). Accordingly, then, the remedy for such a violation is a new trial. See id. at 107 (reversing and remanding for a new trial where the trial judge violated Rule 4-326(d) by substituting a juror with an alternate without first consulting counsel); see also State v. Harris, 428 Md. 700, 720–21 (2012) (holding that a violation of Rule 4-326 is “presumably prejudicial” and requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction “unless the State can 7 Maryland Rule 4-326(d)(2)(C) provides that, when a judge receives a communication from the jury that pertains to the action, “the judge shall promptly, and before responding to the communication, direct that the parties be notified of the communication and invite and consider, on the record, the parties’ position on any response. The judge may respond to the communication in writing or orally in open court on the record.” 7 affirmatively prove otherwise.”); Stewart v. State, 334 Md. 213, 224–25 (1994) (stating that the defendant’s right to be present for any communication between the jury and the trial judge during deliberations is “absolute” and that “a judgment of conviction ordinarily cannot be upheld if the record discloses a violation of the right.”). In the instant case, however, there has been no judgment of conviction for us to reverse. Had Mr. Curry been convicted, the burden would then be on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial judge’s communications with the jury had not been prejudicial, a burden the State could not likely meet given the position taken in its brief. In that circumstance, Mr. Curry would be entitled to a new trial. Here, Mr. Curry’s case resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial. He has not been convicted and instead will receive a new trial—the exact remedy that would have been afforded to him for a violation of Rule 4-326(d). Because Mr. Curry is already receiving a new trial,8 there is no longer any effective remedy for this Court to provide. Broadway, 202 Md. App. at 486. As such, the issue is moot, and we will not decide it. See Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 286 Md. 324, 327 (1979) (“Generally, appellate courts do not decide academic or moot questions.”). 8 The Circuit Court docket shows that Mr. Curry’s new trial was scheduled for August 5, 2025. This trial was later canceled, and the trial proceedings were stayed pending the resolution of the instant appeal. 8 II. Mistrial a. Parties’ Contentions Mr. Curry argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by declaring a mistrial sua sponte because a mistrial was not manifestly necessary in this case. He contends that “[t]he [c]ourt improperly and summarily rejected both of the reasonable alternatives to declaring a mistrial that had been requested by Mr. Curry’s attorney. The [c]ourt also failed to consider whether there [were] any other reasonable alternatives.” Mr. Curry then claims that the motions judge “ignored all of these errors” when evaluating whether he could be retried and therefore the denial of his motion to dismiss was “clear, reversible error.” The State responds that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the jury was deadlocked, and therefore a mistrial was manifestly necessary. The State emphasizes that, “the trial court had before it (1) two days of deliberation, in aggregate almost as long as the trial had been; (2) some private communication not on the record; and (3) a note written on the verdict sheet indicating that the jury was deadlocked.” b. Standard of Review “[W]e review the trial judge’s grant of a mistrial for abuse of discretion.” State v. Baker, 453 Md. 32, 46 (2017) (quoting Simmons v. State, 436 Md. 202, 212 (2013)). “It is well-settled that a decision to grant a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that the trial judge’s determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “That is, we look to whether the trial judge’s exercise of discretion was manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 9  c. The Manifest Necessity Standard “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that, ‘… nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.’” Simmons, 436 Md. at 213 (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). “In a jury trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally bars the retrial of a criminal defendant for the same offense once a jury has been empaneled and sworn.” Id. “Retrial is not automatically barred, however, when a criminal proceeding is concluded after jeopardy attaches but without resolving the merits of the case.” Hubbard v. State, 395 Md. 73, 89 (2006). In the event of a mistrial granted over the objection of the defendant, “double jeopardy principles will not bar a retrial if there exists ‘manifest necessity’ for the mistrial.” Simmons, 436 Md. at 213. “If, however, the mistrial was not manifestly necessary, then the trial judge abused [the judge’s] discretion in declaring the mistrial, and retrial is barred by double jeopardy principles.” Baker, 453 Md. at 47 (citing Hubbard, 395 Md. at 89). Whether there exists manifest necessity to declare a mistrial depends “upon the unique facts and circumstances of each case” but still demands a “high degree” of necessity. Mansfield v. State, 422 Md. 269, 287 (2011). In addition to the “high degree of necessity” component, our Supreme Court has also explained that the trial court must find that no reasonable alternatives to a mistrial are actually available. Baker, 453 Md. at 48. In summary, there exists “manifest necessity” for a mistrial only if 1) there was a “high degree” of necessity for the mistrial; 2) the trial court engaged “in the process of exploring reasonable alternatives” to a mistrial and 10  determined that none was available; and 3) no reasonable alternative to a mistrial was, in fact, available. Id. at 49. The absence of an explicit finding of manifest necessity does not automatically render the trial court’s ruling constitutionally defective, but the reviewing court must be “persuaded by the record that the trial judge acted responsibly and deliberately, and accorded careful consideration to [the defendant’s] interest in having the trial concluded in a single proceeding.” Id. (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516 (1978)). d. Analysis Although the trial judge here did not make an explicit finding on the record that a mistrial was manifestly necessary, he predicated his decision to declare a mistrial on the fact that the jury was deadlocked. “A genuinely deadlocked jury is considered the prototypical example of a manifest necessity for a mistrial.” State v. Fennell, 431 Md. 500, 516 (2013). Genuine deadlock requires “more than an impasse; it invokes a moment where, if deliberations were to continue, there exists a significant risk that a verdict may result from pressure inherent in the situation rather than the considered judgment of all the jurors.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, an apparent deadlock does not dispense with the requirement that the trial judge determine that no reasonable alternative to a mistrial exists. Id. at 519–20. “In the context of a hung jury, therefore, the trial court must determine ordinarily that genuine jury deadlock exists, such that further deliberations are unlikely to be productive.” Id. at 520. 11  It is apparent from the trial judge’s remarks to counsel that he did not believe that continued deliberations would be productive based on his conversation with the jurors. THE COURT: It’s not close. It’s 9 to 3. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t think that’s terribly— THE COURT: It is. They have been [at it] the same way all yesterday and all today. And made it very clear that that was not going to change. The trial judge further expanded on the circumstances of the deadlock when denying the defense’s request for an Allen charge, and again when speaking directly to the jurors in open court before dismissing them. THE COURT: I’m going to deny your request, Counsel. The juror has made it very clear that they aren’t close, and the parties are not changing their position. They’ve tried since all of yesterday and all of today, and that wasn’t happening. *** THE COURT: Please be seated. Good afternoon. It’s my understanding after two days of deliberations you all cannot come to a verdict; is that correct? MADAME FOREPERSON: Yes, sir. JURY (IN UNISON): Yes, sir. THE COURT: Thank you. You’ve informed me of that just a little while ago. You’ve been deliberating almost two whole days, and the disparity is sufficient enough for me to declare a mistrial. The trial judge’s belief that the jury’s deadlock “was not going to change” was further supported by the handwritten note in printed letters on the verdict sheet signed by the jury foreperson, which expressed that the jury “[c]ouldn’t come to a decision.” Given these circumstances, the trial judge’s decision that there was a genuine deadlock and that a mistrial was manifestly necessary was not unreasonable, nor was it an abuse of discretion. 12  Mr. Curry, however, contends that the trial judge had two “reasonable alternatives” available to him: (1) allowing the jury to review the trial recording; and (2) giving an Allen charge. The decision whether to employ either of these options was within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g. Nash v. State, 439 Md. 53, 90 (2014) (“[A] trial judge’s decision whether to give a modified Allen charge is subject to review by this Court for an abuse of discretion.”); Sidbury v. State, 414 Md. 180, 186 (2010) (“The decision of whether to give supplemental instructions is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.”); see also Md. Rule 4-326(c) (providing that a trial judge “may make available to the jury testimony or other evidence requested by it”) (emphasis added). Consistent with the discretion vested in trial judges, our Supreme Court in State v. Fennell, 431 Md. at 517, reiterated precedent from the United States Supreme Court, which has “never required a trial court, before declaring a mistrial because of a hung jury, to consider any particular means of breaking the impasse[.]” Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599, 609 (2012). Accordingly, we will not impose such a requirement on the trial judge here. The trial judge was “in the best position to assess all the factors which must be considered in making a necessarily discretionary determination whether the jury will be able to reach a just verdict if it continue[d] to deliberate[,]” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010), and we will defer to that determination. After nearly two days of deliberations, the jury clearly expressed to the trial judge that they were at an impasse, from which the trial judge concluded that “further deliberations [were] unlikely to be productive.” Fennell, 431 Md. 13 at 520. As such, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by declaring a mistrial without taking specific steps to break the impasse. e. Motion to Dismiss for Double Jeopardy “If granting a mistrial over objection was manifestly necessary, the defendant may be retried without implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause[.]” Hubbard, 395 Md. at 89. Because we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that there was manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, we then further conclude that the motions judge did not err in denying Mr. Curry’s motion to dismiss. Mr. Curry may be retried without implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause. III. A Note on the Security Settings in MDEC In his brief, Mr. Curry states that the jury notes for this case do not appear in the record for this appeal. As a result, Mr. Curry contends that, in failing to include the relevant jury notes in the case record, the court clerk did not comply with Md. Rule 4-326(d)(3), which provides that “the clerk shall enter in the electronic or paper file each written communication from the jury or a juror and each written response by the judge.” Mr. Curry argues that this contributes to a violation of his constitutional right to be present at all stages of his trial, and thus he should receive a new trial as a remedy. The State does not directly address these claims in its brief. We take this opportunity to note that counsel should be aware of the different security settings in the Maryland Electronic Courts (“MDEC”) system and how those settings impact access to record documents. MDEC is the electronic case management processing and record-keeping system used in the State of Maryland’s court system. 14 “Through MDEC, state courts ‘collect, store and process records electronically, and will be able to access complete records instantly as cases travel from District Court to Circuit Court[.]’ In essence, MDEC allows for paper records to be available online and on- demand.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Weinberg, 485 Md. 504, 540 n.22 (2023).9 When a circuit court clerk assigns a document an enhanced security designation in MDEC that restricts access to judges and court personnel (“Judge/Court Personnel Only”), the document remains part of the record, but is not visible to counsel as a docket entry, nor is it included in the Appeal Index. This aspect of MDEC’s security system poses particular difficulty for appellate counsel who did not participate in the proceedings below. Although in this case, during the hearing on Mr. Curry’s motion to dismiss, the motions judge explained that the jury notes were “locked” in MDEC because they were confidential documents not for public viewing, the documents in question were restricted to judges and court personnel only. As a result, counsel for this case could not see that any such documents existed in the record. Counsel should not assume that the absence of a document from the Appeal Index means that it was not filed or is not part of the record. Instead, counsel should promptly notify the appropriate court personnel, often the circuit court clerk, and request access to the relevant documents. When appropriate, the circuit court may modify the document’s security designation to the less restrictive “Confidential,” thereby permitting counsel to review it while continuing to restrict public access. 9 Quoting Maryland Judiciary, About MDEC, available at https://mdcourts.gov/mdec/about, archived at https://perma.cc/RN8D-EJ5Q). 15  CONCLUSION The issue of whether the trial judge abused his discretion by communicating with the jury outside of Mr. Curry’s presence is moot because the remedy for such an error would be a new trial, and Mr. Curry is already receiving a new trial. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by declaring a mistrial because the judge reasonably concluded that the jury was deadlocked, and thus a mistrial was manifestly necessary. Finally, the motions judge did not err in denying Mr. Curry’s motion to dismiss for double jeopardy because the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated when declaring a mistrial was supported by manifest necessity. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 16