United States v. Nathan Goddard

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0277p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ │ > Nos. 24-3841/3844 v. │ │ │ │ NATHAN GODDARD (24-3841); CAHKE CORTNER (24- │ 3844), │ Defendants-Appellants. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton. No. 3:19-cr-00171—Michael J. Newman, District Judge. Argued: July 23, 2026 Decided and Filed: October 7, 2026 Before: KETHLEDGE, Chief Judge; NALBANDIAN and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Elizabeth A. Arrick, CASEY, BAILEY & MAINES, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Nathan Goddard. Timothy F. Sweeney, LAW OFFICE OF TIMOTHY F. SWEENEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant Cahke Cortner. Mary Beth Young, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Elizabeth A. Arrick, CASEY, BAILEY & MAINES, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Nathan Goddard. Timothy F. Sweeney, LAW OFFICE OF TIMOTHY F. SWEENEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant Cahke Cortner. Mary Beth Young, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judge. After learning that Nathan Goddard was storing a large quantity of fentanyl in his brother-in-law’s basement, federal law-enforcement agents obtained a warrant to search the property. Later that evening, a team of officers surrounded the premises and executed the warrant. Task Force Officer Jorge Del Rio knocked and announced law enforcement’s presence at the home. Another officer battered down the door. Officer Del Rio then entered and proceeded to the basement staircase. Other officers followed, repeatedly announcing their presence as police. Goddard, his friend Cahke Cortner, and two others were present in the basement. As officers entered upstairs, Goddard grabbed his high-velocity pistol—which Cortner had helped provide and equipped with a laser sight—from a nearby table. Goddard then stationed himself in a basement corner, which placed him next to a stash of drugs and money and out of view of anyone on the staircase. Meanwhile, Cortner grabbed his own laser-sighted pistol, headed into a back basement room, chambered a round, and disengaged the safety. As Officer Del Rio descended the basement steps, Goddard fired. In the gunfire exchange that followed, Goddard fatally shot Officer Del Rio in the head. The men, evidence showed, would have been looking at each other at the time. Those events led to the trial of Goddard and Cortner for Officer Del Rio’s killing and various related charges. Rejecting Goddard’s self-defense theory, the jury convicted him of killing Officer Del Rio while engaging in a drug-trafficking offense as well as murder of a federal officer. And though Cortner did not himself shoot Officer Del Rio, the jury also convicted him of the killing using what’s called Pinkerton liability—a theory that permits members of a conspiracy to be held responsible for any reasonably foreseeable crimes within the conspiracy’s scope. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946). The jury further convicted both Goddard and Cortner of additional drug and gun offenses.  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 3 Based on those convictions, the district court sentenced both men to life imprisonment. Goddard and Cortner now challenge their convictions, pressing a range of evidentiary, jury- instruction, and sufficiency challenges. Cortner also challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We reject their arguments and affirm. I A On the morning of November 4, 2019, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents arrested Jovan House, a Dayton-area drug dealer. After agreeing to cooperate with the DEA, House identified Nathan Goddard as his supplier. Goddard was no stranger to law enforcement. In August 2018, Oklahoma City police officers stopped Goddard and his associates for a traffic violation. Suspecting Goddard of drug trafficking, officers searched his vehicle and discovered 18 kilograms of cocaine and one kilogram of fentanyl hidden inside a secret compartment. Goddard also has prior convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana, perjury, assault, distribution of marijuana, and a laundry list of minor drug and traffic offenses. It seemed Goddard had not moved on from his trafficking activities. In House’s interview with police, House recounted how Goddard had provided him with two pounds of marijuana the day before. The transaction took place in the basement of 1454 Ruskin Road, a residence owned by Goddard’s brother-in-law, Lionel Combs III. According to House, Goddard showed him 10 kilograms of cocaine and fentanyl during the transaction. House also noticed a firearm sitting on a coffee table in the basement. At some point during the sale, Goddard’s friend Cahke Cortner arrived. Cortner was carrying a firearm. At the DEA’s prompting, House called Goddard. House and Goddard discussed “trees”—a code word for marijuana—and Goddard confirmed that he still had the “fetty” that he showed to House the day before. Warrant Aff., R.133-2, PageID 646. Goddard offered to sell the fentanyl to House for $60,000 per kilogram.  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 4 Special Agent James Vill used House’s information to obtain a search warrant for 1454 Ruskin Road. After obtaining the warrant, the DEA had House call Goddard a second time to ensure that the fentanyl was still present at the property. Goddard confirmed that it was. Around the same time, the DEA prepared an operational plan for executing the warrant. The plan called for the search-warrant team to enter 1454 Ruskin Road through a side entrance. Doing so would provide direct access to a staircase that led down to the basement, which is where the team expected to find the drugs. After the search-warrant team assembled outside the side door, Officer Jorge Del Rio would knock and announce law enforcement’s presence. Upon entering the residence, Officer Del Rio and another team member would clear the first floor. Other team members would wait at the top of the basement steps with a ballistic shield and order anyone in the basement to come up the stairs. Law enforcement arrived at 1454 Ruskin Road around 7:00 that evening. The search- warrant team assembled in a stack outside the side door of the residence. Officer Del Rio was the second member of the stack. He was wearing a tactical vest with “police markings on it,” a “D.E.A. hat,” and a black mask. Day 6 Trial Tr., R.340, PageID 3540. Officer Del Rio loudly knocked and announced law enforcement’s presence. After waiting a “reasonable amount of time,” another officer used a battering ram to breach the side door. Day 7 Trial Tr., R.341, PageID 3753. The search-warrant team then entered the residence while continuing to shout “police[,] D.E.A., search warrant.” Day 6 Trial Tr., R.340, PageID 3562. But rather than clear the first floor, as the operational plan contemplated, Officer Del Rio proceeded straight to the basement staircase. He began to descend the basement steps with his gun in front of him and his body “perpendicular to the steps” and facing out into the basement. Id. at PageID 3563. Goddard was sitting in the basement at the time of the warrant’s execution. He heard the battering ram hit the side door and, as he later told police investigators, “thought it was the police.” Day 8 Trial Tr., R.342, PageID 3965. With him were Cortner, the home’s owner Combs, and another individual, Courtney Allen. Goddard reacted to the DEA’s entry by grabbing his pistol, an FN 5-7 loaded with armor-piercing ammunition. Goddard had illegally acquired that pistol with Cortner’s help through a series of straw purchasers. And Cortner had  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 5 outfitted the pistol with a laser sight. The gun had been sitting on a nearby coffee table next to $11,000 in cash and some marijuana. After arming himself, Goddard “moved to th[e] [basement] corner where there’s a blind spot coming down the stairs.” Id. at PageID 3966. In doing so, Goddard placed himself next to six plastic tubs containing 50 to 60 pounds of marijuana and a closet containing three kilograms of fentanyl, six kilograms of cocaine, over $44,000 in cash, a rifle, and drug paraphernalia. Goddard then “told everybody else to get into the backroom” of the basement. Id. Heeding Goddard’s command, Cortner moved to the back room, drew his own pistol, chambered a round, and disengaged the safety. When Officer Del Rio appeared on the basement staircase, Goddard fired. Officer Del Rio returned fire once, and Goddard fired several more times. At the end of that exchange, Officer Del Rio lay wounded at the bottom of the basement steps. One of Goddard’s shots had struck Officer Del Rio in the head. Given the location of the entry wound, Officer Del Rio and Goddard were “pretty much looking at each other” when Goddard fired. Id. at PageID 3984. Officer Del Rio’s colleagues transported him to a local hospital, where he died the next day. Goddard, Cortner, Combs, and Allen surrendered to law enforcement shortly after the shooting. They were arrested and transported to the Dayton Police Department, where they agreed to speak with police investigators about the shooting. B The Government later charged Goddard, Cortner, and Combs with multiple crimes relating to Officer Del Rio’s death. As relevant here, a grand jury indicted the three men for (1) conspiracy to possess 400 grams or more of fentanyl, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and marijuana with the intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 & 846; (2) possession of 400 grams or more of fentanyl, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and marijuana with the intent to distribute, see id. § 841; and (3) intentionally killing Officer Del Rio while engaging in a drug- trafficking offense, see id. § 848(e)(1). Goddard also was charged with first-degree murder of a federal officer. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 & 1114. Cortner was charged with carrying a firearm  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 6 during and in relation to a drug-trafficking offense. See id. § 924(c)(1)(A). And Combs was charged with maintaining a drug premises. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). Goddard and Combs moved to suppress the evidence seized from 1454 Ruskin Road. The district court denied the motions, reasoning that probable cause supported the search warrant and that the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applied in any event. The Government, for its part, moved in limine to exclude evidence relating to the pre-search operational plan for executing the warrant at Ruskin Road. The district court reserved ruling on that motion until trial, at which point it granted the motion. On the eve of trial, Combs pled guilty to maintaining a drug premises. Goddard and Cortner opted to proceed. The two-week trial that followed featured testimony from over 20 witnesses as well as extensive physical and electronic evidence. That evidence chronicled the events at 1454 Ruskin Road on the evening of November 4, 2019, as well as Goddard’s and Cortner’s broader efforts to obtain firearms and distribute large quantities of drugs. The jury convicted Goddard and Cortner on all counts. Probation then prepared a presentence investigation report for each defendant. Cortner objected to probation’s calculated base offense level and to its application of a sentencing enhancement for Officer Del Rio’s status as a law-enforcement officer. The district court overruled Cortner’s objections and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Goddard, too, received a life sentence. Combs—based on the lone charge of maintaining a drug premises—was sentenced to time served. Goddard and Cortner timely appealed. Goddard challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from the Ruskin Road search, the district court’s exclusion of evidence related to the DEA’s operational plan, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for the first-degree murder and intentional killing of Officer Del Rio. Cortner adopts Goddard’s operational-plan argument by reference. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(i). Cortner also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the district court’s jury instruction on co- conspirator liability, and the reasonableness of his sentence. We consider, and reject, each argument in turn.  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 7 II We begin with Goddard’s argument that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Goddard contends that the DEA lacked probable cause to search 1454 Ruskin Road for evidence of his drug trafficking because, he says, the information House provided was not sufficiently reliable. He further contends that the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement does not apply. Reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, we disagree. See United States v. Simmons, 129 F.4th 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2025). Probable cause supports the search warrant for 1454 Ruskin Road. So we need not consider Goddard’s good-faith arguments. Nor need we address the Government’s contention— which the district court did not pass on—that Goddard lacks standing to challenge the Ruskin Road search. Cf. Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 411 (2018). The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable cause is a low bar.” Frenchko v. Monroe, 160 F.4th 784, 796 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). It requires only “a fair probability that the specific place that officers want to search will contain the specific things that they are looking for.” United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2021). The search-warrant affidavit at issue principally cited facts stemming from law enforcement’s interaction with House—who was identified only as a “cooperating defendant.” Warrant Aff., R.133-2, PageID 646. When “the bulk of the information in the [warrant] affidavit comes from a confidential source, a court must consider the veracity, reliability, and the basis of knowledge for that information as part of the totality of the circumstances” informing probable cause. United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 893 (6th Cir. 2006). Typically, we look for “indicia of the informant[’s] reliability” or “substantial independent police corroboration” of the confidential source’s information. Id. (citation omitted). But those requirements “need not take any particular form.” Id. (citation omitted). That the confidential source “witnessed the drug deal” described in the affidavit or “was known to the officers” can establish the requisite reliability. United States v. Dyer, 580 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2009). And law enforcement’s  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 8 efforts to surveil the target residence, among other steps, can provide sufficient corroboration. Id. at 392. Judged against those principles, the warrant affidavit here provided probable cause to search 1454 Ruskin Road for evidence of drug trafficking. For starters, the affidavit contained “sufficient indicia of reliability.” Id. The affidavit recounts that a cooperating defendant (House) “obtained approximately one pound of marijuana from Goddard” at 1454 Ruskin Road “on or about November 3, 2019.” Warrant Aff., R.133-2, PageID 646. During that transaction, the affidavit explains, the cooperating defendant “observed approximately ten kilograms of drugs in the basement that Goddard purported to be fentanyl.” Id. That personal information about “a drug transaction in the basement of the place to be searched” and “a large quantity of [drugs] remain[ing] after the sale” evidences the cooperating defendant’s reliability. Dyer, 580 F.3d at 391. The same goes for the fact that the cooperating defendant’s identity “was known to the officers.” Id. His information was therefore “entitled to far greater weight than [that] of an anonymous source.” Id. (citation omitted). The affidavit further details the DEA’s efforts to corroborate House’s information. The affidavit explains that the DEA asked the cooperating defendant to call Goddard. On the recorded call that followed, Goddard confirmed that he still had the fentanyl in the basement. DEA agents then drove House past 1454 Ruskin Road and began surveilling the residence. They noticed that two vehicles registered to known drug dealers were parked in the driveway. Those steps amount to “some” corroboration of House’s information. See id. at 392. Our caselaw requires nothing more, as “substantial independent police corroboration” is unnecessary where, as here, “the informant witnessed the illegal activity on the premises searched and was known to the officer writing the affidavit.” Id. Goddard counters that the DEA should have done more to verify House’s information, such as by confirming that the phone number House called was registered to Goddard or by including “firsthand information sufficient to establish probable cause.” Goddard Br. 36. “But we assess an affidavit on the adequacy of what it does contain, not on what it lacks, or on what a critic might say should have been added.” Reed, 993 F.3d at 454 (citation omitted). Because  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 9 law enforcement’s steps were sufficient to support probable cause, doing more to verify House’s information was not required. III We next address the district court’s decision to exclude evidence relating to the DEA’s operational plan. Goddard argues that the district court’s decision violated his constitutional rights and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Cortner adopts that argument by reference. We reject their contentions. At trial, Goddard argued that he acted in self-defense when he shot Officer Del Rio. To support that theory, he sought to show that Officer Del Rio “reckless[ly]” deviated from the operational plan for the Ruskin Road search by descending the basement steps without cover. Goddard Br. 24. But the district court, in line with the Government’s motion in limine, limited Goddard’s ability to adduce evidence or testimony about the DEA’s operational plan. The district court reasoned that any “deviation” from the operational plan was not “relevant” to “Mr. Goddard’s objective belief about who was entering the basement.” Day 4 Trial Tr., R.338, PageID 3098-99. It also stated that the operational-plan evidence “could improperly mislead or confuse the Jury.” Id. at PageID 3099. So the district court would “not allow a comparison of what the plan was versus what actually occurred.” Id. But it did allow defense counsel to question witnesses about “what did or did not happen that night,” and “plans, policies, and procedures in terms of generalities.” Id. A Goddard and Cortner begin by arguing that the district court’s decision to limit testimony about the operational plan violated their constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense. But neither defendant raised those arguments below. Instead, Goddard argued only that the operational-plan evidence was admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Cortner did not raise any separate arguments at trial. That means we review for plain error. See United States v. Burrell, 114 F.4th 537, 555 (6th Cir. 2024).  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 10 To prevail on plain-error review, a defendant must establish (1) an error, (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Among other things, that showing requires the defendant to identify on-point caselaw demonstrating that the district court’s error was “clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal.” United States v. Tellez, 86 F.4th 1148, 1154 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Goddard and Cortner cannot clear that “high bar.” Id. They maintain that the district court’s decision violates their constitutional rights to confront witnesses at trial and to have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See generally Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006). But neither identifies a case holding that a district court committed constitutional error by excluding similar operational-plan evidence for similar purposes in similar circumstances. To the contrary, and as discussed next, courts have excluded similar evidence for the reasons the district court gave here. See, e.g., United States v. Wilk, 572 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2009). Goddard and Cortner thus cannot show that the district court’s decision is “clearly contrary to the law” in this Circuit. Tellez, 86 F.4th at 1154 (quotation omitted). That failure alone forecloses their constitutional argument. B That leaves Goddard and Cortner’s argument that the district court violated Rules 402 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Goddard preserved his evidentiary challenge by raising it in the district court. So we review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Page, 163 F.4th 385, 396 (6th Cir. 2025). “An abuse of discretion exists when the district court applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 570 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The district court concluded that the operational-plan evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible under Rule 402. Alternatively, it also reasoned that the operational-plan  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 11 evidence could mislead the jury and thus barred its admission under Rule 403. Neither decision was an abuse of discretion. Relevance. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence “is relevant” if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The parties dispute only whether the operational-plan evidence was relevant to the self-defense issue. It was not. The “fact” that Officer Del Rio deviated from the operational plan is not “of consequence” to Goddard’s assertion of self-defense. Id. To understand why, consider the district court’s unchallenged self-defense instruction. That instruction provided that, to find that Goddard acted in self-defense, the jury had to conclude that Goddard (1) “did not know that Jorge Del Rio was a law enforcement officer”; (2) “reasonably believed that use of force was necessary to defend himself against an immediate use of unlawful force” by “a private citizen”; and (3) “used no more force than appeared reasonably necessary in the circumstances.” Day 12 Trial Tr., R.348, PageID 5606-07. Given that instruction, “the evidence relevant to [Goddard’s] self-defense claim was his perception of the officers’ actions that [evening], not whether the officers followed proper procedure,” including the operational plan, when “executing the search warrant.” Wilk, 572 F.3d at 1235. The district court allowed Goddard to develop evidence related to his perception. That evidence included testimony on whether the “occupants of the basement” could see the marked police cruiser parked in front of the residence from the basement or hear law-enforcement officers announcing their presence. Day 6 Trial Tr., R.340, PageID 3478. But the facts that officers set out a pre-search operational plan and that Officer Del Rio deviated from that plan shed no light on Goddard’s perception of officers’ conduct “during entry into [the] residence.” Wilk, 572 F.3d at 1235. The operational-plan evidence is therefore irrelevant. Goddard identifies no caselaw that supports the relevance of the operational-plan evidence. Instead, his sole counterargument is that the operational plan is relevant because “its very purpose [wa]s to ensure” the “safety” of “the individuals within” 1454 Ruskin Road. Goddard Reply 22 (emphasis omitted). Yet Officer Del Rio’s deviation from the operational  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 12 plan did not excuse Goddard’s actions in shooting him. So “absent evidence that [Goddard] knew of” the operational plan ahead of time, any deviations from the plan are “irrelevant” to his “subjective” perception of what happened at 1454 Ruskin Road. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985) (excluding evidence regarding the adequacy of an arrest procedure). Rule 403. Even if relevant, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the operational-plan evidence “could improperly mislead or confuse the Jury.” Day 4 Trial Tr., R.338, PageID 3099. A district court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. And as one court has explained in affirming the exclusion of similar evidence, introduction of the operational-plan evidence risked “mislead[ing] the jury” because “it would create the impression that [Goddard’s] criminal responsibility for [Officer Del Rio’s] murder was to be contingent upon [Officer Del Rio’s] conformity to standard arrest [or search] procedure, i.e., [Officer Del Rio’s] lack of negligence.” Rouco, 765 F.2d at 995. Goddard’s response—that the jury was “much smarter than the trial judge and these prosecutors imagined,” Goddard Reply 23—does not establish that the district court “applie[d] the wrong legal standard, misapplie[d] the correct legal standard, or relie[d] on clearly erroneous findings of fact” in assessing the risk of prejudice, Collins, 799 F.3d at 570 (citation omitted). IV We next address Goddard’s sufficiency challenges to his convictions for first-degree murder and intentionally killing Officer Del Rio while engaging in a drug-trafficking offense. Goddard argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings (1) that the killing was premeditated or perpetrated by lying in wait, (2) that Goddard did not act in self-defense, and (3) that Goddard was engaged in a drug-trafficking offense when he killed Officer Del Rio. Sufficient evidence exists if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Baskerville, 164 F.4th 459, 472 (6th Cir. 2026) (citation omitted). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and “resolve all issues of  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 13 credibility in favor of the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citation omitted). Applying our sufficiency framework, we conclude that each of Goddard’s sufficiency challenges lacks merit. A We begin with Goddard’s conviction of murder of a federal law-enforcement officer. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114. “Section 1111 retains a common law distinction between second degree murder, which requires a killing with malice aforethought, and first degree murder, which in addition to malice aforethought requires a killing with premeditation and deliberation.” United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 392 (5th Cir. 1983). Relevant here, the statute defines first- degree murder as “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought” that is perpetrated by “lying in wait” or “any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated” means. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Lying in wait and premeditation are thus “independently sufficient grounds for first-degree murder.” United States v. Downs, 56 F.3d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 1995). The jury convicted Goddard of first-degree murder. But in Goddard’s view, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he acted either with premeditation or after lying in wait. We disagree. A rational juror could have found that Goddard acted with premeditation. Because “sufficient evidence” for “one of the grounds” of conviction is all that’s required to resolve Goddard’s challenge, we do not address whether sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that he was lying in wait. United States v. Wheat, 988 F.3d 299, 313 (6th Cir. 2021). The district court instructed the jury that a killing is premediated “when it is the result of planning or deliberation.” Day 12 Trial Tr., R.348, PageID 5617. “[N]o particular time interval [is] necessary to constitute premeditation; instead, it is sufficient if the defendant had some prior design to commit murder.” United States v. Al-Din, 631 F. App’x 313, 333 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Premeditation therefore “exists when a person has a fully formed conscious purpose to kill, even for a moment.” United States v. Ball, 18 F.4th 445, 456 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). In the context of a shooting, the “swift but deliberate actions” of “reach[ing] for [a] pistol,” “rais[ing]” the pistol, and firing can “demonstrate that [the defendant] acted with the requisite premeditation.” United States v. Greer, 57 F.4th 626, 629 (8th Cir. 2023). The  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 14 same goes for Goddard’s decision to position himself in the basement corner, out of sight of anyone coming down the steps. Cf. United States v. Comly, 998 F.3d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 2021) (“hid[ing] in a closet” to ambush a police officer “demonstrated an intent to kill”). A rational juror could have concluded that Goddard’s decision to shoot and kill Officer Del Rio was premeditated. To start, the jury heard testimony that drug traffickers like Goddard “use and carry firearms” as “a means of protecting their operation.” Day 10 Trial Tr., R.346, PageID 5261. The jury also learned that Goddard had illegally acquired a high-capacity pistol and that Cortner later equipped that pistol with a laser sight. And on the night of the murder, Goddard kept the pistol, loaded with armor-piercing ammunition, in arm’s reach. That sort of advance “preparation to resist with deadly force” supports a finding of premeditation. United States v. Guyon, 717 F.2d 1536, 1539 (6th Cir. 1983). Goddard’s actions in the moments leading up to the shooting further indicate that he acted with premeditation. Goddard admitted that when he heard law-enforcement officers enter 1454 Ruskin Road, the “first thing” he did was “grab[] the pistol.” Day 8 Trial Tr., R.342, PageID 3965. He then stationed himself in a “blind spot” so he would be “out of the line of fire of anyone coming down the stairs.” Id. at PageID 3966. The evidence supports that, when Officer Del Rio appeared, Goddard fired first; he then fired four more times, with one shot striking Officer Del Rio in the head while the men were looking at each other. It was thus “reasonable” for the jury “to infer a conscious awareness of intent to kill” given the “number of shots, the proximity to [the] victim,” and the decision to “aim at” Officer Del Rio’s head. United States v. Smith, 135 F.4th 905, 915 (10th Cir. 2025). Goddard’s responses are unavailing. Goddard reasons that he “had no time for ‘reflection’” because only “7-12 seconds” elapsed “between when any supposed knock and announce occurred” and “when [Officer] Del Rio charged down the basement steps.” Goddard Br. 41. For starters, it’s not settled that only 7-12 seconds elapsed. The jury heard from witnesses who testified that approximately 30 seconds “elapsed from the knock and announce to the ram hitting the door[.]” Day 7 Trial Tr., R.341, PageID 3678. But even if Goddard’s timeline is correct, it does not defeat premeditation.  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 15 To carry its premeditation burden, the Government “need not show that the defendant deliberated for any particular length of time.” United States v. Treas-Wilson, 3 F.3d 1406, 1409 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). All that’s required is “some appreciable time for reflection and consideration.” Shaw, 701 F.2d at 393. “[T]he lapse of days or hours or even minutes” is not necessary—seconds can suffice. Id. (citation omitted). The district court thus correctly instructed the jury that “[a]ny interval of time between forming the intent to kill, and acting on that intent, which is long enough for the Defendant to be fully conscious and mindful of what he intended and willfully set about to do, is sufficient to justify the finding of premeditation.” Day 12 Trial Tr., R.348, PageID 5617-18. And on that score, the jury heard evidence supporting that Goddard had sufficient time to (1) process the entry of police upstairs, (2) grab his pistol from a nearby table, (3) move himself to a blind spot in the corner of the basement near the drug stash, (4) instruct others to get into the back room, (5) raise and aim his weapon towards Officer Del Rio, and (6) fire multiple rounds. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, that evidence could lead a rational juror to “find premeditation in the time it took” Goddard to proceed through that series of actions. Smith, 135 F.4th at 915. Goddard also argues that the premeditation evidence is insufficient because “[n]o evidence was presented that indicated Goddard had any malice or intention to harm a police officer.” Goddard Br. 41. That argument fails because premeditation did not turn on Del Rio’s status as a law-enforcement officer. Cf. United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2008) (§ 1114 “does not require proof that the motivation for the attack was the victim’s status”). Rather, Goddard needed only to “form[] an intent to kill,” not an intent to kill a law-enforcement officer specifically. Al-Din, 631 F. App’x at 334. In any event, the jury could have found that Goddard intended to harm a law-enforcement officer, as we explain next. See infra Part IV.B. B In addition to concluding that Goddard acted with premeditation, the jury also concluded that Goddard did not shoot Officer Del Rio in an act of self-defense. Goddard contends that insufficient evidence supported the jury’s no-self-defense finding. Here, too, we disagree.  Nos. 24-3841/3844 United States v. Goddard, et al. Page 16 “A person may resort to self-defense if he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, thus necessitating an in-kind response.” United States v. Barrett, 797 F.3d 1207, 1218 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In a federal prosecution under § 1111, “the absence of self-defense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt” by the Government. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 842 (11th Cir. 1985). When the charge is murder of a federal law-enforcement officer, one way the Government can overcome a claim of self-defense is “by proving that the defendant knew of the victim’s federal status.” Id. at 843; cf. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975) (An “honest mistake of fact” about the victim’s “official status” as a federal agent “would not be consistent with criminal intent.”). The reason is that a defendant might have reason to act in self-defense when faced with an unlawful, private intruder, but not when a law-enforcement officer arrives to carry out his duties. See Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 843-45. The jury instructions—unchallenged by Goddard—tracked those rules. The district court informed the jury that to “satisfy its burden that [Goddard] did not act in self-defense, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt” that (1) Goddard “knew that Jorge Del Rio was a law enforcement officer”; or (2) Goddard “did not reasonably believe force was necessary to defend himself against an immediate use of unlawful force” even though he “actually believ[ed] that he was acting against a private citizen”; or (3) Goddard “used more force than appeared reasonably necessary in the circumstance.” Day 12 Trial Tr., R.348, PageID 5619-20 (cleaned up). Goddard focuses on whether sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that he knew that Del Rio was a law-enforcement officer, so we do the same. A rational juror could have concluded that Goddard knew that Del Rio was a law- enforcement officer. Indeed, the evidence showed that Goddard admitted as much. During Goddard’s post-shooting interview, a police investigator asked Goddard “what happen[ed] when” he heard the law-enforcement officers enter the residence. Joint Ex. 2, 0:00-0:07. Explaining that he was “just being honest,” Goddard replied that when he “hear[d] the dome, dome, dome” of the battering ram hitting the door he “thought it was the police” and the “first thing” he “did was grab[] the pistol.” Day 8 Trial Tr., R.342, PageID 3970 (playing