Kevin Coit v. R. Marsh
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26-1784
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 26-1784
___________
KEVIN COIT,
Appellant
v.
R. MARSH; J. MALISHAIK; B. SNYDER; KATHY BRITTAIN, Superintendent; MR.
WYNDER, John Doe/Deputy; MS. O’MARA; WERGYNOWIC, Unit Manager;
WENTZEL, Counselor; KEPHART, Deputy
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-01567)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
on October 8, 2026
Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 16, 2026)
____________________________________
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Kevin Coit, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendants. We will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R.
27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
Coit initiated this § 1983 action in 2022, alleging that the defendants violated his con-
stitutional rights during a period of incarceration at SCI Frackville from August to Octo-
ber 2022. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that, inter alia,
Coit failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in accordance with the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act (the “PLRA”) before initiating this lawsuit.
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because
there was no dispute that Coit had not administratively exhausted his claims and because
Coit’s arguments as to why exhaustion should be excused were unpersuasive. Coit filed a
timely notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s order granting summary judgment. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in
favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006).
The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison condi-
tions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner . . . until such ad-
ministrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To properly
exhaust a claim under the PLRA, a prisoner must complete the administrative review pro-
cess established by the prison, complying with all relevant deadlines and procedural
rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-85 (2006). Failure to do so will render a
claim procedurally defaulted. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2004).
Coit admits that he did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies but attempts to
explain his failure, claiming that he was “denied grievances” from August 8, 2022 until
approximately October 20, 2022. However, during this time frame, Coit filed not only the
underlying complaint on October 6, 2022 but also Grievance 993958 on August 15, 2022,
and both are seemingly in Coit’s handwriting, despite his claim to the contrary that the
grievance process and writing materials were unavailable to him during this time, and
that Grievance 993958 was not written by him.1 Additionally, Coit used writing utensils
to prepare his complaint, which was dated September 10, 2022, and to handwrite the
1
The District Court compared the way that Coit (1) printed his name, (2) wrote his capi-
tal Ws and Ts, and (3) wrote the phrase “Cruel and Unusual Punishment.” It appears that
the District Court correctly determined that all of these examples were written in Coit’s
handwriting, contrary to his claim that he did not have access to a pen.
3
mailing address and return address on the complaint’s envelope, as well as his IFP appli-
cation. Further, Coit also attached handwritten Inmate Requests, which are dated August
28, 2022, and September 20, 2022, to his complaint. Coit thus failed to provide a persua-
sive basis for excusing his failure to exhaust.2 Furthermore, even if Coit had been unable
to file a timely grievance, “a prisoner in the Pennsylvania state prison system who had
been impeded from filing a grievance [must] seek an extension of time to file such a
grievance once the impediment is gone.” Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th 255, 263 (3d Cir.
2024).
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
2
As noted by the District Court and Coit, Coit filed a separate complaint that was dock-
eted on August 16, 2022. While Coit dated this complaint in July of 2022, he also sent a
handwritten letter about the case to the Clerk of the Court dated September 26, 2022, in
which Coit also complains about not having a pen, despite seemingly having used a pen
to write the letter.
4