Shelton v. United States

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 24-CF-0668 DEMANN SHELTON, APPELLANT, V. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2019-CF2-016024) (Lynn Leibovitz, Judge) (Argued February 25, 2026 Decided September 10, 2026) Areeba Jibril, Public Defender Service, with whom Jaclyn Frankfurt and Shilpa S. Satoskar, Public Defender Service, were on the briefs, for appellant. R. Allen Darby, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jeanine Ferris Pirro, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Bryan H. Han, and Luke Albi, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee. Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, and EASTERLY and SHANKER, Associate Judges. Opinion for the court by Associate Judge SHANKER. Dissenting opinion by Associate Judge EASTERLY at page 35. SHANKER, Associate Judge: In December 2019, police officers from the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) arrested appellant Demann Shelton along  2 with two other men. After observing that the car the men were in was illegally parked, officers approached and saw the man in the front passenger seat, Antonio Smith, acting in an erratic manner, moving his arms frantically all around him. Mr. Smith subsequently attempted to flee from police, causing the officers to suspect that he possessed and was attempting to hide contraband. After detaining the three men, officers searched the car and found a black jacket, among several other items, behind the front passenger seat. Officers discovered a gun in one of the jacket pockets and also found drugs and drug paraphernalia in the jacket. Mr. Shelton had been sitting in the back of the car and there was no dispute that the jacket belonged to him. The government charged Mr. Shelton with, among other counts, multiple offenses related to his alleged possession of the gun and accompanying ammunition found in the jacket. At trial, the government asked the jury to convict Mr. Shelton on the theory that he was the sole possessor of the gun and drugs. Mr. Shelton’s defense theory was that Mr. Smith put the gun and drugs in Mr. Shelton’s jacket just before he fled. Following closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury on actual and constructive possession. After deliberating for about eight hours, the jury sent a note asking, “Can two or more people have joint possession of an item?” After conferring with the parties, the court determined that there was sufficient evidence to give a  3 supplemental jury instruction on the legal concept known as joint constructive possession. The court’s response to the jury explained that the law recognizes joint constructive possession but admonished that, in order to convict Mr. Shelton, the jury had to find that the government proved all the elements of constructive possession as to him notwithstanding any role that Mr. Smith played with respect to the items in the jacket. The jury returned a guilty verdict on Mr. Shelton’s gun- related charges about an hour later. Mr. Shelton raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court reversibly erred when, in responding to the jury note, it stated that the law recognizes that two or more people can have property in their joint constructive possession. We see no error in the content of the response to the jury note. Accordingly, we affirm Mr. Shelton’s firearms convictions. I. Background A. Mr. Shelton’s Arrest On an afternoon in December 2019, MPD officers arrested Mr. Shelton along with Mr. Smith and Marquis Payne. Before their arrest, the three men had been in a parked car together, with Mr. Payne in the driver’s seat, Mr. Smith in the front passenger seat, and Mr. Shelton in the seat behind the driver. Officers patrolling in  4 the Northwest quadrant of the District observed that the car appeared to be illegally parked. As officers approached, Mr. Smith saw them and began acting in an erratic and suspicious manner, moving his arms frantically all around the front passenger seat. Officers did not, however, see him put anything in the car’s glove box, nor did they recall him reaching behind his seat. Mr. Smith’s “furtive movements” indicated to the officers that he may have been attempting to hide contraband, which prompted them to try and remove him from the car. After ignoring the officers’ repeated commands, Mr. Smith eventually opened the car door, pushed aside an officer, and fled from the scene. Following a brief chase, officers apprehended Mr. Smith and recovered multiple small “zip” bags containing a “white rock like substance” believed to be narcotics. Mr. Shelton, on the other hand, did not make any furtive movements or suspicious gestures as officers approached the vehicle. As Mr. Smith fled, Mr. Shelton stayed with officers near the car. Upon searching the vehicle, officers found a black jacket, among several other items, behind the front passenger seat and removed it from the car. Officers discovered a gun in one of the jacket pockets. 1 The jacket also contained 52 small 1 Officers also found a gun in the car’s glove box. The government did not and does not contend that that gun belonged to Mr. Shelton, and the trial court  5 “zip” bags containing a white rock-like substance, a sandwich bag with 7.8 grams of additional suspected narcotics, 20 suboxone strips, and a digital scale lacking a battery. In addition, officers found in the jacket Mr. Shelton’s photo identification and bank card as well as pieces of mail addressed to him. Officers did not see Mr. Shelton wearing, holding, touching, or putting anything inside the jacket. After arresting Mr. Shelton, officers searched him and found $2,442 in cash. B. Procedural History Mr. Shelton was charged with multiple drug and gun offenses. After the government dismissed certain charges and charge enhancements, Mr. Shelton proceeded to a jury trial on charges of attempted unlawful possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance (PWID), in violation of D.C. Code § 48-904.01(a)(1) (two counts); unlawful possession of a firearm (prior conviction) (FIP), in violation of D.C. Code § 22-4503; carrying a pistol without a license (CPWL), in violation of D.C. Code § 22-4504(a)(1); possession of an unregistered firearm (UF), in violation of D.C. Code § 7-2502.01(a); unlawful possession of ammunition (UA), in violation of D.C. Code § 7-2506.01(a)(3); and possession of drug paraphernalia (PDP), in violation of D.C. Code § 48-1103(a). instructed the jury that there was “no evidence that Mr. Shelton ever possessed” that gun.  6 During closing arguments in Mr. Shelton’s trial, the government contended that Mr. Shelton was the sole possessor of the gun and drugs found in the jacket, asserting that he “was sitting in the back seat . . . by himself” with “a black jacket . . . that [was] chock-full of evidence” and that he “had the power and intent to control the items” in the jacket. The government also argued that it did not “make sense” and was “not logical” to think that Mr. Smith could have placed the gun and drugs into the jacket from his front seat position. It concluded by asserting that if the jury “believe[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that this jacket belongs to [Mr. Shelton], then beyond a reasonable doubt everything inside it is his.” Mr. Shelton, although acknowledging that the jacket was his, asserted that his presence in the back seat near the jacket did not prove that he had constructive possession of the gun or the drugs. He pointed to Mr. Smith’s frantic and panicked movements at the sight of police and contrasted them with his own cooperative behavior to argue that it was more likely that Mr. Smith placed the gun and drugs into the jacket in an attempt to conceal them. Following closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury, including on actual and constructive possession. With respect to constructive possession, the court explained that “a person may exercise control over property not in his or her physical possession if that person has both the power and the intent at a given time to control  7 the property,” and that “[m]ere presence near something or mere knowledge of its location . . . is not enough to show possession.” The next day, the jury sent a note asking, “Can two or more people have joint possession of an item?” and adding that it had reached a verdict on Mr. Shelton’s PDP charge but was “deadlocked on all other counts.” After the court asked the parties for their thoughts, the government asked the court to instruct the jury on the legal doctrine of joint constructive possession. Mr. Shelton objected to the instruction because the government had not made a joint possession argument at trial and he had therefore been unable to counter that theory. The court dismissed the jury and reconvened the parties the following morning for further discussion on how to respond to the jury note. In the resumed discussion, Mr. Shelton argued again that the government had presented no evidence of joint constructive possession and, in fact, had claimed the opposite: that Mr. Smith had nothing to do with the gun in the jacket. The trial court was unconvinced and stated that, even though neither party had advanced a joint constructive possession argument at trial, evidence presented at trial supported that legal theory. The court cited Mr. Shelton’s argument, supported by evidence elicited during cross-examination, that Mr. Smith was the source of the firearm in Mr. Shelton’s jacket. It then determined that if the jury was “making potentially factual  8 findings that the gun may well have been deposited in the jacket by [Mr. Smith] or handed back to [Mr. Shelton] by [Mr. Smith],” then the jury was “permitted to infer that [Mr. Shelton] played a role in accepting the gun, in placing it in the back in the jacket pocket where it was located as if [Mr. Smith] couldn’t have done the whole thing.” The court subsequently instructed the jury: I’m now going to respond to the question you asked me about joint possession. The law recognizes the possibility that two or more individuals can jointly have property in their constructive possession. Two or more persons have property in their joint constructive possession when they each have both the power and the intent at a given time to control the property. I instruct you that if you consider joint constructive possession, in order for you to find the defendant possessed an item, notwithstanding the role of the front- seat passenger, the Government must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of each offense and that the defendant voluntarily and on purpose had the power and intent to control the item. I further instruct you that mere presence near something or mere knowledge of its location, however, is not enough to show possession. To prove possession of an item against the defendant in this case, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had either actual or constructive possession of it. You must consider this instruction along with all the instructions I’ve given you, and you must not give greater  9 weight to this instruction than to the other instructions you have been given. In other words, you must consider all of the instructions as a whole and give equal weight to this and to all the others. A little over an hour after receiving the instruction, the jury notified the court that it had reached a verdict. The jury acquitted Mr. Shelton of both attempted PWID counts but convicted him of the gun-related charges (and it had already delivered a guilty verdict on the PDP charge). This appeal, which challenges only the firearms convictions, followed. II. Analysis Mr. Shelton asserts that the trial court reversibly erred in informing the jury about the legal concept of joint constructive possession because, according to him, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction under that legal theory and the court’s response allowed the jury to convict him despite the lack of evidence that he “was working together with someone else to jointly possess the gun.” We see no error. Responding directly to the jury’s specific question, the court correctly explained that, under the law, two or more people can jointly constructively possess an item, while elucidating that this requires that “each” person had the power and intent to control the property. The court then essentially reiterated its initial constructive possession instruction, telling the jury that it could not convict Mr.  10 Shelton unless the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of each offense as to him, including that Mr. Shelton voluntarily and purposefully had the power and intent to control the items. The court added that the jury had to find as much “notwithstanding the role of” Mr. Smith; that mere presence near something or mere knowledge of its location is not enough to show possession; and that to prove possession by Mr. Shelton, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had either actual or constructive possession of it. If the jury heeded these instructions—which we must presume it did—there is no possibility that it convicted Mr. Shelton without finding that he constructively possessed the gun, regardless of Mr. Smith’s conduct—and Mr. Shelton concedes that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that he constructively possessed the gun. And if the jury found that Mr. Shelton and Mr. Smith both constructively possessed the gun—which is, after all, what joint constructive possession is—that did not serve to expand the basis for liability as to Mr. Shelton; it merely expanded the number of individuals who constructively possessed the gun. A. Standard of Review “When the jury explains specific difficulties, the trial court should clear them away with concrete accuracy. When a jury sends a note which demonstrates that it is confused, the trial court must not allow that confusion to persist; it must respond  11 appropriately.” Parker v. United States, 333 A.3d 1162, 1189 (D.C. 2025) (citation modified); see (Anthony) Smith v. United States, 306 A.3d 67, 73 (D.C. 2023) (assessing whether “the instruction adequately addressed the jury’s apparent confusion and adequately informed the jury of the relevant legal principles”). “A party is entitled to a jury instruction upon the theory of the case if there is sufficient evidence to support it.” Washington v. United States, 111 A.3d 16, 23 (D.C. 2015) (citation modified). The sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury instruction is a question of law, “as to which our review is de novo.” Peyton v. United States, 278 A.3d 713, 723 (D.C. 2022). In (Anthony) Smith, we noted some ambiguity in our case law about the standard of review of a trial court’s response to a jury note. 306 A.3d at 71 (noting that we have said both that the decision on what further instructions, if any, to give in response to a jury question lies within the trial court’s discretion and also that we review de novo whether a challenged jury instruction adequately stated the law, and therefore assuming without deciding that the trial court’s response to a jury note was subject to de novo review). Contrast Parker, 333 A.3d at 1189 (“Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse the trial court’s decision [on what further instructions, if any, to give in response to a jury question] on appeal.”), with Evans v. United States, 304 A.3d 211, 219 (D.C. 2023) (“If the objection was preserved, we review the propriety of the trial court’s response to the jury note de novo.”).  12 We think the review of a response to a jury note is analogous to the review of jury instructions, and the discrepancy in our case law can be explained on that basis. In Alleyne v. United States, we recognized a similar lack of clarity in our cases about the standard of review for jury instructions, and we explained that, “while we review the trial court’s decision to give an instruction for abuse of discretion, the accuracy of an instruction itself is a legal question that we review de novo, if the legal question was preserved.” 327 A.3d 472, 483 n.7 (D.C. 2024) (citation modified); see Fleming v. United States, 224 A.3d 213, 219 (D.C. 2020) (en banc) (“Although our terminology has not always been entirely clear on this point, we review de novo whether challenged jury instructions adequately state the law.”). Moreover, a court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Williams v. United States, 345 A.3d 570, 579 (D.C. 2025) (citation modified). Accordingly, we review a trial court’s decision regarding whether and how to respond to a jury note for an abuse of discretion, while reviewing the legal accuracy of the response and any further instructions de novo. Lucas v. United States, 240 A.3d 328, 343 (D.C. 2020) (“While we review the trial court’s decision on what, if any, response to give to a jury’s question for abuse of discretion[,] the accuracy of the instruction itself is a legal question that we review de novo.”).  13 B. Joint Constructive Possession We begin by explaining what joint constructive possession is and what it is not. “To establish constructive possession, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused (1) knew that the contraband was present, and (2) had the ability and intent to exercise dominion or control over the contraband.” Sanders v. United States, 330 A.3d 1013, 1032 (D.C. 2025); accord Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 129 (D.C. 2001) (en banc). It is well established that, “as a general matter, knowledge of and proximity to contraband are insufficient to establish the intent necessary to prove constructive possession.” Sanders, 330 A.3d at 1032-33. “Constructive possession may be sole or joint and may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 1032 (quoting Bruce v. United States, 305 A.3d 381, 393 (D.C. 2023)); see also Rivas, 783 A.2d at 129; United States v. Benjamin, 711 F.3d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[U]nder [a] theory of joint possession, dominion and control need not be exclusive but may be shared with others.” (citation modified)). But even where multiple people are involved, the government must still show that each person had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over an item to succeed under the joint constructive possession doctrine; and, for that reason, if the evidence shows constructive possession by one person, the fact that another  14 person also had constructive possession does not preclude liability. See Carter v. United States, 957 A.2d 9, 16 (D.C. 2008) (“[T]he possibility that Tucker, too, may have had the ability to exercise control over the gun in the car . . . does not undermine an inference that Carter had the requisite intent to control the gun. ‘Constructive possession may be sole or joint. . . .’” (quoting Rivas, 783 A.2d at 129)); Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1051 (D.C. 2007) (concluding that “[i]t is of little moment that much the same evidence showed constructive possession by” two people because “[p]ossession can be joint” and the evidence may justify attributing the illegal items to both people beyond a reasonable doubt); Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 3.104 §§ B & C (5th ed. 2023) (setting forth the same language for sole actual or constructive possession and joint actual or constructive possessive jury instructions, except that the joint possession instruction adds: “In addition, the law recognizes the possibility that two or more individuals can jointly have property in their constructive possession. Two or more persons have property in their joint constructive possession when they each have both the power and the intent at a given time to control the property.”). Numerous cases from other jurisdictions support this conception of joint constructive possession. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 22 F.4th 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Constructive possession can be joint or sole. . . . In cases of joint constructive possession, the focus is on whether the government can establish a  15 substantial connection between the defendant and the contraband.”); United States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170, 182 (2d Cir. 2021) (“The fact that others may have also possessed the keys, drugs, and weapons does not preclude a finding that [the defendant] did so as well.”); Hopson v. Horton, 838 F. App’x 147, 154-55 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Joint possession is a type of either actual or constructive possession; the essential inquiry is still whether the defendant has control over the weapon.”); United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160, 1169 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that “constructive possession may be joint and need not be exclusive” and concluding that the evidence as to the defendant individually was sufficient to show that he possessed narcotics, “whether exclusively or jointly” (citation modified)); Benjamin, 711 F.3d at 379 (“The fact that Esprit had actual possession of the gun and may not have always been with Benjamin . . . does not preclude Benjamin’s constructive possession of the same weapon.”); United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 71, 78 (1st Cir. 2007) (affirming felon-in-possession convictions despite appellant’s challenge to instruction that stated that “[f]or purposes of determining a defendant’s guilt, joint possession is not different from sole possession”); United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 113 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that when “the doctrine of joint constructive possession applies[,]” the “involvement of multiple actors does not negate the requirement that [the appellant] knowingly have both the power and intent to exercise dominion and control” of the contraband); United States v. Perlaza, 818  16 F.2d 1354, 1362 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the trial court’s instruction that the jury must “consider [the defendants] separately” when deliberating on a theory of joint constructive possession correctly stated the law because it made clear that each defendant must individually satisfy the elements of constructive possession to be convicted); United States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 689 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the trial court’s jury instruction correctly expressed the law of possession when it stated that “[y]ou may find that the requirement of possession is satisfied only if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive possession either alone or jointly with others”). Thus, because even in the case of multiple possible possessors the elements of constructive possession must be proved as to each particular defendant, joint constructive possession neither lowers the bar for a determination of constructive possession as to an individual defendant nor permits a jury to find constructive possession based on the conduct of others. It is not a theory of conspiratorial or vicarious liability—and because it is not such a theory, it does not require proof of concerted action. See Ortiz v. Dubois, 19 F.3d 708, 713 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[J]oint possession . . . does not require proof of concerted action or shared state of mind, and thus, does not offer a basis for vicarious liability for the criminal acts of others.”).  17 To be sure, we have made clear that in shared-space cases or cases involving multiple individuals in proximity to contraband, “there must be something more in the totality of the circumstances that—together with proximity and knowledge— establishes that the accused meant to exercise dominion or control over the narcotics.” Rivas, 783 A.2d at 130; see Ramirez v. United States, 49 A.3d 1246, 1249 (D.C. 2012) (“Constructive possession requires more than mere presence of the accused on the premises, or simply his proximity to the drugs. There must be something more in the totality of the circumstances that establishes that the accused meant to exercise dominion or control over the narcotics.” (citation modified)). That “something more” can be—and often is—evidence of a joint criminal venture. See Moore, 927 A.2d at 1051 (noting that “in some cases involving the presence of more than one person on the premises or even shared occupancy and control, common possession of contraband is not indicated, and the evidence does not justify attributing the illegal items to one party rather than another beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that in such cases, evidence of “a concert of illegal action” involving the contraband can “reinforce[ ] the inference of joint possession” (citation modified)); Wheeler v. United States, 494 A.2d 170, 173 (D.C. 1985) (“We have held that proximity may establish a supportable case of constructive possession of narcotics when colored by evidence linking the accused to an ongoing criminal operation of which that possession is a part.”); id. (evidence of “concert of illegal action” can  18 “dispel any fear that the ‘constructive possession’ doctrine has cast too wide a net” in shared-space cases). We have never, however, said that the “something more” must in all cases be concerted action. To the contrary, in Rivas, we made clear that it need not be concerted action, explaining that the additional evidence necessary to prove constructive possession in a shared-space case is “comparatively minimal” and could be “a furtive gesture indicating an attempt to access, hide[,] or dispose of the object[;] flight or other evidence of consciousness of guilt[;] evidence of participation in an ongoing criminal venture involving the contraband[;] an inculpatory statement[;] evidence of prior possession of the item[;] actual possession of paraphernalia relating to the use or sale of the contraband[;] control of the area or container in which the contraband is found[;] or the like.” 783 A.2d at 137; see id. at 128 (stating that the “something more” can be “a word or deed, a relationship or other probative factor”). The Rivas list was in the disjunctive, and we further observed that it was “not exhaustive.” Id. at 137 n.13. This makes sense. If the evidence shows constructive possession by multiple individuals, there is no reason they should not each face criminal liability for a possessory offense even if they were not involved in a joint criminal venture.  19 Accordingly, we have consistently found the evidence sufficient to support constructive possession by an individual defendant where others might also have constructively possessed the item, even in the absence of any indication of concerted action. See, e.g., See Johnson v. United States, 290 A.3d 500, 516 (D.C. 2023) (“Even when the accused shared the premises with others, additional probative evidence may suffice to establish constructive possession by the accused, as where the contraband was found in plain view, in the defendant’s own bedroom or other personal space, or in proximity to the defendant’s personal items such as mail or personal papers, photographs, and identification cards.” (citation modified)); Dorsey v. United States, 154 A.3d 106, 112-13 (D.C. 2017) (even though the defendant did not live in the apartment and others were present when police entered it, the evidence was sufficient to show the defendant’s constructive possession based on his close proximity to the location of the gun, his evasive conduct, indications that he purposefully went to the gun’s location when officers approached, and a DNA match to the defendant from the gun); (Tamara) Smith v. United States, 55 A.3d 884, 888 (D.C. 2012) (observing that “something more in the totality of the circumstances” was needed because the defendant shared the apartment, and concluding that “two significant factors” (not including concerted action) “constitute[d] ‘something more’”: (1) a backpack containing the gun was “conspicuous” in the defendant’s bedroom and adjacent to the defendant’s bed and (2) it was undisputed that the  20 defendant had been alone in the bedroom prior to the search); Ramirez, 49 A.3d at 1249-50 (observing that “something more” was needed because the defendant shared an apartment with another individual, and concluding that “the government met its obligation to show ‘something more in the totality of the circumstances’” because the defendant was near the drugs, appeared to have been attempting to dispose of them, and acknowledged that he lived in the apartment in a certain bedroom, and in that bedroom was the defendant’s property); Moore, 927 A.2d at 1050-51 (relying on the facts that the defendant had a key to the apartment, the defendant admitted to living there, and the items were found in the apartment’s only bedroom in plain view next to the defendant’s personal papers, and holding that, “[t]aken together, these facts allowed a jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knew the drugs and gun were in his apartment, and that he had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over them,” before noting that evidence of concerted action “reinforced” that inference). Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, the above explication of joint constructive possession neither is “groundbreaking” nor effects a “change” in the law. Post at 36. As our reliance on, among other binding decisions, Rivas, Carter, and Moore, as well as on persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, demonstrates, our view is amply supported. Indeed, in Carter, we said that “the possibility that Tucker, too, may have had the ability to exercise control over the gun in the car does  21 not undermine an inference that Carter had the requisite intent to control the gun.” 957 A.2d at 16 (citation modified). Replacing the names “Tucker” and “Carter” in that quotation with, respectively, “Smith” and “Shelton” resolves this case. 2 By contrast, the dissent’s assertion that joint constructive possession is an independent theory of, essentially, conspiratorial liability, involving a different showing of intent and different evidence, is entirely unsupported. The dissent does not point to a single case where the evidence was sufficient to show the defendant’s sole constructive possession but liability was precluded because someone else also satisfied the requirements of constructive possession and there was no evidence that the defendant and that individual had acted in concert. The dissent’s attempt to characterize Rivas as such a case reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of our analysis in that case. Post at 44-46. In Rivas, the question was whether there was sufficient evidence of Mr. Rivas’s own 2 In his brief on appeal, Mr. Carter argued that Mr. Tucker possessed the firearm and “there was no evidence presented that Mr. Carter and Mr. Tucker planned a crime, conferred during the offense, or shared proceeds of the crime afterwards.” Carter v. United States, Brief of Appellant, 2007 WL 5844065, at *15- 16 (citation modified). We were “satisfied” that the evidence was sufficient to show that Mr. Carter had constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition based on his own conduct, and we then rejected the notion that Mr. Tucker’s constructive possession bore on Mr. Carter’s intent to exercise dominion and control over the gun, without mentioning any concerted action by the two men. Carter, 957 A.2d at 16. Carter controls, but all the dissent can say about it is that it is “simply a sufficiency of the evidence case.” Post at 67.  22 constructive possession of narcotics; that is not the case here, where both Mr. Shelton and our dissenting colleague recognize that there was sufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the gun and drugs in his jacket. Post at 38. In Rivas, we rejected the government’s attempt to impute liability to Mr. Rivas based on the much clearer constructive possession of Mr. Melgar, the owner and driver of the car in which the drugs were found. 783 A.2d at 128, 135. Here, by contrast, joint constructive possession was not applied to extend liability from Mr. Smith to Mr. Shelton. 3 The question, rather, was whether, where Mr. Shelton constructively possessed the gun and drugs, Mr. Smith’s possible additional constructive possession cast doubt on Mr. Shelton’s constructive possession. Rivas would be helpful to the dissent’s position if there the evidence had been sufficient to show Mr. Rivas’s constructive possession and we said that, nonetheless, the fact of Mr. Melgar’s constructive possession required reversal of Mr. Rivas’s conviction because the government had not proven that the two had acted together. 3 The dissent asserts that we have “no way of knowing this,” post at 64 n.11, but we do: the trial court instructed the jury that it could not do so, and we assume that jurors follow the court’s instructions. See Foote v. United States, 108 A.3d 1227, 1239 (D.C. 2015) (noting the “crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instructions” (citation modified)). If the dissent means that we cannot be 100% positive that the jury did not ignore its instructions, that can be said in any case.  23 The dissent’s assertion that two people cannot exercise dominion and control over an item unless they do so under some sort of agreement “to preclude control by the rest of the world,” post at 42, is likewise demonstrably incorrect. It takes little imagination to picture an individual, Jones, who secrets his drugs in a desk drawer in his shared apartment, oblivious that his roommate, Williams, is aware and partakes of the stash. Jones had constructive possession and Williams had constructive possession. It would make little sense to say—and no authority suggests—that Jones cannot be found to have constructively possessed the drugs because Williams also did and the two were not acting together “to preclude control by the rest of the world.” 4 Ultimately, what the dissent appears to not understand is that, even after the jury note, no one was seeking to establish Mr. Shelton’s constructive possession based on Mr. Smith’s constructive possession. The issue—as framed by the trial court’s response to the note—was whether, if Mr. Shelton’s constructive possession 4 In this hypothetical, at trial Jones could very well assert a defense that the drugs belonged to Williams. If the jury sent a note asking whether Williams’s dominion and control over the drugs meant that Jones could not be guilty unless the two were working in concert, surely the correct response would be “no.”  24 was established on the basis of his own conduct, it mattered whether Mr. Smith also had constructive possession. Settled authority makes clear that it did not. 5 C. The Trial Court’s Response to the Jury Note In light of the above correct understanding of the concept of joint constructive possession, we conclude that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor legally erred in responding to the jury in the way that it did. The court first answered the jury’s specific question by correctly affirming that “two or more individuals can jointly have property in their constructive possession.” Mr. Shelton does not argue that this was legally inaccurate. Nor does he dispute that there was sufficient evidence that someone else possessed the gun at some point; indeed, that was his defense at trial and he maintains on appeal that “Mr. Smith’s actions, in particular, suggested that he could have placed the gun in the jacket, either by dropping the gun into the jacket in the back seat or by hiding it in 5 For this reason, our dissenting colleague’s ominous prophecy that our decision here “breaks down the guardrails we have erected to protect against guilt by proximity and association,” post at 70, is unfounded. It is, has always been, and remains the case that to conclude that a defendant jointly constructively possessed an item, the jury must find that the defendant individually satisfied the elements of constructive possession and cannot rely on the defendant’s mere knowledge of and proximity to contraband. Rivas, 783 A.2d at 128, 130, 137-38. Nothing in this majority opinion suggests, as the dissent contends, that a jury may convict a defendant of constructive possession “simply because there is another person present.” Post at 70.  25 the jacket before dropping the jacket in the back seat.” 6 And, as the jury appeared unclear about the legal concept of constructive possession, which was at issue with respect to both the gun and narcotics charges Mr. Shelton was facing, the court properly sought to address that confusion. See Johnson, 290 A.3d at 519 (“Where a jury has demonstrated confusion, the trial judge may not allow that confusion to continue, but must make an appropriate and effective response.” (citation modified)). The trial court’s answer that the law recognizes joint constructive possession was correct, as it would have been improper to suggest that the jury could not find Mr. Shelton guilty of constructive possession on the ground that someone else also constructively possessed the contraband, see Carter, 957 A.2d at 16, or to decline to answer the question and thereby allo