Rommel Rafael Gil Pino v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledSeptember 16, 2026
Docket3D2025-1127
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed September 16, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-1127
Lower Tribunal No. AGSSTSE
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Rommel Rafael Gil Pino,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Betsy
Alvarez-Zane, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Katryna Santa Cruz, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, GORDO, and REBULL, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
Rommel Rafael Gil Pino appeals his conviction and sentence for
driving under the influence in violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes.
He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained following his traffic stop because the police lacked probable cause
for the stop. Having carefully reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing
on the motion to suppress, we conclude the traffic stop of Gil Pino was lawful,
and we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
BACKGROUND
Gil Pino was charged with one count of driving under the influence in
violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes. Prior to trial, he filed a motion
to suppress, arguing the officers involved in his arrest lacked probable cause
to conduct a traffic stop because he did not commit any traffic violations as
there was insufficient evidence that his alleged acts created reasonable
safety concerns or impacted traffic.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
suppress. At the hearing, the officer that initiated the traffic stop, Officer
Claudia Curbella-Mesa of the Doral Police Department, testified. Officer
Curbella-Mesa stated that sometime after 3:00 a.m. on the night of the arrest,
she observed Gil Pino’s vehicle committing several infractions and believed
he might be under the influence of alcohol. Officer Curbella-Mesa indicated
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she observed Gil Pino change lanes twice without using his turn signal and
she also observed him weaving in and out of his lane. She proceeded to
activate her emergency equipment and followed the vehicle, but the vehicle
did not stop for another several blocks despite the officer using her lights,
horn, yelp, and sirens to get the driver to stop.
Officer Curbella-Mesa further testified that upon approaching the
vehicle, she smelled a strong odor of alcohol emitting from the vehicle and
observed Gil Pino to have red, watery, bloodshot eyes. She had to instruct
him a couple of times to turn off the vehicle and step out of the vehicle. After
conducting a roadside assessment, the officer testified Gil Pino was placed
under arrest for DUI.
On cross-examination, Officer Curbella-Mesa indicated that at the time
she conducted the stop, there were other vehicles in the roadway. Officer
Curbella-Mesa further testified that Gil Pino was switching lanes without
using his turn signal and weaving in and out of his lane and, while he did not
cause a traffic accident, he could have impacted traffic.
On redirect, Officer Curbella-Mesa further explained that Gil Pino’s
poor driving pattern indicated to her that there was the possibility of a traffic
crash. Therefore, for the safety of other vehicles in the roadway, she decided
to conduct a traffic stop.
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The trial court ultimately denied Gil Pino’s motion to suppress,
concluding that Officer Curbella-Mesa’s testimony regarding Gil Pino’s
driving pattern was sufficient to establish probable cause for the two
infractions identified, failure to signal when changing lanes and failure to
drive within a single lane. The trial court thus concluded the stop was legal
and denied the motion to suppress.
The matter proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned a guilty
verdict for driving under the influence in violation of section 316.193, Florida
Statutes. This appeal timely followed.
ANALYSIS
Gil Pino argues on appeal that, under Florida law, minor weaving within
a lane or unsignaled lane changes do not provide probable cause absent
safety concerns or impact on other vehicles. We conclude these arguments
are without merit for several reasons.
First, Gil Pino’s reliance on Hurd v. State, 958 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2007), is misplaced because Hurd is factually distinguishable. In Hurd,
the officer testified he came across the vehicle at issue around nine in the
evening and observed the driver looking in his mirror and driving slowly. Id.
at 601. He then observed the driver speed up and then slow down again. Id.
at 601-02. When the vehicle approached an intersection, the officer
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observed the vehicle cross over a solid white line into another lane without
using a turn signal. Id. at 602. The officer further testified he observed the
defendant committing two traffic violations, the failure to maintain a single
lane and the failure to signal. Id. The officer admitted, however, that no other
cars were in the vicinity when these alleged infractions occurred. Id.
On appeal, the Fourth District concluded this evidence failed to
establish a violation of either section 316.155, Florida Statutes,1 for failure to
use a turn signal when switching lanes, or section 316.089, Florida Statutes,
for failure to maintain a single lane.2 As it pertains to the failure to use a turn
signal, the Fourth District relied on State v. Riley, 638 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1994),
which held that section 316.155 requires a signal only if another vehicle
would be affected by the turn. The Fourth District concluded that because
the officer testified there were no other cars on the roadway, the failure to
1
Section 316.155, Florida Statutes, provides: “No person may turn a vehicle
from a direct course or move right or left upon a highway unless and until
such movement can be made with reasonable safety, and then only after
giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided, in the event
any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” § 316.155(1), Fla. Stat.
2
Section 316.089, Florida Statutes, provides: “A vehicle shall be driven as
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved
from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can
be made with safety.” § 316.089(1), Fla. Stat.
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use a turn signal could not have provided probable cause for the stop. Hurd,
958 So. 2d at 602-03.
As it pertained to the failure to maintain a single lane, the Fourth District
held that the failure to maintain a single lane alone could not establish
probable cause when the action was done safely, unless there was a
reasonable suspicion of impairment, unfitness, or vehicle defects. Id. at 603.
The Fourth District concluded that there was nothing in the record to
establish probable cause that the defendant’s actions were not done safely,
nor did the defendant’s action demonstrate erratic driving, providing the
officer with a basis to suspect impairment. Id.
Here, in contrast, Officer Curbella-Mesa’s testimony at the evidentiary
hearing established there were other vehicles in the roadway at the time Gil
Pino switched lanes without signaling. Officer Curbella-Mesa also
specifically testified that Gil Pino’s poor driving pattern presented a safety
concern to the other vehicles in the roadway, prompting her to conduct a
traffic stop.
Moreover, Officer Curbella-Mesa’s traffic stop of Gil Pino was also
justified because she demonstrated a well-founded suspicion that he was
impaired. “The courts of this state have recognized that a legitimate concern
for the safety of the motoring public can warrant a brief investigatory stop to
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determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in
situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal
behavior.” State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603
So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). See also Roberts v. State, 732 So.
2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“[A] police officer can stop a driver based
on a founded suspicion that the driver is under the influence, even where the
driver is not committing a separate traffic offense. In the instant case,
Roberts’ continuous weaving, even if only within her lane, during the time
that she was being followed presented an objective basis for suspecting that
she was under the influence. Thus, the objective facts supported the stop.”);
State v. Carrillo, 506 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (stating that weaving
within lane five times within one-quarter mile sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion of impairment); State v. Sheldon, 394 So. 3d 1263 (Fla.
5th DCA 2024) (holding that weaving within a lane five times within one-
quarter mile was sufficient to establish founded suspicion that the driver was
impaired, thereby authorizing a stop).
Here, Officer Curbella-Mesa specifically testified that Gil Pino’s poor
driving caused her to suspect that he was impaired. This erratic driving
included changing lanes twice without using a turn signal, weaving in and
out of his lane over the course of a block or two, and failing to stop for four
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to five blocks after the officer turned on her lights, horn, yelp, and sirens to
get the driver’s attention. Officer Curbella-Mesa’s suspicions were
subsequently substantiated when she approached the vehicle, smelled a
strong odor of alcohol emitting from the vehicle, and observed Gil Pino to
have red, watery, bloodshot eyes. Officer Curbella-Mesa further testified she
had to instruct Gil Pino several times to turn off the vehicle and step out
before he complied. Based on this testimony, a well-founded suspicion of
impairment was demonstrated, justifying the stop.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial
of Gil Pino’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
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