Duhart v. State

Demitri Anwar Duhart v. State of Maryland, No. 1004, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Zic, J., Filed November 2, 2026 CRIMINAL LAW – CONFRONTATION CLAUSE – LIMITATION OF CROSS- EXAMINATION AS TO BIAS OF WITNESS – THRESHOLD LEVEL OF INQUIRY The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights require that a defendant be afforded a threshold level of inquiry into a witness’ potential bias or motive to testify falsely. Where the jury heard extensive evidence bearing on the witness’ credibility, the defendant was afforded the constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry and his confrontation right was not violated. CRIMINAL LAW – CONFRONTATION CLAUSE – LIMITATION OF CROSS- EXAMINATION AS TO BIAS OF WITNESS – FACTUAL FOUNDATION Although Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) permits cross-examination concerning a witness’ expectation of a benefit, there must be a sufficient factual foundation that there was a benefit as viewed from the witness’ perspective. The trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination concerning a State’s witness’ probation status, prior drug distribution convictions, and possible expectation of non-prosecution where the record contained no evidence of pending charges, a decision to forego prosecution known to the witness, or other State action supporting an expectation of leniency. Where the jury heard extensive evidence bearing on the witness’ credibility, the defendant was afforded the constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry and his confrontation right, protected by the federal and Maryland constitutions, was thus not violated. CRIMINAL LAW – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – WITNESS PROMISED BENEFIT INSTRUCTION MPJI-Cr 3:13 Witness Promised Benefit applies when a witness may be motivated to testify falsely in exchange for a benefit that leaves the witness better off than he or she otherwise would have been. The trial court did not err in not giving MPJI-Cr 3:13 where a State’s witness received use and derivative use immunity to compel his testimony because the immunity merely protected the witness from the State’s use of his compelled testimony and was not conditioned on its content. Moreover, MPJI-Cr 3:10 Witness Credibility Instructions adequately covered the subject by directing the jury to consider the witness’ motives, interests, and biases. Circuit Court for Howard County Case No. C-13-CR-23-000327 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 1004 September Term, 2024 ______________________________________ DEMITRI ANWAR DUHART v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Berger, Zic, Eyler, James R. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Zic, J. ______________________________________ Filed: November 2, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.11.02 14:38:11 -05'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  On June 2, 2023, Quantonio Dunscomb was shot once outside a room at a motel in Jessup, Maryland. A jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Howard County acquitted Demitri Duhart, appellant, of attempted first-degree murder and convicted Mr. Duhart of attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime. The circuit court imposed an aggregate term of thirty-five years’ imprisonment. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Mr. Duhart presents five questions for our review, which we have recast and rephrased as follows:1 1. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Duhart’s motion to bifurcate the count charging possession of a regulated firearm by a person previously convicted of a disqualifying crime from the remaining counts? 1 Mr. Duhart phrased the questions as follows: 1. Did the court abuse its discretion in denying the defense motion to bifurcate the firearm possession by a person convicted of a disqualifying crime count from the other counts? 2. Did the court err and violate the Sixth Amendment by preventing the defense from impeaching the victim on his bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely? 3. Did the court err in declining to give the requested pattern instruction “Witness Promised Benefit” in connection with the victim’s use immunity agreement? 4. Were the trial errors separately, or taken together, not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? 5. Must the sentence for first-degree assault merge with the sentence for attempted second-degree murder pursuant to the rule of lenity?  2. Did the circuit court err or abuse its discretion by limiting Mr. Duhart’s cross- examination of Mr. Dunscomb regarding Mr. Dunscomb’s potential bias, interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or motive to testify falsely? 3. Did the circuit court err in declining to give MPJI-Cr 3:13, “Witness Promised Benefit,” in connection with the grant of use and derivative use immunity to Mr. Dunscomb? 4. Must the sentence for first-degree assault merge into the sentence for attempted second-degree murder pursuant to the rule of lenity? For the reasons that follow, we answer the first three questions in the negative and the fourth in the affirmative. BACKGROUND Factual Background On June 2, 2023, the manager of a motel in Jessup, Maryland, was on break when he heard banging on a door followed by a shot. The noises came from a room occupied by Ms. M.2 After the shot, the manager checked the motel’s security cameras and saw a man he did not recognize leaving through the motel entrance. He then heard Ms. M. scream, prompting him to investigate. When he reached Ms. M.’s room, he found a man lying face down at the entrance of her room with Ms. M. still inside. When the manager turned the man over, he recognized him as Quantonio Dunscomb, a regular customer who often paid for Ms. M.’s room. Mr. Dunscomb was wounded in the chest; the manager retrieved towels and applied pressure to Mr. Dunscomb’s wounds, while another individual called 911 for medical assistance. First responders arrived less than ten minutes later. 2 For privacy purposes, we refer to this witness as “Ms. M.” 2  While the shooting itself was not recorded, the surveillance video did capture the surrounding events: Mr. Dunscomb arriving at the motel by car at 12:33:43 p.m.; Demetri Duhart arriving on foot at 12:37:48 p.m.; Mr. Duhart walking around the motel parking lot; Mr. Duhart and Ms. M. stumbling out of Ms. M.’s room at 12:38:44 p.m.; and, beginning at 12:39:08, Mr. Dunscomb walking to his car, opening the door, leaning into the vehicle for about twenty seconds, and then walking slowly back to the room. A responding Howard County police officer found Mr. Dunscomb lying about ten feet inside the room and, while rendering aid, recovered a closed folding pocketknife from Mr. Dunscomb’s front right pocket. After Mr. Dunscomb was transported to Shock Trauma, a crime scene technician recovered a cartridge casing outside the room and two folding knives inside the room. A firearms expert identified the casing as a .380 caliber cartridge case fired from a .380 semiautomatic pistol, a common firearm. When the police learned Mr. Duhart’s name, the lead detective retrieved Mr. Duhart’s Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) page and driver’s license photo, which he compared to the motel surveillance footage. From this comparison, the lead detective believed that it was the same person based on his hair (particularly his blonde tips), facial hair, and facial structure. On the day of the shooting, based on information recovered from the search of the motel room, the police obtained a search warrant for an apartment about two blocks south of the motel. The police approached the property manager at the apartment and asked for video footage related to a resident, Mr. Duhart. The property manager provided the 3 police with the requested footage and Mr. Duhart’s lease. The property manager had previously interacted with Mr. Duhart and recognized Mr. Duhart in the footage. The search of Mr. Duhart’s apartment produced a red shirt and a pair of shoes matching the clothing worn by the man in the motel surveillance footage, along with dark camouflage pants, a black cross-body bag, and a wristwatch. No firearm was recovered. Mr. Duhart was arrested on June 7, 2023 and charged with attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a disqualifying conviction. Procedural History On September 13, 2023, Mr. Duhart filed a Motion to Bifurcate Count 5 (possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a disqualifying conviction) from Counts 1-4. A motions hearing took place on September 14, 2023. At the hearing, defense counsel asked the court to have the jury consider Counts 1 through 4 and then, only if it found that Mr. Duhart possessed a firearm, consider Count 5 in a second phase. Defense counsel argued that “the jury would be prejudiced if they were to hear about Mr. Duhart’s prior conviction,” and that bifurcation was “a good remedy, a way to sanitize the situation so the jury doesn’t hear his prior record.” The State opposed Mr. Duhart’s motion to bifurcate and offered to stipulate that Mr. Duhart had a prior disqualifying conviction. 4  The court denied Mr. Duhart’s motion, reasoning that “the [c]ourt presiding over Mr. Duhart’s trial could give curative instructions to the jury that will be sufficient to alleviate any prejudice.” Thus, the “[c]ourt . . . den[ied the] motion to sever the charges.” The parties ultimately stipulated to Mr. Duhart’s disqualifying conviction. The stipulation, which was read to the jury without objection, read as follows: “The State and the Defendant agree to the following fact: The Defendant was previously convicted of a crime that disqualified him from possessing a regulated firearm.” After jury selection, the State moved in limine to exclude any mention of the following: the substances found in Mr. Dunscomb’s car, the credit card and debit card bearing other individuals’ names, the additional folding knife recovered from the motel room bedstand, and Mr. Dunscomb’s probationary status. As to Mr. Dunscomb’s probationary status, the State represented that: There has been no indication that the probationary status of Mr. Dunscomb . . . incur[s] some bias on his behalf. The State has made no promises to Mr. Dunscomb about any charges that may or may not be filed or the status of any probation. There has been no benefit promised to Mr. Dunscomb whatsoever . . . [the State] do[es]n’t think [defense counsel] has a good faith basis to suggest that there is a bias as to his probationary status. Defense counsel opposed the State’s motion in limine on the ground that it would limit Mr. Duhart’s ability to effectively cross-examine Mr. Dunscomb as to his biases. Defense counsel argued that Mr. Dunscomb’s probation status was relevant as to his bias because “there [were] . . . at least four or five different reasons that he face[d] a violation of probation if he t[old] the truth.” In rebuttal, the State maintained that “[t]here ha[d] 5 been no decision by the State to forego charges,” that it had “certainly . . . not been involved in any decision to forego charges against Mr. Dunscomb,” that defense counsel was “only speculating that a decision ha[d been] made,” and that “certainly the possibility of charges have not been discussed or mentioned to Mr. Dunscomb either by the State or by any detectives[.]” The circuit court denied the State’s motion in limine as to the knives, suspected drugs, and Mr. Dunscomb’s convictions within the last fifteen years and granted it only as to his probationary status. During cross-examination of Mr. Dunscomb, defense counsel renewed his request to ask Mr. Dunscomb about his probationary status to show bias under Maryland Rule 5-616; the court again denied defense counsel’s request. When Mr. Dunscomb was called to testify, the court advised him outside the presence of the jury that he may be asked questions that would result in self- incrimination. The court advised Mr. Dunscomb that “[he] ha[d] a Fifth Amendment right not to testify in this case.” In response, Mr. Dunscomb asked whether “this case concern[s] . . . [him] getting charged with something[,]” and whether he could “plead the Fifth” without “get[ting] in trouble[.]” Mr. Dunscomb expressed concern, stating that he was “not trying to get in trouble . . . I don’t know . . . what you all gonna do[] [c]ause you just threw me for a loop with that one.”3 Mr. Dunscomb accepted the court’s offer of 3 Prompted by Mr. Dunscomb’s statement, defense counsel once again raised the bias argument “[b]ecause [Mr. Dunscomb is] afraid he’s going to get in trouble if he doesn’t testify.” 6 consulting with a lawyer. After consulting an attorney from the Office of the Public Defender, Mr. Dunscomb invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and declined to testify. The State subsequently moved to compel Mr. Dunscomb to testify. Before signing the order, the court pressed the State on their charging intentions, asking the State if it “intend[ed] to prosecute [Mr. Dunscomb] for the drugs that were recovered from th[e] vehicle[.]” When pressed again, the State maintained that it “ha[d] no personal intent to prosecute Mr. Dunscomb” and wanted “the [c]ourt, the jury, and Mr. Dunscomb to understand the parameters of the order,” because an “incorrect implication . . . that he’s getting this really great deal that doesn’t exist . . . would be a misrepresentation of the facts.” The court then signed the order, which required Mr. Dunscomb to testify and granted him use and derivative use immunity. The court stated that it “hop[ed] that [the State is] being straight” and “do[es]’nt intend to prosecute [Mr. Dunscomb].” The State gave “assurances to the Court” and maintained that “[t]here are no games being played.” Before Mr. Dunscomb testified, the court requested that Mr. Dunscomb be advised “that he’s subject to being found in contempt of this court and could be incarcerated” if he “t[oo]k[] the Fifth[.]” The court instructed the jury on the credibility of witnesses under MPJI-Cr 3:10,4 which directs jurors to consider “whether the witness has a motive not to tell the truth[,]” 4 MPJI-Cr 3:10 Credibility of Witnesses provides, in pertinent part, that the jury is: the sole judge of whether a witness should be believed. In making this decision, you may apply your own common sense and life experiences. (continued) 7 “an interest in the outcome of the case[,]” and “a bias or prejudice.” The court further instructed the jury that it “may consider . . . evidence [that Mr. Dunscomb had been convicted of a crime] in deciding whether the witness is telling the truth.” Defense counsel objected to the court’s refusal to give MPJI-Cr 3:13 Witness Promised Benefit, 5 which defense counsel had requested. Defense counsel argued that the use and derivative use order “compelled [Mr. Dunscomb] and granted him immunity for his testimony,” In deciding whether a witness should be believed, you should carefully consider all the testimony and evidence, as well as whether the witness’s testimony was affected by other factors. You should consider such factors as: ... (5) whether the witness has a motive not to tell the truth; (6) whether the witness has an interest in the outcome of the case; ... (10) whether the witness has a bias or prejudice. You are the sole judge of whether a witness should be believed. You need not believe any witness, even if the testimony is uncontradicted. You may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. 5 MPJI-Cr 3:13 Witness Promised Benefit provides that the jury: may consider the testimony of a witness who [testifies] [has provided evidence] for the State as a result of [a plea agreement] [a promise that he will not be prosecuted] [a financial benefit] [a benefit] [an expectation of a benefit]. However, you should consider such testimony with caution, because the testimony may have been influenced by a desire to gain [leniency] [freedom] [a financial benefit] [a benefit] by testifying against the defendant. 8 thus giving him “a benefit.” Defense counsel further argued that Mr. Dunscomb received two other benefits: Mr. Dunscomb testifying to his possession of a deadly weapon while his probation status was excluded and the absence of drug charges related to the suspected drugs in Mr. Dunscomb’s car. The court noted these objections. A jury ultimately acquitted Mr. Duhart of attempted first-degree murder (“Count 1”) and convicted Mr. Duhart of attempted second-degree murder (“Count 2”), first- degree assault (“Count 3”), use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence (“Count 4”), and possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime (“Count 5”). At the July 12, 2024 sentencing hearing, the State used this Court’s decision in Wright v. State, 255 Md. App. 407 (2022), to argue that Mr. Duhart’s convictions for first-degree assault and attempted second-degree murder should not be merged. The State relied on this Court’s statement in Wright “that the firearm modality of first-degree assault is not a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.” Id. at 417. The circuit court agreed and imposed an interlocking sentence totaling 35 years: 25 years for Count 2; five years on Count 3, consecutive to Count 2; five years on Count 4, consecutive to Count 3; and five years on Count 5, concurrent with Count 4. We supplement with additional facts as needed. 9  DISCUSSION I. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DECLINING TO BIFURCATE THE CRIMINAL-IN-POSSESSION COUNT. A. The Parties’ Contentions Mr. Duhart contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in declining to bifurcate because it “did not weigh prejudice against judicial efficiency,” but instead “reasoned incorrectly that curative instructions to the jury would be sufficient to alleviate any prejudice.” Mr. Duhart emphasizes that the stipulation “merely lessen[ed] the potential for prejudice,” whereas a “bifurcated jury trial entirely eliminates the prejudice by sanitizing the jury’s deliberation of the other counts from the taint of any prior record.” The State argues that the court sufficiently balanced “the likely prejudice caused by” the circuit court’s denial of Mr. Duhart’s motion to bifurcate against “considerations of economy and efficiency in judicial administration,” and that it ameliorated any prejudice through a properly sanitized stipulation. The State emphasizes that a trial court “need not lay out every step in logic and reasoning.” B. Standard of Review Maryland Rule 4-253(c) “permit[s] the trial judge to bifurcate counts between the same fact finder, subject to the sound discretion of the trial judge,” and “the burden rests upon [the defendant] to establish that the trial judge’s denial of the motion to bifurcate was an abuse of discretion.” Hemming v. State, 469 Md. 219, 243 (2020). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is “well removed from any center mark imagined by 10 the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” Wheeler v. State, 459 Md. 555, 561 (2018) (citation modified). C. Applicable Legal Principles 1. Bifurcation Generally Maryland Rule 4-253(c) provides that “[i]f it appears that any party will be prejudiced by the joinder for trial of counts . . . the court may, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, order separate trials of counts, charging documents, or defendants, or grant any other relief as justice requires.” (Emphasis added). A bifurcated proceeding before a single factfinder falls within Rule 4-253(c)’s “other relief” clause. Hemming, 469 Md. at 266-67. “[B]ifurcation is the separation of the legal issues or elements for a cause of action for separate trials, ordinarily by the same jury.” Id. at 248-49 (citation modified). As used in Rule 4-253(c), “prejudice” refers to the harm a defendant suffers “from the reception of evidence that would have been inadmissible . . . had there been no joinder.” Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 394 n.11 (2002) (citation modified). Rule 4-253(c) “affords a trial judge discretion in making a joinder[] determination and embodies a balancing approach between ‘the likely prejudice caused by the joinder . . . [and] the considerations of economy and efficiency in judicial administration.’” State v. Hines, 450 Md. 352, 369 (2016) (quoting Frazier v. State, 318 Md. 597, 608 (1990)). The “overbearing concern of the law of this State with respect to joint or separate trials of a defendant charged with criminal offenses [is] to safeguard against potential prejudice.” Frazier, 318 Md. at 607. 11  2. Bifurcation in a criminal-in-possession case Four doctrinal points frame the analysis in a criminal-in-possession case. First is the Carter stipulation. In Carter v. State, the Supreme Court of Maryland promulgated a per se rule, which was later expounded on in Hemming: any defendant charged with the possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person is legally entitled to a stipulation that informs the jury that he or she is simply prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm, and disclosing no further detail regarding any prior convictions, if the defendant requests it. Hemming, 469 Md. at 259 (citing Carter v. State, 374 Md. 693, 722 (2003)). Under this per se rule, the trial judge “should not describe the previous conviction with any . . . particularity or by using . . . categories of crimes . . . []such as ‘crime of violence’ or ‘felony’[][.]” Carter, 374 Md. at 722. Second, the entirety of the charge is ordinarily to be heard by the jury because “[t]he jurors must know . . . why they are being asked to subject an individual to criminal punishment for possessing a firearm when, generally, such an act is not illegal.” Id. at 713. As the Supreme Court of Maryland observed, a “Carter stipulation is the procedurally simpler method to address the potential prejudice inherent in cases involving charges of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person and appears to be preferable to bifurcation in terms of judicial economy.” Hemming, 469 Md. at 260. Third, bifurcation before a single factfinder is not mandatory. Id. at 266-67 (“Many courts have left it to the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion to weigh the potential prejudice to the defendant against the interests of judicial economy when 12 deciding to bifurcate criminal proceedings.”). To hold otherwise is “an untenable position[.]” United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 848 (3d Cir. 1992). Fourth, for a trial to be bifurcated, the prejudice that a defendant complains of “must be more than the same potential for prejudice that every criminal defendant faces when multiple counts are tried together.” Hemming, 469 Md. at 266-67 (citing Joshua, 976 F.2d at 848). D. Analysis Mr. Duhart has not met his burden of showing that the circuit court’s denial of bifurcation was beyond the fringe of what is minimally acceptable; thus, we do not find that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Duhart’s motion to bifurcate. See Wheeler, 459 Md. at 561. The record does not support Mr. Duhart’s contention that the circuit court failed to properly weigh prejudice against judicial efficiency. In its ruling on Mr. Duhart’s motion to bifurcate, the circuit court concluded that, while proving the predicate offense would require the State to “bring in . . . a certified copy of that conviction,” the inherent prejudice would be alleviated by a less cumbersome remedy: curative jury instructions. In doing so, the court sufficiently weighed the prejudice of proving the predicate offense against judicial efficiency. Mr. Duhart correctly points out that the circuit court’s explanation was brief, but brevity is not the same as abdication; appellate courts must ask whether the court weighed the balance, not whether it narrated it exhaustively. See Hines, 450 Md. at 369; Hemming, 469 Md. at 246. 13  Further, Mr. Duhart’s claim of prejudice is the generic prejudice inherent in trying any criminal-in-possession count alongside the offense that generated it. Mr. Duhart argues that the jury was “reminded throughout trial” of his prior conviction because Count 5 was referenced in the preliminary instructions, the final instructions, the State’s closing argument, and the verdict sheet. However, each of those references was an unavoidable incident of trying Count 5 in the first place, and none of the references disclosed anything beyond the sanitized facts that the agreed-upon Carter stipulation already supplied. As the Court stated in Hemming, such references are not enough: the prejudice “must be more than the same potential for prejudice that every criminal defendant faces when multiple counts are tried together.” 469 Md. at 267. Otherwise, bifurcation would be mandatory in every criminal-in-possession case in which a defendant requested it, which is “untenable.” Id. at 263.6 Even assuming error, we would find it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976). The jury learned only that Mr. Duhart had some undescribed disqualifying conviction, a sanitized fact the parties jointly presented and to which no objection was made. Further, Mr. Duhart’s assertion that the circuit court’s denial of the motion to bifurcate “surely affected a whole host of decisions” is speculative, if not implausible. This is because, in addition to the stipulation being 6 We note that Mr. Duhart does not argue that Hemming requires a trial judge to grant bifurcation when requested by a defendant. Instead, Mr. Duhart argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Duhart’s motion to bifurcate because it failed to adequately weigh prejudice against judicial economy and efficiency, as required by Hemming. 14 sanitized, the jury saw and heard weighty evidence, including surveillance footage from the motel showing Mr. Duhart armed with a regulated firearm. On this record, we can declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the presence of Count 5 in the same deliberation in no way influenced the verdict. We thus hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Duhart’s motion to bifurcate. II. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REGULATING THE CROSS- EXAMINATION OF MR. DUNSCOMB. A. The Parties’ Contentions Mr. Duhart contends that the circuit court denied him the “threshold level of inquiry required by the Confrontation Clause” and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by preventing defense counsel from asking Mr. Dunscomb about his probation status, three of his prior drug distribution convictions, “and his hope or expectation” that the State would not prosecute him for the drugs in his car. He argues that because questions “directed at showing that a witness has a motivation to testify falsely are authorized by Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4), and because there was a factual foundation to ask such questions of [Mr.] Dunscomb, the [trial] court erred by limiting [Mr. Duhart’s] cross-examination of” Mr. Dunscomb. Mr. Duhart presents three bases to support this argument: first, Mr. Dunscomb was not criminally charged in Howard County in relation to his car being “full of ‘street 15 drugs’” 7; second, Mr. Dunscomb “feared prosecution,” invoked his Fifth Amendment right, and testified only under compulsion and threat of incarceration; and third, “[t]he lack of prosecutorial action in the face of obviously criminal activity is a decision to forgo charges[.]” Mr. Duhart emphasizes that the inquiry need not be supported by evidence of an actual deal, because the inquiry is what, if anything, the witness may have hoped for or believed, and “the question itself is the sought-after impeachment.” The State responds that “there was no factual foundation because,” in relation to Mr. Dunscomb, there were no pending charges, no nolle prossed charges, no release from custody, and no evidence that the Howard County Police Department ever considered investigating him. The State points out that the prosecutor represented on the record that no promises had been made, no charging decision had been taken, and that “there is nothing in the record to show that Mr. Dunscomb actually received a benefit[.]” In any event, the State argues, “Mr. Duhart’s questioning was not limited by the court in the way that he now claims[,]” because Mr. Dunscomb’s probation, prior convictions, immunity grant, and the substances in his car all reached the jury. B. Standard of Review “[W]hen an appellant alleges a violation of the Confrontation Clause, an appellate court must consider whether the cumulative result of those decisions, some of which are judgment calls and some of which are legal decisions, denied the appellant the 7 Mr. Duhart emphasizes that “[t]he fact that [Mr.] Dunscomb’s car was filled with ‘street drugs’ would have enabled the State to criminally charge [Mr.] Dunscomb in the same county in which the State was currently prosecuting [Mr.] Duhart.” 16 opportunity to reach the ‘threshold level of inquiry’ required by the Confrontation Clause.” Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105, 124 (2015). Because Mr. Duhart alleges that the circuit court, in limiting his cross-examination of Mr. Dunscomb, violated his confrontation right protected by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, we ask whether the cumulative effect of the rulings denied Mr. Duhart the threshold level of inquiry. Id. C. The Applicable Legal Principles “A criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses is protected by the Confrontation Clause that appears in both the federal and [Maryland] constitutions.” Peterson, 444 Md. at 122. The Sixth Amendment and Article 21 “generally provid[e] the same protection to defendants.” Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 103 (2013). The confrontation right affords a defendant the opportunity to test the witness “in the crucible of cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). It includes the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses about matters relating to their “possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives” to testify falsely, because “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974). Though not without limits, trial courts must, therefore, give counsel “wide latitude to cross-examine a witness as to bias or prejudices.” Martinez v. State, 416 Md. 418, 428 (2010) (citation modified). “Compliance with our federal and state constitutions requires the trial judge to allow the defense a ‘threshold level of inquiry’ that puts before the jury ‘facts from which 17 jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” Manchame-Guerra v. State, 457 Md. 300, 309 (2018) (citing Martinez, 416 Md. at 428 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318)). That right is not “boundless.” Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661, 680 (2003). Rather, it requires “the trial judge to allow the defense a ‘threshold level of inquiry’ that puts before the jury facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Manchame-Guerra, 457 Md. at 309 (citation modified). “A trial court may exercise its discretion to limit cross-examination only after the defendant has been afforded the constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry.” Martinez, 416 Md. at 428 (citation modified). Once that threshold is met, a court may limit the scope of cross-examination “when necessary for witness safety or to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, and inquiry that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Manchame-Guerra, 457 Md. at 309 (citation modified); Md. Rule 5-611(a).8 Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) authorizes questions directed at “[p]roving that the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome of the proceeding, or has a motive to testify falsely.” Such questions “should be prohibited only if (1) there is no factual 8 Maryland Rule 5-611(a) reads: The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 18 foundation for such an inquiry in the presence of the jury, or (2) the probative value of such an inquiry is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice or confusion.” Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 638 (2010); accord Manchame-Guerra, 457 Md. at 312. When determining whether a factual foundation exists, the expectation or hope of a benefit “is to be viewed from the perspective of the witness.” Manchame- Guerra, 457 Md. at 318. In addition to direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may also satisfy the factual foundation requirement because “even an untruthful man will not usually lie without a motive.” Calloway, 414 Md. at 633 (citation modified). Questions about circumstantial or direct evidence “concerning a witness’s credibility as to an expectation of a benefit” are left to the trier of fact. Gonzalez v. State, 487 Md. 136, 166 (2024). By way of example, direct evidence could be “an agreement with the prosecution to resolve charges in return for testimony[,]” while circumstantial evidence could include “release of [the] witness from custody, dismissal of charges, . . . [or] postponement of disposition of a violation of probation charge[.]” Peterson, 444 Md. at 135-36. “[A]llegations of quid pro quo or leniency in a[] . . . case [could] giv[e] rise to a motive to testify falsely” or could show bias. Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 52-53 (2020) (quoting Md. Rule 5-616(a)(4)). “[P]ending charges alone,” however, are “not a sufficient predicate for [Md. Rule 5-616(a)(4)] question[s].” Id. Nor is a delayed proffer made after the cross-examination of the witness enough. Id. at 138-39. So, to answer the question of what a sufficient factual foundation looks like, we turn to the case law. 19  In Calloway, a factual foundation existed where the State’s witness had contacted the prosecutor while awaiting trial and facing a violation of probation; before he testified, the State entered a nolle prosequi on his charges, sought his release on personal bond, and did not prosecute his probation violation. 414 Md. at 637. In Martinez, the State’s witness was held on a body attachment pending his testimony and, six days before his testimony, the State nolle prossed the witness’s pending charges. 416 Md. at 431. In Manchame-Guerra, the State’s witness had burglary, theft, and weapons charges pending in the same county where the trial was held, a fact known by the investigating detective. 457 Md. at 320-21. By the time of the witness’s testimony, the charges had been pending against him for roughly eighteen months. Id. at 321. In Leeks v. State, 110 Md. App. 543, 548, 558 (1996), “there was a great deal of circumstantial evidence reasonably suggesting the existence of a