Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Tyquan Jamar Johnson, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2024-000112 Appeal From Florence County Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-477 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Brian Hollis Gibbs, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of Florence, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Tyquan Jamar Johnson appeals his convictions for trafficking more than 400 grams of methamphetamine and possession of a weapon during commission of a violent crime and his concurrent sentences of twenty-five years' imprisonment and five years' imprisonment. On appeal, Johnson argues the trial court erred by allowing his confession into evidence because officers used improper police tactics to coerce an involuntary admission of guilt during the custodial interrogation that followed a search of his residence. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. We hold the trial court did not err by denying Johnson's motion to suppress his statements because the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he made the statements voluntarily. See State v. Miller, 441 S.C. 106, 119, 893 S.E.2d 306, 313 (2023) ("[V]oluntariness presents a mixed question of law and fact."); id. ("[T]he ultimate legal conclusion—whether, based on [the] facts, a statement was voluntarily made—is a question of law subject to de novo review."); id. at 120, 893 S.E.2d at 313 ("[A] defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession." (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964))); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) ("If a defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, but nevertheless chose to make a statement, the 'burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his rights were voluntarily waived.'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54, 55, 370 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1988))). After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we find Johnson's will was not overcome by the officers' conduct. See State v. Collins, 442 S.C. 444, 455, 900 S.E.2d 426, 432 (2024) ("If a suspect's will is overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, use of the resulting confession offends due process." (quoting Saltz, 346 S.C. at 136, 551 S.E.2d at 252)); Miller, 441 S.C. at 120, 893 S.E.2d at 313-14 ("In analyzing whether a defendant's will was overborne and the resulting confession was offensive to due process, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the details of the interrogation and the characteristics of the defendant."). Johnson was in his late thirties when questioned; an officer testified Johnson was not intoxicated or otherwise impaired; an officer warned Johnson of his Miranda rights prior to questioning; and footage from an officer's body-worn camera showed officers questioned Johnson for less than ten minutes, Johnson made the incriminating statements over the course of one contiguous interaction, and the questioning took place while Johnson sat on his front porch next to his brother. See Miller, 441 S.C. at 120-21, 893 S.E.2d at 314 (holding courts may consider the youth, maturity, and physical condition of the accused, whether the accused was advised of his constitutional rights, as well as the length, location, continuity, and repeated or prolonged nature of the investigation to determine the voluntariness of inculpatory statements). Moreover, officers did not physically punish Johnson, deprive him of food or sleep, make promises of leniency, or misrepresent the evidence against him. See id. (holding courts may consider the use of physical punishment, specific promises of leniency, and intentional misrepresentations of the evidence against the accused). We acknowledge that officers told Johnson everyone present at the scene—which included Johnson's brother, wife, and mother—would be arrested if no one claimed ownership of any illegal items found during the execution of a search warrant. However, we find this statement did not overcome Johnson's will because the footage from an officer's body-worn camera showed Johnson asserted ownership over "anything illegal" found during the search prior to the officer's statement regarding arresting others at the scene. See id. at 120, 893 S.E.2d at 314 ("[T]he determination [of voluntariness] will depend 'upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.'" (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000))); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 386, 652 S.E.2d 444, 452 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding a statement is not voluntary."); Collins, 442 S.C. at 456, 900 S.E.2d at 432 ("It is generally recognized that the police may use some psychological tactics in eliciting a statement from a suspect." (quoting State v. Parker, 381 S.C. 68, 89, 671 S.E.2d 619, 630 (Ct. App. 2008))); id. ("These ploys may play a part in the suspect's decision to confess, but so long as that decision is a product of the suspect's own balancing of competing considerations, the confession is voluntary." (quoting Parker, 381 S.C. at 89, 671 S.E.2d at 630)); cf. State v. Corns, 310 S.C. 546, 552, 426 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Ct. App. 1992) ("We find that the testimony of the officers conceding they informed [the defendant] his wife could be arrested, that she could be 'involved in the marijuana,' and that their children could be taken from them amounted to an exertion of improper influence rendering [the defendant's] statement involuntary."); id. at 549-50, 426 S.E.2d at 325-26 (explaining the officers' statements regarding the defendant's wife and children occurred immediately prior to the defendant stating "something to the effect of 'I'll plead guilty to the marijuana, just don't mess with my wife and kids'" showing a direct connection between the officers' statements and the defendant's acceptance of responsibility). AFFIRMED.1 THOMAS, KONDUROS, and CURTIS, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.