Full Opinion

22-2885 United States v. Taveras UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. Present: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, SUSAN L. CARNEY, MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. 22-2885 JUAN TAVERAS, Defendant-Appellant. __________________________________________ FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: John S. Wallenstein, Law Office of John S. Wallenstein, Garden City, NY. FOR APPELLEE: Susan Corkery, James R. Simmons, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Joseph Nocella, Jr., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Seybert, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and the case is REMANDED. Defendant-Appellant Juan Taveras appeals from the judgment of the district court convicting him of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Taveras principally to a term of 120 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. The written judgment included four mandatory conditions of supervised release and the thirteen “standard” conditions of supervised release, 1 which the district court did not orally pronounce at sentencing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal. “We generally review the imposition of conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 111 (2d Cir. 2019). “When a challenge to a condition of supervised release presents an issue of law, however, we review the imposition of that condition de novo.” United States v. Harris, 164 F.4th 181, 192 (2d Cir. 2026) (cleaned up). “Whether the spoken and written terms of a defendant’s sentence differ impermissibly presents a question of law.” United States v. Fabian, 171 F.4th 174, 195 (2d Cir. 2026) (cleaned up). Taveras argues that the district court’s failure to pronounce orally the four mandatory and thirteen standard conditions of supervised release runs afoul of United States v. Maiorana, 153 1 See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(2) (setting forth the standard conditions of supervised release). 2 F.4th 306 (2d Cir. 2025) (en banc). The government concedes that Maiorana requires vacatur of the thirteen standard conditions and a remand, but it maintains that the mandatory conditions were properly imposed. We agree with the government. Maiorana holds that “a sentencing court intending to impose non-mandatory conditions of supervised release,” including the thirteen standard conditions set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(2), “must notify the defendant during the sentencing proceeding.” Id. at 314. The court “need not read the full text of every condition [into] the record,” but it must “expressly adopt or specifically incorporate by reference particular conditions that have been set forth in writing and made available to the defendant.” Id. Mandatory conditions, however, “may be imposed without prior notice or pronouncement.” Id. at 313. The district court thus did not err by imposing the four mandatory conditions in the written judgment alone. But it did err by imposing the thirteen standard conditions “via the written judgment without pronouncing them, or otherwise making [Taveras] aware of them, at sentencing.” Fabian, 171 F.4th at 195. We thus vacate that part of the judgment and remand to the district court to address the standard conditions of supervised release. If the district court chooses to reimpose the standard conditions, it may either “recite the conditions” to Taveras or “direct him to a written copy of the conditions and expressly adopt the conditions as set forth in the written copy, and give him the opportunity to object to any conditions he believes should not be imposed.” Id. 3 * * * For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the district court with respect to the standard conditions of supervised release, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order. We otherwise AFFIRM.2 FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 2 It is further ordered that counsel’s pending motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) is DENIED as moot. 4