Full Opinion

Filed 11/6/26 P. v. Wycoff CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A171464 v. (Alameda County Super. Ct. CHAUNDELL BRIAN WYCOFF, Nos. 23-CR-005189; 23-MH- 005189) Defendant and Appellant. Chaundell Brian Wycoff pled no contest to assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. Months later, he sought to withdraw his plea, but the trial court denied the oral motion and sentenced him to felony probation. On appeal, he contends the court erred by summarily denying his motion — which was based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel — without first conducting a hearing similar to those required by People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 and without appointing separate counsel to investigate, file, and argue a formal motion to withdraw his plea.1 We affirm. 1 After a Marsden hearing, court-appointed counsel may be discharged or replaced when the trial court determines “ ‘ “failure to do so would substantially impair or deny the right” ’ ” to effective assistance of counsel. (People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) 1 BACKGROUND In 2023, Wycoff stabbed someone, and the district attorney charged him with felony assault with a deadly weapon and various aggravating factors. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c); undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled no contest to assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. (§ 245, subd. (a)(4).) He also admitted his prior convictions as an adult were numerous or of increasing seriousness. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2).) Before accepting the plea, the trial court asked Wycoff if anyone promised him anything different, was forcing or threatening him to enter the agreement, or if he was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or medication. He responded, “No.” It also confirmed he’d had an opportunity to review the charges and defenses with his attorney. He conveyed that he understood he was waiving certain constitutional rights, and the court found his plea knowing and voluntary. It released him from custody pursuant to a Cruz waiver — authorizing courts to “impose a sentence in excess of the bargained- for term” if a defendant fails to appear where the defendant (1) expressly waives his right to withdraw guilty plea; and (2) agrees to those terms. (People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1254, fn. 5.) At a June 13, 2024 sentencing hearing, Wycoff requested a Marsden hearing, so the matter was sent to a different department. At the Marsden hearing, he claimed his counsel failed to adequately consider his contention of self-defense, failed to provide him with discovery material, and consistently disregarded his concerns, which demonstrated a breakdown of the attorney- client relationship. As a result, he wanted to withdraw his plea and enter a not guilty plea. 2 In response, defense counsel noted Wycoff never requested discovery. He also detailed the different avenues he pursued for Wycoff — declaring doubt regarding his competency, mental health diversion, and ultimately obtaining a plea agreement with a Cruz waiver. Counsel said, “If he had wanted to fight his case at that time and present a self-defense defense, of course, I would have supported him in doing that.” Counsel also believed Wycoff made an informed decision when pleading to the charge. Specifically, he told Wycoff a felony conviction could affect his access to low-income housing. Despite this, Wycoff accepted the plea agreement and Cruz waiver to get out of custody. Only thereafter, counsel explained, did Wycoff seek to withdraw his plea because of his concerns it would impact his housing. The trial court denied the Marsden motion, concluding counsel was providing constitutionally adequate representation. It explained that changing one’s mind about a plea was not a basis for replacing counsel. Later the same day, the matter was returned to the sentencing court. Although the parties did not provide us with a transcript of this proceeding, Wycoff indicates he told the court he wanted to withdraw his plea. The court apparently indicated it was inclined to deny the request, and Wycoff’s counsel obtained a continuance.2 At the continued sentencing hearing on July 31, 2024, Wycoff’s counsel seemed to summarize what occurred when the parties returned to the sentencing department on June 13: “The Court [heard] his motion to withdraw his plea. He didn’t want to go forward with sentencing. You denied it, and I asked for a continuance.” Counsel continued, “At this point, I don’t have anything to offer the Court, but I know my client still wishes to 2 There also was a hearing on July 15, 2024. But Wycoff did not appear, and the parties do not address this hearing. 3 withdraw his plea and not go forward with sentencing today.” The court denied the oral motion and imposed the negotiated sentence of two years of felony probation with credit for time served. Upon Wycoff’s request, the court issued a certificate of probable cause. DISCUSSION Wycoff argues the trial court ignored procedures for assessing his motion to withdraw his plea based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends the court was required to either examine whether his right to counsel was substantially impaired or appoint separate special counsel to assess his reasons for seeking to withdraw his plea. No error appears. Courts must conduct Marsden hearings when a criminal defendant indicates “after conviction a desire to withdraw his plea on the ground that his current counsel provided ineffective assistance.” (People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89–90 (Sanchez).) There must be a clear indication the defendant “ ‘wants a substitute attorney.’ ” (Ibid.) At the hearing, they must have the opportunity to state grounds for dissatisfaction with the current attorney. (Id. at p. 90.) Substitute counsel must be appointed for all purposes if defendants demonstrate their right to counsel was substantially impaired. (Ibid.) But a court errs by “appoint[ing] substitute counsel to represent” defendants on motions to withdraw their pleas “in lieu of conducting a Marsden hearing—in effect, granting [the] Marsden motion without conducting the required hearing.” (Id. at p. 92.) Indeed, courts should not appoint substitute counsel “ ‘to investigate or evaluate [a] defendant’s proposed . . . plea withdrawal motion.’ ” (Id. at p. 89.) The trial court employed the correct procedure here. It transferred the case to a different department for a Marsden hearing once Wycoff requested 4 new counsel based on alleged inadequacies in representation that resulted in his desire to withdraw his plea. (Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 89.) During that hearing, Wycoff “relate[d] specific instances of his attorney’s asserted inadequacy” — the alleged failure to consider self-defense, provide discovery materials, and address his concerns. (People v. Turner (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1218–1219.) In response, counsel detailed his discussions with Wycoff before accepting the plea agreement. He explained Wycoff accepted the deal because he wanted to be released from custody. (Compare with People v. Farley (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 851, 859 [ineffective assistance of counsel if defendant affirmatively shows defense counsel’s omission “ ‘involved a critical issue, and . . . cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice of tactics’ ” (italics omitted)].) Counsel noted he would support Wycoff “in whatever he decides to do.” Moreover, counsel said he would provide Wycoff with any discovery materials, even though he never requested any access to them. (Turner, at p. 1219 [courts may question attorneys about asserted inadequacies in Marsden hearings].) After the hearing, the court determined counsel was providing constitutionally adequate representation. Wycoff’s change of mind about the plea, the court explained, was not a basis to replace counsel. We discern no error. The trial court’s procedures mirror those Wycoff seeks on appeal — it conducted a Marsden hearing and solicited his reasons for withdrawing his plea. We reject his further assertion that People v. Eastman (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 688 required the court to appoint independent counsel to represent him or investigate why he wished to withdraw his plea. To the contrary, Eastman concluded a trial court erred by appointing a second attorney to investigate the defendant’s claims of inadequate representation rather than holding a Marsden hearing. (Id. 5 at p. 698.) Indeed, Sanchez — ignored by Wycoff — expressly disapproved the appointing of a “substitute or ‘conflict’ attorney solely to evaluate whether a criminal defendant has a legal ground on which to move to withdraw the plea on the basis of the current counsel’s incompetence.” (Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 90.) Next, Wycoff argues the trial court abandoned its duty to assess his request to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing. Not so. Courts “may . . . permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted” any time before judgment. (§ 1018.) “A no contest plea is treated the same as a guilty plea for this purpose.” (People v. Ramirez (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1506.) Defendants must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that there is good cause to withdraw the guilty plea — i.e., that they were “operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of [their] free judgment, including inadvertence, fraud, or duress.” (People v. Breslin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416.) In addition, defendants must demonstrate they would not have accepted the plea bargain but for the mistake. (Ibid.) We review a decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) There is “no basis to disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying [Wycoff’s] motion to withdraw” his plea. (People v. Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416.) As a threshold matter, the record indicates that after the Marsden motion was denied, the court heard his motion to withdraw his plea on June 13, 2024. It seems that on that date, the court denied his motion (or indicated its inclination to deny it), but Wycoff’s counsel obtained a continuance. At the July 31 hearing, counsel again noted Wycoff wanted to withdraw his plea and forgo sentencing. Only then did the court deny the motion without further inquiry. 6 More importantly, the record demonstrates Wycoff sought to withdraw his plea because having a felony conviction impacted his ability to obtain or maintain low-income housing. But his counsel expressly advised him of that consequence before he entered his plea. Despite this, he pled guilty because he wanted to be released from custody. Thus, he accepted the plea not due to mistake, ignorance or involuntary exercise of judgment — any one of which could have supported good cause for withdrawal — but because he changed his mind — which does not constitute good cause to withdraw a guilty plea. (People v. Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416; People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456.) In his reply brief, Wycoff asserts he entered the plea while under duress; this does not alter our conclusion. He forfeited this argument by raising it for the first time in his reply brief without presenting any good reason for failing to present it earlier. (Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894–895, fn. 10.) He further fails to identify any evidence to support this claim. Nor are we persuaded that his alleged self-defense claim — which he maintains his counsel failed to investigate — was “ ‘ “sufficient cause to permit a change of plea from guilty to not guilty.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507.) In Ramirez, the defendant was ignorant of an existing supplemental prosecution report containing exonerating evidence regarding his charged offense. (Id. at p. 1508.) The report “provided possible defenses to several charges, thereby casting the case against him in an entirely different light.” (Ibid.) His resulting ignorance affected the decision to enter his guilty plea. (Ibid.) The facts here are distinguishable. Wycoff fails to identify exculpatory evidence of which he was ignorant before he entered his plea. Nor does he identify new witnesses or provide information that could 7 support possible defenses to his original charges. Rather, his counsel told the trial court he discussed possible defenses if the case proceeded to trial, but Wycoff elected to enter a guilty plea to secure his release from custody. “To the extent there was a credibility question between defendant and counsel at the hearing, the court was ‘entitled to accept counsel’s explanation.’ ” (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696.) The court did not err in forgoing further inquiry regarding the basis for his motion to withdraw. Wycoff alternatively insists his counsel was ineffective because he did not argue the motion to withdraw his plea. This argument fails too. Criminal defendants are entitled to competent representation on a motion to withdraw. (People v. Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 690.) But we “ ‘ “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” ’ ” while also “bearing in mind that not even the Sixth Amendment requires a defense attorney to act in violation of accepted ethical standards.” (People v. McLeod (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 585, 589.) Here, defense counsel brought Wycoff’s motion to withdraw to the trial court’s attention. He then stated, “At this point, I don’t have anything to offer the Court, but I know my client still wishes to withdraw his plea and not go forward with sentencing today.” Though not expressly stated on the record, it appears counsel felt the motion was meritless — as counsel and the court were aware, Wycoff only wanted to withdraw his plea because he changed his mind. (Compare with People v. Brown (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 207, 215–216 [counsel should not have refused to bring nonfrivolous motion to withdraw plea].) Counsel did not abandon Wycoff by not offering further argument since doing so could “involve potential compromise of legal or 8 ethical standards.” (People v. McLeod, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at pp. 589– 590.) DISPOSITION The order denying Wycoff’s motion to withdraw his plea is affirmed. 9 _________________________ RODRÍGUEZ, J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ TUCHER, P. J. _________________________ FUJISAKI, J. A171464; P. v. Wycoff 10