Gerod Lekeith Studemire v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 16, 2020
Docket1D20-0947
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D20-947
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GEROD LEKEITH STUDEMIRE,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Mark Borello, Judge.
November 16, 2020
ROWE, J.
Gerod Lekeith Studemire appeals the trial court’s order
denying his motion to withdraw his plea before sentencing.
Because Studemire did not show good cause to allow withdrawal
of his plea, we affirm.
Facts
The State charged Studemire with (1) second-degree murder
with a weapon for beating his former stepson to death with a
baseball bat, (2) tampering with evidence for disposing of evidence
connected to the murder, including burning the car used to move
the victim’s body, and (3) abuse of a dead body for burying the
victim’s body in a shallow grave, digging up the body, and
reburying the body in a different location.
After four days of trial and the presentation of about thirty
witnesses, the trial court asked the parties if there had been any
plea negotiations. Both sides responded that there had been no
plea offers. The court informed Studemire that he had three
choices. He could (1) proceed with the trial, (2) make an offer to the
State to see if the State would accept it, or (3) enter an open plea
to the court. Studemire responded, “I really don’t want to proceed
with this trial. I just want to - - like I say, I never really wanted to
get to this point.” Based on Studemire’s response, the court gave
him time to confer with his counsel, Gonzalo Andux.
When court reconvened, Andux announced that Studemire
agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder with a weapon and
to plead no contest to abuse of a dead body. The State explained
that it had agreed to drop the charge of tampering with evidence.
The trial court then conducted a plea colloquy. The court
advised Studemire of the maximum penalty for each of his charges.
Studemire affirmed that he had enough time to discuss the
decision to enter a plea with Andux and that he was satisfied with
Andux’s representation. Studemire confirmed that he was not
under the influence of any substance and that no one had
threatened or coerced him into entering a plea. The trial court
explained that Studemire had the right to continue with the trial
and that he was giving up that right by entering a plea. Studemire
stated that he understood the effect of entering a plea.
The trial court confirmed that Studemire had read the plea
form and that he went over the form with Andux. Studemire
attested that he read the front and the back of the form. He
affirmed that he understood everything on the form. And he stated
that he did not have any questions about the form. The trial court
explained to Studemire how sentencing would work and
determined that Studemire knew that he could receive consecutive
sentences. The court accepted that Studemire’s plea and found
that it was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
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But twenty-four days later and before sentencing, Studemire
moved to withdraw his plea. He alleged that he did not “fully
understand” his plea because he was “under a lot of pressure” and
received “bad advice” from his family and Andux. He also alleged
that Andux did not do a good job and was unprepared.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and then
denied Studemire’s motion to withdraw his plea. The court found
that Studemire fell “woefully short of establishing any sort of good
cause” to allow withdrawal of his plea. And the court found that
there was no credible evidence that Studemire was under extreme
pressure or that the plea was not freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily entered.
The court sentenced Studemire to forty years’ imprisonment
for second-degree murder with a weapon and to a consecutive
prison term of ten years for abuse of a dead body. This timely
appeal follows.
Analysis
We review the court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea
before sentencing for an abuse of discretion. See Rentz v. State, 285
So. 3d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Studemire has the burden
to show that the trial court abused its discretion. See id.
A trial court has the discretion to allow a defendant to
withdraw a plea before sentencing, but it must do so on a showing
of good cause. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f). A trial court should
allow a defendant to withdraw a plea if the defendant entered the
plea under “mental weakness, mistake, surprise,
misapprehension, fear, promise, or other circumstances affecting
[his] rights.” Rentz, 285 So. 3d at 1012 (quoting Robinson v. State,
761 So. 2d 269, 274 (Fla. 1999)). But “[m]ere allegations are not
enough; the defendant must offer proof that the plea was not
entered voluntarily and intelligently.” Id. at 1013. Studemire did
not meet that burden.
Studemire argued first that he entered his plea under a
misapprehension of his ability to fire his counsel. He asserted that
Andux never told him that he could fire Andux and that Andux
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never advised him that he could seek a Nelson hearing. Studemire
claimed he wanted to fire Andux because Andux was not prepared
for trial.
These arguments fail for two reasons. First, Studemire had no
right to a Nelson hearing because his counsel was not court
appointed, but privately retained. See Branch v. State, 685 So. 2d
1250, 1251 (Fla. 1996) (explaining that Nelson is inapplicable
when privately retained counsel represents the defendant).
Second, the record refutes Studemire’s argument that he wanted
to fire Andux. Studemire affirmed on the record after jury selection
and during his plea colloquy that he was satisfied with counsel’s
representation. “Where a defendant enters a plea and swears that
he is satisfied with his counsel’s advice, he may not later attack
counsel’s effectiveness for failure to investigate or defend the
charge.” Smith v. State, 41 So. 3d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
And so the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found
that Studemire’s arguments related to his counsel failed to provide
good cause for withdrawal of his plea.
Studemire next argued that the trial court should have
allowed him to withdraw his plea because he was under a lot of
pressure to enter a plea. But no record evidence supports this
argument. The trial court gave Studemire and counsel time to
discuss the plea. Neither asked for more time when court
reconvened. Andux testified at the evidentiary hearing that he
went over the plea form twice with Studemire. The first time was
before trial when he and Studemire discussed coming up with a
plea offer that would be acceptable to the State. The second time
was just before Studemire entered his open plea to the court.
Andux testified that Studemire did not have any hesitation about
entering a plea. Studemire’s statement at trial that he did not
want to proceed with the trial corroborated Andux’s testimony.
Studemire cannot now go behind his sworn statements. See Lynn
v. State, 286 So. 3d 357, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
Because Studemire did not show good cause, we hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to
withdraw the plea. The judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
ROBERTS and KELSEY, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Megan Long, Assistant Public
Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Welch, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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