Full Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0306p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ DENNY OBERMILLER, │ Petitioner-Appellant, │ No. 24-3854 > │ v. │ │ TIM SHOOP, Warden, │ Respondent-Appellee. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. No. 1:19-cv-02193—John R. Adams, District Judge. Argued: July 28, 2026 Decided and Filed: November 19, 2026 Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Tiana S. Bohanon, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Brenda S. Leikala, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Tiana S. Bohanon, Matthew Gay, Calland M. Ferraro, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Charles L. Wille, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. I. Introduction This habeas case arises from Denny Obermiller’s conviction in Ohio state court of murder and rape. Obermiller appeals the denial of two claims for relief. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief. II. Facts and Procedural History Petitioner Denny Obermiller pleaded guilty to, inter alia, numerous counts of murdering his grandmother and grandfather and raping his grandmother. Per Ohio law, a state three-judge panel conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing and, after finding that the State had proven Obermiller’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, accepted Obermiller’s plea. Obermiller waived his right to present mitigating evidence at his sentencing, and the panel sentenced him to death. Having a change of heart, and eventually counsel, Obermiller unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence. As the Ohio Supreme Court noted, that appeal challenged neither his guilty plea nor his mitigation waiver. State v. Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d 93, 107, 118 n.3 (Ohio 2016). His state post-conviction proceedings faced a similar fate. As it relates to this appeal,1 Obermiller argued that mental illness, particularly bipolar disorder, prevented him from making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea and rendered him incompetent to waive his right to present mitigating evidence at his sentencing. To support his arguments, Obermiller attached “new” evidence to his post-conviction petition, including but not limited to social security records, jail and prison records, and multiple expert reports which opined on his mental capacity and competence. The Ohio Court of Appeals, the highest state court to adjudicate his post- 1Obermiller’s post-conviction proceedings included many claims, but only two are before this court on appeal. No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 3 conviction proceedings, held that Ohio’s res judicata law barred Obermiller from challenging his plea and mitigation waiver because he failed to make those arguments on direct appeal, despite their availability. State v. Obermiller, 2019-Ohio-1234, ¶¶ 42–43, 48. Obermiller filed a federal habeas petition in the Northern District of Ohio. The district court determined that his claims were procedurally defaulted but also ruled that they failed on the merits. Obermiller v. Shoop, No. 1:19 CV 2193, 2024 WL 4349435, *26, *52 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2024). Obermiller appeals that decision here. Obermiller advances two deprivation-of-due-process claims.2 First, he claims that the state trial court “failed to ensure that he was competent during the guilt phase of trial and that his jury waiver and guilty plea were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” App. Br. at 1. Second, he claims that the state trial court “failed to ensure that he was competent during the sentencing phase of trial and that his waiver of presenting mitigating evidence was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. III. Standard of Review This court reviews de novo denials of habeas corpus petitions. Hale v. Cool, 122 F.4th 637, 644 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 304 (2025) (mem.). “[L]ike the district court, our ability to disturb final state-court convictions is tightly constrained by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).” Id. Federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991), holding modified by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). That rule applies to both substantive and procedural grounds. Id. 2The Warden presents arguments related to Obermiller’s Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. See Appel. Br. at 15–23. Because Obermiller did not appeal his Sixth Amendment claim, we will not address those arguments. See Reply at 2. No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 4 IV. Analysis Obermiller’s claims are procedurally defaulted. The procedural default doctrine “applies to bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement. In these cases, the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Id. at 729–30. “The independent and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452–53 (2000). And reviewing a habeas petition from “a prisoner who had presented his claim to the state court, but in such a manner that the state court could not, consistent with its own procedural rules, have entertained it,” violates both “comity and federalism” principles. Id. at 453. This court applies a four-part test to determine if a claim is procedurally defaulted. Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 693 (6th Cir. 2001). We address each part in turn. First, we determine whether the state employs a “procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner’s claim and whether the petitioner failed to comply with that rule.” Id. “Ohio has a rule that claims must be raised on direct appeal if possible; otherwise, res judicata bars their litigation in subsequent state proceedings.” Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 555 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing State v. Perry, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967)). Res judicata also bars post-conviction relief when “the petitioner could have raised the issues in his petition at trial or on direct appeal without resorting to evidence which is beyond the scope of the record.” State v. Scudder, 722 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added). On direct appeal, Obermiller challenged neither his guilty plea nor his mitigation waiver. Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d at 107, 118 n.3. He could have, but did not. Like the defendant in Scudder, Obermiller was not “prevented . . . from presenting” evidence to challenge his guilty plea or mitigation waiver during trial or direct appeal. Scudder, 722 N.E.2d at 1058. So Obermiller did not comply with an Ohio procedural rule; hence part one is satisfied. Next, we consider “whether the state courts actually based their decisions on the procedural rule”—in this case, res judicata. Williams, 260 F.3d at 693. The court looks to “the last explained state-court judgment” to answer this question. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 5 805 (1991). Here, that court is the Ohio Court of Appeals and it applied res judicata to Obermiller’s claims for relief. See Obermiller, 2019-Ohio-1234, ¶¶ 42–43, 48. Although that court also analyzed the claims’ merits, that “does not require us to disregard the state court’s finding of procedural bar.” Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 1998). This case satisfies the second part of the test. Third, the court asks if “the procedural rule is an adequate and independent state ground on which the state can rely to foreclose federal review of a federal constitutional claim.” Williams, 260 F.3d at 693. And like the test’s second part, this one is also easily satisfied because “Ohio’s use of the doctrine of res judicata to preclude a merits determination of a claim raised in post-conviction proceedings that had been, or should have been, raised on direct appeal is an adequate and independent state ground barring federal habeas review.” Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 432 (6th Cir. 2007). Finally, having found that Obermiller’s case satisfies the test’s first three parts, we turn to the fourth part: this court will not review Obermiller’s procedurally defaulted claims unless he “can show cause for not following the procedural rule and that failure to review the claim would result in prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.” Williams, 260 F.3d at 693. But Obermiller does not make any arguments for this exception, which creates the presumption that we will not review his procedurally defaulted claims. Id. However, in this case, that is not the end of the matter. Instead of arguing for the “cause and prejudice” exception, Obermiller argues that the state court of appeals misapplied Ohio’s res judicata bar. See App. Br. at 53, 68. While Obermiller correctly states that in the past the Sixth Circuit “has not ‘hesitate[d] to conclude that Ohio courts erred in applying their res judicata rule,’” his argument still fails. Id. at 53 (quoting Jones v. Bradshaw, 46 F.4th 459, 485 (6th Cir. 2022)). Because the claims Obermiller pursued in his post-conviction proceedings were available at trial and on direct appeal, he cannot assert those claims now even though, to support his claims, he offers evidence previously outside the record. Typically, “claims involving evidence outside the trial record (sometimes referred to as evidence ‘dehors’ the record) may be first raised in a petition for state post-conviction relief.” No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 6 Jones, 46 F.4th at 485. But “[t]o overcome the res judicata bar, evidence offered dehors the record must demonstrate that the petitioner could not have appealed the constitutional claim based upon information in the original record.” Id. at 485 (third emphasis added). In other words, Obermiller must show that on direct appeal he could not have challenged his plea or mitigation waiver. Overcoming res judicata requires the evidence dehors the record to “be competent, relevant and material to the claim, be more than marginally significant, and advance the claim beyond mere hypothesis and a desire for further discovery.” State v. Fears, No. C-990050, 1999 WL 1032592, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1999) (citation modified). But of significance here, the evidence “must not be cumulative of or alternative to evidence presented at trial.” Id. Rather, it must be “new, not-previously-available evidence.” Jones, 46 F.4th at 487 (emphasis added). If the defendant offers evidence that “was in existence and available to the defendant at the time of the trial and which could and should have been submitted at trial if the defendant wished to make use of it,” then res judicata still bars it. Fears, 1999 WL 1032592, at *3. So too here. Obermiller could have challenged his plea and mitigation waiver at any time during his initial proceedings but chose not to. Both the trial court and defense counsel had “a mountain of medical and psychiatric records regarding Obermiller’s long history of mental illness—including bipolar disorder, psychosis, and suicide attempts.” App. Br. at 17–18. But Obermiller never entered those records into evidence—in fact, he refused to permit them to be entered—nor did he attempt to use that evidence at trial or on appeal. See R. 17-1, PageID 5864, 5922, 6078–80. Three different clinicians confirmed Obermiller’s competence at two separate stages of the proceedings. Id., PageID 5061, 6075–76, 6135–36. One, hired by defense counsel, evaluated Obermiller before the guilt phase of trial. Id., PageID 4692, 5061. And two more evaluated Obermiller at the court psychiatric clinic between the guilt and sentencing phases. Id., PageID 6135–36. And Obermiller only went to the court psychiatric clinic because the three-judge panel ordered the evaluation after Obermiller explicitly told the panel that he did not want a psychiatric evaluation. Id., PageID 6075–76. In the panel’s own words, it acted with “an abundance of No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 7 caution” to ensure there was zero doubt about Obermiller’s competence before he waived his right to present mitigating evidence. Id., PageID 6075–76. Further, when the panel pressed Obermiller’s trial counsel about their work to compile mitigating evidence, counsel responded: “we’ve done the best we could given the limitation of what Mr. Obermiller has instructed us or allowed us to do.” Id., PageID 6078. The court advised Obermiller to take his time in deciding whether to waive presenting mitigating evidence and invited him to let the court know if he changed his mind any time before the trial’s mitigation phase, scheduled for about a month later. Id., PageID 6080–81. But, the court warned, once Obermiller made his decision at the mitigation hearing, that decision was final. Id., PageID 6081. The court crossed its t’s and dotted its i’s so Obermiller’s plea and waiver would be procedurally sufficient. Obermiller’s attorneys pushed to mount a hearty defense. Id., PageID 6078. But Obermiller’s resolve to accept his death sentence prevailed. Id., PageID 6192. He exercised his right to control his case, plead guilty, and present no mitigating evidence. Even so, the three-judge panel noted Obermiller’s mental illness, despite his attempt to keep it out of the record. See e.g., id., PageID 5925, 6016. In his brief on appeal, Obermiller claims that the three-judge panel did not know about his bipolar disorder, but on the same page acknowledges that his girlfriend mentioned his bipolar disorder during the plea-phase presentation of evidence. App. Br. at 56; R. 17-1, PageID 5864. These statements not only contradict one another but also undermine his arguments altogether. The record reflects that the court questioned Obermiller’s girlfriend about his bipolar disorder, which further discredits his argument. R. 17-1, PageID 5864–65, 5922–28. And while the court examined Obermiller, he also informed the court that doctors prescribed him Neurontin (antidepressant) and Remeron (anticonvulsant) for “mental health reasons.” Id., PageID 4890–91, 4968. He downplayed these medications, citing anxiety as the reason he was taking them. Id., PageID 4968. Still the court questioned Obermiller and his attorneys to ensure his competence and understanding. Id., PageID 4885–4988. No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 8 Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion on direct appeal discussed at length Obermiller’s history of abuse and mental illness. Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d at 112–25. So, the court considered at least some of the evidence that Obermiller attempts to introduce as new. Namely, the court discussed Obermiller’s physical and emotional abuse, unstable childhood, life- time depression, criminal record, self-hatred, lack of education, psychiatric report, and more. Id. Now, the “new” expert reports and records Obermiller bases his post-conviction petitions on are “cumulative, a repackaging of evidence already presented, or failed to materially advance his claims.” Fears, 1999 WL 1032592, at *9. The Ohio Supreme Court noted on direct appeal that during his initial trial and sentencing, Obermiller’s attorneys “hired a defense investigator, a mitigation expert, and a psychologist to evaluate Obermiller’s competency, and obtained numerous documents regarding Obermiller’s history.” Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d at 113. Every doctor who evaluated Obermiller during the initial proceedings found him to be competent. R. 17-1, PageID 4692, 5061, 6135–36. To the extent Obermiller now argues that their evaluations failed constitutional muster, that is a failure of his own making, highlighted by the fact that he would not release his medical records to the court psychiatric clinic. R. 30-6, PageID 10708. Likewise, if, as appears from the record, Obermiller tried to hide his mental illness at trial and on direct appeal,3 he now attempts to use the “new” evidence to advance an alternative theory, which is also prohibited. See Fears, 1999 WL 1032592, at *7. A few examples illuminate this point. Obermiller failed to inform the three-judge panel on his own that he had any history of mental illness, R. 17-1, PageID 4967, downplayed his mental illness and medications when the court asked about them, id., PageID 4968, intentionally withheld the details of his past suicide attempt, id., PageID 4970–71, and refused to release his medical records to the court-appointed psychiatrists,4 R. 30-6, PageID 10708. Obermiller made every attempt to keep his history of mental illness outside the record. Having failed to get past the res 3“The record is replete with evidence that Obermiller’s objective was to plead guilty as charged and to offer no mitigation during sentencing.” Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d at 113. 4It is unclear from the record whether the psychologist retained by Obermiller prior to the plea hearing evaluated his medical record, but since Obermiller requested that doctor not produce a written report we can assume she evaluated Obermiller and his medical history to the extent he wished. No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 9 judicata bar, Obermiller cannot claim incompetence now. Simply stated, Obermiller admits that from the case’s start he and his attorneys knew that he had a long history of both substance abuse and mental illness, and ample evidence to prove it. App. Br. at 18. But they did nothing with that information at trial or on direct appeal. So the Ohio Court of Appeals correctly found the claims barred in post-conviction proceedings. And Obermiller cannot revive those claims in federal court by asking us to second guess the state court’s procedural bar. V. Conclusion Obermiller had numerous opportunities to challenge his plea and mitigation waiver on direct appeal. But, as the district court discussed when it addressed the merits, even if Obermiller had brought those challenges at the right time he still could not prevail. The record overflows with evidence that everyone except one person involved in this case at the start—the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court—wanted Obermiller to have the opportunity to present a full defense. The one outlier was Obermiller himself. Having his “new” claims and evidence at his fingertips from the start, he could not wait until state post-conviction proceedings to invoke them. Since Obermiller’s claims are procedurally defaulted, we AFFIRM.