Denny Obermiller v. Tim Shoop
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket24-3854
JudgeAlice M. Batchelder; Eric L. Clay; Eric E. Murphy
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0306p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐
DENNY OBERMILLER,
│
Petitioner-Appellant, │ No. 24-3854
>
│
v. │
│
TIM SHOOP, Warden, │
Respondent-Appellee. │
┘
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:19-cv-02193—John R. Adams, District Judge.
Argued: July 28, 2026
Decided and Filed: November 19, 2026
Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Tiana S. Bohanon, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio,
for Appellant. Brenda S. Leikala, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Tiana S. Bohanon, Matthew Gay, Calland M.
Ferraro, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Charles
L. Wille, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 2
_________________
OPINION
_________________
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.
I. Introduction
This habeas case arises from Denny Obermiller’s conviction in Ohio state court of
murder and rape. Obermiller appeals the denial of two claims for relief. For the following
reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
II. Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner Denny Obermiller pleaded guilty to, inter alia, numerous counts of murdering
his grandmother and grandfather and raping his grandmother. Per Ohio law, a state three-judge
panel conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing and, after finding that the State had proven
Obermiller’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, accepted Obermiller’s plea. Obermiller waived
his right to present mitigating evidence at his sentencing, and the panel sentenced him to death.
Having a change of heart, and eventually counsel, Obermiller unsuccessfully appealed his
conviction and sentence. As the Ohio Supreme Court noted, that appeal challenged neither his
guilty plea nor his mitigation waiver. State v. Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d 93, 107, 118 n.3 (Ohio
2016).
His state post-conviction proceedings faced a similar fate. As it relates to this appeal,1
Obermiller argued that mental illness, particularly bipolar disorder, prevented him from making a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea and rendered him incompetent to waive his right
to present mitigating evidence at his sentencing. To support his arguments, Obermiller attached
“new” evidence to his post-conviction petition, including but not limited to social security
records, jail and prison records, and multiple expert reports which opined on his mental capacity
and competence. The Ohio Court of Appeals, the highest state court to adjudicate his post-
1Obermiller’s post-conviction proceedings included many claims, but only two are before this court on
appeal.
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conviction proceedings, held that Ohio’s res judicata law barred Obermiller from challenging his
plea and mitigation waiver because he failed to make those arguments on direct appeal, despite
their availability. State v. Obermiller, 2019-Ohio-1234, ¶¶ 42–43, 48.
Obermiller filed a federal habeas petition in the Northern District of Ohio. The district
court determined that his claims were procedurally defaulted but also ruled that they failed on the
merits. Obermiller v. Shoop, No. 1:19 CV 2193, 2024 WL 4349435, *26, *52 (N.D. Ohio Sept.
30, 2024). Obermiller appeals that decision here.
Obermiller advances two deprivation-of-due-process claims.2 First, he claims that the
state trial court “failed to ensure that he was competent during the guilt phase of trial and that his
jury waiver and guilty plea were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” App. Br. at 1. Second, he
claims that the state trial court “failed to ensure that he was competent during the sentencing
phase of trial and that his waiver of presenting mitigating evidence was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Id.
III. Standard of Review
This court reviews de novo denials of habeas corpus petitions. Hale v. Cool, 122 F.4th
637, 644 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 304 (2025) (mem.). “[L]ike the district court,
our ability to disturb final state-court convictions is tightly constrained by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).” Id. Federal
courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that
court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to
support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991), holding modified by
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). That rule applies to both substantive and procedural
grounds. Id.
2The Warden presents arguments related to Obermiller’s Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.
See Appel. Br. at 15–23. Because Obermiller did not appeal his Sixth Amendment claim, we will not address those
arguments. See Reply at 2.
No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 4
IV. Analysis
Obermiller’s claims are procedurally defaulted. The procedural default doctrine “applies
to bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because
the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement. In these cases, the state judgment
rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Id. at 729–30. “The independent
and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own
mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452–53
(2000). And reviewing a habeas petition from “a prisoner who had presented his claim to the
state court, but in such a manner that the state court could not, consistent with its own procedural
rules, have entertained it,” violates both “comity and federalism” principles. Id. at 453.
This court applies a four-part test to determine if a claim is procedurally defaulted.
Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 693 (6th Cir. 2001). We address each part in turn.
First, we determine whether the state employs a “procedural rule that is applicable to the
petitioner’s claim and whether the petitioner failed to comply with that rule.” Id. “Ohio has a
rule that claims must be raised on direct appeal if possible; otherwise, res judicata bars their
litigation in subsequent state proceedings.” Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 555 (6th Cir.
2000) (citing State v. Perry, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967)). Res judicata also bars post-conviction
relief when “the petitioner could have raised the issues in his petition at trial or on direct appeal
without resorting to evidence which is beyond the scope of the record.” State v. Scudder, 722
N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added).
On direct appeal, Obermiller challenged neither his guilty plea nor his mitigation waiver.
Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d at 107, 118 n.3. He could have, but did not. Like the defendant in
Scudder, Obermiller was not “prevented . . . from presenting” evidence to challenge his guilty
plea or mitigation waiver during trial or direct appeal. Scudder, 722 N.E.2d at 1058. So
Obermiller did not comply with an Ohio procedural rule; hence part one is satisfied.
Next, we consider “whether the state courts actually based their decisions on the
procedural rule”—in this case, res judicata. Williams, 260 F.3d at 693. The court looks to “the
last explained state-court judgment” to answer this question. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,
No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 5
805 (1991). Here, that court is the Ohio Court of Appeals and it applied res judicata to
Obermiller’s claims for relief. See Obermiller, 2019-Ohio-1234, ¶¶ 42–43, 48. Although that
court also analyzed the claims’ merits, that “does not require us to disregard the state court’s
finding of procedural bar.” Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 1998). This case satisfies
the second part of the test.
Third, the court asks if “the procedural rule is an adequate and independent state ground
on which the state can rely to foreclose federal review of a federal constitutional claim.”
Williams, 260 F.3d at 693. And like the test’s second part, this one is also easily satisfied
because “Ohio’s use of the doctrine of res judicata to preclude a merits determination of a claim
raised in post-conviction proceedings that had been, or should have been, raised on direct appeal
is an adequate and independent state ground barring federal habeas review.” Durr v. Mitchell,
487 F.3d 423, 432 (6th Cir. 2007).
Finally, having found that Obermiller’s case satisfies the test’s first three parts, we turn to
the fourth part: this court will not review Obermiller’s procedurally defaulted claims unless he
“can show cause for not following the procedural rule and that failure to review the claim would
result in prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.” Williams, 260 F.3d at 693. But Obermiller does
not make any arguments for this exception, which creates the presumption that we will not
review his procedurally defaulted claims. Id.
However, in this case, that is not the end of the matter. Instead of arguing for the “cause
and prejudice” exception, Obermiller argues that the state court of appeals misapplied Ohio’s res
judicata bar. See App. Br. at 53, 68. While Obermiller correctly states that in the past the Sixth
Circuit “has not ‘hesitate[d] to conclude that Ohio courts erred in applying their res judicata
rule,’” his argument still fails. Id. at 53 (quoting Jones v. Bradshaw, 46 F.4th 459, 485 (6th Cir.
2022)). Because the claims Obermiller pursued in his post-conviction proceedings were
available at trial and on direct appeal, he cannot assert those claims now even though, to support
his claims, he offers evidence previously outside the record.
Typically, “claims involving evidence outside the trial record (sometimes referred to as
evidence ‘dehors’ the record) may be first raised in a petition for state post-conviction relief.”
No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 6
Jones, 46 F.4th at 485. But “[t]o overcome the res judicata bar, evidence offered dehors the
record must demonstrate that the petitioner could not have appealed the constitutional claim
based upon information in the original record.” Id. at 485 (third emphasis added). In other
words, Obermiller must show that on direct appeal he could not have challenged his plea or
mitigation waiver.
Overcoming res judicata requires the evidence dehors the record to “be competent,
relevant and material to the claim, be more than marginally significant, and advance the claim
beyond mere hypothesis and a desire for further discovery.” State v. Fears, No. C-990050, 1999
WL 1032592, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1999) (citation modified). But of significance here,
the evidence “must not be cumulative of or alternative to evidence presented at trial.” Id.
Rather, it must be “new, not-previously-available evidence.” Jones, 46 F.4th at 487 (emphasis
added). If the defendant offers evidence that “was in existence and available to the defendant at
the time of the trial and which could and should have been submitted at trial if the defendant
wished to make use of it,” then res judicata still bars it. Fears, 1999 WL 1032592, at *3. So too
here.
Obermiller could have challenged his plea and mitigation waiver at any time during his
initial proceedings but chose not to. Both the trial court and defense counsel had “a mountain of
medical and psychiatric records regarding Obermiller’s long history of mental illness—including
bipolar disorder, psychosis, and suicide attempts.” App. Br. at 17–18. But Obermiller never
entered those records into evidence—in fact, he refused to permit them to be entered—nor did he
attempt to use that evidence at trial or on appeal. See R. 17-1, PageID 5864, 5922, 6078–80.
Three different clinicians confirmed Obermiller’s competence at two separate stages of the
proceedings. Id., PageID 5061, 6075–76, 6135–36. One, hired by defense counsel, evaluated
Obermiller before the guilt phase of trial. Id., PageID 4692, 5061. And two more evaluated
Obermiller at the court psychiatric clinic between the guilt and sentencing phases. Id., PageID
6135–36. And Obermiller only went to the court psychiatric clinic because the three-judge panel
ordered the evaluation after Obermiller explicitly told the panel that he did not want a psychiatric
evaluation. Id., PageID 6075–76. In the panel’s own words, it acted with “an abundance of
No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 7
caution” to ensure there was zero doubt about Obermiller’s competence before he waived his
right to present mitigating evidence. Id., PageID 6075–76.
Further, when the panel pressed Obermiller’s trial counsel about their work to compile
mitigating evidence, counsel responded: “we’ve done the best we could given the limitation of
what Mr. Obermiller has instructed us or allowed us to do.” Id., PageID 6078. The court
advised Obermiller to take his time in deciding whether to waive presenting mitigating evidence
and invited him to let the court know if he changed his mind any time before the trial’s
mitigation phase, scheduled for about a month later. Id., PageID 6080–81. But, the court
warned, once Obermiller made his decision at the mitigation hearing, that decision was final. Id.,
PageID 6081.
The court crossed its t’s and dotted its i’s so Obermiller’s plea and waiver would be
procedurally sufficient. Obermiller’s attorneys pushed to mount a hearty defense. Id., PageID
6078. But Obermiller’s resolve to accept his death sentence prevailed. Id., PageID 6192. He
exercised his right to control his case, plead guilty, and present no mitigating evidence.
Even so, the three-judge panel noted Obermiller’s mental illness, despite his attempt to
keep it out of the record. See e.g., id., PageID 5925, 6016. In his brief on appeal, Obermiller
claims that the three-judge panel did not know about his bipolar disorder, but on the same page
acknowledges that his girlfriend mentioned his bipolar disorder during the plea-phase
presentation of evidence. App. Br. at 56; R. 17-1, PageID 5864. These statements not only
contradict one another but also undermine his arguments altogether. The record reflects that the
court questioned Obermiller’s girlfriend about his bipolar disorder, which further discredits his
argument. R. 17-1, PageID 5864–65, 5922–28. And while the court examined Obermiller, he
also informed the court that doctors prescribed him Neurontin (antidepressant) and Remeron
(anticonvulsant) for “mental health reasons.” Id., PageID 4890–91, 4968. He downplayed these
medications, citing anxiety as the reason he was taking them. Id., PageID 4968. Still the court
questioned Obermiller and his attorneys to ensure his competence and understanding. Id.,
PageID 4885–4988.
No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 8
Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion on direct appeal discussed at length
Obermiller’s history of abuse and mental illness. Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d at 112–25. So, the
court considered at least some of the evidence that Obermiller attempts to introduce as new.
Namely, the court discussed Obermiller’s physical and emotional abuse, unstable childhood, life-
time depression, criminal record, self-hatred, lack of education, psychiatric report, and more. Id.
Now, the “new” expert reports and records Obermiller bases his post-conviction petitions
on are “cumulative, a repackaging of evidence already presented, or failed to materially advance
his claims.” Fears, 1999 WL 1032592, at *9. The Ohio Supreme Court noted on direct appeal
that during his initial trial and sentencing, Obermiller’s attorneys “hired a defense investigator, a
mitigation expert, and a psychologist to evaluate Obermiller’s competency, and obtained
numerous documents regarding Obermiller’s history.” Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d at 113. Every
doctor who evaluated Obermiller during the initial proceedings found him to be competent.
R. 17-1, PageID 4692, 5061, 6135–36. To the extent Obermiller now argues that their
evaluations failed constitutional muster, that is a failure of his own making, highlighted by the
fact that he would not release his medical records to the court psychiatric clinic. R. 30-6, PageID
10708.
Likewise, if, as appears from the record, Obermiller tried to hide his mental illness at trial
and on direct appeal,3 he now attempts to use the “new” evidence to advance an alternative
theory, which is also prohibited. See Fears, 1999 WL 1032592, at *7. A few examples
illuminate this point. Obermiller failed to inform the three-judge panel on his own that he had
any history of mental illness, R. 17-1, PageID 4967, downplayed his mental illness and
medications when the court asked about them, id., PageID 4968, intentionally withheld the
details of his past suicide attempt, id., PageID 4970–71, and refused to release his medical
records to the court-appointed psychiatrists,4 R. 30-6, PageID 10708. Obermiller made every
attempt to keep his history of mental illness outside the record. Having failed to get past the res
3“The record is replete with evidence that Obermiller’s objective was to plead guilty as charged and to
offer no mitigation during sentencing.” Obermiller, 63 N.E.3d at 113.
4It is unclear from the record whether the psychologist retained by Obermiller prior to the plea hearing
evaluated his medical record, but since Obermiller requested that doctor not produce a written report we can assume
she evaluated Obermiller and his medical history to the extent he wished.
No. 24-3854 Obermiller v. Shoop Page 9
judicata bar, Obermiller cannot claim incompetence now. Simply stated, Obermiller admits that
from the case’s start he and his attorneys knew that he had a long history of both substance abuse
and mental illness, and ample evidence to prove it. App. Br. at 18. But they did nothing with
that information at trial or on direct appeal. So the Ohio Court of Appeals correctly found the
claims barred in post-conviction proceedings. And Obermiller cannot revive those claims in
federal court by asking us to second guess the state court’s procedural bar.
V. Conclusion
Obermiller had numerous opportunities to challenge his plea and mitigation waiver on
direct appeal. But, as the district court discussed when it addressed the merits, even if
Obermiller had brought those challenges at the right time he still could not prevail. The record
overflows with evidence that everyone except one person involved in this case at the start—the
prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court—wanted Obermiller to have the opportunity to
present a full defense. The one outlier was Obermiller himself. Having his “new” claims and
evidence at his fingertips from the start, he could not wait until state post-conviction proceedings
to invoke them. Since Obermiller’s claims are procedurally defaulted, we AFFIRM.