Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86922-1-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION RIGOBERTO RODRIGUEZ- MACEDO, Appellant. DÍAZ, J. — Rigoberto Rodriguez-Macedo 1 pled guilty to a murder. More than two years later, he filed several pro se discovery motions, which the trial court denied. He now challenges the denial, claiming for the first time that the record lacks evidence that his extradition from California to Washington was proper. We affirm the trial court’s orders. I. BACKGROUND In October 2018, Rodriguez-Macedo shot Christopher Rea during a confrontation about a debt. He fled Washington and law enforcement arrested him in California two days later. The King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office had 1 Throughout the record, and in the briefing, the appellant’s name is spelled in various ways. We will adopt the spelling used most frequently in his briefing on appeal and in his statement of plea of guilty. No. 86922-1-I/2 him returned to Washington and charged him with murder in the second degree and unlawful possession of a firearm. He pled guilty to the former as charged. In June 2021, the court sentenced him to 156 months confinement and other conditions. In January 2024, Rodriguez-Macedo filed several motions pro se. Among them, he alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated at his arraignment. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The superior court denied the motions. In May and June 2024, Rodriguez-Macedo, still pro se, filed multiple notices of appeal, challenging some combination of the denial of those motions. 2 In December 2024, a commissioner of this court ruled that Rodriguez-Macedo’s pro se motions “appear[] to be a challenge to trial court orders denying relief under CrR 7.8(c)(2)” and that he should be assigned appellate counsel. 3 His assigned counsel challenges both those orders and Rodriguez-Macedo’s extradition. 2 In November 2024, Rodriguez-Macedo also filed a CrR 7.4 motion to arrest judgment, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction “over his person or the offense.” He also filed a CrR 8.3 motion to dismiss the charges. In January 2025, he filed a motion to correct judgment, arguing that the trial court erred when it did not credit him for time served in the county jail. Nowhere does he assign error to these decisions, there are no orders on these motions in the record, and we therefore do not review any such rulings. 3 For the first time in his reply brief, Rodriguez-Macedo characterizes his initial brief as a Personal Restraint Petition. We note that our commissioner ruled that Rodriguez-Macedo’s motions were CrR 7.8 motions, which require transfer to an appellate court “for consideration as a personal restraint petition (PRP) unless the motion is not time barred and ‘either the defendant has made a substantial showing of merit or a factual hearing is required to decide the motion.’” State v. Frohs, 22 Wn. App. 2d 88, 92-93, 511 P.3d 1288 (2022) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Ruiz-Sanabria, 184 Wn.2d 632, 638, 362 P.3d 758 (2015)) (citing CrR 7.8(c)(2)). But when a trial court denies a CrR 7.8 motion, we review the denial for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 92 (footnote omitted). We therefore review this matter as an appeal from the denial of a CrR 7.8 motion, not as a PRP. 2 No. 86922-1-I/3 II. ANALYSIS We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rodriguez- Macedo’s discovery motions. CrR 4.7 generally governs criminal discovery. State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d 822, 826, 845 P.2d 1017 (1993). The State has an obligation to produce discovery while a criminal case is ongoing. See CrR 4.7(a); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). “A Brady violation occurs when a prosecutor suppresses ‘evidence favorable to an accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Mulamba, 199 Wn.2d 488, 497, 508 P.3d 645 (2022) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). The scope of criminal discovery is within the trial court’s discretion. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d at 826. Because the State’s ordinary discovery obligations end when the case concludes, a defendant seeking discovery post-conviction has a higher burden. State v. Albright, 25 Wn. App. 2d 840, 842-43, 525 P.3d 984 (2023). A defendant must show “a substantial likelihood the discovery will lead to evidence that would compel relief.” Id. at 843 (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 137 Wn.2d 378, 390-92, 972 P.2d 1250 (1999)). When a defendant seeks post-conviction relief from a judgment, generally under CrR 7.8, they must include “a concise statement of the facts or errors upon which the motion is based.” CrR 7.8(c)(1). Rodriguez-Macedo filed motions requesting a “Brady order,” Brady 3 No. 86922-1-I/4 sanctions, an evidentiary hearing, and in-camera review of the State’s file. 4 He requested production of the arrest warrant, search warrant, and complaint, along with supporting affidavits and records of proceedings. The only factual allegation in Rodriguez-Macedo’s motions and supporting memorandums is that his right to counsel at arraignment was violated. He alleges that this violation allowed the State to “1) enter into the record a fraudulent probable cause; 2) search and arrest the defendant without a complaint; 3) filed a criminal complaint without a complainant.” He also argues for the first time on appeal that the record lacks documentation of proper extradition from California to Washington. 5 These alleged facts do not support a claim that the State committed a Brady violation by suppressing favorable evidence. Mulamba, 199 Wn.2d at 497. It also does not demonstrate that Rodriguez-Macedo has material evidence, as is 4 “No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” RCW 10.73.090. Rodriguez-Macedo filed his various motions more than one year after sentencing. However, the State does not challenge the timeliness of Rodriguez-Macedo’s request for relief and so we do not dismiss the motions as time-barred. 5 Rodriguez-Macedo’s motions made no claim related to extradition. The trial court rulings therefore did not address any claim that his extradition was improper. “The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court.” RAP 2.5(a). Rodriguez-Macedo attempts to circumvent this requirement with the argument that “seeking the trial court’s entire file regarding his case would necessarily include any documentation purporting to validly authorize his extradition.” But we require parties to preserve issues for appeal in such a way as to give the trial court the opportunity to address any alleged error. State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304-05, 253 P.3d 84 (2011). Because Rodriguez-Macedo did not remotely expressly challenge his extradition before the trial court, the trial court could not address the issue, and so any claim of improper extradition is waived on appeal. 4 No. 86922-1-I/5 required for an evidentiary hearing or in-camera review. See In re Pers. Restraint of Brown, 143 Wn.2d 431, 445-46, 21 P.3d 687 (2001) (holding that to obtain an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner “must demonstrate that he has competent, admissible evidence to establish facts which would entitle him to relief”); State v. Jobe, 34 Wn. App. 2d 471, 482, 569 P.3d 331 (2025) (holding, “Due process requires an in camera review of otherwise privileged or confidential records when the defendant adequately demonstrates that the records contain material evidence.”). In denying these motions, the trial court found that “[c]ounsel was appropriately provided to Defendant for pre-trial Discovery, Trial and Sentencing, and a Certified Court Spanish Interpreter was provided to the Defendant for all proceedings.” The record of proceedings from Rodriguez-Macedo’s arraignment supports this finding. This finding supports the court’s conclusion that Rodriguez- Macedo had not provided “new evidence to warrant an evidentiary review, or, by extension, sanctions pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.” We agree that Rodriguez- Macedo’s motions did not include facts that would show “a substantial likelihood the discovery will lead to evidence that would compel relief.” Albright, 25 Wn. App. 2d at 843. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and we affirm the trial court’s orders. 6 6 Even if we were to consider the claim that his extradition from California to Washington was improper, the argument fails as a matter of law. Our Supreme Court held that a trial court has jurisdiction of a defendant who enters a plea and is present at trial. Ollison v. Rhay, 68 Wn.2d 137, 139, 412 P.2d 111 (1966). Because Rodriguez-Macedo was present with counsel at arraignment, plea, and sentencing, even an illegal extradition would not result in lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 138. 5 No. 86922-1-I/6 III. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s order. WE CONCUR: 6