Full Opinion

25-1239 White v. Wolcott UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, ALISON J. NATHAN, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges, _____________________________________ Derrick White, Petitioner-Appellant, v. 25-1239 Julie Wolcott, Attica Correctional Facility, Respondent-Appellee. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT: MANVITHA KAPIREDDY (Matthew Bova, on the brief), Center for Appellate Litigation, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE: PAUL B. LYONS, Assistant Attorney General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Ira M. Feinberg, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia James, Attorney General, State of New York, New York, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Ronnie Abrams, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court, entered on April 23, 2025, is AFFIRMED. Derrick White appeals from the District Court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. That petition challenges his state conviction and sentence related to an April 20, 2015 shooting in East Harlem, New York, NY. On appeal, White argues that the District Court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. The evidence offered against White at trial included six days of cell site location information (CSLI), which the police had obtained without probable cause or a warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). White’s counsel did not move to suppress or otherwise object to the admission of this evidence. After the close of evidence but during jury 2 deliberations, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carpenter v. United States, agreeing to hear a challenge to the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the acquisition of CSLI did not qualify as a Fourth Amendment search. See Carpenter v. United States, 581 U.S. 1017 (2017); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016). A year later, while White was navigating state direct appeal and postconviction proceedings, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Carpenter holding that police must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring CSLI. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 316 (2018). White argues that his attorney was ineffective for not objecting to the CSLI evidence at trial, thereby failing to preserve the issue for review on appeal. We review de novo the denial of a § 2254 petition. Murray v. Noeth, 32 F.4th 154, 157 (2d Cir. 2022). A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), unless (1) the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) the state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 1 1 Petitioner does not argue that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable 3 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the Strickland standard, which requires the petitioner to demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” according to “prevailing professional norms,” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). Under AEDPA, we must determine whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable, a higher bar than simply deciding whether counsel was ineffective under that standard. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). The effectiveness of representation is judged “as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Applying this analysis, this Court has stated that “[c]ounsel is not required to forecast changes in the governing law.” Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1994). White argues that at the time of his trial, the law regarding CSLI was sufficiently unsettled that his counsel should have perceived the opportunity for a meritorious suppression argument. But at the time of trial in New York state court, there was a controlling intermediate appellate court decision resolving the question. In People v. Hall, the First Department concluded that the government could obtain CSLI without probable cause or a warrant on the grounds that there was no reasonable expectation of determination of the facts. 4 privacy while traveling in public. See 86 A.D.3d 450, 451 (1st Dep’t 2011) (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). Without addressing whether we would find counsel deficient were we not bound by AEDPA deference, we conclude that the state court was not unreasonable in finding that counsel acted within the bounds of professional conduct when he relied on this negative precedent in declining to object to the CSLI. See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 317 (2d Cir. 2001). White also argues that his counsel should have been on notice of the importance of preserving the suppression issue because of the petition for certiorari on the question filed before trial and granted during trial. But we cannot say the bar for constitutionally adequate representation requires defense attorneys to remain abreast of every certiorari petition that might impact one of their cases. And while a grant of certiorari is more significant, the Supreme Court did not indicate it would take up Carpenter until White’s jury was already deliberating. See Carpenter, 581 U.S. at 1017. Under these circumstances, the state court’s denial of White’s ineffective assistance claim was not unreasonable. Because White has not shown that the state court’s application of the performance prong of Strickland was unreasonable, we decline to reach the prejudice prong. 5 CONCLUSION We have considered White’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the April 23, 2025 judgment of the district court. Before his counsel filed his appellate briefing, White submitted a pro se motion to overturn his conviction or for Pullman abstention. The motion overlaps substantially with White’s arguments in this appeal; to the extent it mentions arguments concerning White’s right to counsel at his police lineup, those arguments were not raised in his briefing and are thus forfeited. Accordingly, we DENY White’s motion dated July 14, 2025. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6