White v. Wolcott
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-1239
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
25-1239
White v. Wolcott
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 17th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
REENA RAGGI,
ALISON J. NATHAN,
MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
Circuit Judges,
_____________________________________
Derrick White,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. 25-1239
Julie Wolcott, Attica Correctional Facility,
Respondent-Appellee.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT: MANVITHA KAPIREDDY (Matthew Bova,
on the brief), Center for Appellate
Litigation, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE: PAUL B. LYONS, Assistant Attorney
General (Barbara D. Underwood,
Solicitor General, Ira M. Feinberg,
Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for
Letitia James, Attorney General, State of
New York, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Ronnie Abrams, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court, entered on April 23, 2025, is
AFFIRMED.
Derrick White appeals from the District Court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 petition. That petition challenges his state conviction and sentence related to an
April 20, 2015 shooting in East Harlem, New York, NY. On appeal, White argues that
the District Court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, to which
we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
The evidence offered against White at trial included six days of cell site location
information (CSLI), which the police had obtained without probable cause or a warrant
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). White’s counsel did not move to suppress or otherwise object
to the admission of this evidence. After the close of evidence but during jury
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deliberations, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carpenter v. United States, agreeing
to hear a challenge to the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the acquisition of CSLI did not
qualify as a Fourth Amendment search. See Carpenter v. United States, 581 U.S. 1017
(2017); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016). A year later, while
White was navigating state direct appeal and postconviction proceedings, the Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Carpenter holding that police must generally obtain a warrant
supported by probable cause before acquiring CSLI. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S.
296, 316 (2018).
White argues that his attorney was ineffective for not objecting to the CSLI
evidence at trial, thereby failing to preserve the issue for review on appeal.
We review de novo the denial of a § 2254 petition. Murray v. Noeth, 32 F.4th 154,
157 (2d Cir. 2022). A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
§ 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), unless (1) the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) the state court’s decision “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 1
1 Petitioner does not argue that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable
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Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the Strickland standard,
which requires the petitioner to demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation “fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness” according to “prevailing professional norms,”
and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). Under AEDPA, we must determine whether the state court’s
application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable, a higher bar than simply
deciding whether counsel was ineffective under that standard. Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
The effectiveness of representation is judged “as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Applying this analysis, this Court has stated that “[c]ounsel
is not required to forecast changes in the governing law.” Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d
528, 533 (2d Cir. 1994).
White argues that at the time of his trial, the law regarding CSLI was sufficiently
unsettled that his counsel should have perceived the opportunity for a meritorious
suppression argument. But at the time of trial in New York state court, there was a
controlling intermediate appellate court decision resolving the question. In People v.
Hall, the First Department concluded that the government could obtain CSLI without
probable cause or a warrant on the grounds that there was no reasonable expectation of
determination of the facts.
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privacy while traveling in public. See 86 A.D.3d 450, 451 (1st Dep’t 2011) (citing United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). Without addressing whether we would find
counsel deficient were we not bound by AEDPA deference, we conclude that the state
court was not unreasonable in finding that counsel acted within the bounds of
professional conduct when he relied on this negative precedent in declining to object to
the CSLI. See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 317 (2d Cir. 2001).
White also argues that his counsel should have been on notice of the importance
of preserving the suppression issue because of the petition for certiorari on the question
filed before trial and granted during trial. But we cannot say the bar for constitutionally
adequate representation requires defense attorneys to remain abreast of every certiorari
petition that might impact one of their cases. And while a grant of certiorari is more
significant, the Supreme Court did not indicate it would take up Carpenter until White’s
jury was already deliberating. See Carpenter, 581 U.S. at 1017. Under these
circumstances, the state court’s denial of White’s ineffective assistance claim was not
unreasonable.
Because White has not shown that the state court’s application of the performance
prong of Strickland was unreasonable, we decline to reach the prejudice prong.
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CONCLUSION
We have considered White’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the April 23, 2025 judgment of the district court.
Before his counsel filed his appellate briefing, White submitted a pro se motion to
overturn his conviction or for Pullman abstention. The motion overlaps substantially
with White’s arguments in this appeal; to the extent it mentions arguments concerning
White’s right to counsel at his police lineup, those arguments were not raised in his
briefing and are thus forfeited. Accordingly, we DENY White’s motion dated July 14,
2025.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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