Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Willis Terrel Ivey, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2024-001916 Appeal From Charleston County Heath P. Taylor, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-474 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellate Defender Molly M. Keegan, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Willis Terrel Ivey appeals his convictions for failure to stop for a blue light and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN) and his aggregate sentence of eighteen years' imprisonment. On appeal, he argues the trial court (1) abused its discretion when it failed to dismiss his charges on the basis that his state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial had been violated when he was arrested on June 15, 2018, and his case was called to trial on November 4, 2024; (2) erred when it denied his directed verdict motion as to his ABHAN charge because the State failed to establish he had the required mens rea to support the charge; and (3) abused its discretion when it refused to provide a jury charge on specific intent related to the ABHAN charge because subsection (b) of the ABHAN statute functions like an attempt statute. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. 1. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ivey's motion to dismiss his charges. See State v. Hunsberger, 418 S.C. 335, 342, 794 S.E.2d 368, 371 (2016) ("The trial court's ruling on a motion for speedy trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."); id. at 342, 794 S.E.2d at 371-72 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is based on an error of law or upon factual findings that are without evidentiary support."). First, we find the delay between Ivey's arrest on June 15, 2018, and his trial, which took place on November 4, 2024, was presumptively prejudicial. Therefore, we analyze the Barker1 factors. See id. at 342-43, 794 S.E.2d at 372. ("To trigger a speedy trial analysis, the accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay . . . ."); State v. Reaves, 414 S.C. 118, 131, 777 S.E.2d 213, 219 (2015) (finding a delay of "nearly thirty-nine months" between the date the appellant was apprehended and his first trial was "presumptively prejudicial and trigger[ed] the remaining Barker inquiry"); Hunsberger, 418 S.C. at 343, 794 S.E.2d at 372 ("Once the accused has met this initial burden, a court must look to four factors, among the totality of the circumstances, to decide whether the defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied."); id. ("These factors are: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the accused's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the accused."). Addressing the first factor, we find the length of the delay, approximately six years, weighs heavily against the State. See Hunsberger, 418 S.C. at 346, 794 S.E.2d at 373 (finding an eight-year delay between arrest and trial was "extraordinary" and "weigh[ed] heavily against the State"). We find the second factor, the reason for the delay, weighs slightly against the State. Excluding the time when courts were closed during the COVID-19 pandemic from March 2020 to September 2021, the State attributed the reason for 1 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). the delay from June 15, 2018, until August or July 2023 to waiting for the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) to provide forensic testing results. However, because the State did not send DNA evidence to SLED until 2019 or 2020, and there is no evidence that it did so intentionally, we find the State acted negligently and its stated reason for the delay weighs against it slightly. See State v. Langford, 400 S.C. 421, 443, 735 S.E.2d 471, 483 (2012) (finding the State was "[a]t most . . . negligent" when it neither "used its best efforts to secure an interpreter" nor "intentionally tarried in finding one"); id. (finding the State's failure to obtain an interpreter was "a neutral reason for delay which d[id] not weigh heavily against it."). Further, we find the delay attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic is a neutral reason that cannot be held against the State. See State v. Sandoval, Op. No. 6166 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Sept. 23, 2026) (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 36 at 56) (finding "the COVID-19 interruption of jury trials was a neutral reason for much of th[e] delay" in the appellant's case); State v. Waites, 270 S.C. 104, 108, 240 S.E.2d 651, 653 (1978) ("In order to establish the denial of a speedy trial, it must be demonstrated the delay was attributable to the State."). Additionally, the parties entered into consent orders that prevented Ivey from going to trial from January 10, 2020, to June 29, 2020, and from August 12, 2021, until February 1, 2022—we find this reason weighs against both parties. See State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 551, 647 S.E.2d 144, 156 (2007) (finding the appellant "contributed to the delay, at least to some degree, by requesting independent competency evaluations and continuances"). Further, we find any delay attributable to plea negotiations after the receipt of forensic evidence from SLED should not weigh against the State. See Waites, 270 S.C. at 108, 240 S.E.2d at 653 ("In order to establish the denial of a speedy trial, it must be demonstrated the delay was attributable to the State."). Additionally, delays attributable to a change in the solicitor assigned to the case, overcrowded dockets, and the State investigating whether it could pursue additional charges against Ivey after he rejected a plea offer, are neutral reasons that slightly weigh against the State. See Reaves, 414 S.C. at 130, 777 S.E.2d at 219 ("Neutral reasons, such as overcrowded dockets or negligence, should be weighted less heavily; however, the State is still ultimately responsible for bringing a criminal defendant to trial."). We find the third factor, the assertion of the right to a speedy trial, weighs against Ivey because he first asserted his right in 2022—four years after his arrest—and he had previously consented to delay his trial before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. See id. ("The third factor—assertion of the right—recognizes that while a criminal defendant has no responsibility to bring himself to trial, the extent to which he exercises his right to a speedy trial is significant."); id. ("This consideration prevents a criminal defendant from strategically acquiescing in a delay which works to his advantage, then asking the case be dismissed at the last moment once it is called for trial."); id. at 131, 777 S.E.2d at 220 (holding the appellant's "failure to assert his right to a speedy trial weigh[ed] strongly against him" where he "did not assert his right to a speedy trial until over three years after his arrest"). We find the fourth factor, whether the delay prejudiced the accused, weighs against Ivey because he failed to show he had experienced either presumptive or actual prejudice from the delay between his arrest and trial. See Hunsberger, 418 S.C. at 351, 794 S.E.2d at 376 ("[A]n accused can assert actual prejudice or presumptive prejudice as the result of the State's violation of his right to a speedy trial."). Although the six-year delay between Ivey's arrest and trial was long enough to warrant a presumption of prejudice, he did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 2022; thus, Ivey acquiesced in the delay, extenuating the presumption of prejudice. Cf. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 658 (1992) ("When the Government's negligence thus causes delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review, and when the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief." (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)). 2. We hold the trial court properly denied Ivey's directed verdict motion because, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the State presented evidence of all the necessary elements of ABHAN. See State v. Elders, 386 S.C. 474, 480, 688 S.E.2d 857, 860 (Ct. App. 2010) ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, an appellate court must employ the same standard as the trial court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."); State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014) ("On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, [an appellate court] views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State."). We find the evidence presented at trial established that Ivey (1) either recklessly or negligently, (2) unlawfully injured another person (3) through means likely to produce death or great bodily injury. See State v. Rogers, 405 S.C. 554, 563, 748 S.E.2d 265, 270 (Ct. App. 2013) ("If there is any direct evidence, or if there is substantial circumstantial evidence, that reasonably tends to prove the defendant's guilt, we must find the trial court properly submitted the case to the jury."); State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 237, 781 S.E.2d 352, 354 (2016) ("[T]he court must concern itself solely with the existence or non-existence of evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer guilt."); S.C Code Ann. § 16-3-600(B)(1)(b) (2015) ("A person commits the offense of [ABHAN] if the person unlawfully injures another person, and . . . the act is accomplished by means likely to produce death or great bodily injury."). We find that whether Ivey intended to strike another person or another vehicle while he fled from law enforcement was irrelevant to a determination of whether the State presented sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of the ABHAN statute. See State v. Shank, 447 S.C. 564, 572, 929 S.E.2d 403, 408 (2026) ("'ABHAN is a general-intent crime,' and the State need not prove an intent to cause great bodily harm, only that the defendant committed the act with the requisite mental state." (quoting State v. Smith, 430 S.C. 226, 234 n.9, 845 S.E.2d 495, 499 n.9 (2020))). 3. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to provide a specific-intent jury instruction on the ABHAN charge because specific intent is not an element of ABHAN. See State v. English, 443 S.C. 49, 55, 902 S.E.2d 385, 388 (2024) ("In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review errors of law only."); State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court's] decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion."); id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 583 ("To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."); § 16-3-600(B)(1)(b) ("A person commits the offense of [ABHAN] if the person unlawfully injures another person, and . . . the act is accomplished by means likely to produce death or great bodily injury."); Shank, 447 S.C. at 572, 929 S.E.2d at 408 ("'ABHAN is a general-intent crime,' and the State need not prove an intent to cause great bodily harm, only that the defendant committed the act with the requisite mental state." (quoting Smith, 430 S.C. at 234 n.9, 845 S.E.2d at 499 n.9)). AFFIRMED.2 THOMAS, KONDUROS, and CURTIS, JJ., concur. 2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.