State v. Miller

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA No. COA25-525 Filed 16 September 2026 Pender County, Nos. 21CR050774-700, 21CR050775-700, 21CR050776-700 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL LEGAGE MILLER, JR., Defendant. Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 12 December 2023 by Judge Clinton D. Rowe in Pender County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 June 2026. Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Zachary K. Dunn, for the State. Caryn Strickland, for defendant-appellant. FLOOD, Judge. Defendant Michael Legage Miller, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s judgments entered upon a jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of first degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by, first, denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant; second, permitting the State to impeach a witness through extrinsic evidence; third, admitting expert testimony regarding firearm toolmark identification and glass analysis; fourth, denying Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction; fifth, instructing the jury that Defendant had the burden to prove third-party guilt via  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court recent possession; and sixth, entering a civil judgment for attorneys’ fees without affording Defendant an opportunity to be heard. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors requires reversal. After careful review, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error. The trial court erred, however, by entering a civil judgment for attorneys’ fees without affording Defendant an opportunity to be heard; thus, we vacate the attorneys’ fees orders and remand this matter to the trial court for a new hearing. I. Factual and Procedural Background On 8 November 2020, police officers of the Pender County Sheriff’s Office were dispatched to the residence of William Coley and Destiny Greene to assist an “unknown-age female that was seven months pregnant[,]” later identified as Greene, in cardiac distress. Police Officer Enoch Cottle was one of the first officers to respond to the scene. When he went inside the house to check on Greene, Officer Cottle observed Greene lying in her bed and suffering from “what appeared to be a gunshot wound” right above her eye. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Officer Cottle and the other officers proceeded to “[s]et a perimeter” in an effort “to preserve the crime scene as a whole and protect anything within that area” until detectives arrived. Shortly thereafter, Detective Roy Brandenburg arrived at the scene. As he was walking around the exterior of the residence, he noticed a “thick” blood trail, “a few inches wide[,]” leading from a muddy area “[o]utside of the driveway” into the woods. Detective Brandenburg followed the trail and found Coley’s body “laid off into the -2-  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court woods. His legs were kind of bent. His arms up over his head as if he was dragged out there.” The lead detective for this case, Detective Eric Short, noticed Coley was not wearing shoes, but his socks “were clean and dry.” He also noticed two sets of shoeprints: one set of shoeprints appeared to have the brand name Nike stamped on them and the other shoeprints “appeared to be consistent with . . . the boots the first responders had on.” Inside the residence, law enforcement officers collected a shell casing that was lying near Greene’s arm. According to the autopsy reports, Greene and Coley both died from gunshot wounds to their heads. The case had no leads for more than six months. Finally, on 5 May 2021, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Agent Carey Hunter received a tip indicating Defendant was responsible for the triple homicide and that his nephew—later determined to be William Smith—was possibly involved. That same day, Detective Short received “information that a white Malibu” owned by Defendant’s girlfriend, Kim Buentello, was possibly involved. Law enforcement officers seized Buentello’s Malibu later that evening and transported it to the Brunswick County Sheriff’s Office to do an M-Vac test on the front passenger seat. An M-Vac test is “basically a vacuum cleaner that has a filter in it. It injects something like a . . . sterile solution . . . and it’ll suck that [solution] up through a filter.” “[T]his filter basically collects all of the fluid and filters it through -- you let the filter dry and they can then test at the Lab to see if DNA is present -3-  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court inside the filter itself.” The results of the M-Vac test indicated Coley had been inside of the car. Officers also performed two presumptive tests for blood: one test on the black rubber seal that goes around the door, and the second test on the “support arm for the dash to the ceiling.” Both tests were negative. Detective Short then sprayed luminol—another type of presumptive test for blood—on “the front passenger seat and front passenger floorboard[,]” but there was no reaction. While they were processing the car, officers noticed “the molding around the doorjamb appeared to have been taken off and replaced” and how the front passenger window looked like it had been replaced. Detective Short also found and collected shards of glass in the bottom of the passenger side door. Detective Short’s investigation revealed that Defendant lived part-time with his half-brother, Bilal Jenkins. On 7 May 2020, the SWAT team executed a warrant to search Jenkins’s residence. At the time, Jenkins, Smith, Smith’s then-girlfriend, and Katrina Best, Jenkins’s then-wife, were at the house. Law enforcement arrested Jenkins for absconding parole and detained Smith for his alleged involvement. Law enforcement interviewed Jenkins later that day; during his interview, Jenkins identified Defendant as the perpetrator and told law enforcement officers, inter alia, they would find a barrel buried in the ditch next to his house and broken glass in the woods. Officers returned to Jenkins’s residence and recovered glass -4-  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court fragments from the driveway. Officers using dogs and metal detectors searched extensively for the barrel but did not find one. Law enforcement also interviewed Smith. At that time, Smith did not tell law enforcement what had happened because he was “scared for [his] life.” He was questioned sometime after that, but, again, he did not tell law enforcement officers what had happened. Smith did not tell law enforcement officers what had happened until he was arrested in October of 2021. During this interview, Smith confessed to being present at the scene and asserted that Defendant had shot and killed Coley and Greene. On 11 May 2021, law enforcement officers obtained a warrant for Defendant’s arrest. Two days later, officers traced Defendant’s and Buentello’s phones to Room 200, rented by Buentello, at the Motel 6 in Jacksonville, North Carolina. Detective Short obtained a warrant to search the room and to seize “[a]ny [c]ell phones located” within Room 200. Law enforcement officers subsequently executed the warrants, arrested Defendant, searched the room, and seized Defendant’s and Buentello’s cell phones. A search of Buentello’s phone revealed someone had conducted a Google search for “car glass replacement” on 8 November 2020. Defendant was indicted on 30 August 2021 for two counts of first degree murder of Coley and Greene, and on 31 January 2022, via a superseding indictment, for first degree murder of Greene’s unborn child. Defendant filed four pretrial motions to (1) “preclude any witness from being declared an ‘expert’ in the presence of the jury -5-  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court and to preclude the use of the word ‘expert’ to refer to witnesses in front of the jury”; (2) suppress the evidence seized from Buentello’s cell phone; (3) exclude the testimony of the State’s expert firearms witness; and (4) exclude the testimony of the State’s expert glass analyst. All four motions were denied. In October of 2022, while Defendant was in jail, Jenkins sent him a letter apologizing for “lying” about him. Jenkins also signed an affidavit stating that he had lied during his May 2021 interview because he was afraid Best would be charged with trafficking drugs. On 14 October 2023, Detective Short questioned Jenkins about the letter and the affidavit. During this interview, Jenkins told Detective Short that he wrote the letter because his older brother, Antonio Jenkins, was threatening him. Defendant’s case came on for trial on 30 October 2023. Smith’s trial testimony tended to show that Defendant had woken Smith up around 6:00 a.m. on 8 November 2020 and asked him to go with him to rob someone. The pair entered Buentello’s Malibu, and Defendant drove to Coley’s and Greene’s residence. When they arrived, Defendant instructed Smith to “go stand beside the house” because Coley would “get skeptical” if he saw Smith. Defendant knocked on the front door until Coley came to the door. Smith heard Coley tell Defendant “to hold on[,]” and then observed Defendant re-enter Buentello’s Malibu. Smith then saw Coley come out of the house with a “Glock with an extended clip” in his hand and enter the front passenger side of the car with Defendant. According to Smith, “less than a minute after Coley got in and shut the door, -6-  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court [he saw] the car start shaking and tussling” and then he “heard a gunshot.” Defendant got out of the car and told Smith to come get the body out of the car, but Smith refused, so Defendant “got [Coley] out of the car . . . and then drug [sic] him to the woods.” Smith then watched Defendant go into the house and heard a “lady screaming” followed by a gunshot. Defendant came out with a black Draco, handed it to Smith, told him to put it in the car, went back into the house, and grabbed “a white basket full of shoes.” They got to the “end of the road” before Defendant turned the car around and went back to retrieve a pair of “socks he had around his hand.” When they left Coley’s house, Defendant told Smith to keep his “mouth shut. Because if . . . it gets out, I’ll get the death penalty and you’ll get life.” Smith further testified that, upon return to Jenkins’s residence, he “told [Jenkins] what happened. That’s when [Jenkins] insisted that we need to burn everything . . . .” The three men burned the clothes Smith and Defendant had been wearing as well as the shoes and basket. Jenkins then instructed Defendant “[h]e needed to clean the car out . . . with Windex. Anything with ammonia takes out the blood.” By Smith’s account, Defendant “cleaned the car and then 20 minutes later he went . . . halfway down the dirt road . . . from [Jenkins’s] house, and finished breaking the window out.” Smith also observed Jenkins and Best take pictures with the Draco firearm. Smith testified that he sold the Draco to a man named Torrence Shaw for three “bricks” of heroin, and Defendant sold the Glock with the extended magazine to -7-  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court Nashahala King. On 10 May 2021, Detective Short spoke with King, who told him to go to the “address of 516 North Queen Street” and to “look under a traffic cone. And he would . . . have the weapon placed under the traffic cone.” Detective Short found a “Glock 19, 9-millimeter handgun with an aftermarket barrel under the traffic cone.” Later, King, who passed away before trial, signed an affidavit stating that he had “never bought, sold, given, or received a 9-millimeter handgun from” Defendant or “acted as an intermediary.” The State called Jenkins to testify about what he had told Detective Short during his interviews, but Jenkins testified that, although he remembered Detective Short questioning him, he could not recall the details of the interviews. When the State asked him if looking at the videos of those interviews would refresh his recollection, Jenkins responded, “[i]t wouldn’t.” Jenkins went on to explain that it would be impossible to refresh his memory because he has a disability that affects his memory. Thereafter, the trial court, at the State’s request, declared Jenkins to be a hostile witness and allowed the State to ask leading questions about the statements Jenkins made during his interviews. The State then asked Jenkins whether he remembered telling Detective Short that he (1) saw an AK-47 in the backseat of Buentello’s Chevy Malibu; (2) had observed Defendant driving the Malibu and having a Glock 9mm handgun with an extended magazine on his person in November 2020; and (3) encountered Smith “coming up to [him] in an early morning November of 2020 -8-  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court crying and distraught.” Jenkins responded that he did not recall telling Detective Short any of those things. After an off-the-record bench conference, the trial court excused the jury, and Defendant argued that Jenkins had “responded several times that he does not recall what statements he made to Detective Short,” and that the State’s attempt “to cross-examine [Jenkins] as to specific things that . . . he said in that interview is just an attempt to get those hearsay statements before the jury.” In rebuttal, the State argued that Jenkins’s testimony was vital to the State’s case because “Jenkins is the only witness in this case who is not an interested witness that is aware of a confession of” Defendant. The trial court ultimately allowed the State to continue asking Jenkins about the statements he made during his police interviews; Jenkins could not recall most of the prior statements. Over defense counsel’s objections, the trial court then allowed the State to play videos of Jenkins’s interviews—which were cumulatively over an hour long—for the limited purpose of impeaching or corroborating his credibility. After each video, the trial court gave the pattern jury instruction on impeachment or corroboration by prior statement. The State then called Kristin Crawford, a North Carolina State Crime Laboratory forensic scientist in the trace evidence and glass comparison analysis section, to testify about her analysis of the glass shards recovered from Buentello’s Malibu and those shards of glass recovered from the driveway of Jenkins’s residence. After being qualified as an expert witness over Defendant’s objection, Crawford -9-  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court testified, opining that the glass recovered from the driveway of Jenkins’s residence was “consistent with” the glass recovered from the passenger door of the Malibu. Additionally, Crawford testified that both samples of glass were “consistent with automobile glass,” and they “could have shared a common origin.” On cross examination, Crawford acknowledged that modern automobile glass is mass produced, “production runs” can last for a period of years, and modern testing methods “can make it difficult to discriminate between” different samples of glass. The State also called Jennifer Slish, a North Carolina State Crime Laboratory forensic science manager in the firearms section, and tendered her as an expert witness. Slish had examined the Glock pistol Detective Short found under the traffic cone, a shell casing obtained after a controlled test firing of the Glock, and the shell casing officers had recovered from next to Greene’s body. Slish opined that both shell casings shared class characteristics consistent with being fired from a Glock, were “fired by the same firearm,” and “were fired” from the recovered Glock 9mm handgun. On cross examination, Slish testified that firearms comparisons are considered “subjective pattern-matching methodology,” and it could be “possible for [her] subjective determination to be different from that of another subjective determination of another firearms examiner.” Slish also disclosed that she had been removed from casework and retrained on class characterizations because of an error she made in a different case. - 10 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court At the charge conference, the trial court asked if all parties had received “a copy of the proposed jury instructions” and referenced “one change . . . to [Defendant’s] proposal.” Both parties agreed to the instructions, and the trial court instructed the jury that the State was seeking to prove Defendant’s guilt via the doctrine of recent possession. Additionally, the trial court explained that Defendant was seeking to establish guilt of a third party by the doctrine of recent possession and instructed the jury that Defendant had “the burden of proof [to establish] beyond a reasonable doubt” a third party was guilty via the doctrine of recent possession. After two days of deliberations, the jury was deadlocked 10-2, and two of the jurors were crying. The trial court then gave an Allen charge.1 The jury ultimately returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of first degree murder under the first degree felony murder rule. Defendant was determined to be a prior record level IV with eleven points, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to three consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed. II. Jurisdiction Defendant appeals from his criminal judgments, from which Defendant’s counsel gave timely oral notice of appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) (2025). As such, this Court possesses jurisdiction over Defendant’s appeal from his criminal judgments 1 An Allen charge “is an instruction that may be given to a deadlocked or ‘hung’ jury which encourages the jury to continue deliberating and attempt to reach a verdict, while also emphasizing that each individual member should not abandon their honest convictions.” State v. Powell, 921 S.E.2d 603, 609 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2025) (emphasis omitted). - 11 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b)(1) and 15A-1444(a) (2025). Defendant also appeals from the trial court’s civil judgment for attorneys’ fees. Defendant’s counsel, however, failed to file a timely written notice of appeal, thereby violating Rule 3 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. See State v. Patterson, 269 N.C. App. 640, 642 (2020) (“We have previously determined that judgments entered against a defendant for attorney fees and appointment fees constitute civil judgments, which require a defendant to comply with Rule 3(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure when appealing from those judgments. . . . Failure to give timely notice of appeal in compliance with . . . this rule of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure is jurisdictional, and an untimely attempt to appeal must be dismissed.” (citation modified)). Contemporaneously with Defendant’s opening brief, Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari (“PWC”) to remedy the defects in the notice of appeal. On 13 March 2026, this Court dismissed the PWC “without prejudice to petitioner’s right to refile with sufficient supporting documents[.]” In accordance with this Court’s order, Defendant filed the amended PWC as well as an accompanying conditional motion for remand. Defendant’s amended PWC includes an appendix with three Capital Case Fee Application Order for Payment Judgment Against Indigent forms signed by a superior court judge. Although Defendant’s Rule 3 violation prohibits this Court from hearing his appeal from the attorneys’ fees orders, this Court possesses discretion to consider the - 12 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court matter by granting a PWC. See State v. McCoy, 171 N.C. App. 636, 638 (2005). A PWC requires the petitioner to show that, (1) “merit or that error was probably committed below[,]” and (2) “extraordinary circumstances” justify the issuance of the writ. Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs of the U.S., 384 N.C. 569, 572 (2023). This Court has previously issued a writ of certiorari where the litigant failed to appeal a civil judgment for attorneys’ fees because the litigant’s argument was meritorious. See, e.g., State v. Friend, 257 N.C. App. 516, 522 (2018). As discussed further below, in Section III. G., Defendant’s argument on the issue of attorneys’ fees is meritorious. See id. Thus, we grant Defendant’s PWC. In the exercise of our discretion, we also dismiss Defendant’s conditional motion for remand. III. Discussion Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (A) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the seizure of all cellular phones; (B) permitting the State to impeach Jenkins through extrinsic evidence; (C) admitting expert testimony regarding firearm toolmark identification and glass analysis; (D) denying Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction; and, (E) instructing the jury that Defendant bore the burden of proof in the defense theory of third-party guilt through recent possession. Defendant also argues that (F) the cumulative effect of these alleged errors requires reversal. Lastly, Defendant argues that (G) the trial court erred by entering a civil judgment for attorneys’ fees - 13 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court without affording Defendant an opportunity to be heard. We discuss each argument in turn. A. Motion to Suppress Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from Buentello’s cell phone because the warrant was facially overbroad, and the supporting affidavit recklessly omitted material facts. The State argues that this Court should reject Defendant’s arguments because Defendant has no standing to challenge the seizure of Buentello’s cell phone. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court’s “scope of review is strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Rogers, 388 N.C. 453, 458 (2025) (citation modified). “[T]he trial court’s conclusions of law are fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Malone, 373 N.C. 134, 145 (2019). The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as incorporated and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects “the people” from “unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, and only those persons whose rights have been infringed may assert the protection of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 377 (1994). - 14 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court Thus, as a general rule of law, “one may not object to a search or seizure of the premises or property of another.” State v. Greenwood, 301 N.C. 705, 707 (1981); State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 415 (1979) (“[A] defendant may not object to the introduction of evidence which has been obtained in violation of the rights of some third party.”). “[T]he lack of property rights in an invaded area is not necessarily determinative of whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights have been infringed.” State v. Alford, 298 N.C. 465, 471 (1979). Whether a defendant has standing to challenge the legality of a search or seizure turns on whether he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Id. A person’s legitimate expectation of privacy “has two components: (1) the person must have an actual expectation of privacy, and (2) the person’s subjective expectation must be one that society deems to be reasonable.” State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 602 (2002) (citation omitted). The burden of demonstrating standing is on the defendant. Taylor, 298 N.C. at 415. Here, Defendant asserts that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room and had standing to contest the seizure of Buentello’s cell phone. We agree with Defendant that he, as a guest of the hotel, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. See State v. McBennett, 191 N.C. App. 734, 738 (2008) (“No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964))). Defendant, however, - 15 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court has failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Buentello’s cell phone. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05 (1980) (holding that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his companion’s purse); State v. Jordan, 40 N.C. App. 412, 414–15 (1979) (holding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the pocketbook of a passenger in his vehicle). Consequently, we conclude that Defendant lacked standing to challenge the seizure of Buentello’s cell phone, and the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. B. Jenkins’s Police Interviews Next, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach and corroborate Jenkins’s testimony by playing his police interviews as extrinsic evidence, denying the defense any meaningful opportunity for confrontation. Specifically, Defendant argues that (1) the admission of Jenkins’s testimony was “mere subterfuge” to elicit inadmissible hearsay under the “guise of impeachment,” and (2) the police interviews were improperly admitted as extrinsic evidence in violation of Rule 403. 1. “Mere Subterfuge” Defendant argues that the trial court violated Rule 607 by allowing the State to call Jenkins as a “mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible” under the “guise of impeachment.” This Court’s “standard of review for rulings made by the trial court pursuant - 16 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court to Rule 607 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence is abuse of discretion.” State v. Banks, 210 N.C. App. 30, 38 (2011) (citing State v. Covington, 315 N.C. 352, 356–57 (1986)). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 756 (1986) (citations omitted). Rule 607 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence permits any party, including the party calling the witness, to attack the credibility of the witness. N.C.G.S. § 8C- 1, Rule 607 (2025). One way a party may discount the credibility of a witness is by impeaching him with “proof of prior conduct or statements which are inconsistent with the witness’s testimony.” State v. Riccard, 142 N.C. App. 298, 302 (2001) (citation omitted). Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement may be used to impeach a witness if the matter is material; conversely, “a prior inconsistent statement may not be used to impeach a witness if the questions concern matters which are only collateral to the central issues.” State v. Najewicz, 112 N.C. App. 280, 288 (1993). Material matters are those “‘matters which are pertinent and material to the pending inquiry,’ while ‘collateral’ matters are those which are irrelevant or immaterial to the issues before the court.” Riccard, 142 N.C. App. at 302 (quoting State v. Whitley, 311 N.C. 656, 663 (1984)). When permissible, prior unsworn inconsistent statements “may only be used to impeach the witness’[s] credibility; they may not be admitted as substantive - 17 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court evidence.” State v. Miller, 330 N.C. 56, 63 (1991). “[T]he difficulty with which a jury distinguishes between impeachment and substantive evidence and the danger of confusion that results has been widely recognized.” State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 343, 349 (1989) (citations omitted). A widespread concern is that the State, in a criminal case, will take “advantage of the jury’s likely confusion regarding the limited purpose of impeachment evidence” and abuse Rule 607 by calling “a witness that it knew would not give it useful evidence, just so it could introduce hearsay evidence against the defendant in the hope that the jury would miss the subtle distinction between impeachment and substantive evidence—or, if it didn’t miss it, would ignore it.” Id. at 349–50 (quoting United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (1984)). Thus, while Rule 607 “allows a party to impeach its own witness on a material matter with a prior inconsistent statement, impeachment is impermissible where it is used as a mere subterfuge to get evidence before the jury which is otherwise inadmissible.” Riccard, 142 N.C. App. at 304 (citing Hunt, 324 N.C. at 349). “[T]o prevent abuse of Rule 607, impeachment should only be allowed when ‘[c]ircumstances indicating good faith and the absence of subterfuge’ are present.” State v. Lanier, 165 N.C. App. 337, 352 (2004) (quoting Hunt, 324 N.C. at 350). Circumstances indicating good faith and the absence of subterfuge include facts showing “the witness’s testimony was extensive and vital to the government’s case, that the party calling the witness was genuinely surprised by his reversal, or that the trial court followed the introduction of the statement with an effective limiting - 18 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court instruction[.]” Hunt, 324 N.C. at 350 (citation modified). Not all of these circumstances need to be present in order to determine whether impeachment was permissible. See State v. Goins, 232 N.C. App. 451, 457 (2014) (“We need not decide whether the record shows the State was genuinely surprised by [the witness’s] reversal because the testimony was critical to the State’s case.”). In Hunt, our Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of a witness’s prior statements as impeachment evidence after the witness repeatedly denied making such statements and determined that her prior statements were impermissibly admitted as substantive evidence. 324 N.C. at 346, 348. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court first reasoned that it was improper to impeach the witness by allowing a police officer to testify as to the substance of the witness’s prior statements because she had denied making such statements. Id. at 348–49. This reasoning is in accordance with the well-settled rule “that extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements may not be used to impeach a witness where the questions concern matters collateral to the issues.” Id. (citing State v. Greene, 296 N.C. 183 (1978)); see also Najewicz, 112 N.C. App. at 289 (“[O]nce a witness denies having made a prior inconsistent statement, the State may not introduce the prior statement in an attempt to discredit the witness; the prior statement concerns only a collateral matter, i.e., whether the statement was ever made.”). After determining that the trial court had erred by allowing the officer to testify as to the substance of the witness’s prior statements, our Supreme Court - 19 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court scrutinized the circumstances to determine if the witness’s trial testimony “was critical to the [S]tate’s case or . . . introduced altogether in good faith and followed by effective limiting instructions.” Hunt, 324 N.C. at 351. When analyzing the importance of the witness’s testimony, our Supreme Court compared her testimony to a witness’s testimony in United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1980). In DeLillo, the witness’s testimony was deemed vital to the government’s case as it corroborated several essential aspects of the government’s case. DeLillo, 620 F.2d at 946. Conversely, in Hunt, the value of the witness’s testimony was deemed minuscule as most of her testimony, with the exception of “brief testimony about the color of her bicycle, which another of the [S]tate’s witnesses thought he had seen [the] defendant riding, . . . consisted entirely of responding to challenges to her credibility and bias.” Hunt, 324 N.C. at 351. In scrutinizing the facts to determine whether the State was surprised by the witness’s turn, our Supreme Court observed evidence in the record indicating the State knew prior to trial that the witness would refuse to testify consistently with her prior statements. Id. Lastly, as the Supreme Court determined, any confusion on the part of the jury was further compounded by the ambiguity of the trial court’s limiting instruction. Id. at 351–52. Notably, although the trial court had indicated to the jury that it was to consider the witness’s prior statements only for impeachment purposes, the trial court failed to instruct the jury accordingly when the statements were read to and denied by the witness or when the statements were reiterated by the officer as extrinsic evidence. Id. Accordingly, the Court held that the - 20 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court statements were erroneously admitted as impermissible hearsay evidence offered under the guise of impeachment. Id. Hunt is distinguishable from the instant case for three reasons. First, unlike the witness in Hunt, Jenkins never denied making these statements; rather, Jenkins testified he could not recall the exact statements he made during his interviews. Consequently, his statements were not a collateral matter, and extrinsic evidence of those statements could be used to impeach Jenkins. See Riccard, 142 N.C. App. at 303 (“[W]here there is testimony that a witness fails to remember having made certain parts of a prior statement, denies having made certain parts of a prior statement, or contends that certain parts of the prior statement are false, our courts have allowed the witness to be impeached with the prior inconsistent statement.”). Second, there is no evidence in the instant case indicating the State knew prior to trial that Jenkins would refuse to answer questions while on the stand. In Hunt, the prosecutor specifically asked the witness if she had told police officers prior to trial that she was not going to testify. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 351. This question, in the Supreme Court’s words, “made evident the fact that the [S]tate was on notice before the trial began that their witness would not reiterate the unsworn statements it wished the jury to hear.” Id. Here, Defendant argues the State knew Jenkins was not going to cooperate while on the stand because the State had to obtain a material witness order to force Jenkins to testify at trial. A material witness order may be issued if there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the person whom the State . . - 21 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court . desires to call as a witness in a pending criminal proceeding possesses information material to the determination of the proceeding and may not be amenable or responsive to a subpoena at a time when his attendance will be sought.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-803 (2025). The material witness order, at most, indicates that Jenkins was reluctant to appear at Defendant’s trial to testify, but it does not show that the State knew prior to trial that Jenkins would not cooperate while on the stand. See State v. Gabriel, 207 N.C. App. 440, 450 (2010) (concluding the fact that a witness failed to appear to testify at trial prior to the issuance of a show cause order did not tend to show the State knew the witness would refuse to cooperate); see also State v. Williams, 341 N.C. 1, 11 (1995) (holding the fact that the witness had met with the defendant in jail and had ridden home with the defendant’s mother did not indicate the State had knowledge that the witness would change her testimony). Third, unlike the trial court in Hunt, the trial court here instructed the jury regarding impeachment or corroboration by prior statement immediately after both interviews were published to the jury. Thus, after considering the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the State’s attempt to impeach Jenkins with the prior inconsistent statements he made during his police interviews was not a mere subterfuge to admit, as impeaching evidence, otherwise inadmissible hearsay. 2. Rule 403 Defendant further contends that the admission of Jenkins’s police interviews - 22 -  STATE V. MILLER Opinion of the Court violated North Carolina Rule of Evidence 403. “Whether or not to exclude evidence under Rule 403 of the Rules of