Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Philip Scott Steele, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2025-001064 Appeal From Greenville County Jessica Ann Salvini, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-495 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 18, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellate Defender Wesley Chandler Norville and Appellate Defender Molly M. Keegan, both of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Brian Hollis Gibbs, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Cynthia Smith Crick, of Greenville, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Philip Scott Steele appeals his convictions for one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor (CSCM) and two counts of third-degree CSCM; and his concurrent sentences of twenty-five years' imprisonment for first-degree CSCM and time served for the two counts of third-degree CSCM.1 On appeal, Steele argues the trial court erred "by giving a coercive Allen 2 charge because the charge lacked the advisement that jurors were not required to surrender their closely held beliefs during deliberations[,] particularly where they remained in the jury room for over six (6) hours and returned what appeared to have been a compromise verdict, indicating the likelihood of pressure to convict." We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. We hold the trial court did not err because its instructions were a proper exercise of its discretion and did not constitute an Allen charge. See State v. Rampey, 438 S.C. 519, 524, 885 S.E.2d 366, 368-69 (2022) ("[W]hen reviewing jury charges for error, [an appellate court] considers the trial court's charge as a whole and in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial."); id. at 524, 885 S.E.2d at 369 ("[A]n Allen charge, due to its potential for coercion, must be viewed with a more heightened scrutiny than a general jury charge."). The jury's note did not indicate it was deadlocked; rather, the jury asked to know "the plan" if it did not reach a unanimous decision, and the court asked the jury to continue its deliberations. See State v. Lee-Grigg, 374 S.C. 388, 418 n.1, 649 S.E.2d 41, 57 n.1 (Ct. App. 2007) (explaining "[a]n Allen charge is 'an instruction advising deadlocked jurors to have deference to each other's views, that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's argument'" (emphasis added) (quoting Allen Charge, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990))); State v. Cottrell, 421 S.C. 622, 645, 809 S.E.2d 423, 436 (2017) (holding that the trial court "acted within [its] discretion" when it "determined that the jury had not yet reached a deadlock after 'reasonable deliberation' because it had only been deliberating for two hours at that point" and "the note sent by the jury . . . did not state that it was hopelessly deadlocked" but "simply indicated what the jurors' vote was and inquired as to the next step"). Moreover, the trial court's response to the jury's note was a proper use of its discretion because the jury had only been deliberating for three hours when it sent the note in question. See Cottrell, 421 S.C. at 644, 809 S.E.2d at 435 ("The determination of whether a jury has engaged in a 'reasonable deliberation' is a matter committed to the trial [court's] discretion."); Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 483, 490, 552 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2001) (holding that reasonable deliberation is "not 1 The jury also acquitted Steele of one count of first-degree CSCM and one count of third-degree CSCM. 2 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). simply an elapsed-time dependent determination"); Cottrell, 421 S.C. at 633-45, 809 S.E.2d at 429-36 (highlighting that "[w]ithout a deadlock, the trial [court] found it was not appropriate to give an Allen charge, [and] instead [told] the jury to continue with its deliberations" and "advised the jury not to notify [it] of its specific vote counts in future notes"). AFFRMED. 3 WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur. 3 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.