State v. Philip Scott Steele
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2025-001064
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Philip Scott Steele, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2025-001064
Appeal From Greenville County
Jessica Ann Salvini, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-495
Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 18, 2026
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Wesley Chandler Norville and
Appellate Defender Molly M. Keegan, both of Columbia,
for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Brian Hollis Gibbs, both of Columbia;
and Solicitor Cynthia Smith Crick, of Greenville, all for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Philip Scott Steele appeals his convictions for one count of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor (CSCM) and two counts of
third-degree CSCM; and his concurrent sentences of twenty-five years'
imprisonment for first-degree CSCM and time served for the two counts of
third-degree CSCM.1 On appeal, Steele argues the trial court erred "by giving a
coercive Allen 2 charge because the charge lacked the advisement that jurors were
not required to surrender their closely held beliefs during deliberations[,]
particularly where they remained in the jury room for over six (6) hours and
returned what appeared to have been a compromise verdict, indicating the
likelihood of pressure to convict." We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
We hold the trial court did not err because its instructions were a proper exercise of
its discretion and did not constitute an Allen charge. See State v. Rampey, 438 S.C.
519, 524, 885 S.E.2d 366, 368-69 (2022) ("[W]hen reviewing jury charges for
error, [an appellate court] considers the trial court's charge as a whole and in light
of the evidence and issues presented at trial."); id. at 524, 885 S.E.2d at 369 ("[A]n
Allen charge, due to its potential for coercion, must be viewed with a more
heightened scrutiny than a general jury charge."). The jury's note did not indicate
it was deadlocked; rather, the jury asked to know "the plan" if it did not reach a
unanimous decision, and the court asked the jury to continue its deliberations. See
State v. Lee-Grigg, 374 S.C. 388, 418 n.1, 649 S.E.2d 41, 57 n.1 (Ct. App. 2007)
(explaining "[a]n Allen charge is 'an instruction advising deadlocked jurors to have
deference to each other's views, that they should listen, with a disposition to be
convinced, to each other's argument'" (emphasis added) (quoting Allen Charge,
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990))); State v. Cottrell, 421 S.C. 622, 645, 809
S.E.2d 423, 436 (2017) (holding that the trial court "acted within [its] discretion"
when it "determined that the jury had not yet reached a deadlock after 'reasonable
deliberation' because it had only been deliberating for two hours at that point" and
"the note sent by the jury . . . did not state that it was hopelessly deadlocked" but
"simply indicated what the jurors' vote was and inquired as to the next step").
Moreover, the trial court's response to the jury's note was a proper use of its
discretion because the jury had only been deliberating for three hours when it sent
the note in question. See Cottrell, 421 S.C. at 644, 809 S.E.2d at 435 ("The
determination of whether a jury has engaged in a 'reasonable deliberation' is a
matter committed to the trial [court's] discretion."); Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 483,
490, 552 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2001) (holding that reasonable deliberation is "not
1
The jury also acquitted Steele of one count of first-degree CSCM and one count
of third-degree CSCM.
2
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
simply an elapsed-time dependent determination"); Cottrell, 421 S.C. at 633-45,
809 S.E.2d at 429-36 (highlighting that "[w]ithout a deadlock, the trial [court]
found it was not appropriate to give an Allen charge, [and] instead [told] the jury to
continue with its deliberations" and "advised the jury not to notify [it] of its
specific vote counts in future notes").
AFFRMED. 3
WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.