State v. Michael Anthony Dolan, Jr.
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2025-001053
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Michael Anthony Dolan, Jr., Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2025-001053
Appeal From Lexington County
Martha M. Rivers, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-496
Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 18, 2026
AFFIRMED
Adam Sinclair Ruffin, of Ruffin Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III, of
Lexington, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Michael Anthony Dolan, Jr. appeals his convictions for
trafficking methamphetamine and possession with the intent to distribute (PWID)
marijuana and his sentences of twenty-eight years' imprisonment for trafficking
methamphetamine and five years' imprisonment for PWID marijuana. On appeal,
Dolan argues the trial court erred in denying his request for a pretrial hearing
pursuant to Franks v. Delaware1 because he "adequately alleged [law
enforcement's] reckless disregard for the truth and lack of probable cause without
the tainted information." We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
We hold the trial court did not err when it denied Dolan's pretrial motion for a
Franks hearing because Dolan failed to provide any evidence that law enforcement
made false statements and omitted key information knowingly and intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth, in the search warrant affidavit, and therefore
failed to make a substantial preliminary showing under Franks. See State v. Porch,
417 S.C. 619, 626, 790 S.E.2d 440, 444 (Ct. App. 2016) ("Entitlement to a Franks
hearing is a matter of law subject to de novo review."); Franks, 438 U.S. at 171
("There is . . . a presumption of validity . . . to the affidavit supporting the search
warrant."); id. at 155-56 (explaining that if a defendant "makes a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant
affidavit," a Franks hearing must be held at the defendant's request); id. at 171
("To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than
conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.");
id. ("There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for
the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof."); id.
("Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be
furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained."); State v. Missouri, 337 S.C.
548, 554, 524 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1999) ("[T]he Franks test also applies to acts of
omission in which exculpatory material is left out of the affidavit."); State v. Lynch,
412 S.C. 156, 179, 771 S.E.2d 346, 358 (Ct. App. 2015) ("A party attempting to
demonstrate information was intentionally or recklessly omitted from an affidavit
bears a heavy burden of proof."); Missouri, 337 S.C. at 554, 524 S.E.2d at 397
("To be entitled to a Franks hearing for an alleged omission, the challenger must
make a preliminary showing that the information in question was omitted with the
intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether it made, the affidavit misleading
to the issuing [court].").
Even if Dolan had satisfied his heavy burden of proof, we hold Dolan failed to
demonstrate that the magistrate's probable cause determination was dependent on
the allegedly false information. The affidavit's detailing of law enforcement's
personal investigation into Dolan, resulting in the discovery of fraudulent Vehicle
1
438 U.S. 154 (1978).
Identification Numbers and Manufacturer's Certificates of Origin, supplied the
requisite probable cause. See State v. Bellamy, 336 S.C. 140, 143, 519 S.E.2d 347,
348 (1999) ("A search warrant may [be] issue[d] only upon a finding of probable
cause."); State v. King, 349 S.C. 142, 150, 561 S.E.2d 640, 644 (Ct. App. 2002)
("Th[e] determination [of probable cause] requires the magistrate to make a
practical, common-sense decision of whether, given the totality of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and basis of
knowledge of persons supplying the information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."); Missouri,
337 S.C. at 554, 524 S.E.2d at 397 ("There will be no Franks violation if the
affidavit, including the omitted data, still contains sufficient information to
establish probable cause."); State v. Gore, 408 S.C. 237, 245, 758 S.E.2d 717, 721
(Ct. App. 2014) (providing that if the affidavit contains a deliberate falsehood or a
reckless disregard for the truth, then "the court must exclude the false material and
consider the remainder of the affidavit to determine if it is sufficient to establish
probable cause").
AFFIRMED.2
THOMAS, KONDUROS, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.