United States v. Enyinna Onyewu

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued March 26, 2026 Decided August 21, 2026 No. 22-3063 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE v. ENYINNA ONYEWU, ALSO KNOWN AS REGGIE ONYEWU, APPELLANT Consolidated with 23-3216, 23-3217 Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:20-cr-00225-2) Jerry R. Smith Jr., Robin M. Earnest, Steven M. Klepper, all appointed by the court, argued the causes and filed the briefs for appellants. Thomas D. Hill, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanine Ferris Pirro, U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb and Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.  2 Before: HENDERSON, WILKINS and WALKER, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALKER. PER CURIAM: Enyinna Onyewu, Emmanuel Sumo and Quaysa Flumo were all convicted of robbery-related offenses after a joint trial. They now appeal their convictions, advancing numerous bases for remand, a new trial or outright acquittal. They also raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time. After considering each of their arguments, we conclude that none succeeds. Accordingly, we affirm the appellants’ convictions in full. I. Background A grand jury indicted Onyewu, Sumo and Flumo in connection with the January 2018 robberies of ten commercial establishments located in the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia. The ten robberies involved (1) BP Gas Station in Silver Spring, Maryland on January 2, 2018; (2) Lucky Seven in Arlington, Virginia on January 3, 2018; (3) Lucky’s Beer & Wine in Takoma Park, Maryland on January 10, 2018; (4) Delicias Market II in Washington D.C. on January 10, 2018;  3 (5) El Don Restaurant in Washington D.C. on January 12, 2018; (6) Sunoco Gas Station in Washington D.C. on January 17, 2018; (7) Las Placitas Restaurant in Washington D.C. on January 22, 2018; (8) Prime Beer & Wine in Silver Spring, Maryland on January 27, 2018; (9) Sheger International Market in Silver Spring, Maryland on January 27, 2018; and (10) Exxon Gas Station in Silver Spring, Maryland on January 29, 2018. J.A. 45–46. The indictment principally charged the trio with conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by means of robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, in short, conspiracy to commit “Hobbs Act robbery.” Flumo and Sumo also faced two counts of completed Hobbs Act robbery and two counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) arising out of the fifth and sixth robberies. 1 Security camera footage of the robberies depicts a consistent scheme. In all but one robbery (in one, all three men entered), two of the men entered the store while the third waited nearby. They wore ski masks, dark clothes and gloves to obscure their identities. One robber threatened employees and patrons inside the store with a handgun and the other gathered 1 Flumo and Sumo had been indicted on three sets of these additional counts but the Government dismissed one set related to the fourth robbery at a pre-trial hearing.  4 cash and valuables. Although the gun was never fired, it was racked during several of the robberies. The three also used physical force in several robberies. For example, during the robbery of a Lucky Seven convenience store—the one instance in which all three men entered—one robber hit the cashier in the face with the handgun. Meanwhile, another robber went to the back room, where he repeatedly punched and kicked the store manager whom he found there. Following a nine-day trial, the jury found the trio guilty on all charges. The district court sentenced Onyewu to 166 months’ incarceration, Flumo to 234 months and Sumo to 204 months. All timely appealed. Because the three appeals raise joint issues, they are consolidated for our review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court reviews the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997)). Legal questions are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Abou-Khatwa, 40 F.4th 666, 674 (D.C. Cir 2022). II. Analysis The three appellants challenge their convictions on several grounds and raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time. We address, and reject, each argument in turn. A. Evidence of Missouri Traffic Stop In 2020, Missouri police pulled over a car for speeding. Sumo was driving the car, Onyewu was in the passenger seat  5 and Flumo was in the back seat. 2 Upon searching the vehicle, officers recovered “fraudulent identification cards for . . . Flumo and Sumo as well as instruments used in identity theft crimes.” J.A. 153; accord id. at 332. All three men were arrested but the charges were eventually dropped. Before trial on the robbery-related offenses at issue here, the Government filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of the traffic stop. The district court granted the motion over objection. It concluded the incident was relevant to show “a criminal relationship between the conspirators” and was not overly prejudicial. Id. at 198–99. The Missouri deputy sheriff who conducted the traffic stop and made the arrests provided testimony at trial. All three appellants challenge the admission of the traffic stop. They allege its introduction violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides that “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character[,]” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), i.e., “propensity evidence,” see United States v. Green, 149 F.4th 733, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Propensity evidence may be admitted, however, if “it has any purpose other than seeking to prove a criminal propensity.” Id. at 751. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the traffic stop evidence had a valid, non- propensity purpose. The joint arrest established a criminal association among Onyewu, Flumo and Sumo. See United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per 2 The robbery-related indictment of Onyewu, Flumo and Sumo sub judice had not yet been filed at this time, explaining why they were not already in custody for those offenses.  6 curiam) (approving the admission of evidence “for the nonpropensity purpose of proving the relationships among coconspirators”). An association is highly relevant to the charged offense of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, which requires an agreement among two or more persons. See United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 155 (1st Cir. 2004) (“In a conspiracy case, the district court may admit evidence of other bad acts if they tend to suggest a criminal association between the alleged conspirators.”); see also United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The appellants themselves characterize the traffic stop’s “real value” as “show[ing] that all three of the defendants collectively were the members of the charged conspiracy.” Appellants’ Br. 40 (emphasis added). Because the traffic stop evidence had a valid non-propensity purpose, its admission did not violate Rule 404(b). The appellants also argue the traffic stop is not relevant to establish a criminal association at the time of the conduct underlying their convictions because the traffic stop occurred over two years after the robberies. Relevance, however, is a low bar. Green, 149 F.4th at 755. If evidence has “any tendency” to make a fact “of consequence” more or less probable, it is relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 401. The existence of a relationship at one point is circumstantial, even if weak, evidence of that relationship’s existence at an earlier point. See United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 1996) (“A later criminal association increases the likelihood of an earlier one—which is all that ‘relevance’ requires[.]”). The appellants also argue that even if the traffic stop was admissible under Rule 404(b), Federal Rule of Evidence 403 required its exclusion. Rule 403 permits courts to exclude otherwise admissible evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of” unfair prejudice. Fed.  7 R. Evid. 403. “A district court is accorded a wide discretion” in making evidentiary rulings, which is “particularly true with respect to Rule 403.” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) (citation modified). We have no issue with the district court’s exercise of discretion here. Granted, the traffic stop had limited probative value due to its date and a potential for prejudice given the involvement of other crimes. Nonetheless, it is far from clear any potential prejudice “substantially outweighed” the probative value. Fed. R. Evid. 403. For one thing, the criminal conduct uncovered during the traffic stop was nonviolent, unlike the conduct in issue at trial. See United States v. Burwell, 642 F.3d 1062, 1067–68 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding low potential for prejudice when other conduct is less violent than the defendants’ charged offense), vacated in part en banc, No. 06-3070, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20699 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 2011) (mem.), reinstated en banc, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The appellants’ trial counsel had the opportunity to attack the timing of the evidence on cross examination but none did so. Moreover, the jury twice heard a limiting instruction explaining proper use of the evidence. J.A. 346–47, 588–89. Overall, the district court carefully weighed the evidence and determined admission was warranted. That is enough to satisfy Rule 403. See United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“As long as it appears from the record as a whole that the trial judge adequately weighed the probative value and prejudicial effect . . . the demands of Rule 403 have been met.” (citation modified)). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this “other acts” evidence.  8 B. Evidence from Onyewu’s Car One month after the robberies underlying the appellants’ convictions, police responded to an apparently unrelated 9-1-1 call about a home invasion at 8802 36th Avenue in College Park, Maryland. The victims reported being held at gunpoint by three men who “made demands for marijuana and money.” J.A. 67. The robbers fled without taking anything from the residence once police arrived. Two of the robbers were apprehended after a foot chase and were identified as Onyewu and Sumo. The third suspect escaped. 3 Police proceeded to canvas the “streets surrounding” the invaded residence. Id. During the search, Detective Ken Lin discovered a blue 2008 Buick Lucerne registered to Onyewu. Police seized the vehicle and Lin then applied for a search warrant that identified the car as having been found “parked in an alley between 36th [A]venue and 37th Avenue.” Id. However, no such alley exists. Instead, the car was parked on Crystral Springs Road, a street perpendicular to 36th Avenue. A Maryland judge approved the warrant without knowing of this error. Police searched the vehicle and uncovered, among other things, a jacket and ski mask shown to be worn by one of the perpetrators in the robbery security camera footage, multiple cell phones and a box of ammunition. Onyewu moved to suppress all evidence found in his car as fruit of an allegedly unlawful seizure, which motion Flumo and Sumo joined. The district court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. Onyewu then renewed the motion to suppress and additionally requested a hearing to interrogate the veracity of Detective Lin’s warrant application for the vehicle, 3 The Government ultimately dropped the charges arising out of this home invasion.  9 which motion Flumo joined. The district court again denied the motion and all three appellants now challenge these denials on appeal. Because the police’s seizure of the car was lawful and the mistake in the warrant application was neither material nor intentional, we reject both claims. 1. Probable Cause The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[A] warrant must generally be secured” for a search or seizure to be reasonable. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011). But there are several exceptions to the warrant requirement. One exception—the automobile exception—provides that “if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more.” United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citation modified). If the exception applies, “[o]fficers have the option of either ‘carrying out an immediate search without a warrant’ or ‘seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate.’” United States v. Jenkins, 984 F.3d 1038, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)). Here, police seized Onyewu’s car before obtaining a warrant but later acquired one before conducting a search. The district court held that the automobile exception justified the car’s seizure. The appellants now advance two theories to undermine the exception’s application. First, they argue that Onyewu’s car was not mobile at the time of its seizure. 4 In particular, they note that two of the 4 This argument was not made in the district court and, thus, it is subject to plain error review. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507 (2021).  10 home invasion suspects were in custody and could not access the vehicle. But this argument ignores the fact that the third suspect remained at large. Regardless, a car need not be “immediately mobile” to fall within the automobile exception. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985). Mobility is inherent in all operable vehicles. See United States v. Williams, 773 F.3d 98, 105–06 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“All that is required for an automobile to be readily mobile within the meaning of the automobile exception is that it is used on the highways, or is readily capable of such use.” (citation modified)); United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 494 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The mere inherent mobility of the vehicle is sufficient to constitute the ‘ready mobility’ the automobile exception [re]cognizes.”). Thus, the mobility of the car does not turn on the appellants’ access to it. Second, and principally, the appellants argue police lacked probable cause to seize and search the car. We determine the existence of probable cause de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). Our analysis requires determining whether police had probable cause to believe the car contained “contraband or evidence of a crime” at the time they discovered it, Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013), notwithstanding their decision to obtain a warrant before conducting the search, see Jenkins, 984 F.3d at 1041. 5 We conclude that police had probable cause to seize Onyewu’s vehicle. “The test for probable cause is not reducible to precise definition or quantification,” Harris, 568 U.S. at 243 (citation modified), and courts instead look to the “totality of the circumstances,” id. at 244. Here, the 5 The appellants challenge the seizure of the vehicle as violative of the Fourth Amendment and any evidence discovered during the subsequent search as so-called “fruit of the poisonous tree.”  11 combination of the car’s proximity to the home invasion and its registration to an apprehended suspect suffice to meet this standard. There need not be “certainty that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found—only a ‘fair probability.’” United States v. Washington, 775 F.3d 405, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). We think it is fairly probable that such evidence will be found in a suspect’s car when it is parked near the scene of the crime. The appellants also assert that, because Sumo and Onyewu were unsuccessful in taking anything from the residence and were quickly apprehended, they could not have stashed any contraband in the car. This argument again ignores the fact that the third suspect remained at large. It also too narrowly characterizes what can establish probable cause. As Detective Lin noted in the warrant application, robbers often leave instrumentalities of crime—including weapons or identification—in their vehicles. And a likelihood of finding such instrumentalities is enough for probable cause. See United States v. Lawson, 410 F.3d 735, 740–41 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 2. Franks Hearing The appellants further argue that the mistaken description of the car’s location in Detective Lin’s affidavit invalidated the corresponding search warrant. As noted supra, the affidavit described Onyewu’s car as “parked in an alley between 36th [A]venue and 37th Avenue,” J.A. 67, although no such alley exists and the car was in fact parked on Crystal Springs Road They assert the district court erroneously denied their request for an evidentiary hearing (a Franks hearing) on the matter. We disagree. This Court has not resolved which standard applies when reviewing the denial of a Franks hearing and our sister circuits  12 are split on the issue. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 551; see United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 843 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (collecting cases). We need not decide the matter in this case as the claim fails under either de novo or clear error review. See United States v. Becton, 601 F.3d 588, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2010). There is usually a “presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting [a] search warrant.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). An evidentiary hearing into the warrant’s veracity, known as a Franks hearing, will not be granted unless the challenger makes “allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof.” Id. Moreover, if there is sufficient evidence to support probable cause without the disputed material, no hearing is required. Id. at 171–72. Because Lin’s misrepresentation was neither material nor intentional, a Franks hearing was not necessary. Although the proximity of Onyewu’s car to the home invasion was crucial, the precise location of the car is immaterial for probable cause. The warrant affidavit adequately established that Onyewu’s car was nearby, even without using that precise word. It noted the car was discovered during a canvas of “the streets surrounding 8802 36th Avenue, College Park, Prince George’s County, Maryland.” J.A. 67. “Surrounding” implies proximity. See Surround, Oxford Eng. Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/surround_v?tab=meaning_an d_use [https://perma.cc/SK94-EMZN] (last visited June 5, 2026) (“To enclose, encompass, or beset on all sides[.]”). As noted supra, this location together with the car’s registration to Onyewu was enough to support probable cause. See Transcript of Oral Arg. at 57 (appellants’ counsel conceding that the  13 warrant application would have supported probable cause if the location were accurate). Moreover, there is no evidence that Detective Lin deliberately misrepresented the car’s location. Although the appellants allege Lin lied about the car’s location to justify seizure of the car under local towing regulations, this is sheer speculation. The affidavit made no mention of any such regulations and instead focused entirely on the nearby home invasion as the basis of probable cause. Also, Detective Lin explained that he tried to identify the street when he initially found the car but was unable to do so because he could not see any street signs and was unable to find any street name on the map on his phone. Thus, it appears the address included was “believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. That is not the type of deliberate misstatement or “reckless disregard for the truth” that a Franks hearing aims to address. Id. at 155. C. Whether Hobbs Act Robbery is a “Crime of Violence” Appellants Flumo and Sumo then argue that the district court erred in not dismissing the § 924(c) counts against them because Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a predicate “crime of violence.” We disagree. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), criminal defendants who are convicted of a “crime of violence” receive a mandatory-minimum sentencing enhancement of five years. That mandatory-minimum sentencing enhancement applies to Hobbs Act robbery. 1. The Modified Categorical Approach To determine whether a crime is a “crime of violence,” one must determine whether to apply the categorical approach or the modified categorical approach. So we start by explaining those two approaches.  14 First some background. Some statutes, like § 924(c), prescribe punishment based on the defendant’s commission of an underlying crime, or “predicate offense.” For example, § 924(c) adds a five-year minimum enhancement to the sentence of any defendant who has committed a “crime of violence,” which is defined as a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Id. § 924(c)(3)(A). Thus, to apply that five-year minimum enhancement, the underlying crime the defendant committed—his predicate offense—must have had “as an element” the actual, attempted, or threatened use of force. Elements are necessary features of crimes. See Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504 (2016). So to qualify as a “crime of violence,” the predicate offense must necessarily, or “always[,] require[] the [G]overnment to prove . . . the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.” United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 850 (2022). Otherwise, the actual, attempted, or threatened use of force would not be an element, or necessary feature, of the predicate offense. Or to use the Supreme Court’s language, the predicate offense must categorically involve the actual, attempted, or threatened use of force. Id. That, in a nutshell, is the categorical approach. But notice the upshot of this focus on the elements of the offense. “[T]he defendant’s actual conduct” does not matter. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504. So suppose a defendant bludgeons someone to death. An ordinary speaker of English would likely say the defendant committed a “crime of violence.” But the defendant might not have done so as § 924(c) uses that term. It would depend on the elements of the crime of which the defendant is convicted. Only when one knows the elements of the crime of conviction can one determine whether that crime necessarily, or  15 categorically, involves the actual, attempted, or threatened use of force so as to qualify as a “crime of violence.” The logic of the categorical approach naturally gives rise to another approach: the modified categorical approach. The modified categorical approach rests on a basic reality. Sometimes, a single statute provides two alternative elements, thereby creating two separate crimes. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505. In that case, courts applying the categorical approach must figure out which of the two separate crimes the defendant has committed in order to apply the categorical approach to that particular crime. See id. at 506. One must be careful, though, in determining whether a statute creates alternative elements, and therefore multiple crimes, or merely spells out “various factual means of committing a single” crime. Id. For example, a statute that proscribes “murder, including with a gun, knife, bat, or other dangerous object” should probably not be divided into separate crimes of gun murder, knife murder, bat murder, and other- dangerous-object murder. See id. (discussing a similar example). Instead, the statute is better thought of as spelling out various factual means for committing a single offense: murder. (Because that statute cannot be so divided, courts call it “indivisible.”) Moreover, to convict under that indivisible statute, “a jury need not find (or a defendant admit) any particular item: A jury could convict even if some jurors ‘conclude[d] that the defendant used a knife’ while others ‘conclude[d] he used a gun[.]’” Id. (quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)). On the other hand, a statute that proscribes “‘the lawful entry or the unlawful entry’ of a premises with the intent to steal,” and provides for greater punishment if the entry were unlawful, should probably be divided into “two different  16 offenses.” Id. at 505. (Because that statute can be so divided, courts term it “divisible.”) To convict under that divisible statute, every juror would need to agree either that the entry was unlawful or that it was lawful. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 90 (2020) (“A jury must reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict” consistent with the Constitution). Whether a statute is divisible makes a difference for purposes of the categorical approach. To see why, consider an example. Imagine a defendant points a gun at his landlord while taking the landlord’s crystal statue of a horse’s head. The defendant is then convicted under a statute that proscribes “taking another’s property under threat of violence or slander.” If that statute is divisible—i.e., if “threat of violence” and “threat of slander” are understood as alternative elements of separate crimes—the defendant presumably committed a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). He committed the crime of “taking another’s property under threat of violence,” and that would seem to have “as an element the . . . threatened use of physical force.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (so defining “crime of violence” under § 924(c)). But if the statute is indivisible— i.e., “threat of violence” and “threat of slander” are different factual means of committing a single crime—the defendant probably did not commit a “crime of violence.” A hypothetical defendant could commit that crime by taking his landlord’s horse-head statue while threatening to lie to the other tenants that the landlord spends his weekends at the racetrack gambling away the tenants’ security deposits. Spewing that sort of malicious falsehood, of course, would not appear to involve the actual, attempted, or threatened use of force. So the crime the defendant committed would not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c).  17 2. The Modified Categorical Approach as Applied to Hobbs Act Robbery Because it can be difficult to determine when a statute provides different factual means of committing a single crime (i.e., is indivisible) instead of different elements of different crimes (i.e., is divisible), courts have developed tools for drawing the distinction. Some tools are textual. For example, if the statute “itself identif[ies] which things must be charged,” those things are elements. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 518. But if the statute identifies which things “need not be” charged, those things are means. Id. Additionally, when “statutory alternatives carry different punishments,” the alternatives are elements, whereas when “a statutory list is drafted to offer ‘illustrative examples,’” the examples are factual means for committing a single offense. Id. (quoting United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014)). Sometimes, textual clues alone leave something to be desired. In that case, courts may look to the record of prior conviction to help determine whether the statutory alternatives are separate elements of separate crimes or various means to commit a single crime. See id. a. Hobbs Act Robbery Is a Divisible Offense The statute at issue in this case, the Hobbs Act, is divisible. It may be divided into the separate crimes of Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs Act extortion. 6 Thus, the modified categorical approach applies. 6 The Hobbs Act may be further divided. For instance, the Hobbs Act also creates separate offenses of Hobbs Act robbery and  18 We begin with the text of the statute. The Hobbs Act imposes criminal penalties on “[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do.” 18 U.S.C § 1951(a). The text suggests robbery and extortion are separate elements of separate crimes. The Hobbs Act offers separate legal definitions for robbery and extortion, listing a series of requirements for a crime to qualify as “robbery” and different requirements for a crime to qualify as “extortion.” Compare id. § 1951(b)(1) (defining “robbery” as “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury”), with § 1951(b)(2) (defining “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right”). Moreover, those legal definitions come in two distinct paragraphs. See id. § 1951(b)(1) (“robbery”), (b)(2) (“extortion”). That reaffirms that robbery and extortion are not just separate factual means to commit a single crime. Instead, “robbery” and “extortion” are different legal elements of different crimes. The text is also reaffirmed by other tools of analysis. For instance, the jury instructions labeled one of the Hobbs Act offenses as “Interference with Interstate Commerce by Robbery.” J.A. 594. The jury was instructed to determine whether each defendant took money or property “by robbery.” attempted Hobbs Act robbery. See Taylor, 596 U.S. at 851 (distinguishing the two); see also United States v. States, 72 F.4th 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2023) (“[B]ecause attempts and completed offenses are distinct crimes, . . . a statute that prohibits a crime and the attempt to commit it is likely to be divisible[.]”).  19 Id. No other “means” were listed in the alternative. So to convict, the jury had to find the defendant committed “robbery.” The separate instruction for the crime of “Conspiracy to Interfere with Interstate Commerce by Robbery” is of a piece. It required the jury to find that there was an agreement to commit robbery. Id. at 592. It did not instruct the jury that the defendant could be convicted of conspiracy if some jurors found he had committed conspiracy to rob and others found he committed conspiracy to extort. Our reading of the Hobbs Act accords with precedent. “[C]ourts across the country . . . have long held that Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs Act extortion are separate and distinct crimes[.]” United States v. Armstrong, 122 F.4th 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2024) (collecting cases). Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has referred to “the substantive offense of Hobbs Act extortion,” Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. 282, 292 (2016), in addition to the separate offense of “Hobbs Act robbery,” Taylor, 596 U.S. at 848. b. Burwell Is Not to the Contrary In United States v. Burwell, our court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), which generally “criminalizes bank robbery completed ‘by force and violence, or by intimidation,’ or ‘by extortion.’” 122 F.4th 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)). The question presented was whether extortion was a separate factual means for committing federal bank robbery or whether extortion was an alternative element of a separate crime. Burwell concluded that extortion was a separate factual means for committing the single crime of federal bank robbery.  20 Burwell’s logic depended in part on the fact that within the subsection criminalizing federal bank robbery, Congress had provided a paragraph break. In the first paragraph, Congress had proscribed federal bank robbery. In the second paragraph, Congress had proscribed federal bank burglary. From that, Burwell reasoned that if Congress wanted to create separate crimes, it knew to use separate paragraphs. See Burwell, 122 F.4th at 990; cf. United States v. Butler, 949 F.3d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 2020) (“a paragraph break often signals that a new idea is coming,” thus it is “logical to conclude that a paragraph break in a statute signals a new offense”). Thus, according to Burwell, “force and violence,” “intimidation,” and “extortion”—all contained within the same paragraph—had to be separate factual means to commit the singular crime of federal bank robbery. Burwell, 122 F.4th at 990. Here, though, the relevant subsection of the Hobbs Act contains a single paragraph. There is no separate paragraph denoting a separate crime from which one can infer Congressional intent to create separate crimes for extortion and robbery. Indeed, if anything, Burwell’s reasoning bolsters our holding that the Hobbs Act makes extortion and robbery separate elements of separate crimes. Burwell said that paragraph divisions within a statute may mark different crimes. The Hobbs Act divides robbery and extortion, placing them in distinct paragraphs. Thus, Burwell reinforces that the Hobbs Act makes robbery and extortion different crimes. 3. Hobbs Act Robbery Is a Crime of Violence Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). Assuming Hobbs Act robbery is not further divisible, it requires “an unlawful taking . . . of personal property” against an individual’s “will, by means of actual or threatened  21 force, or violence, or fear of injury . . . to his person or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). Regardless of whether the robbery is committed by force, violence, or fear of injury, it necessarily requires the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” Id. § 924(c)(3)(A). Even presuming § 924(c) requires “violent force,” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (so interpreting § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)’s similar language), a robbery committed by “force” or “violence” naturally involves violent force. In the context of a robbery statute like the Hobbs Act, terms like “force” or “violence” typically refer to physical force. See Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423, 431 (2025). So the only question in § 1951(b)(1)—which requires force, violence, or fear of injury—is whether “fear of injury” involves “violent force.” It does. The “fear of injury” prong, whether to one’s “person or property,” does not appear in isolation. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). It is preceded by the terms “force” and “violence,” both of which are inherently physical. See Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977) (counseling that several “words grouped in a list should be given related meaning”); Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015) (“[A] word is known by the company it keeps[.]”). In that context, the term “fear of injury” is best understood to mean “fear of physical injury,” i.e., the “violent force” contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. Yet again, we are not alone in our understanding of the statute. Every court of appeals that has addressed this issue has reached the same conclusion: Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. See United States v. García-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 107–09 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 60  22 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Stoney, 62 F.4th 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Buck, 847 F.3d 267, 275 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285, 291–92 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Fox, 878 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Jones, 919 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Eckford, 77 F.4th 1228, 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 521 (2023), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199 (9th Cir. 2026); United States v. Melgar-Cabrera, 892 F.3d 1053, 1066 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355, 1363– 64 (11th Cir. 2023); see Armstrong, 122 F.4th at 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2024). Today, we join our sister circuits in that conclusion. D. Onyewu’s Due Process Claim Onyewu individually advances an argument that the Government deprived him of due process when it wired his plea offer to his co-defendants’ offers. We hold that it did not. When the Government wires a plea offer—i.e., conditions one defendant’s plea offer on other defendants’ acceptance of their respective plea offers—it “does not, per se, offend due process.” United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1992). So long as “the government had probable cause to arrest and prosecute” all the “defendants in a related crime,” and the Government did not “conduct[] itself in bad faith . . . to generate additional leverage over the defendant,” the “wired plea is constitutional.” Id. at 1021. Under that test, the wiring of Onyewu’s plea was constitutional. Onyewu does not argue there was no probable cause nor that the crimes were unrelated. He argues only that the Government acted “in bad faith . . . to generate additional leverage over” him. Id. That fails.  23 Onyewu has not proven that the Government made a bad- faith attempt to assert additional leverage over him. Indeed, nothing Onyewu has asserted shows “improper . . . pressure to force him to plead guilty.” Id. at 1020; see also id. at 1021 (“The question, of course, is whether the practice of plea wiring is so coercive as to risk inducing false guilty pleas.”). On the contrary, the more likely explanation for the Government’s wiring of the plea deal was efficiency. The goal was that either all three defendants would enter plea deals, or the Government would just take all three to trial. See United States v. Williams, 827 F.3d 1134, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that the Government’s preference to either accept guilty pleas from both defendants or trying both “provides no basis to conclude that the Government’s offer was coercive or made in bad faith”). Moreover, it is somewhat challenging to find coercion on this record given that Onyewu did not even accept the plea offer. Cf. Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1021 (“To say that a practice is ‘coercive’ or renders a plea ‘involuntary’ means only that it creates improper pressure that would be likely to