Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two November 10, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 60739-5-II Respondent, v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION BRIAN T. BAKER, Appellant. VELJACIC, C.J. — Brian T. Baker appeals his convictions of one count of indecent liberties by forcible compulsion and one count of attempted indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. Baker argues insufficient evidence supported both of his convictions. Additionally, Baker argues the trial court erred in finding the communication between Baker and his wife was not private and that the privacy act should have barred admission of the recording. Lastly, Baker argues that the trial court failed to add limiting language to his community custody condition, requiring him to submit to polygraph examinations. We remand for the sole purpose of adding limiting language to the polygraph examination community custody condition. We otherwise affirm. 60739-5-II FACTS I. BACKGROUND Baker and Jennifer Baker1 were married. The two lived in a house with Jennifer’s daughter, N.J.-L., and N.J.-L.’s two-year-old son. Prior to the incident, N.J.-L. had not spoken to Baker in six weeks. During this time, Baker wanted to kick N.J.-L. out of the house. In the early morning of June 15, 2024, N.J.-L. woke up not feeling well. N.J.-L. got up to get some water and saw Baker hunched over on the kitchen counter. N.J.-L. decided to go to urgent care at around 7:00 a.m. Urgent care then sent N.J.-L. to the emergency room. N.J.-L. was at the hospital for about three or four hours. While at the hospital, N.J.-L. received a text from Baker that read, “I love you.” 2 Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 46. N.J.-L. explained that this was strange because she had not spoken to Baker in six weeks. II. FIRST BEDROOM INCIDENT N.J.-L. arrived home later that afternoon and Baker greeted her. Baker said to N.J.-L., “I’m here for you. What can I help you with? Let me . . . take care of you.” 2 RP at 45. N.J.-L. kept telling him that she was sick and just wanted to go to her room. N.J.-L. then went to her bedroom because she was not feeling well. N.J.-L. was “profusely vomiting” and was “carrying around a bowl” with her. 2 RP at 45. N.J.-L.’s son was in her bedroom and Jennifer was in and out of the bedroom all day. Jennifer began drinking when N.J.-L. arrived home. When N.J.-L. went into her bedroom, Baker followed her in. N.J.-L. was sitting at the foot of the bed with the bowl in front of her. Baker kept saying, “I’m here for you, sweetheart. It’s okay baby girl. Quit . . . puking. It’s okay.” 2 RP at 48. N.J.-L. noticed Baker was intoxicated. 1 For clarity, we will refer to Brian Baker as “Baker” and Jennifer Baker as “Jennifer.” No disrespect is intended. 2 60739-5-II Baker then got behind N.J.-L., as she sat on the bed, his entire body weight pressed against her back. Baker was rubbing N.J.-L.’s back and shoulders. N.J.-L. was nudging Baker away and trying to push his hands off her. Baker then grabbed N.J.-L.’s breast from behind. N.J.-L. pushed Baker’s arm away, scooted away from him and said, “I want to be left alone. I don’t feel good.” 2 RP at 48. Baker responded, “You don’t get to be alone. That’s not how it works.” 2 RP at 48. After N.J.-L. pushed Baker away, Baker again reached from behind N.J.-L. and grabbed her breast a second time. N.J.- L.’s son was also on the bed during the incident. N.J.-L. immediately stood up and left to take a shower. III. BATHROOM INCIDENT N.J.-L. went into her bathroom to take a shower, which was connected to the interior of N.J.-L’s bedroom. When done showering, but while still in the shower, N.J.-L. needed a towel. Through the frosted glass shower door, N.J.-L. saw a figure in the bathroom, and believing it was her mom Jennifer, asked her to grab a towel. When N.J.-L. opened the shower door to receive the towel, she realized it was Baker who was in the bathroom with her. Baker looked her up and down, and N.J.-L. immediately closed the shower door. N.J.-L. stated that she was uncomfortable and felt violated. Baker eventually left the bathroom, and N.J.-L. was able to get out of the shower. After the shower, N.J.-L. got ready to take a nap with her son. N.J.-L. locked her bedroom door. She said, “I just wasn’t comfortable sleeping with my door unlocked at that time.” 2 RP at 60. N.J.- L. stated that during the incidents, Jennifer had told Baker to leave N.J.-L. alone and in “one or two instances had physically tried to pull him away.” 2 RP at 58. 3 60739-5-II IV. SECOND BEDROOM INCIDENT After her nap, N.J.-L. woke up and unlocked her bedroom door to gather toys for her son to play with in the bedroom. N.J.-L. took the toys and her son back into the bedroom. N.J.-L. closed the door but did not lock it. N.J.-L. and her son were on the bed in their bedroom when Baker walked into the room with no pants on, wearing only a t-shirt, with his penis fully erect. Baker walked into the room and began walking toward N.J.-L., who was sitting on the bed. N.J.- L. stated, “[Baker’s penis] was fully erect. . . . I saw his pubic hairs and I saw his testicles and everything.” 2 RP at 63. She described feeling “[t]errified” and “very violated.” 2 RP at 63. After Baker took a few steps toward N.J.-L., she immediately jumped up and screamed, “Get the ‘F’ out of here” and something along the lines of, “Get out of my room. That isn’t okay.” 2 RP at 63-64. Baker then stepped back out of the room and N.J.-L. shut and locked the door. Baker began to bang on the door, telling N.J.-L. to let him in. Shortly after, Baker began yelling while conversing with Jennifer. V. AUDIO RECORDING N.J.-L. began recording the conversation between Baker and Jennifer by sliding the phone under her bedroom door. N.J.-L. locked her bedroom door and stated she could hear Baker “yelling for sure. Absolutely yelling.” 2 RP at 67. Baker was exclaiming his desire to have N.J.-L. move out of the house. Additionally, N.J.-L. heard Baker say that he was going to take his nut sack and rub it on my chin in front of my son, and that he wouldn’t care. He was saying that I needed to get out right that minute, that I needed to leave. He was saying that I wasn’t sick, I didn’t actually have cancer, and that there was nothing wrong with me. And then he eventually said that they were going to go bowling—him and my mom were going to go bowling with my head. 2 RP at 115. N.J.-L. explained that this made her feel disgusted and that she was worried about “what [her] son was going to witness.” 2 RP at 118. 4 60739-5-II VI. 911 CALL After N.J.-L. ended the audio recording, she immediately called 911. Police arrived at the home and contacted Baker. Baker was clearly intoxicated. Officers observed the smell of alcohol, slurred speech, and Baker wobbling and swaying as he spoke with them. Baker was placed under arrest. En route to the jail, Baker made several statements such as, “drinking is not illegal,” “touching someone is not illegal,” and “Indecent liberties? This is my house!” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 116. The State charged Baker with indecent liberties by forcible compulsion—domestic violence, assault in the fourth degree—domestic violence,2 and attempted indecent liberties by forcible compulsion—domestic violence. VII. TRIAL Baker waived his right to trial by jury and a bench trial was held. Prior to trial, Baker objected to the State’s motion to admit the recordings of the defendant’s statements. Baker argued that the audio recordings were private communications and violated Washington’s two-party consent rules pursuant to RCW 9.73.030. The trial court reserved ruling, pending an offer of proof by both parties during witness testimony. At trial, N.J.-L., officer Jeffrey Cabanting-Rafael, and Jennifer testified consistent with the above factual account. Following N.J.-L.’s testimony, the trial court held a CrR 3.5 hearing concerning the admissibility of the audio recording. The court found “that the conversation itself was not a private conversation, and as a result does not fall into the ambit of the Privacy Act.” 2 RP at 257. The court rendered its decision based on the volume of Baker’s communication and knowing there was 2 The assault charge was dismissed at the close of the State’s case for lack of sufficient evidence. 5 60739-5-II a third party that could overhear the conversation. The court held that the audio recordings were admissible because the conversation was not private and therefore did not violate the privacy act. After both parties rested and gave closing arguments, the trial court ruled that both N.J.- L.’s and Cabanting-Rafael’s testimonies were credible. The trial court ultimately found Baker guilty of indecent liberties by forcible compulsion (count 1, breast grabbing incident) and attempted indecent liberties by forcible compulsion (count 3, the bedroom incident). VIII. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE The court imposed community custody conditions. Condition 17 required Baker to “[s]ubmit to polygraph examinations at the direction of the Community Corrections Officer.” CP at 146. Baker timely appeals. ANALYSIS I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Baker argues that insufficient evidence supports his convictions because the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove the element of forcible compulsion for either charge. We disagree. A. Legal Principles Whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is a question of constitutional law reviewed de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. State v. Roberts, 5 Wn.3d 222, 237, 572 P.3d 1191 (2025); State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). The sufficiency of the evidence standard remains the same when reviewing a bench trial decision, “appellate courts must 6 60739-5-II consider all the evidence presented to determine whether a rational fact finder could find the charged crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Roberts, 5 Wn.3d at 234 (emphasis omitted); see also State v. Frahm, 193 Wn.2d 590, 595, 444 P.3d 595 (2019); Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. “Circumstantial and direct evidence are to be considered equally reliable.” State v. Cardenas- Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 266, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). We “defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence.” Roberts, 5 Wn.3d at 234. “A person is guilty of indecent liberties when he or she knowingly causes another person to have sexual contact with him or her or another: (a) By forcible compulsion.” RCW 9A.44.100(1)(a). Forcible compulsion is “physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury.” RCW 9A.44.010(3). The physical force must be directed at overcoming the victim’s resistance and distinguishable from force inherent in any act of sexual contact. State v. McKnight, 54 Wn. App. 521, 527-58, 774 P.2d 532 (1989). “We find no rational basis for requiring resistance to be manifest in all cases by physical means, and in fact, are persuaded that public policy considerations militate against such a requirement.” Id. at 525 (holding that given the victim’s physical weakness, unsophistication and isolation, the victim’s verbal resistance was reasonable to meet the forcible compulsion element of rape in the second degree). Indecent liberties by forcible compulsion requires the defendant overcome some form of resistance, either verbal or physical, from the victim. Id. Additionally, the defendant’s force used to overcome the resistance must be force different than the sexual contact itself. The unpublished opinion, State v. Curtis, No. 54359-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2022) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2054359-1-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf, 7 60739-5-II supports this proposition as it relates to indecent liberties in particular. Though it is unpublished, we approve of this approach, as we discuss further below. Forcible compulsion does not always require resistance by physical means. McKnight, 54 Wn. App. at 525. In McKnight, the victim was 14 years old and was raped by the defendant who was 17. Id. at 522. The victim did not physically resist. Id. at 522-23. The defendant slowly pushed her down, disrobed her, and began to penetrate the victim. Id. at 521-23. She told the defendant to stop multiple times, and expressed that the sexual contact hurt, yet he did not stop. Id. The court held that “[g]iven [the victim’s] physical weakness and unsophistication and her isolation in the apartment with appellant, a reasonable juror could conclude [the victim’s] resistance was reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 527. The minimal force used by the defendant was sufficient for the court to find sufficient evidence of indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. Id. Additionally, the force used by the defendant must be force intended to overcome resistance. Curtis, No. 54359-1-II, slip op. at 16-17. In Curtis, the victim was repeatedly turning away from the defendant, and the defendant pulled the victim onto their back to engage in the sexual touching. Id. This court held that the “physical force was intended to overcome [the victim’s] resistance; it was not force inherent in any act of sexual touching. Significantly, the force was sufficient to leave bruises on [the victim’s] breast.” Id. at 17. Overall, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion requires a showing of (1) at least minimal resistance, either verbal or physical by the victim, which is reasonable under the circumstances (2) a showing of the defendant overcoming such resistance, (3) by force which is not inherent in the sexual contact. See McKnight, 54 Wn. App. at 521, 774 P.2d 532; Curtis, slip op. at 16-17. 8 60739-5-II 1. Indecent Liberties by Forcible Compulsion (Count 1) Baker first asserts insufficient evidence supports his conviction for count 1, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. Baker argues that N.J.-L. did not resist. He also appears to argue that he did not use any force to overcome resistance because his grabbing of N.J.-L.’s breast was spontaneous. The State argues that Baker “worked to overcome” N.J.-L.’s resistance, both verbal and physical, sufficient to support a conviction for count 1. Br. of Resp’t at 21. We agree with the State. In the case before us, consistent with McKnight, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that N.J.-L. resisted and that Baker used force outside of the sexual contact to overcome N.J.-L.’s resistance. N.J.-L. had told Baker several times that she did not feel well and wanted to be left alone. Additionally, because N.J.-L. was vomiting and physically ill, any form of resistance was likely to be minimal. Aside from verbal resistance, N.J.-L. physically resisted by nudging and pushing Baker away while his entire body weight was leaned up against her and he was rubbing N.J.-L’s shoulders and back. These forms of resistance by N.J.-L. were reasonable given the circumstances and are sufficient to find both verbal and physical resistance. A rational finder of fact could conclude that Baker overcame the resistance. Baker moving onto the bed in such a close position that his body was touching that of N.J.-L., pressing his entire body weight against N.J.-L. communicated to her his size, strength, and weight advantage. His positioning behind her made it impossible for her to see what he was doing. Similar to McKnight, where the defendant slowly laid the victim down and engaged in sexual contact, Baker’s contact here was physical contact with minimal force leading up to the sexual contact. A rational finder 9 60739-5-II of fact could conclude that his rubbing of her back and shoulders was a way of getting N.J.-L. to let her guard down, facilitating his sudden sexual contact. Baker also used physical force to overcome the resistance. While N.J.-L. was resisting and Baker was leaning on her, he reached around her body to grab her breast. N.J.-L. then resisted again and pushed Baker’s hand away. But again Baker reached around her body and grabbed her breast a second time. All this is sufficient to find physical force overcoming N.J.-L’s resistance outside of the sexual contact itself. A rational finder of fact could conclude that there was sufficient resistance for Baker to overcome and that Baker overcame it. Baker relies on State v. Ritola, 63 Wn. App. 252, 817 P.2d 1390 (1991), and State v. Gene, 20 Wn. App. 2d 211, 499 P.3d 214 (2021), to argue that Baker’s contact was spontaneous and therefore there was no prefatory resistance. He also argues there was no physical contact outside of the contact inherent in the sexual touching. The record refutes this argument. We have already determined that a rational finder of fact could conclude Baker’s conduct was enough to show he overcame N.J.-L.’s resistance. Accordingly, Ritola and Gene are inapposite and Baker’s argument fails. Additionally, Baker appears to argue that resistance must be physical and the force to overcome it must be physical and asserts neither occurred here. 3 Baker cites Gene and Ritola for the proposition that there must be some resistance to overcome in order to establish forcible compulsion. But the facts of Gene and Ritola are distinguishable from those of this case. In Ritola, 3 Baker appears to be conflating the three separate requirements to show forcible compulsion. Specifically, Baker argues that spontaneity goes to the overcoming resistance requirement, when case law makes it clear that spontaneous touching can undercut a victim’s ability to resist at all, thereby resulting in a failure of proof of one aspect of a forcible compulsion showing. But as we conclude above, resistance was established. Ritola, 63 Wn. App. at 253. By conflating the several distinct aspects of forcible compulsion, Baker fails to identify cases that clearly support his assertions. 10 60739-5-II the victim was caught so off-guard there was no time to react or resist, and without resistance, there was nothing to overcome, which undercut the forcible compulsion element. 63 Wn. App. at 253. Similarly, in Gene, the victim was completely unconscious and therefore unable to react or resist. 20 Wn. App. 2d at 224. As we conclude above, a rational finder of fact could conclude that N.J.-L. verbally requesting Baker leave her alone, nudging Baker away, and pushing Baker’s hands away were sufficient resistance under the circumstances. See McKnight, 54 Wn. App. at 527 (verbal resistance in the appropriate factual context can equate to reasonable resistance when considering forcible compulsion). N.J.-L. was capable of resisting, and she did resist. Baker’s assertion that his touching was not force to overcome the resistance separate from the sexual contact itself is also belied by the record. As we have determined above, a rational fact finder could conclude that his conduct before the sexual touching in the form of positioning himself behind her and leaning his body weight against her was sufficient force to overcome her resistance and that this was separate from the sexual touching. When viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Baker’s conviction for count 1, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. 2. Attempted Indecent Liberties by Forcible Compulsion (Count 3) Baker argues that when entering N.J.-L.’s room, walking straight toward her with no pants and an erection, he was neither attempting to overcome resistance nor threatening to overcome resistance as required under RCW 9A.44.100(1), and therefore there is insufficient evidence for a conviction on count 3. Baker relies on two cases, State v. Khalif, No. 84221-8-I, (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2024) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/842218.pdf, and State v. 11 60739-5-II Anguiano, No. 327183-III, (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2015) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/327183.unp.pdf, to argue that Baker’s conduct, without physical contact, was not a substantial step toward the crime of indecent liberties by forcible compulsion and not conduct that corroborates Baker’s criminal purpose The State argues that no physical contact was necessary and that Baker’s actions throughout the day “already showed what [Baker’s] intent and plan was.” Br of Respondent at 24. We conclude that on these facts Baker’s actions were strongly corroborative of his criminal purpose. To convict an individual of attempted indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual took a substantial step toward, “knowingly [causing] another person to have sexual contact with him or her or another: (a) By forcible compulsion.” RCW 9A.44.100. Forcible compulsion is defined above. A person is guilty of attempt to commit a crime if they intend to commit a specific crime and do “any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” RCW 9A.28.020(1) (emphasis added). Mere preparation to commit a crime is not a substantial step. State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 449, 584 P.2d 382 (1978). The conduct must be “strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.” State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 899, 270 P.3d 591 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, a rational fact finder could conclude that Baker had made advances on N.J.-L. throughout the day—advances that escalated as the day went on. It began with a text from Baker to N.J.-L. that was sent to her while she was at the hospital. The text read, “I love you,” which N.J.-L. testified was strange in light of their six-week history of no communication. 2 RP at 45. The two had not spoken due to Baker wanting to kick N.J.-L. out of the house. Once N.J.-L. returned home, Baker insisted on taking care of her. Baker was saying things such as, “I’m here 12 60739-5-II for you. What can I help you with? . . . Let me take care of you.” 2 RP at 45. Baker made these ingratiating comments to N.J.-L. while she was sick and vulnerable. These comments were unwanted and inconsistent with the nature of their relationship. In further escalation, when N.J.-L. returned home Baker followed her into her bedroom and began to interact with her physically. Baker rubbed on her back and shoulders, leaning his entire body weight up against her. Baker again escalated his contact from merely physical, to sexual in nature, grabbing N.J.-L’s breast two separate times. Baker’s intent became clear, he was making sexual advances on her and taking advantage of her vulnerability. Continuing, Baker, in an obvious invasion of personal space, entered the bathroom while N.J.-L. was showering, waited on the toilet while she showered, and looked at her disrobed body up and down. N.J.-L., shaken from this next escalation, locked her bedroom door to nap with her son. Baker demonstrated both physical and sexual desires in his interactions with N.J.-L., all within a few hours to this point. Baker’s escalating contact was a sudden change from a status of non-communication with N.J.-L., to sexual predation. Viewing Baker’s conduct that forms the basis of the attempt charge in count 3 in light of the circumstances that day, Baker opening the door, entering the bedroom wearing nothing but a T-shirt, his penis erect and genitals exposed, then advancing directly toward N.J.-L., who was on the bed where Baker had already made previous sexual contact, is strongly corroborative of Baker’s criminal purpose: to contact his penis with some part of N.J.-L. toward his goal of sexual gratification. After being shut out of N.J.-L.’s room, Baker expressed his desire to be let back in, and banged on the door. He continued to loudly rant about N.J.-L. and expressed wanting to rub his “nut sack” on her face. 2 RP at 115. 13 60739-5-II Viewing all the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Baker intended the crime of indecent liberties, and that his conduct was strongly corroborative of his criminal purpose and was a substantial step toward completion of the crime. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported Baker’s conviction for count 3, attempted indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, beyond a reasonable doubt. II. WASHINGTON PRIVACY ACT Baker argues that the trial court erred in admitting the audio recording because it was a private conversation, and therefore N.J.-L. recording the conversation violated Washington’s privacy act. Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred, any error was harmless. Where an error is not constitutional in nature, we apply a nonconstitutional harmless error analysis. State v. Barry, 183 Wn.2d 297, 303, 352 P.3d 161 (2015). Under this standard, “‘an accused cannot avail himself of error as a ground for reversal unless it has been prejudicial.’” Id. (quoting State v. Cunningham, 93 Wn.2d 823, 831, 613 P.2d 1139 (1980)). “In assessing whether the error was harmless, we must measure the admissible evidence of the defendant’s guilt against the prejudice, if any, caused by the inadmissible evidence.” Id. Here, while Baker’s statements were also memorialized in the recording, N.J.-L. separately testified to all of Baker’s statements contained in the recording. Baker argues that the recording corroborates N.J.-L.’s testimony and is therefore prejudicial. But N.J.-L.’s testimony was corroborated aside from the recording. Baker told police, “touching someone is not illegal,” and “Indecent liberties? This is my house!” CP at 116. In doing so, he confirmed a continuation of the defiant tone present in the statements N.J.-L. attributed to him in her testimony. His statements also corroborate the conduct N.J.-L. testified to. 14 60739-5-II Jennifer’s testimony also corroborated N.J.-L.’s testimony. Jennifer testified, “he got upset because he—you know, she slammed the door on him, and he’s, like, I want you out of my house.” 5 RP at 314. Based on this additional corroboration, Baker’s assertion that the recording corroborated N.J.-L. and therefore its admission was not harmless fails. We conclude that if there was any error in the admission of the audio recording, it was harmless. III. POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION Last, Baker argues that the trial court failed to add limiting language to community custody condition 17, which required Baker to submit to polygraph testing. The State concedes that the community custody condition needs to be modified. We agree with Baker and accept the State’s concession. “Trial courts have authority to impose polygraph testing.” State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 342, 957 P.2d 655 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)). However, polygraph testing should be limited to monitoring compliance with other community custody conditions, “not as a fishing expedition to discover evidence of other crimes, past or present.” State v. Combs, 102 Wn. App. 949, 953, 10 P.3d 1101 (2000). We remand and direct the trial court to add limiting language to limit the scope of the polygraph community custody condition 17. 15 60739-5-II CONCLUSION We remand for the purpose of adding limiting language to community custody condition 17, the polygraph examination. We otherwise affirm. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Veljacic, C.J. We concur: Glasgow, J. Price, J. 16