Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Travis John Alston, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2025-000365 Appeal From Richland County Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-480 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellate Defender Sarah Elizabeth Shipe, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Brian Hollis Gibbs, and Solicitor Byron E. Gipson, all of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Travis John Alston appeals his conviction for resisting arrest and his sentence of one year in prison. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred when it denied his directed verdict motion because the State failed to present evidence that tended to prove that his underlying arrest—which was initiated under section 56-5-2540 of the South Carolina Code (2018)—was lawful. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. We hold the trial court properly denied Alston's directed verdict motion because, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the State presented evidence of all the necessary elements of section 16-9-320(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015). See State v. Elders, 386 S.C. 474, 480, 688 S.E.2d 857, 860 (Ct. App. 2010) ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, an appellate court must employ the same standard as the trial court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."); State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014) ("On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, [an appellate court] views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State."). We find the evidence presented at trial established that Alston (1) knowingly or willfully (2) resisted (3) an arrest being made (4) by a person Alston knew or reasonably should have known was a law enforcement officer. See State v. Rogers, 405 S.C. 554, 563, 748 S.E.2d 265, 270 (Ct. App. 2013) ("If there is any direct evidence, or if there is substantial circumstantial evidence, that reasonably tends to prove the defendant's guilt, we must find the trial court properly submitted the case to the jury."); State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 237, 781 S.E.2d 352, 354 (2016) ("[T]he court must concern itself solely with the existence or non-existence of evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer guilt."); § 16-9-320(A) ("It is unlawful for a person knowingly and wil[l]fully . . . to resist an arrest being made by one whom the person knows or reasonably should know is a law enforcement officer, whether under process or not."). Regarding whether the law requires that the underlying arrest be lawful, we find there is no such requirement. We find that the General Assembly removed any requirement of a lawful arrest when it amended section 16-9-320 of the South Carolina Code (2015) in 1990. 1 See Key Corp. Cap., Inc. v. County of Beaufort, 1 In 1980, when section 16-9-320 was added to Chapter 9 of Title 16 of the South Carolina Code, it read: Section 16-9-320. Any person who knowingly and wil[l]fully: (a) Opposes or resists any law enforcement officer in serving, executing or attempting to serve or execute any legal writ or process or who resists any lawful arrest, 373 S.C. 55, 60, 644 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2007) ("We have long acknowledged the presumption that in adopting an amendment to a statute, the Legislature intended to change the existing law."); id. at 61, 644 S.E.2d at 678 ("Because the amendment materially changed the terminology of the statute, a departure from existing law clearly was intended, rather than a clarification of original intent."); State v. Whitner, 399 S.C. 547, 552, 732 S.E.2d 861, 864 (2012) ("Absent an ambiguity, the court will look to the plain meaning of the words used to determine their effect."). Additionally, we hold the existence of a legal basis for Alston's underlying arrest was irrelevant to a determination of whether the State had presented sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of section 16-9-320(A). See State v. Brannon, 388 S.C. 498, 503, 697 S.E.2d 593, 596 (2010) ("There are multiple elements to the crime of resisting arrest as codified in section 16-9-320(A)."); id. ("Under section 16-9-320(A), the State must demonstrate that the accused knowingly and willfully resisted an arrest being made."); id. at 504, 697 S.E.2d at 597 (finding whether officers had probable cause to arrest the respondent was "immaterial to [its] analysis"); id. ("Under the plain language of section 16-9-320(A), we are only whether under process or not, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . (b) Assaults, beats or wounds any law enforcement officer engaged in serving, executing or attempting to serve or execute any legal writ or process or who assaults, beats or wounds such officer when such person is resisting any lawful arrest, whether under process or not, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . 1980 Act. No. 511. In 1990, this statute was amended to change the phrase "lawful arrest" in both paragraphs to "arrest." The amended version included in both paragraphs a requirement that the arrest be "made by one whom the person knows or reasonably should know is a law enforcement officer." 1990 Act. No. 598. In contrast, section 16-3-625 of the South Carolina Code (2015), which concerns resisting arrest with a deadly weapon and was also enacted in 1980, has retained the requirement that a person charged with this offense must "resist[] the lawful efforts of a law enforcement officer to arrest him or another person." (emphasis added). focused on determining whether an arrest was being made at the time of [the respondent's] flight."). AFFIRMED.2 THOMAS, KONDUROS, and CURTIS, JJ., concur. 2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.