United States v. Tiye Jones
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-13972
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-13972
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TIYE DEVAUGH JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00170-SDM-TGW-1
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tiye Jones appeals his conviction and fifteen-year sentence
for possessing a firearm and ammunition after a felony conviction,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Jones argues that
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-13972
the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and by
enhancing his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”). After careful review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm Jones’s conviction and sentence.
I.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Early in the morning
on March 5, 2021, Tampa Police Department officers Jorge Ta-
margo, Michael Townsend, and Alias Trevino were on patrol in
East Tampa in an unmarked police car. At around 1:00 a.m., the
officers conducted a traffic stop of a white Mazda, driven by Jones,
for failure to come to a complete stop at a stop sign.
Officer Tamargo approached the driver’s side of the Mazda,
while Officer Townsend went to the passenger side. Jones opened
his window a crack, and Tamargo explained the basis for the stop
and asked for, and received, Jones’s license. Officer Trevino took
the license back to the police car to run Jones’s information.
Officer Tamargo testified that, as he was speaking with
Jones, he smelled a “strong odor” of burnt marijuana coming from
the Mazda, and he saw “green leafy flakes” next to a tobacco leaf
on the empty front passenger seat. Officer Townsend likewise tes-
tified that he saw “small granules of a green leafy substance” on the
passenger seat, which he believed to be “shake” marijuana.
Officer Tamargo asked Jones whether the car contained any
narcotics, firearms, marijuana, or hemp, and Jones said no. Then,
based on the odor and presence of suspected marijuana, Tamargo
told Jones that they planned to remove him from the car so they
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25-13972 Opinion of the Court 3
could search for drugs. Around the same time, Officer Trevino no-
tified Tamargo that Jones was on probation and subject to search
conditions.
Jones then resisted the officers’ attempts to remove him
from the car, causing a scuffle that led to his handcuffing. Once
Jones was out of the car and detained, the officers began searching
the car and found a loaded handgun.
II.
Jones was indicted for possessing a firearm and ammunition
as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The su-
perseding indictment alleged that Jones was subject to enhanced
penalties under the ACCA, see id. § 924(e), because he had at least
three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug
offense, namely convictions for (1) strongarm robbery, (2) aggra-
vated battery, and (3) resisting an offense with violence.
Jones moved to suppress evidence of the gun and statements
he made during the traffic stop. He argued that the odor and pres-
ence of suspected marijuana did not establish probable cause for a
warrantless search given Florida’s recent legalization of hemp,
which looked and smelled like marijuana.
At an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge heard testi-
mony from the three officers involved and watched footage from
the officers’ body cameras. Following the hearing, the magistrate
judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) that the mo-
tion to suppress be denied.
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-13972
The R&R found that the odor of marijuana provided proba-
ble cause to search the Mazda under this Court’s precedent, not-
withstanding the legalization of hemp. The R&R further con-
cluded that, because Jones was a probationer subject to a search
condition, the relevant standard was “reasonable suspicion,” not
“probable cause,” and that reasonable suspicion existed because the
officers smelled and observed what they reasonably believed to be
marijuana. Jones filed objections, arguing that probable cause was
lacking because the officers could not distinguish between lawful
hemp and unlawful marijuana.
The district court adopted the R&R over Jones’s objections.
Jones eventually waived his right to a jury trial and executed a joint
stipulation of facts, upon which the district court adjudicated him
guilty at a bench trial in July 2025.
The district court sentenced Jones to 180 months of impris-
onment, the mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA.
Jones had argued that the ACCA enhancement should not apply
because the prior offenses were committed nonviolently. But the
court found that Jones’s prior offenses categorically qualified as
crimes of violence under this Court’s precedent. Jones now ap-
peals.
III.
Jones first argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop and
search of the Mazda.
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25-13972 Opinion of the Court 5
On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we re-
view factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Thompson, 188 F.4th 1318, 1335 (11th Cir. 2026). We
construe the facts “in the light most favorable to the government
as the prevailing party.” Id. We may affirm the denial of a motion
to suppress on any ground supported by the record. United States
v. Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d 409, 415 (11th Cir. 2016).
Law enforcement may conduct a warrantless search of a ve-
hicle if it’s operational and there is probable cause to search it.
United States v. Morley, 99 F.4th 1328, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2024).
“[P]robable cause exists when, under the totality of the circum-
stances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in the vehicle.” Id. at 1337 (quotation marks
omitted). Probable cause “deals with probabilities, not hard cer-
tainties, and thus turns on a common-sense” assessment of the sit-
uation facing the officers. Thompson, 188 F.4th at 1336 (quotation
marks omitted).
A warrantless search is also permitted when an “officer has
reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condi-
tion is engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 121 (2001). “[W]hen deciding whether reasonable suspi-
cion exists, we consider the totality of the circumstances and ask
whether the detaining officers have a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Joseph, 189
F.4th 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 2026) (brackets and quotation marks
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-13972
omitted). “[R]easonable suspicion may be formed by observing ex-
clusively legal activity.” Id. (cleaned up).
Under our precedent, “the smell of burnt marijuana emanat-
ing from a vehicle is sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle.”
Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 560 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015); see United
States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1339 (11th Cir. 2018) (“We have ex-
plained that an officer’s credible testimony that he smelled mariju-
ana can establish probable cause.”). Likewise, we have held that
“[t]he smell of marijuana alone may provide a basis for reasonable
suspicion.” United States v. Harden, 104 F.4th 830, 839 (11th Cir.
2024) (quotation marks omitted).
Jones maintains that the odor or presence of suspected ma-
rijuana did not provide probable cause given Florida’s legalization
of hemp and medical marijuana. See Fla. Stat. §§ 381.986,
581.217(3). He cites Florida appellate caselaw holding that, based
on these changes in law, the odor of marijuana is no longer suffi-
cient on its own to establish probable cause in Florida. Williams v.
State, 421 So. 3d 809, 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025). Even so, it’s undis-
puted that some marijuana “remains illegal,” and that “odor is a
valid factor to be considered along with all others under the totality
of the circumstances.” Id.; Baxter v. State, 389 So. 3d 803, 811–12
(Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (“[T]he smell of cannabis may be a relevant,
but not dispositive, factor to consider under the totality of the cir-
cumstances.”); see also Hatcher v. State, 347 So. 3d 807, 811 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2022) (“[W]e need not resolve whether the smell of mariju-
ana alone remains sufficient to establish probable cause. We must
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25-13972 Opinion of the Court 7
instead consider whether there was probable cause to justify the
search based on the totality of the circumstances.”).
Here, Jones has not shown that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. To start, Jones fails to address the
R&R’s determination—later adopted by the court—that the legal-
ity of the search depended on the standard of reasonable suspicion,
not probable cause, because he was a probationer subject to search
conditions. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
Nor does Jones dispute the finding that the circumstances
provided reasonable suspicion that Jones was engaged in criminal
activity. See Joseph, 189 F.4th at 1320. He therefore has abandoned
any challenge to that independent ground for denying the motion
to suppress. See United States v. Maher, 955 F.3d 880, 885 (11th Cir.
2020) (“To obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based
on multiple, independent grounds, [the defendant] must convince
us that every stated ground for the judgment against him is incor-
rect.”) (quotation marks omitted). “It follows that [Jones’s convic-
tion] is due to be affirmed.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
In any case, Jones cannot show that the officers lacked rea-
sonable suspicion to search the Mazda for contraband. Our prece-
dent has long held that the smell of marijuana can establish proba-
ble cause or reasonable suspicion. See Merricks, 785 F.3d at 560 n.3;
Harden, 104 F.4th at 839. And “the admissibility in federal court of
the products of state searches and seizures is controlled by federal
law,” not state law. United States v. Clay, 355 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th
Cir. 2004).
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-13972
Insofar as state law informs the analysis of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, Jones’s cited cases recognize that the smell of
marijuana remains a valid factor to be considered under the totality
of the circumstances. See Williams, 421 So. 3d at 819; Baxter, 389
So. 3d at 811–12. And the facts here reflect that the officers reason-
ably suspected Jones of criminal activity before the search.
Upon stopping the Mazda driven by Jones, the officers en-
countered not just the odor of marijuana, which conceivably could
be hemp, medical marijuana, or illegal marijuana, but the strong
odor of burnt marijuana, along with “flakes” or “granules” of a
“green leafy” substance on the passenger seat. From these facts,
the officers could “reasonably conclude that [Jones] had been ille-
gally smoking marijuana in his vehicle,” even if he had a medical
marijuana card. Cherfils v. State, 430 So. 3d 953, 956 (Fla. 2d DCA
2025) (finding probable cause based on “burnt marijuana coming
from the vehicle,” despite the driver’s medical marijuana card, be-
cause state law prohibited medical use in a vehicle).
It may have been possible that the substance was hemp, but
officers are not required “to rule out . . . innocent explanation[s]”
for a defendant’s conduct. D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018).
Jones also denied possessing hemp and then resisted the officers’
attempts to remove from him the vehicle. See United States v.
Knight, 562 F.3d 1314, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because there was
probable cause to stop the car [for a traffic infraction], [the officer]
was entitled to ask the driver to step out of the car.”).
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25-13972 Opinion of the Court 9
Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had at
least reasonable suspicion that Jones was engaged in criminal activ-
ity at the time of the search. And because Jones was a probationer
subject to search conditions, reasonable suspicion was enough to
permit the warrantless search of the vehicle he was driving. See
Knights, 534 U.S. at 121. We need not and do not resolve whether
the circumstances also met the higher standard of probable cause.
For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying
Jones’s motion to suppress. We therefore affirm his convictions.
IV.
Jones also argues that his prior Florida conviction for resist-
ing an officer with violence does not qualify as a “violent felony”
under the ACCA.
We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction
qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes. United States v.
Hill, 799 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015). Under the ACCA, a per-
son who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and has at least three previ-
ous convictions for violent felonies committed on different occa-
sions must be imprisoned for not less than fifteen years. See 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
A violent felony is one punishable by a term of imprison-
ment exceeding one year that “has as an element the use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
of another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). To determine if an offense meets
this definition, we use a categorical approach, looking to whether
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the elements of a state offense necessarily involve the use of physi-
cal force. Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 424 (2019).
Jones was convicted of violating § 843.01(1), which makes it
unlawful to resist a law-enforcement officer “by offering or doing
violence.” Fla. Stat. § 843.01(1). We have held that a prior convic-
tion for resisting an officer with violence under § 843.01(1) “cate-
gorically qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause of
the ACCA.” United States v. Hill, 799 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th Cir.
2015); see also United States v. Romo-Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1251
(11th Cir. 2012). That precedent is binding on us as a subsequent
panel, and Jones points to nothing that has abrogated it. See United
States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] prior
panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until
it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su-
preme Court or by this court sitting en banc.”).
For these reasons, the district court properly treated Jones’s
prior conviction for resisting an officer with violence under Fla.
Stat. § 843.01(1) as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA.
AFFIRMED.