Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 1 of 21 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12605 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus LEROY THOMAS JOYNER, JR., Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00242-ECM-JTA-1 ____________________ Before JILL PRYOR, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellant Leroy Joyner, Jr., is serving a 300-month sentence for transporting a minor across state lines with the intent that the minor engage in sexual activity for which any person can be USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 2 of 21 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 charged with a criminal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). On appeal, Joyner, proceeding pro se, challenges his conviction and sentence. After careful consideration, we affirm. I. Joyner operated a youth tennis program. He lived in Ala- bama and regularly traveled with players out of state for training and tournaments. In October 2018, a 15-year-old girl whom Joyner coached re- ported to her mother that he had physically abused her. She told her mother that Joyner had punished her by paddling her with wooden paddles. The mother pulled her daughter from Joyner’s tennis program. A few months later, in January 2019, the victim admitted to her mother that she had engaged in sexual acts with Joyner. The victim’s mother contacted law enforcement. In August 2022, a federal grand jury charged Joyner with transporting a minor across state lines with the intent that the mi- nor engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). 1 The in- 1 Before the proceedings in this case, the government had obtained and then voluntarily dismissed two indictments against Joyner. In October 2020, a fed- eral grand jury indicted him for violating § 2423(a). In June 2021, on the gov- ernment’s motion, the district court voluntarily dismissed that indictment without prejudice. A month later, a federal grand jury returned a second in- dictment charging Joyner with violating § 2423(a). But in January 2022, upon USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 3 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 3 dictment alleged that Joyner had transported the victim from Ala- bama to Georgia intending that she engage in sexual activity for which he could have been charged with the crime of statutory rape. See O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3. Joyner pleaded not guilty. In the district court, he at times proceeded pro se and at other times was represented by counsel. In the section that follows, we discuss Joyner’s pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment, the proceedings at trial, and Joyner’s sen- tencing. A. Before trial, Joyner filed several motions to dismiss the in- dictment on the ground that the government had engaged in mis- conduct. The government had subpoenaed and obtained records from Verizon Wireless, the victim’s cellphone provider. Joyner ar- gued that the Verizon records were exculpatory because they showed that he traveled with the victim across state lines solely for the purpose of playing tennis, not to engage in sexual conduct, and that the victim had been bullied and harassed into making false ac- cusations against him. He asserted that the government had de- stroyed the Verizon records instead of turning them over to him. The government opposed Joyner’s motions, arguing that it had turned over all the documents it received from Verizon. the government’s motion, the district court dismissed the second indictment without prejudice. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 4 of 21 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 A magistrate judge held a three-day evidentiary hearing on Joyner’s motions. At the hearing, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent explained that Verizon had produced documents in response to a subpoena requesting the victim’s cell phone records. She testi- fied that the government had turned over to Joyner’s attorney a digital copy of the records that Verizon produced. At the hearing, the government also provided Joyner with a hard copy of the Ver- izon records. The agent testified that the records Verizon produced did not include the content of the victim’s text messages. She explained that the government would have needed a search warrant, not a subpoena, to obtain this content. She testified that she did not seek a search warrant because she knew that Verizon retained text mes- sage content for only three to five days. Because she was seeking the records in July 2019—many months after the charged sexual abuse ended—she knew that Verizon would no longer have the content of the victim’s text messages from the relevant time. Even after the agent testified, Joyner continued to assert that the government had not provided a complete copy of Verizon’s records. The court gave him an opportunity to subpoena Verizon and gather evidence to support his position. A few weeks later, the court reconvened the evidentiary hearing. Joyner called a Verizon representative as a witness. The witness testified that shortly before the hearing Verizon, for a sec- ond time, had gathered and produced records that were responsive to the government’s original subpoena. The records that Verizon USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 5 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 5 produced the second time matched the records the government had previously turned over to Joyner and his attorney. After the hearing, the magistrate judge issued a thorough re- port and recommendation. She reviewed the evidence introduced at the hearing and determined that Joyner had presented no evi- dence “in support of his claim that the Government destroyed or concealed records.” Doc. 129 at 11–12. 2 Instead, she found that the unrebutted evidence showed that the government had turned over to Joyner all the records that Verizon produced. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny Joyner’s motions to dismiss. Over Joyner’s objection, the district court, upon an in- dependent and de novo review of the record, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied the motions to dismiss. Joyner filed a motion for reconsideration, again asserting that the government had suppressed exculpatory evidence from Verizon. He asked the court to hold another evidentiary hearing on the records he contended were missing and to compel the gov- ernment to produce them. The court denied the motion. After the court denied the motion for reconsideration, Joyner moved to stay the case until he received the supposedly missing Verizon records. The district court denied this motion as well. Joyner filed additional motions requesting that the court continue his trial and hold an evidentiary hearing to address his 2 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 6 of 21 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 claims that the government had withheld evidence. The district court denied these motions. B. Finally, in January 2024, the case went to trial. At trial, Joyner was represented by counsel. The government’s witnesses included the victim and her mother. The victim testified that Joyner was her tennis coach. She described how, on a typical day, she would practice with Joyner for about four hours in the morning, spend three hours eating lunch and completing schoolwork, 3 and practice with him for about five hours in the afternoon. In her testimony, the victim described how Joyner paddled her and other players. For the paddlings, he used a piece of wood approximately two inches thick. She stated that he would paddle players for doing things like holding a racket incorrectly or sneak- ing a snack. She stated that one time Joyner paddled her ten times in a row, and another time he paddled a different player approxi- mately 100 times in a row. The victim also testified about sexual abuse by Joyner. She said that when she was 13, he exposed his penis to her. A few weeks later, he had her take her shorts off, and he performed oral sex on her. After she turned 14, they had sexual intercourse. They some- times trained in Columbus, Georgia and stayed at a home that 3 The victim was home schooled and taught by Joyner’s wife. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 7 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 7 Joyner’s wife owned. The victim testified that while in Columbus, she had sex with Joyner. They also had sex in Louisiana and South Carolina, she said. When she performed poorly at tennis, Joyner told her that she needed to have sex with him to improve her game. The government sought to introduce into evidence video recordings of two forensic interviews of the victim conducted by the Southeast Child Advocacy Center. Joyner’s attorney objected to the admission of the video from the second interview because the government had not provided a “summary or a copy of” it Doc. 281 at 20. The government explained that it had not turned over a copy of the video because it was covered by a protective order. But according to the government, the video had been avail- able to Joyner and his attorneys to view for four years at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and they had never viewed it. The government added that it had turned over a transcript of the interview when it first provided discovery in the case four years ago and had also given Joyner a copy of the transcript when he was proceeding pro se. The court admitted both videos into evidence, and they were shown to the jury. After the jury viewed the videos, Joyner’s attorney recalled the victim to the stand. He noted that she testified on direct exam- ination that she had once stayed with Joyner in Columbus for three-weeks and that the trip was for both “tennis purposes” and “sexual purposes.” Doc. 282 at 73. Joyner’s attorney asked the vic- tim whether, after viewing the video of her second interview, it USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 8 of 21 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 was still her testimony that the trip had been for both purposes. The victim affirmed her testimony. The jury found Joyner guilty of transporting a minor across state lines with intent for the minor to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. C. Before Joyner’s sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR described the offense conduct, detailing the physical and sexual abuse that the victim suffered. This description was largely based on the victim’s statements during the two forensic interviews conducted by the Southeast Child Advocacy Center. The PSR addressed the application of the Sentencing Guide- lines. Because Joyner had been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), the PSR assigned him a base offense level of 28. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2G1.3(a)(3). It then applied several en- hancements: a two-level increase because the victim was in Joyner’s custody, care, or supervisory control; a two-level increase because he unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited con- duct; and a two-level increase because the offense involved the commission of a sex act or sexual contact. See id. § 2G1.3(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(4)(A). In addition, the PSR applied a two-level enhancement be- cause Joyner had obstructed justice. See id. § 3C1.1. The PSR stated that Joyner had engaged in obstruction when he repeatedly ac- cused the government of destroying or withholding the victim’s USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 9 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 9 cell phone records from Verizon. It reported that the magistrate judge had held an evidentiary hearing and found that Joyner had received a copy of the Verizon records. Even after this ruling, Joyner continued to submit filings accusing the prosecution of en- gaging in misconduct and destroying evidence. The PSR found that this conduct delayed the prompt resolution of the case. The PSR reported that Joyner’s total offense level was 36 and he was in criminal history category I. It calculated his guidelines range as 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. He faced a manda- tory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum sen- tence of life. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Before the sentencing hearing, Joyner objected to the PSR. He challenged each enhancement. In his objections, he argued that his relationship with the victim was limited to serving as her tennis coach. He accused the victim of fabricating the story of abuse and stated that there was no evidence to corroborate her accusations. He further argued that an enhancement for engaging in a sexual act should not apply because the commission of a sexual act was not an element of his offense. And he argued that the obstruction enhancement should not apply because he was denied access to the Verizon records as well as materials related to the victim’s second forensic interview. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 10 of 21 10 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 At the sentencing hearing, Joyner proceeded pro se. 4 The court reviewed each of Joyner’s objections to the PSR and over- ruled all of them. First, the court ruled that the two-level enhancement under § 2G1.3(b)(1) applied. It found that the government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Joyner acted as a caretaker for the victim when she traveled to tennis tournaments. Second, it determined that a two-level enhancement under § 2G1.3(b)(2) applied because Joyner unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. Because there was more than a ten-year age gap between Joyner and the victim, the court pre- sumed that the enhancement applied and concluded that Joyner had not rebutted this presumption. The court also concluded that Joyner’s telling the victim that having sex with him would improve her tennis game and paddling her with a wooden board established that he had unduly influenced her to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. Third, the court concluded that a two-level enhancement under § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) applied because Joyner’s conduct involved the commission of a sex act or sexual contact. The court deter- mined that the videos of the forensic interviews and the victim’s testimony at trial established that Joyner had committed a sex act with the victim. 4 Standby counsel attended the hearing. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 11 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 11 Fourth, the court determined that a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice applied. It found that Joyner had “repeatedly litigated baseless motions with this Court based on false and misleading evidence that the government, alone or in conjunction with Verizon Wireless, destroyed evidence favor- able to” him. Doc. 283 at 20. And it found that he “repeatedly made representations about the content of documents that were not ac- curate” and “even after multiple hearings, [he] filed multiple mo- tions to reconsider.” Id. The court found that his “baseless mo- tions” delayed the case and that the obstruction enhancement was “fully supported by the record.” Id. After overruling Joyner’s objections, the court calculated his guidelines range as 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. The gov- ernment requested an upward variance. It argued that a sentence above 235 months was appropriate because Joyner had used his po- sition as a trusted tennis coach to take advantage of a vulnerable child. Joyner opposed the government’s request. The victim’s mother addressed the court. She said that Joyner “deserve[d] to rot in prison [for] the rest of [his] life” for what he had done to her daughter. Id. at 35. She asked the court to consider the lasting effects that the abuse would have on her daughter. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 12 of 21 12 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 The court imposed a sentence of 300 months. It stated that it had considered the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 5 in- cluding: the nature and circumstances of the offense, Joyner’s his- tory and characteristics, the seriousness of the offense, the need to promote respect for the law, the need to provide just punishment for the offense, the need to afford adequate deterrence, the need to protect the public from further crimes, and the need to avoid un- warranted sentencing disparities. The court found that Joyner’s criminal conduct was “egregious” and involved taking advantage of a “vulnerable young girl” by sexually and physically abusing her. Id. at 37. It also found that he had not taken responsibility for his actions but instead blamed others, including the victim. The court again noted that he had filed baseless motions accusing the govern- ment and Verizon of destroying evidence and found that he had “delayed these proceedings unnecessarily and unreasonably . . . in- terfered with the administration of justice.” Id. at 38. The court 5 Under § 3553(a), a district court is required to impose a sentence that is “suf- ficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include the need to: reflect the seriousness of the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just punish- ment; deter criminal conduct; protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct; and effectively provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. Id. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing dis- parities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 13 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 13 concluded by observing that even if it had sustained Joyner’s objec- tions, it still would have varied upward and imposed a 300-month sentence. The court also sentenced Joyner to a lifetime term of su- pervised release and ordered him to pay the victim $150,000 in res- titution. This is Joyner’s appeal. He is proceeding pro se on appeal. II. We review de novo whether the government violated a de- fendant’s constitutional rights by failing to turn over exculpatory evidence or knowingly using perjured testimony at trial. See United States v. Brester, 786 F.3d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1208 n.79 (11th Cir. 2010). We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We liberally construe briefs filed by pro se litigants. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). III. On appeal, Joyner challenges his conviction, arguing that his due process rights were violated when (1) the government with- held exculpatory evidence, (2) the prosecutor presented false testi- mony from the victim at trial, and (3) he received ineffective assis- tance of counsel during pretrial proceedings and at trial. In addi- tion, he challenges his sentence as unreasonable. We address each issue in turn. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 14 of 21 14 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 A. In a criminal proceeding, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the government to turn over evidence that is favorable to the accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The government must turn over both impeachment and exculpa- tory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show: (1) the govern- ment possessed evidence that was favorable to him; (2) he did not possess the evidence and could not obtain it with any reasonable diligence; (3) the government suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) there is a reasonable probability that if the evidence had been disclosed, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. United States v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135, 1145–46 (11th Cir. 2017). Joyner argues that the government committed Brady viola- tions when it failed to turn over (1) records from Verizon for the victim’s cell phone and (2) evidence related to the victim’s second forensic interview. These challenges fail because Joyner has not shown that the government suppressed any evidence. Instead, the record shows that before trial the government turned over all the Verizon records it received. The record also shows that before trial the government turned over the transcript of the victim’s second forensic interview. It is true that the government did not send Joyner a copy of the recording of the interview. But that was be- cause the video was covered by a protective order, and it was avail- USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 15 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 15 able for Joyner or his attorneys to watch at the U.S. Attorney’s Of- fice. Because there is no evidence that the government suppressed evidence, there was no Brady violation. B. A defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prose- cutor knowingly introduces perjured testimony at trial. See Na- pue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 268–69 (1959). To establish a constitu- tional violation, a defendant must show that “(1) the contested statements were actually false, (2) the statements were material, and (3) the prosecution knew that they were false.” United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1395 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation modified). We liberally construe Joyner’s appellate brief as arguing that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and violated his due process rights by presenting trial testimony from the victim that Joyner sex- ually abused her during a three-week period when she stayed with him in Columbus. In Joyner’s view, the prosecutor had to know that this statement was false because in the second forensic inter- view the victim denied that any sexual abuse occurred during this trip. Even assuming the victim’s trial testimony conflicted with a statement she made during an earlier forensic interview, 6 there is 6 We emphasize that we assume, but do not decide, that Joyner is correct that the victim denied in the second forensic interview that sexual abuse occurred during the three-week period when she and Joyner stayed in Columbus. But we note that victim also said during this interview that Joyner had sexually abused her on at least one trip to Columbus. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 16 of 21 16 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 no indication that the prosecutor knew that the victim’s trial testi- mony was false. At most, Joyner has shown that the prosecutor knew or should have known that the victim’s trial testimony con- flicted with one of her earlier statements. But the existence of con- flicting testimony, without more, does not establish that the pros- ecutor committed misconduct or that a due process violation oc- curred. See McNair, 605 F.3d at 1208 (recognizing that “a prior state- ment that is merely inconsistent with a government witness’s tes- timony” does not establish prosecutorial misconduct or a due pro- cess violation). C. Joyner also argues that his right to due process was violated because he received ineffective assistance of counsel before and during trial. He asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in a number of ways including by: (1) failing to raise issues before and during trial about the Verizon records and the materials related to the victim’s second forensic interview, (2) failing to introduce at trial evidence of exculpatory statements that the victim made dur- ing a state court proceeding when she sought a protective order against him, and (3) failing to challenge the indictment after the government’s two earlier indictments were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. “The preferred means for deciding a claim of ineffective as- sistance of counsel is through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion even if the record contains some indication of deficiencies in counsel’s perfor- mance.” United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (11th Cir. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 17 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 17 2010) (citation modified). Accordingly, we decline to consider Joyner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this direct appeal. See id. He must raise it in a § 2255 motion. D. The final issue Joyner raises on appeal is that his sentence was unreasonable. Reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence is a two-step process. “We look first at whether the district court com- mitted any significant procedural error and then at whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under the totality of the cir- cumstances.” United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). “The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) fac- tors.” Id. We begin with Joyner’s challenge to the procedural reason- ableness of his sentence. In our review, we must “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation modi- fied). Examples of such errors include: “failing to calculate (or im- properly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any de- viation from the Guidelines range.” Id. (citation modified). We liberally construe Joyner’s appellate brief as arguing that the district court committed a procedural error by failing to ade- USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 18 of 21 18 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 quately explain its decision to impose a sentence outside the appli- cable guidelines range. When a court imposes a sentence outside the guidelines range, it must “state the specific reasons for the var- iance.” United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). Its “reason must be sufficiently compel- ling to support the degree of the variance, and it must be specific enough to allow for meaningful appellate review.” Id. (citation modified). A “major variance . . . require[s] a more significant jus- tification than a minor one.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We conclude that the district court adequately explained its decision to impose an upward variance. It gave a detailed explana- tion for that decision, discussing the applicable § 3553(a) factors and emphasizing the seriousness of Joyner’s repeated sexual abuse of a vulnerable victim. Joyner also argues that his sentence is procedurally unrea- sonable because he was “denied an opportunity to object to the PSR” before he was sentenced. Appellant’s Br. 12. Not so. The rec- ord shows that he submitted written objections to the PSR and had an opportunity to argue those objections at the sentencing hear- ing.7 7 Joyner also complains that the attorney who represented him at trial filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing without his consent. He says that it was improper for the attorney to file the motion because he wanted to pro- ceed pro se at that point. We see no error. After Joyner announced that he wanted to represent himself at sentencing, the court held a hearing and then USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 19 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 19 Joyner also challenges his sentence as procedurally unrea- sonable because the district court applied a two-level enhancement for conduct involving the commission of a sex act or sexual contact. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A). He says that the court erred in apply- ing this enhancement because the statute he was convicted of vio- lating, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), does not have as an element of the of- fense that the defendant had sexual contact with the victim. He also argues that the district court erred in requiring the government to prove only by a preponderance of the evidence that his conduct included sexual contact with the victim. Even though the government was not required to prove that Joyner engaged in sexual contact with the victim to establish that he violated § 2423(a), the court could consider at sentencing whether he had, in fact, engaged in sexual contact with the victim. When deciding whether an adjustment or enhancement applies under Chapters Two and Three of the Sentencing Guidelines, a dis- trict court may consider the defendant’s relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). And we have recognized that relevant conduct includes “uncharged . . . conduct that is proven at sentenc- ing by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Gyetvay, 149 F.4th 1213, 1239 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). We thus see no error in the district court’s application of an enhancement allowed him to proceed pro se. And while proceeding pro se, Joyner agreed to the postponement of his sentencing hearing. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 20 of 21 20 Opinion of the Court 24-12605 under § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) because the court found by a preponder- ance of the evidence that Joyner engaged in a sexual act with the victim.8 Joyner further argues that the district court procedurally erred at the sentencing hearing because it relied upon statements the victim made in the recorded forensic interviews without giving him an opportunity to cross-examine her at that hearing. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Under the Confrontation Clause, the government generally cannot rely on “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial” unless “the declarant is unavailable” and the “defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine” the declarant. Crawford v. Washing- ton, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). But our precedent recognizes that in non-capital cases, a defendant’s right to confrontation does not ex- tend to sentencing proceedings. See United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005). We thus reject Joyner’s chal- lenge that the district court committed a procedural error at sen- tencing by relying on the victim’s out-of-court statements from the forensic interviews without affording him another opportunity to cross-examine her. 8 Joyner also argues that the district court improperly referred “the fact finding portion” of the sentencing to the magistrate judge. Appellant’s Br. 12. But the record from the sentencing hearing shows that the district court conducted the sentencing hearing and made all required findings of fact. USCA11 Case: 24-12605 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 11/04/2026 Page: 21 of 21 24-12605 Opinion of the Court 21 We now turn to whether Joyner’s 300-month sentence was substantively reasonable. We will vacate a sentence as substan- tively unreasonable “only if[] we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judg- ment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (citation modified). Importantly, “the weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016). In addition, “a sentence im- posed well below the statutory maximum penalty indicates reason- ableness.” United States v. Woodson, 30 F.4th 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). After considering the record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed an error of judgment when it weighed the § 3553(a) factors and imposed a 300- month sentence. Although the lengthy sentence involved an up- ward variance, it was still below the applicable statutory maximum of life imprisonment. See id. The district court did not abuse its dis- cretion in imposing a 300-month sentence given the seriousness of Joyner’s repeated sexual and physical abuse of a vulnerable minor whom he was coaching and the fact that he had taken no responsi- bility for his actions. We thus conclude that the sentence was sub- stantively reasonable. AFFIRMED.